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‘Stokers-the lowest of the low?' 
A Social History of Royal Navy Stokers 1850–1950 
 
The introduction of steam propulsion during the early nineteenth century 
presented the Royal Navy with two interlinked challenges. In the first, steam 
propulsion had to overcome the sceptics and the challenges of technical 
development until it proved a reliable and superior alternative to sail. The 
second was a challenge to the social infrastructure of the Navy which struggled 
to integrate increasingly large numbers of engine room personnel into a 
traditional close knit naval hierarchy dominated by seamen. The engineers’ 
struggle for commissioned status and equality with the executive branch is well 
documented, as is the history of the engine room artificers’ branch. By 
comparison, where naval and historical custom has promoted and celebrated 
the ideal of the Royal Naval ‘bluejacket’ or seaman, its stokers have become 
subjects of censure while their story has been largely ignored and corrupted by 
prejudice and myths.  
 
Tradition dictates that stokers are portrayed as coarse, uneducated men 
with a reputation for being trouble makers. As a result, they were judged to have 
the worst discipline record on the lower-deck. Because of the physical nature of 
their work and the filth and detritus from the coal they worked with they were 
also commonly believed to originate from the lowest classes of contemporary 
society. Yet without stokers no ship could leave harbour let alone engage the 
enemy. Every item of machinery and equipment onboard a ship relied on the 
steam produced by stokers. But far from being seen as equals or given any 
credit for their endeavours in the miniature hell of the stokehole, stokers 
became social outcasts. No other branch of men in the Navy has been 
subjected to such longstanding and deep seated censure. The negative 
stereotypes which surround stokers continue to perpetuate a disservice to a 
much overlooked and maligned branch of men. In order to determine the 
reasons why stokers attracted such negative sympathies this thesis will 
separate the facts from the myths and offer a new perspective on the men 
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Introduction: Stokers in History 
 
The Comet, launched in 1822 was the first steam ship ordered for the 
Royal Navy although the Monkey, which was purchased from William Evans her 
builders at Rotherhithe, entered naval service a year earlier.1  From this modest 
beginning the first steam ship to appear in the Navy List was HMS Lightning in 
1823 (later re-named Royal Sovereign) she was powered by a Maudslay engine 
and was followed in 1829 by the first steam fighting ship HMS Dee, which had a 
200 horse power engine reputed to be the largest marine engine of its kind.2  
Thereafter, it would take another seventy-seven years of continual technical 
development before the Royal Navy laid down the world’s first steam turbine 
battleship Dreadnought which was commissioned in 19063.   
 
The drive to develop steam technology during the mid-nineteenth century 
prompted D. K. Brown to suggest that 1860 marked the ‘high-water mark’ of 
British industrial supremacy.4 By this mid way point in the technical 
development of steam propulsion, it could be argued that the Royal Navy had 
made the transition from an all sail to an all ‘steam Navy.’ By 1865 there was 
only one ‘ship of the line’ without auxiliary steam propulsion, the remaining fifty- 
five ships all being classed as ‘steam,’ (See Appendix 1). Out of forty-six 
frigates, thirty-seven were equipped with steam machinery and only nine 
retained full sailing rigs.5   
 
In total, the Navy could muster a total of 445 steam vessels against a 
mere sixty-nine sail, a figure artificially enhanced by the inclusion of fifty-four 
minor mortar vessels and floats. Nevertheless, while on paper at least, the Navy 
                                            
 
1 Geoffrey Penn, Up Funnel, Down Screw: The Story of the Naval Engineer (London, Hollis and 
Carter, 1955),13. 
2 P.M. Rippon, The Evolution of Engineering in the Royal Navy, 2: vol. 1 (Tunbridge Wells: 
Spellmount, 1988), 21.  
3 D.K. Brown, Warrior to Dreadnought; Warship Development 1860-1905,(London, Chatham, 
1997), 9. 
4 Ibid. 
5 'Return of Number of Steam-Ships Afloat, Building and Converting, with Number of Effective 
Sailing Ships: February 1865,' ed. Admiralty (House of Commons, 51, 1865). 
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appeared to have made the transition from sail to steam, it is true to say that 
steam propulsion, together with hull design and armaments, were still in the 
evolutionary stage. Furthermore, despite the commissioning of the Royal Navy’s 
first mastless turret ship Devastation in 1873, ships continued to be built and 
equipped with full or partial sailing rigs until the very end of the nineteenth 
century.   
 
In 1872 the committee on designs for ships of war argued, ‘the 
possession of full rigged ships with good sailing qualities is a necessity in our 
fleet among the vessels specially designed for distant foreign service.’6 Edgar 
Smith called this period the ‘great sailing era,’ after the all steam fitted Particular 
Service Squadron conducted a world cruise entirely under sail in order to train 
officers and men in seamanship, thereby highlighting the continued reliance of 
sailing rigs for long passages.7  
 
The long period of transition from sail to steam has been well covered 
elsewhere. However, the problems caused by the introduction of large numbers 
of engine room personnel into a traditional close knit social hierarchy dominated 
by seaman has been largely overlooked. The extent of this upheaval is 
described by Basil Greenhill and Anne Giffard in Steam, Politics and Patronage 
where they argue that engineers were ‘interlopers who threatened the vested 
interests of the ships’ establishment.’8  The perceived threat posed by the 
introduction of engineers was thought to be the ability of engineers to be able to 
perform the ‘most important function onboard a ship’; that of making her get 
under way, without the need for sails or rigging.9   
 
Brian Lavery makes the point in his excellent three part history of the 
lower-deck that the ordinary sailor of the Royal Navy has not had his share of 
                                            
6 George. Elliot and A. P. Ryder, "Report by Admiral G. Elliot and Rear-Admiral A. P. Ryder, 
Members of Committee on Designs for Ships-of-War, Dissenting from Report of Committee," ed. 
Admiralty (House of Commons, C. 489, 1872). 
7 Edgar C Smith, A Short History of Naval and Marine Engineering (Cambridge: University 
Press, 1937), 162. 
8 Basil Greenhill and Ann Giffard, Steam, Politics and Patronage: The Transformation of the 
Royal Navy 1815-54 (London, Conway Maritime, 1994), 84. 
9   Ibid. 
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attention from historians over the years.10  Moreover, he argues that social 
historians have devoted far more attention to the working class ashore than the 
common seaman afloat, unless of course they had a particular interest in mutiny, 
ill-discipline or recruitment.11  Interestingly, Lavery has identified the dichotomy 
whereby there have been important works covering the early history of the 
lower-deck, particularly from historians such as Nicholas Rodger in the period 
before 1815, but apart from one or two notable exceptions there has been 
precious recent work with regards to the first half of the twentieth century. This 
leads Lavery to describe the period from 1850 to the present as a ‘clean sheet’ 
so far as the historian is concerned.12   
 
Within the little that has been written about the lower-deck it is clear that 
the seaman or ‘bluejacket’ has received far more attention than the naval 
engineering branch in general, or the stokers’ branch in particular. With regards 
to the history of the engineering branch, most of the published work has been 
written by naval engineers themselves. However, as one might expect, 
engineers are more concerned with the ‘technical’ applications of marine 
engineering rather than the social history of the engine room personnel who 
operated it. Moreover, when they deemed it necessary to address aspects of 
their ‘social history’, the main emphasis has been placed upon the emergence 
of naval engineers and their challenge to gain social acceptance and equal 
service status in a Navy dominated by seamen.  
 
In similar fashion, lower-deck engine room artificers were forced to fight 
their own battle, although for them the ultimate goal was not just to gain 
acceptance, but to successfully establish themselves as a ‘special’ and superior 
breed apart from the rest of the men of the lower-deck. Different and distinct 
from the artificers, the largest body of men within the engine room branch were 
its stokers. Yet despite their numerical strength second only to the seaman 
branch, stokers did not challenge the status quo. Instead, and somewhat 
grudgingly, stokers appeared to have accepted the position allotted them and 
                                            






suffered as a result of being placed on the very bottom rung of the naval 
hierarchical ladder.   
 
 So why is a social history of the Stokers’ branch needed?  A social 
history approach to the subject is necessary in order to explore a very under 
documented history of the second largest branch of the modern naval lower-
deck. Contemporary and modern literature either completely ignores the 
contribution of the naval stoker to the service or singles him out for censure. 
Stokers are traditionally portrayed in a negative stereotype often criticised for 
their lack of discipline, poor education and ignorance of traditional service 
discipline and values. By contrast, history celebrates the virtues of the seaman 
rating, the naval bluejacket, highlighting his discipline, steadfastness in action, 
loyalty and traditions. While the common seaman has received much attention 
from historians, there has been no equal study of the naval stoker or any 
attempt to analyse the reason why he should be so negatively stereotyped. 
Despite their undoubted contribution to the efficiency and operational 
effectiveness of the Navy, history and popular memory have ignored or 
marginalised stokers to the extent that having been placed firmly on the bottom 
rung of the naval social hierarchical ladder they are regarded as the ‘lowest of 
the low.’   
 
The historiography of Royal Navy Stokers 
 
The social history of the naval engineers’ struggle for wardroom status, 
acceptance and integration into the Navy and the consequent emergence of the 
E.R.A. have been fully examined in Up Funnel Down Screw by Geoffrey Penn.13  
This short, concise history mentions stokers, but gives only the briefest outline 
of changes to their service conditions and ignores any reference to their social 
position or standing in the Navy. Similarly, Edgar Smith’s Short History of 
Marine Engineering, which despite its title is a more comprehensive and 
detailed account than that given by Penn, gives even less information on 
                                            
13 G. Penn, Up Funnel Down Screw, 95-110.   
13 
 
stokers. It even adds insult to injury by observing that stokers ‘liked to suit their 
own convenience’ when stoking.14   
This derogatory view is repeated in Denis Griffiths Steam at Sea, where 
Griffiths managed to ignore the naval stoker entirely while condemning the 
fireman, the Merchant Service equivalent, as a ‘recalcitrant drunkard.’15 In 
taking this harsh line Griffiths unsympathetically ignored the courage of the 
firemen and stokers who gave their lives during the two World Wars of the 
twentieth century. Those who knew the perils firemen and stokers faced even in 
peace time service were more supportive. The following contemporary 
observation of the final moments of RMS Titanic points to the harsh reality and 
courage of the men who toiled below:    
It is stated that the lights were burning until a few minutes before the ship took 
her final plunge. This proves that the officers and men below remained at their 
posts when they must have known that death – the most terrible and painful that 
it is possible to conceive – awaited them at any minute, wither by the bursting of 
the steam-pipe or water rising in a compartment. It is certain that those working 
below must have known the awful danger the ship was in long before anybody 
else, but they remained at their posts, resolving to die sooner than come on 
deck and create a panic or attempt to save themselves.16  
In a review of the first century of naval engineering, Engineer Vice-
Admiral Sir John Kincome praised the contribution of engineering officers and 
E.R.As over the preceding century. However, he completely ignored stokers or 
their tradesmen counterparts, naval mechanicians.17  At least P.M. Rippon, 
another former engineer, acknowledged the existence of stokers although 
Rippon succumbed to tradition by implying that the nineteenth century Navy 
recruited stokers from ‘the merchant service, colliers, fishing smacks and the 
gaols and highways.’18   
 
                                            
14 Edgar, C, Smith, A Short History of Naval and Marine Engineering, 137. 
15 Denis Griffiths, Steam at Sea: Two Centuries of Steam-Powered Ships (London, Conway 
Maritime, 1997), 133.  
16 Lord Charles Beresford Tribute to the Black Squad (Lloyds Weekly News, 1912 [cited 28 May 
2012]); cited in http://www.encyclopedia-titanica.org/black-gang-tribute.html. 
17 John Kingcome, 'A Century of Naval Engineering,' Journal of Naval Engineering 43, no. 2 
(2007). 
18 P. M. Rippon, The Evolution of Engineering in the Royal Navy, 42. 
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B. W. Beresford repeated the same claim in a journal article and may 
well have taken it directly from Rippon.19 However, while neither author 
referenced their source, the quote is clearly part of a phrase used by A. P. 
Eardley-Wilmot in his 1849 treatise Manning the Navy.20 In making a case for 
the introduction of a continuous service system to replace the then current 
system of recruiting men for an individual ship’s commission, Eardley-Wilmot 
observed that the Navy of his day was dependent on: 
 
The Merchant Service, colliers, fishing smacks and the gaols and highways to 
make their vicious contribution to the motley company of our crews corrupting 
by their presence and example those who might otherwise be accessible to 
mental improvement and moral reformation.21  
 
Eardley-Wilmot used this disparaging phrase to highlight the fact that the 
Navy had become reliant upon the recruitment of low-calibre seamen from 
wherever they could be found. As a seaman officer, Eardley-Wilmot had no 
interest in the recruitment of stokers, a fact made obvious by his complete lack 
of reference to them in his treatise. And why would Eardley-Wilmot have shown 
any interest in the recruitment of stokers? Fifteen years after his treatise on 
naval manning was published there were only 4,086 stokers serving, compared 
to 53,000 seamen; thereby making the accusation even more unlikely.22  Yet, 
despite this fact both Rippon and Beresford took Eardley-Wilmot’s phrase from 
its context and re-presented it in order to suggest that it was directed solely at 
the recruitment of stokers, which is clearly not the case. This poor use of a 
historical source is a prime example of how the negative image of stokers has 
been perpetuated and reinforced in the popular memory without just cause.  
 
Peter Kemp’s The British Sailor followed the path of the seaman from 
Tudor times to the Fisher reforms of 1904 and is another example of where the 
tradition of portraying stokers in a poor light is continued. Having entirely 
ignored the contribution of the stoker in his history of the lower-deck, Kemp 
                                            
19 B. W. Beresford, ‘Stoker Royal Navy the Lowest of The Low’, Sea Breezes, 67, no. 575 
(1993), 889. 
20 A. P. Eardley-Wilmot, Manning the Navy, (London, 1849). 
21 Ibid, ix. 
22 "Diagram Showing the Number of Ships in Commission and Engine Room Ratings, Seamen 
and Marines Voted for Each Year from 1793-1903," (London, Admiralty, 1904). 
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contemptuously dismissed stokers by suggesting that they were seen as a 
‘distinctly lower order of life’, by the officers and the seamen of the fleet.23  
 
In similar vein, Christopher Lloyd’s The Nation and the Navy takes up 
from where Kemp left off and continued the social history of the Navy up to the 
First World War, although again, Lloyd managed to leave out any reference to 
stokers and their contribution to the evolution of the Navy. In an earlier history, 
Michael Lewis The Navy in Transition: A Social History 1814-1864 also ignored 
the social position of stokers despite the fact that by the 1860s stokers were 
serving in every ship in the Navy; albeit in small numbers because sail was still 
the principal means of propulsion, steam being reserved for entering or leaving 
harbour.24  
 
Refreshingly, Brian Lavery in Able Seamen: The Lower-deck of the Royal 
Navy 1850-1939, dispenses with tradition and correctly argues that stokers 
were few in number during the mid-nineteenth century but highly regarded and 
well paid.25  Moreover, he shows that before the emergence of the E.R.A. the 
Chief Stoker was a ‘skilled man’ able to manage an engine by himself and take 
the place of the junior engineer.26 Lavery’s social history of the lower-deck 
sympathetically addresses the rise of the stokers’ branch in two important areas. 
Firstly, Lavery includes stokers in each chapter giving them equality with other 
ratings, while highlighting their importance to the development of the steam 
Navy. Secondly, and more importantly, Lavery breaks new ground by 
dispensing with the negative stereotype so often applied to stokers by historians.      
 
But what do contemporary writers about life on the lower-deck have to 
say about stokers? Many of them were naval officers such as Captain Taprell 
Dorling [Taffrail]. Dorling was a prolific commentator of lower-deck life which he 
portrayed in a series of novels and sketches with titles such as Pincher Martin 
OD, Shipmates and Endless Story. Dorling freely admitted that he gave ‘fictional 
                                            
23 Peter. Kemp, The British Sailor: A Social History of the Lower Deck (London, Dent, 1970), 
198. 
24 Michael Lewis, The Navy in Transition: A Social History 1814-1864 (London, Hodder and 
Stoughton, 1965).  
25 B. Lavery, Able Seamen: The Lower Deck of the Royal Navy 1850-1939, 37. 
26 Ibid, 73-4. 
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colouring’ to his subjects and portrayed sailors how people might have imagined 
them to be, rather than as they really were.27 Another commentator on lower-
deck life was Paymaster Lewis Ansalem da Costa Ricci, [Bartimeus]. Like 
Dorling he was born in the nineteenth century towards the end of Victoria’s 
reign when class distinction firmly isolated officers’ from their men. The fictional 
sailor characters in the stories of these two authors were stereotyped as simple 
folk who, despite the harsh discipline, extreme punishments, poor food and 
conditions of service were nonetheless contented with their lot and seemingly 
devoted to their officers. In reality, the social gulf between the two classes of 
men was so wide the average officer would have taken little interest in the 
lower-deck and even less in the private lives of the men who occupied it.  
 
The most valuable accounts of lower-deck life are those written or 
recorded by the men who experienced it at first hand. However, Christopher 
McKee in Sober Men and True points out that the average lower-deck 
autobiography tends to conform to what sailors perceived to be the demands of 
the ‘naval-memoir genre,’ whereby they concentrate on irrelevant matter such 
as accounts of pranks and misadventures ashore, rather than on the important 
facts such as lower-deck deprivations, illnesses and the occasional terror.28   
 
The autobiography Aye Aye Sir, written under the pseudonym ‘Clinker 
Knocker,’ is a classic example of this form of naval-memoir genre. The name 
‘Clinker Knocker’ was attributed to stokers by seamen during the age of coal 
firing when stokers used a nine foot iron bar called a slice to ‘knock’ the burnt 
clinker off the fire bars when cleaning the fire.29 This so called autobiography is 
clearly a fictional account written to conform to how a stoker was expected to 
behave, rather than any attempt to present an accurate picture of the 
challenges faced by stokers on the lower-deck. The reader is subjected to an 
endless account of drunkenness, fighting, and ill-discipline and led to believe 
that it typified the average stoker. Rather than celebrate the lives of stokers, this 
                                            
27 Taprell Dorling, [Taffrail], Endless Story (London, Hodder & Stoughton, 1931), Preface. 
28 Christopher McKee, Sober Men and True: Sailor Lives in the Royal Navy 1900-1945 (London, 
Harvard University, 2002), 8. 
29 Clinker Knocker, Aye Aye Sir (London, Rich and Cowan, 1938), 46. 
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story could only have further tarnished their reputation and confirmed the worst 
fears of those who already held them in low esteem.  
 
There is a strong possibility the autobiography was actually written by 
someone purporting to be from the lower-deck. Why else would a man of such a 
modest lower-deck background need to adopt a pseudonym?  Moreover, why 
would an Admiral who admitted that he had not met or even served with the 
author wish to contribute to a foreword, particularly as the book brought the 
service into disrepute? The author may well have been Dorling [Taffrail] as 
Clinker Knocker invites the reader to learn more about the sinking of the 
Narborough and Opal after the Battle of Jutland by referring to Endless Story.30   
 
By contrast, Clear Lower-deck and A Stoker’s Log are far more 
believable and accurate autobiographies. Unlike Clinker Knocker, these 
accounts only occasionally lapse into the naval-memoir genre. Instead, the two 
former stokers concentrate on the more important social detail of life on the 
lower-deck. In A Stoker’s Log Henry Vincent outlined his reasons for writing his 
memoir by stating that he wished to bring to public notice the numerically large 
but little known species of lower-deck ratings, known as ‘the black gang.’ For, 
he admits, the naval stoker was quite unknown to the public other than as an 
‘object of derision.’31    
 
In the 1920s Vincent was well aware that stokers were misrepresented or 
ignored in history and literature. As a result, he strongly criticised the writers of 
naval social history who claimed to know the lower-deck but who then failed to 
give stokers ‘their rightful place in history.’32 Vincent acknowledged that stokers 
suffered from being negatively stereotyped but claimed the stoker was not the 
‘abandoned reprobate that popular view too often made him out to be.’ However, 
Vincent unwittingly added to the stereotype by admitting with honest candour 
that stokers were looked upon as ‘a lower order of seafarers, having all the 
vices of the common seaman, but none of their virtues.’33  
                                            
30 Tapprell Dorling, Endless Story 186. 
31 Henry Vincent, A Stoker's Log (London, Jarrolds, 1929). 7. 
32 Ibid.     
33 Henry Vincent, A Stoker's Log, 7. 
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In Clear Lower Deck, Sidney Knock argued that stokers were subjected 
to prejudice from both civilian and naval authorities alike.34 Knock observed that 
‘departmental antagonism’ between seamen and stokers often led to stokers 
being picked out and targeted by seamen because of the dirt and residual mess 
which was an unfortunate by-product of their work. Nonetheless, Knock was 
prepared to admit that seamen often had good grounds to complain against 
stokers, who he claimed often showed a distinct lack of consideration in the 
matter of upper deck ‘ship cleaning.’35 While avoiding the trap of the naval 
memoir-genre, Knock took great pains to refute accusations that sailors were a 
‘drunken crowd’; instead he promoted the sailor (and stoker) as a ‘family man.’36  
 
In From Jack Tar to Union Jack, Mary Conley observed that at the close 
of the nineteenth century the reputation and popularity of naval men was 
intimately connected to the growing presence and stature of the Royal Navy. In 
addition, their popularity was such that sailors came to be represented as 
defenders not only of British interests abroad, but also of 'Britishness.'37 This 
was the age of the popular 'cult of navalism,' which was avidly followed by the 
popular press and writers of the day and promoted by organisations such as the 
British Navy League and the Imperial Maritime League.38 Moreover, Conley 
suggested that by distancing themselves from their rough forerunners, naval 
writers of the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries constructed the sailors 
manhood in relation to their moral stature, professional advancement and their 
familial responsibilities.39 Nonetheless, despite the popularity of naval men at 
the beginning of the twentieth century and Mary Conley's suggestion that their 
popularity had allowed them to shake off the 'Jolly Jack Tar' image, three 
decades later, Sidney Knock still found himself having to defend the sailors' 
image, giving rise to the suggestion that some negative attitudes towards sailors 
remained.  
 
                                            
34 Sidney  Knock, Clear Lower Deck, 2nd ed. (London, Philip Allan, 1932). 52. 
35 Ibid, 54. 
36 Ibid. 194. 
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Unusually, Knock’s memoirs were reviewed by a naval officer in the 
service journal, The Naval Review, which for the most part supported Knock’s 
description of a stoker’s life on the mess deck. However, the reviewer took 
exception to Knock’s failure to give naval officers more prominence in his story 
claiming that they had been ‘practically ignored.’40  Knock’s failure to dwell on 
the role of naval officers is unsurprising as he set out to describe conditions on 
the lower-deck as seen through the eyes of a stoker and, while a chapter on the 
relationships between officers and men would have been useful to historians, it 
was obviously not essential to Knock. Moreover, Knock may well have had 
good reason to exclude officers from his description of lower-deck life as the 
following statement from the reviewer of his book reveals a patronising attitude 
towards the maturity and intelligence of seamen: 
 
Till recent years the crowd mentality of sailors was that of children, to-day it has 
reached the adolescent stage. By common consent that is the hardest stage of 
all because the adolescent’s outlook is warped by a sense of his own self-
sufficiency. He is in revolt against authority resenting any attempt to guide his 
footsteps and denying any suggestion that he may need help.41 
 
The attitude displayed above also suggests that while the sailor's image 
may have improved in the public domain, there were still officers in the naval 
service who looked down on the men as uneducated children that required 
close 'parental control.' Knock's critic also made the weak accusation that by 
publishing his book the year following the infamous 1931 Invergordon mutiny, 
Knock harboured an ulterior ‘propagandist motive, being out to cause 
mischief.’42   
 
Yet, lower-deck autobiographies were unlikely to challenge, influence or 
change lower-deck conditions. The Naval Discipline Act prevented serving men 
from collectively making complaints or representations regarding their 
conditions of service. Therefore, in order to challenge the status quo the men 
needed a champion, someone who knew at first hand the conditions of the 
lower-deck and who had the influence to effect change. Such a man was the 
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former Petty Officer and Coastguard man Lionel Yexley who was previously 
known as James Woods.After retiring from the Navy, Yexley joined the 
Coastguard Service and after retiring for the second time he became an author 
of lower-deck journals and an active campaigner for improvements to lower-
deck living conditions. As a vocal naval commentator Yexley regularly brought 
lower-deck issues to the attention of the lower-deck, the general public, 
Parliament and the Admiralty.  
 
Despite the fact that Knock failed to mention Yexley in his book, Knock’s 
critic accused Yexley, together with the influence of naval Welfare Committees, 
for interfering in naval matters which he suggested were ‘the province of naval 
officers.’43  Yexley became a keen supporter of stokers and was active in 
promoting their cause. However, he also recognised their poor standing in the 
service noting that, ‘stokers did not lead a pleasant life as seamen tended to 
look upon them with contempt.’44   
 
Therefore, with stokers apparently omitted from both the history of naval 
engineering and from the social history of the lower-deck, an alternative means 
of discovering the reasons why stokers seemed to have attracted such a poor 
reputation must be sought. One approach would be to seek the opinions of the 
men themselves. However, the men who served in the Royal Navy throughout 
the period of this thesis are now long passed over the bar.   
 
Fortunately, far sighted historians such as Henry Baynham orally 
recorded the experiences of men who served in the Navy of Victoria and 
Edward, a small number of whom were stokers. Baynham introduced a 
compilation of his recordings in Men from the Dreadnoughts which contains a 
full chapter on stokers, albeit we are only offered a brief outline of conditions of 
service before and during the First World War. Baynham interviewed fifty-one 
former naval ratings from a variety of branches and social backgrounds, 
although only seven had formerly served as stokers. Despite Baynham’s 
sterling work in tracing and interviewing the experiences of these men for 
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posterity, he resorted to the use of the negative stereotype when he observed 
that stokers were viewed by contemporary naval society as ‘the lowest forms of 
marine life,’ although he failed to provide any evidence to support this claim.45   
 
Peter Liddle also compiled an extensive oral history archive from 
personnel who had served in all three arms of the services during both World 
Wars. Liddle and his associates recorded over 440 interviews from former naval 
men who had served during the 1914-1918 era alone. These recordings and 
transcripts detail the lives and experiences of the officers and men who served 
in ships, submarines and the Royal Naval Air Service during the first great 
conflict of the twentieth century. However, even in this extensive collection, 
stokers remain a minority contributing to only twelve recordings out of the 442 
naval subjects.  
 
From a review of the literature thus far two patterns emerge. Firstly, it is 
clear that in writing the history of the engine room branch naval engineers have 
ignored the role of stokers or only marginally included them in passing. This is 
also true of the historians who have contributed to works on the social history of 
the lower-deck who likewise have marginalised or ignored stokers. Secondly, it 
is also clear that the tradition of stereotyping the stoker in a negative fashion is 
very much a part of history. Lavery’s recent contribution breaks new ground with 
regards to identifying the role of stokers within the social history of the lower-
deck. However, because Lavery ignores the negative stereotype and makes no 
comments on its use by others, he provides no answers as to why it has been 
so successfully applied to stokers in the past. Apart from Lavery’s singular 
important work, the mass of the available literature which covers the social 
history of the lower-deck ignores or downplays the contribution of stokers; 
therefore, it is of little use to this thesis. As a result, this thesis will rely on other 
sources including oral history in order to determine the reasons why stokers 
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The Methodology of this thesis 
The naval lower-deck was a complex hierarchical society and even 
though it was composed of working-class men their status was determined by 
the branch of service to which they belonged. Therefore, as the lower-deck 
hierarchical structure is a relatively unexplored and complex aspect of lower-
deck life, it was decided to adopt a social history approach to this thesis in order 
to examine the structure from the 'bottom up.'  The second approach was to use 
oral history to allow the stokers who served to write the history of their branch 
from their own experiences. In order to gain a balanced and unbiased view of 
their social position, oral testimony will  be introduced from ratings and officers 
from other branches and specialisations. This additional material will offer 
insights into the relationships between stokers and other men and allow 
comparisons to be made while highlighting where bias, prejudice and 
stereotyping originated in the stokers’ story. 
 The Popular Culture of 'Navalism' 
The main aim of this thesis is to explore the social history of naval 
stokers in order to re-define their position within the naval social hierarchy and 
to determine why they attracted such negative stereotypes. However, a social 
history such as that proposed cannot be explored in isolation. The 'modern' 
Navy of the emerging twentieth century was an integral part of British social, 
cultural and political life such that it generated its own 'popular culture of 
navalism.' Mary Conley makes the point in From Jack Tar to Union Jack that 
Britain's national identity had long been defined by its position as an island 
nation, its relationship to the sea and its reliance on the Navy. By the late 
Victorian and early Edwardian period the popular culture of navalism was 
embedded in the public consciousness and displayed in mass public 
attendances at fleet reviews, naval exhibitions and warship launches.46 
Moreover, the culture of the Navy was celebrated and promoted in British 
society through advertisements depicting sailors using popular products, 
through music, boys' stories, exhibitions, pageantry and spectacle.47  
                                            




The way in which Britain and Germany celebrated the Navy and the sea 
during the imperial age was described by Jan Rüger in The Great Naval Game, 
as bordering on an 'obsession.'48 This celebration led to a host of rituals that 
placed the Navy and nation on the public stage creating a 'naval theatre' which 
the authorities used to promote the Navy and to educate the public.49 However, 
while the authorities attempted to utilise the naval stage for their own interests, 
Rüger noted that they had to acknowledge that the forces of mass culture had a 
strong grip on this arena.50 The stokers' disturbances that took place at 
Portsmouth barracks in 1906 is a case in point. While most naval mutinies 
generally occurred in ships at sea or in naval dockyards prohibited to the public 
and press; this affair became a public spectacle played out in full view of the 
citizens of Portsmouth and avidly followed by the popular press. Although 
relatively minor in scale, the events at Portsmouth had a long-lasting effect on 
both the public's attitude towards stokers and to their future position within the 
service hierarchy which may account in part for their perceived position as the 
'lowest of the low.' The disturbances at Portsmouth will be examined in more 
detail in chapter seven.  
 
Another form of public education was the advent of the campaign for 
'National Efficiency.' In his The Question of National Efficiency, G.R. Searle 
suggested that the twentieth century began with the catch-phrase 'National 
Efficiency' or simply 'Efficiency'.51 The term 'National Efficiency' was both 
acknowledgement that Britain as a great power was in decline and also a policy 
to aid recovery. As such, it was a convenient label under which a complex 
system of beliefs, assumptions and demands could be grouped and driven 
forwards by powerful political and public groups in British society. Through a 
process of 'efficiency' it was hoped that Britain would be more adequately 
prepared for the Great Power rivalries of the coming century. Among the 
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programmes and ideologies of the efficiency movement were those of tariff 
reform, compulsory military service and eugenics.52  
 
 The idea of compulsory military service and eugenics went hand in hand 
and stemmed in part from the poor quality of recruits that presented themselves 
for service to the Army during the Boer War. Searle noted that out of 11,000 
volunteers for Army service 8,000 were deemed unsuitable while a further 2,000 
were only considered fit for the home based militia.53 Journalists and politicians 
discussed this problem in language that bordered on panic, leading to a fear 
that the physical stock of the nation had degenerated.54 This fear led to a call for 
the improvement of the 'National Physique.55  
 
Then again, Richard Price in An Imperial War and the British Working 
Class, described the recruiting pattern for the Boer War as an 'interesting 
phenomenon' which suggests that there may be more to the recruiting pattern 
for the war than the lack of physique of the recruits as suggested by Searle.56 
For example, Price observed that the bulk of recruitment for the war came from 
three specific groups from the established Volunteer movement which included 
'active service companies,' 'City Imperial Volunteers' and the 'Imperial 
Yeomanry.' Many of these units were raised and financed by private individuals 
and while they contained an element of working class men, Price determined 
that the force was dominated by men who were 'certainly not working class in 
status or attitude.'57 However, as the Boer War became more unpopular the 
number of volunteers from the working class increased while the numbers of 
middle and upper-class volunteers decreased. Price suggested that this 
anomaly could be explained by the fact that volunteering for the Army (or Navy) 
was always related to the labour market. Unemployment which had remained 
low since the mid-1890s began to rise during the Boer War years while at the 
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same time real wages started to fall making the armed forces a more attractive 
prospect.58  
 
An inter-departmental committee set up to investigate the poor standard 
of recruits for Army service reported that the health and physique of army 
recruits was not an accurate reflection of the physical state of the nation as a 
whole.59 Indeed, Professor Cunningham pointed out to the Royal Commission 
on Physical Deterioration: 
 
when trade is good and employment plentiful it is only from the lowest stratum 
of the people that the Army receives its supply of men.....when trade is bad, a 
better class of recruit is available.60 
 
 This is an important point with regards to the nature of the man who  
volunteered to join the Navy as a stoker. All of the former stokers that have 
been used as subjects for this thesis were ordinary working-class men, indeed 
many of them were skilled workers while others had served formal 
apprenticeships. Moreover, they all joined the Navy out of economic necessity 
after losing their jobs during periods of economic downturn when employment 
opportunities were limited. Therefore, they would have met the criteria identified 
above which would have arguably made them a 'better class of recruit,' than the 
type that may have joined when work had been more plentiful.  
   
 With regards to the 'cult' of the Navy, Mary Conley suggests that its 
heightened profile within society enabled men of the lower-deck to reject the 
traditional portrayal of 'Jack Tar' and to assert themselves as educated, 
responsible professionals.61 They were supported in this respect by a number of 
dedicated navalists particularly journalists and novelists such as Fred Jane and 
Rudyard Kipling et al who justified greater naval spending by championing the 
lives of the hard-working lower-deck. Moreover, Conley noted that both 
navalists and lower-deck advocates recognised that the persistent caricature of 
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the traditional drunken and irresponsible 'Jack Tar' jeopardised the Navy and its 
men. In its place, a new image of the sailor was constructed that celebrated the 
modern bluejacket for his professionalism, discipline, intellect and domesticity. 
As a consequence, Conley maintains that despite the increasing challenges to 
British authority from within and from abroad, the symbol of the British 
bluejacket could at once embody and safeguard the Navy, the nation and the 
Empire.62  
 
However, while the bluejacket of the emerging twentieth century had 
never been so popular in the public consciousness, his desire to re-invent 
himself into a modern professional would be seriously handicapped by the 
Admiralty he served. In the first place, the naval service was hidebound and 
steeped in tradition particularly when it came to its responsibilities towards the 
lower-deck. This was evident in the stark contrast between the state of the art 
warship Dreadnought commissioned in 1906 which was equipped with world 
leading armament and machinery and the archaic conditions under which the 
ship's company lived and worked. In order to establish the social order of the 
lower-deck and the position of stokers within it will require a review of the 
contemporary conflicts that took place between the lower-deck and the 
Admiralty over service conditions during the early decades of the twentieth 
century.  
    
The structure of this thesis 
 
Following the traditions of social and oral history, this thesis will examine 
the work, reputation and social position of stokers during the heyday of coal-
firing. The thesis has three main aims. The first is to give stokers a historical 
identity free from stereotyping and prejudice. The second is to investigate the 
myths and misconceptions that have sullied the name and reputation of stokers. 
The final aim is to determine whether stokers deserved to be regarded as the 
‘lowest of the low,’ with regard to their social standing and reputation in the 
Navy and history.  
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There are eight chapters. The chapters follow a chronological order and 
focus on a particular aspect of a stoker’s life, work and relationships with 
officers and other ratings. The chapters will highlight the dominance of the 
seaman branch on the lower-deck and the difficulties experienced by stokers in 
establishing their own identity.  
 
Chapter one (Introduction-stokers in history) highlights the limited 
attention stokers have received from historians while exploring the negative 
stereotypes that invariably accompany any historical reference to them. In order 
to redress the balance the chapter argues that stokers require their own 
historical identity free from stereotyping and prejudice. The chapter suggests 
that prejudice and discrimination have been responsible for many of the myths 
which have blighted the history of stokers and have collectively resulted in 
stokers being regarded as ill-disciplined, uneducated and occupying the lowest 
position within the lower-deck social structure.  
 
Chapter two (‘Down below’ – life in the stokehole) will explore the 
introduction of the stoker into the Navy and chart the changes to his status from 
his modest early nineteenth century beginnings through to the heyday of coal-
firing during the First World War when stokers briefly became the largest branch 
of men on the lower-deck. The chapter will explore the recruitment, training and 
work of stokers and will highlight the prejudice and stereotyping that came to be 
associated with their work in the stokehole. During the nineteenth century 
stokers were regarded as skilled men, however their status changed at the end 
of the century amid controversies over the introduction of the water-tube boiler. 
These controversies would later form part of the folklore which condemned 
stokers as unskilled and uneducated and contributed to them being relegated to 
the position of ‘lowest of the low’ by the service and future history. 
  
Chapter three (Heatstroke, stokers’ cramp and other stokehole maladies) 
explores the occupational accidents, illnesses and medical conditions that were 
a unique, and often life threatening aspect, of a stoker’s work. The chapter will 
examine the debilitating conditions of heat stroke and stokers’ cramp brought 
about through hard labour under extreme conditions of heat. It will highlight the 
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lack of medical knowledge of the time into these occupational conditions and 
the lack of interest shown by the Admiralty into the well-being of those who 
toiled below. In addition, the chapter will investigate the concept of ‘over-driving,’ 
which was a strategy employed by stokers in order to combat the onset of 
fatigue and to prove to others that they could handle anything the Navy could 
demand of them.    
 
Chapter four (‘Off watch’- mess deck affairs) will explore the domestic 
aspects of lower-deck life including life in barracks and onboard ship, naval 
victualling, canteens, and welfare representation. It will assess the extent that 
disputes and challenges to the status quo affected relationships between 
stokers and others and explore the animosities that bred inter-branch rivalries. 
Despite the 'cult of navalism' described in the introduction and the re-invention 
of 'Jack Tar' into a disciplined, intellectual professional man, his life on the early 
twentieth century lower-deck was virtually unchanged from the life of the sailor 
who served during the late eighteenth century. While the Admiralty may have 
kept abreast of technological changes it proved to be very unwilling to improve 
the conditions of the lower-deck. As a result, it was left to outsiders and the men 
themselves to seek redress. The chapter will analyse the reasons why stokers 
failed in their attempts to improve their conditions of service leaving them as the 
‘lowest of the low,’ while much smaller branches succeeded in improving their 
position.   
   
Chapter five (Working relationships and social hierarchies) will examine 
the interaction between ratings and branches and explore the complex social 
criteria that determined the relevant position of each branch within the complex 
hierarchical structure that made up the lower-deck. The chapter will argue that 
while mutual trust and respect existed between stokers and E.R.As, working 
relationships were never properly established between stokers and seamen. 
The open hostility and mistrust which existed between stokers and seamen 
could have resulted in a power struggle between the two largest groups of men 
on the lower-deck. However, seamen successfully maintained their traditional 
superiority by condemning stokers to the position of ‘lowest of the low,’ a 
position from which stokers were unable to challenge.  
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Chapter six (New technologies: oil fuel and submarines) examines the 
opportunities these technologies provided for stokers to improve their lives, 
opportunities and working conditions. The chapter will argue that the submarine 
service ethos of ‘all of one body’ ensured that submarine stokers enjoyed equal 
status and parity with seamen so that the prejudice and discrimination that 
existed within general service was entirely absent in submarines. However, 
while the introduction of oil fuel removed the manual labour and drudgery of the 
stokehole from stokers’ lives, it arguably also removed their last vestige of 
admired proficiency as the skill of coal-firing was replaced by the automatic oil 
fuel sprayer at the boiler front.   
 
Chapter seven (Stokers-the weakest link?) will challenge the common 
contemporary perception, that still exists among certain historians, that stokers 
were the ‘weak link’ in the chain of naval discipline. The chapter will explore the 
1906 Portsmouth barracks disturbances together with other examples of  
insubordination and mutiny in order to assess the extent to which service and 
public attitudes contributed towards the negative stereotypes that were applied 
to stokers. The extent to which stokers engaged in collective disobedience and 
mutiny compared to that committed by seamen will be assessed and the results 
will be analysed in order to judge whether the embedded perceptions of stokers' 
ill-discipline was accurate and deserved.  
 
Finally, chapter eight (Conclusion: 'A very inferior class of men’- A  
reappraisal of the myth) draws all of the available evidence together in order to 
reach the conclusion that stokers were discriminated against through prejudice 
and stereotyping on account of their perceived ‘dirty work.' As a result, stokers 
have been marginalised by history and their story has remained largely untold. 
What little story there is, remains shrouded in untruths and clouded by prejudice 
and myths which has reduced them to the ‘weakest-link’ in the chain of naval 
discipline and the ‘lowest of the low’ with regards to their social position within 








‘Down below’ – life in the stokehole 
 
The Emergence of the Stoker 
 
The rating of leading stoker was introduced into the Royal Navy in 1842, 
and stoker and coal-trimmer in 1844. Even at this early stage, a stoker first 
class was notionally equivalent in rank to a leading seaman while a leading 
stoker was equal to a seaman petty officer because there was no equivalent 
rate of stoker petty officer. However, in relative terms because only seamen 
held executive authority the differential between each rank was limited to the 
rate of pay with a stoker earning more than a seaman of the next higher rate. 
Chief Stoker first appeared in 1864 but the rate was abolished at the end of 
1868 with the introduction in 1869 of the E.R.A. Chief E.R.A. was introduced in 
1877 and chief stoker re-introduced in 1885. The separate titles of stoker and 
coal-trimmer were merged into the single branch title of stoker in 1900 and the 
rate of stoker petty officer (S.P.O.) appeared in 1907.63 Between the years 
1871-1906 the non-substantive rate of stoker-mechanic existed which roughly 
equated to a stoker first class albeit the stoker-mechanic was considered to 
denote a ‘highly skilled man.’64 Stoker-Mechanics would have practical 
knowledge of an allied trade gained through examination and a practical test, 
for example boilermaker, fitter, furnace bricklayer etc. By 1906, the year it was 
abolished, approximately half of all serving stokers held the rate of stoker-
mechanic. In May 1947 the rate of stoker mechanic was re-introduced to 
replace the rate of stoker in the rating titles. This title was changed again in 
1955 when all stoker-mechanics were renamed engineering-mechanics.65 
 
Notwithstanding the fact that the rate of stoker did not become official 
until 1844, stokers were employed in the Comet when she first commissioned in 
1822. Prior to the introduction of the E.R.A. in 1869, the personnel employed to 
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operate and maintain the boilers and engines in steam fitted ships consisted of 
engineers, assistant engineers, stokers and coal trimmers. On commissioning, 
the Comet had a complement of just eight men including an engineer and three 
stokers. By 1827 the Comet’s complement had been increased by an additional 
assistant engineer and an extra stoker.66 The Lightning of 1828 had a similar 
complement which included a first and second engineer, two engineer 
apprentices, and three stokers. However, the Lightning did not appear to be 
fully manned, as the ship’s Pay Book shows that she was authorised to carry a 
total of ten seamen ratings of whom ‘five could be stokers’; this suggests that at 
this early juncture in the development of the steam-Navy, the position of 
seaman and stoker may well have been interchangeable.67 
 
Nonetheless, despite attracting a poor image and reputation much later 
in the development of the steam Navy, in these early days of steam propulsion 
stokers were considered to be a valuable asset to a ship. In his, Treatise on 
Navigation by Steam, Captain John Ross suggested that stokers were so 
essential to the smooth running of the ship’s engines he advocated that they 
should be: 
 
Employed solely on their duties in the boiler room and are to be relieved every 
two hours and awarded a double quantity of beer or other beverage while so 
employed.’ 68   
 
Furthermore, Ross recommended that stokers were to be ‘regularly bred’ 
for their calling, arguing that it was a mistake to believe that ordinary seamen 
were able to tend the fire as well as a qualified stoker. Moreover, he argued that 
by keeping a better fire, a stoker would be able to apply a more steady heat on 
the boiler, which would result in considerable fuel savings.69  
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Ross was also influential in recommending the minimum levels of 
manning for steam vessels by stipulating that every steam-fitted ship would 
require one head-engineer, one assistant engineer, and one head foreman. 
With ships fitted with engines rated up to forty-horsepower, Ross calculated that 
three stokers would be sufficient, with an extra stoker added to the complement 
for every additional twenty-horsepower delivered.70   
 
Engineers at this time were little more than semi-skilled ‘engine-drivers,’ 
or men with limited technical ability recruited from engineering firms or from the 
few steam factories then in existence. As a result of their lack of formal 
qualifications, the early engineers were only accorded the status of petty 
officers, but without the authority of the rank or the right to wear service uniform. 
In similar vein, stokers were not given any formal training and therefore could 
be considered to have been unskilled, or at the best, semi-skilled men. However, 
Walton suggested that ‘mechanically competent stokers’ occupied the place of 
artificer engineers a decade before artificer engineers were formally 
established.71  Therefore, there must have been a number of stokers who 
demonstrated technical competence over and above that expected.   
 
The ad hoc nature of manning steam vessels was eventually put on a 
proper footing when an Order-in-Council dated July 1837 established the 
Engineering Branch as a formal part of the naval service. From this date, 
engineers were accorded the rank of warrant officer, although like seamen, 
stokers were still only engaged for the duration of a commission of an individual 
ship.72        
 
A superior class of Stokers 
 
By 1853 sixth rate steam vessels with complements of 200 men were 
authorised to carry five leading stokers and twenty-one stokers or coal-trimmers, 
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while vessels with complements of 175 men had four leading stokers and 
twenty stokers and coal trimmers respectively.73  However, the one limiting 
feature which seriously affected the manning of the new steam-Navy was the 
continuing shortage of suitably qualified engineers. Compared with the much 
better pay and conditions of service to be found in either a steam factory or in 
the lucrative merchant service, the Royal Navy found itself unable to compete in 
the recruitment of engineers. This shortage led to a recommendation put 
forward by the Committee on Marine Engines in 1859 which argued for a 
reduction in the numbers of assistant engineers to be replaced with a superior 
class of stokers.74 However, this proposal was dismissed by the Admiralty 
surveyor who agreed that while there were ‘slight grounds’ for proposing that 
assistant engineers should be sent to the Admiralty factories to be tested for 
their efficiency, he could see no reason whatsoever to replace them with 
stokers who he considered to be a ‘very inferior class of men.’75  
 
The question of replacing a number of assistant engineers with superior 
stokers was debated a second time by the committee who made another 
proposal, this time for the establishment of a superior class of ‘Chief Leading 
Stokers’ at the rate of two Chief Leading Stokers for each assistant engineer 
reduced from the complement.76  In response to this proposal, Rear-Admiral Sir 
Baldwin Walker the Surveyor of the Navy, admitted that during the Russian War 
of 1854-1855, the Navy had been so short of assistant engineers despite 
resorting to the recruitment of temporary engine drivers and workmen from 
government factories, that it had been forced to employ suitably qualified 
stokers to make up the deficiencies.77 The committee’s report shows that in 
November 1855 the decision was taken to reduce the numbers of assistant 
engineers then serving in ships fitting out for war service and to replace them 
with suitably qualified leading stokers or stokers with the attraction of additional 
pay set at the rate of two shillings a month. Having issued a circular to all ships 
to forward names of suitably qualified men, ninety-two ships replied forwarding 
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sixty-seven names of leading stokers and stokers considered suitable to 
undertake the duties of assistant engineer. 
 
Despite the support from the fleet to replace assistant engineers with 
stokers, the Surveyor would not commit himself to the proposal. He considered 
‘that no great reliance could be placed on this resource’, although he admitted 
that it would be ‘unwise to absolutely reject it before an absolute necessity 
arose.’78  While the Surveyor admitted that in time of war, stokers would 
‘doubtless be found to be useful auxiliaries and would therefore be employed as 
engineers’, he did not believe there was a sufficient need to employ them in that 
capacity at that time.79 Nevertheless, Joshua Field of Maudslay Sons and Field, 
the Thameside engineers, recognised as early as 1830 that the poor treatment 
and indifferent service attitudes towards naval engineers had been driving the 
best of them out of the service. This led Field to voice the opinion that this had 
led to the advancement of second and third engineers, ‘and even stokers,’ to 
the position of first engineer.80  
 
The  hardships of a stoker’s work were obvious, however there did not 
appear to be any shortage of men wishing to become stokers. The committee 
formed in 1859 to investigate the ‘Best Means of Manning the Navy’ questioned 
Rear Admiral Milne as to whether it would have been desirable to increase the 
numbers of stokers then currently employed. 81 In reply Admiral Milne offered 
the observation that there appeared to be ‘plenty of volunteers to go stoking’, 
adding, ‘everyone goes stoking if he can.’82  However, Milne may have 
underestimated the demands required of a stoker on watch below. A later 
committee investigating future ship design noted that existing ship’s 
complements were merely ‘skeleton complements’ which would require a large 
increase in time of war. Moreover, it was suggested that the complements of 
stokers then allowed were ‘little more than enough to maintain ironclads at ten 
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knots speed continuously with the stokers in three watches.’83  Furthermore, it 
was put to the committee that if full speed was required to be maintained for 
twenty four hours with the numbers of stokers then allowed, the men would 
have to be worked in two watches, watch and watch about, which the 
committee advised would undoubtedly lead to the men becoming ‘utterly worn 
out.’84  
 
The fears of this committee with regards to the lean manning of stokers 
appeared to be borne out when evidence from a six hour steam trial was 
submitted which disclosed that despite manning the stokehole with a large party 
of carefully selected stokers and using the very best Welsh steam coal, the 
stokers were unable to maintain full steaming for the fifth and sixth hours of the 
trial owing to fatigue.85  Despite this evidence it is apparent that the committee 
did not regard the application of twenty-four hours steaming at full power to be 
beyond the remit of any stoker. In an argument to support the adoption of 
thirteen and a half knots as the optimum full speed to be maintained for forty-
eight hours, the committee advised the Admiralty that, if stokers were not to be 
unduly fatigued in maintaining this speed, their ‘indifference and inferior 
physique would need to be improved.’86   
 
With this proposal in mind a suggestion was made to the committee that 
stokers should be recruited from the ‘same class and style of men to be found in 
the stokeholes of the great steam-companies.’  The conclusion was drawn that 
if stokers were not physically able to meet the demands of a ship’s full power 
capabilities then the official speed claimed for each class of vessel would need 
to be reduced, in order to compensate for the failure of stokers to maintain the 
best speed for the required length of time.87 If this were to be the case, the 
committee argued that, ‘should the latter option be adopted, then most fourteen 
knot steamers would be reduced in the records to ten knot vessels.’   
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Furthermore, the claim was made that: 
 
It was an absolute necessity that the Navy required not just efficient engines, 
but a sufficient crew of stokers to work them continuously and if necessary, at 
high speed and in three watches, just as it was for a ship to have full sail 
equipment and an adequate number of the right able-bodied seamen to bring 
out its full value.88  
 
The apparent under-manning of stokers stemmed from an earlier 
Admiralty decision with regards to manning ships fitted with full sailing rigs and 
screws which could be hoisted clear of the water. As sails were usually used for 
passage wherever possible, the engines were used infrequently resulting in a 
lack of work for the stokers. As a result, the Admiralty decided in 1854 to reduce 
the complement of stokers. However, in so doing it transpired that should the 
ship wish to raise steam there would be too few stokers to man the stokeholes 
and also act as coal trimmers. Therefore it was decided to employ seamen and 
others to undertake the duties of coal-trimming whenever the burden fell too 
heavily on stokers. In addition, the Admiralty decided that if a ship needed to 
steam at full power for any length of time, the men recruited as coal trimmers 
could also be used to supplement the stokers in the stokehole. As a result, 
these men were entitled to draw the relevant stokers’ rate of pay.89  
 
Training for the stokehole 
 
In evidence to the Manning Committee Admiral Milne stated that stokers 
‘received instruction in stoking;' although he confirmed they were not required to 
pass any examination to confirm their skills or competence.90  However, the 
instruction Milne referred to was ‘on the job instruction,’ as stokers did not 
receive any formal training in mechanical skills prior to joining their first ship. At 
the time of the 1859 manning enquiry, stokers joining the Royal Navy were 
processed in one of the main naval depots, namely Portsmouth, Devonport, 
Chatham or Sheerness, where they received their initial kit and bedding issue. 
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From there they were drafted as second class stokers directly to their first ship 
where instruction in stoking was given ‘on the job.’  
 
The first indication that stokers received any formal naval, military or 
mechanical training is to be found in an Admiralty ‘Orders in Council’ dated 
1886 which stated:  
 
It is desirable to make provision for training Chief Stokers, Leading Stokers and 
Stokers in the use of arms and in the management of the machinery and boilers 
of Torpedo Boats, and to give extra remuneration to men who give proof of 
satisfactory proficiency in these subjects. Any Chief Stoker, Leading Stoker or 
Stoker who is qualified in Torpedo boat work and can pass the examination for 
trained man in cutlass, rifle and pistol exercises shall be rated ‘trained man’ and 
receive a penny a day extra pay.91  
 
However, this training was for ‘torpedo boats’ only. The lack of formalised 
training for stokers was still a cause for concern after the 1888 naval 
manoeuvres when a report to the Admiralty claimed:  
 
I cannot urge too strongly upon their Lordships’ consideration the inadequacy of 
the engine-room complements of modern ships and cruisers; not only does this 
apply to the number of ratings authorised, but to the fact that so large a 
proportion of the crews comprise stokers 2nd class, and large number of the 
stokers are men who have been advanced to that rating for drafting purposes 
while still untrained. I had been led to believe that there was a proper standard 
as regards to height and chest measurement for stokers; but judging by their 
physique generally, it would appear that such is not the case. The men are 
willing enough, and do their best but are quite incapable of undergoing the 
labour required, nor, in fact can it be expected of them since they become 
exhausted and faint.92 
 
 The topic was raised again in 1891 in a proposal for improving the 
training of stokers which argued:   
 
The training of military branches of the Royal Navy, including Officers, warrant 
officers, seamen-gunners, torpedo-men, seamen, marines and marine artillery 
men, with coastguard and other reserves, appears to be most complete; and 
everything is done that experience can suggest. The result is that from a purely 
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military point of view, our Navy is in a very satisfactory condition. With stokers 
the case is altogether different. Our ships are commissioned and sent to sea 
with a large proportion of the stoker complements totally untrained in their 
duties; the consequence is that for months after a ship is commissioned she is 
not in a fit condition to meet an enemy.93   
 
It was also pointed out that in ‘modern’ ships where the stoker 
complement was equal in numbers to that of the seamen, seamen were fully 
trained men. Stokers by contrast, were said to have had ‘no training whatsoever 
in boating or the other necessities of a sea-going life.’ Therefore, it was 
proposed that all stokers on entry should be sent to a central training ship for 
three months followed by a further three months sea experience in a cruiser. It 
was envisaged that at the end of this six month training period, the newly rated 
stoker could be sent to a sea-going ship in order to consolidate his training.’94  
 
A training syllabus was proposed which consisted of basic stokehole 
training including the various parts of boilers and engines, the names and uses 
of common tools and fire-irons and instruction in reading a pressure gauge. In 
addition, it was recommended that stokers be taught how to understand engine 
telegraphs, the use of voice pipes and instruction in shutting a steam stop-valve 
in an emergency. The more intelligent men were to be taught the first principles 
of the steam-engine, the use of a vacuum and the actions of pumps. Citing the 
need to train stokers in the correct use of a shovel prior to going to sea, the 
Chief Engineer described the difficulties of firing a furnace seven feet long by 
three and a half feet wide through an opening fourteen inches by nine inches 
sited level with a man’s chest; a difficulty increased by the rolling action of the 
ship. With this in mind he recommended that firing instruction take place ashore 
in an instruction room fitted up with a ‘few dummy furnaces including high and 
low ones.’  He recommended that coals would not be required for this training 
suggesting that a ‘cart-load’ of macadam stones would serve instead and also 
prevent waste.95       
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Acknowledging that some rifle and cutlass drill was already taught to 
stokers, it was suggested that boat-work should also be introduced together 
with ‘ambulance drill’ as stokers were ‘particularly exposed to the dangers of 
burns and scalds.’ Finally, in order for stokers to become regular ‘jack of all 
trades’ it was suggested that they should be taught ‘miscellaneous duties’ such 
as mixing cement and mortar, laying firebricks and re-building furnace bridges 
while ‘school-work’ would prove beneficial if time allowed.96 After sixty-eight 
years of existence in the Navy, formal military training for stokers was finally 
introduced in 1891 although provision for shore based mechanical training was 
not introduced until 1900.97 
 
The introduction of the water tube boiler 
 
The under-manning of stokers, together with stokers’ training, came to a 
head with the adoption of the French designed ‘Bellville’ water tube boiler in the 
closing years of the nineteenth century. Prior to the introduction of the water 
tube boiler, ships were fitted with simple cylindrical boilers that were relatively 
large and easy to operate and maintain. In cylindrical boilers the heat and gases 
from the combustion of coal in the furnace was transmitted through a small 
number of large diameter fire tubes immersed in water. By 1878 the Inflexible 
was able to produce steam at sixty-pounds per square inch, while the large 
volume of water contained in her cylindrical boilers made it relatively easy for 
stokers to maintain a safe working level of water in the boiler.98  
 
By comparison, the water-tube boiler was much smaller in size and 
contained hundreds of small diameter tubes, these contained the boiler water 
and were exposed to the direct heat of the furnace gases. This method 
generated steam at a higher pressure than the fire-tube boiler. However, being 
physically smaller in size, the water tube boiler could not hold the same volume 
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of water than its larger predecessor. Therefore, many more water tube boilers 
were required to produce a given horsepower, together with a much more 
complex and technically demanding boiler water level system to maintain a safe 
working level at all power levels.  
 
As an example, the protected cruiser, Minerva was fitted with eight large 
cylindrical boilers, whereas the second-class protected cruiser Highflyer of a 
similar tonnage had forty-eight, smaller, water tube boilers. Therefore, ships 
fitted with water tube boilers required a much larger complement of engine room 
staff, particularly stokers, in order to fire and maintain the boilers. In addition, as 
water tube boilers were much more technically challenging to operate and 
maintain than cylindrical boilers, engineers, E.R.As and stokers required a 
higher degree of training than was previously required. This fact was colourfully 
described in a parliamentary debate on the Belleville boiler when it was 
suggested that:    
 
The Belleville boiler is such a box of tricks as never before was put into a ship. It 
is like a lady's watch, always getting out of order and requiring most delicate 
handling. It requires to be stoked to a nicety, and when defects occur they 
require to be repaired to a nicety. If you are to live with the Belleville boiler you 
must treat stoking no longer as unskilled or quasi-unskilled labour; it is a fine art, 
and you require artists to do it. How are you to get them? Other nations have 
been in the same difficulty as we are in, but France got out of the difficulty by 
doing as I now venture humbly to suggest the right hon. Gentleman should do 
namely, obtain instruction from the Belleville Company itself in stoking as a fine 
art. Will the right hon. Gentleman do that? I feel very strongly the urgency of this 
matter. I believe that no other Belleville boilers ought to be put into Her 
Majesty's ships, but we have sixty-one ships with them, and the right hon. 
Gentleman should take the means open to his hand for using them to the best 
advantage. Let him set up a school of stoking, and send for two or three French 
stokers from the Belleville Company, to teach our men the art of stoking. Those 
men could then teach others, and in course of time we should learn to stoke the 
Belleville boiler. You cannot do it by leaving it to the unskilled stoker to learn it 
by himself, or if he should learn it in that way he will learn it too late. It may gall 
the pride of the right hon. Gentleman to go to France to be taught stoking, but 
this is a French dish, and if you wish to enjoy it you must have it done by a 
French cook.99  
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Therefore, as the Navy entered into the first decade of the twentieth 
century, it appears that in some quarters at least, ‘stoking’ had been elevated 
from an unskilled or semi-skilled position to that of a ‘fine art.’ However, despite 
the plea for stokers to be taught the art of stoking Bellville boilers, the First Lord 
of the Admiralty admitted:   
 
the personnel of the Fleet had increased at so large a rate it had been 
impossible to give the full training to the younger men we should like.’100 
 
Despite this admission the F.L. suggested that he would ‘not shrink from 
putting water tube boilers into commission;’ ‘not only with the object of seeing 
whether they have defects, but also in order to accustom as many engineers 
and stokers as possible in the use of the water tube boiler.’101 
 
Stoker Arthur Lilley began his initial stoker training in Devonport onboard 
the steam and sail harbour training ship Phaeton in 1910, some nine years after 
the admission that there had been difficulties in training sufficient numbers of 
stokers in the operation of water-tube boilers. Bizarrely, Lilley and his peers 
were taught the theory and practice of cylindrical boilers using Phaeton’s old 
fashioned boilers before they moved onto the Andromeda and Amphitrite for the 
practical firing stage of their training which was conducted on water-tube 
boilers.102  Training the men on two vastly different technologies could hardly 
have prepared them for the safe operation of the machinery they would have 
found on joining the fleet.  
 
The fact that the Royal Navy had committed itself to the introduction of 
the Bellville boiler but had not implemented a training programme is all the more 
remarkable when compared to the training arrangements of less technically 
advanced countries. The Russian Navy for example, also saw the benefits of 
the water-tube boiler, however, unlike the Royal Navy it made the decision to 
send its engineers and stokers to France to be trained by the Bellville boiler 
company prior to the boilers being installed in their ships. Moreover, whereas 
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stokers in the Royal Navy were trained on obsolete cylindrical boilers and 
machinery and then often drafted to a modern ship fitted with Bellville boilers or 
similar type, Russian engineers and stokers were trained on the type of boiler 
fitted to the ship they were selected to join.103  
 
Russian stokers sent to learn their trade at the Bellville factory may have 
been specially selected from amongst their peers. Compulsory military service 
had been introduced for all Russian males over the age of twenty years of age 
from 1874 which had led to very high levels of illiteracy amongst new recruits to 
Russian military and naval service. As a result, the Russian stokers selected for 
water-tube boiler training in France would probably have been amongst the 
more literate of recruits.104  Amongst this class of men was the Russian-German 
settler Phillipp Frick, a skilled cobbler who was drafted to join the tsar’s Navy as 
a stoker in early 1901 at the age of twenty-one. On entering the Russian Navy, 
Frick was sent to the School of Stokers for training before joining the brand new 
first-rank cruiser Variag [Varyag] at Kronstadt naval base in May 1901. 
 
Notwithstanding the factory training undertaken by Russian stokers 
discussed above, the Variag appeared to suffer from similar problems to those 
experienced by the Royal Navy with regards to the operation of her water-tube 
boilers which were said to have ‘plagued’ the stokers with frequent 
breakdowns.105  Moreover, while Frick was literate, many of the Variag’s ship’s 
company were not, which must have made training the men in technical trades 
extremely difficult. As a result, a systematic educational and training programme 
was instigated onboard the ship with the primary aim of teaching the men to 
read and write.106  
 
 By contrast, the Chief Engineer of the Royal Navy suggested that the 
proposed changes to the training syllabus for stokers may have been 
considered by some to have 'gone too far,' implying that it may have been 
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beyond their capabilities. Nonetheless, the Chief Engineer claimed that the 
advance in education over the preceding years had produced men who 
acquired knowledge and who often showed themselves to be ‘really 
intelligent.’107 Mary Conley made this point by observing that naval writers and 
serving men considered that the effect of education had changed the whole 
character of the lower-deck.108 At the turn of the nineteenth century Henry 
Capper, a former chief gunner who later reached the rank of lieutenant 
commander, put the improvement of the lower-deck down to the 1870 
Education Act which he claimed had removed illiterates from the Navy.109 
Similarly, Rear-Admiral Thomas Spence Lyne who became the first man 
promoted from the lower-deck to Admiral's rank since 1818 on his retirement in 
1931, suggested that as far as the education of the lower-deck was concerned, 
'the country was beginning to get value for money.'110 
 
Stoker Arthur Lilley is a good example of a well-educated lower-deck 
rating. He was only sixteen years of age on joining the Navy suggesting that the 
recruiter who entered him turned a blind eye towards the regulations as Lilley 
was two years below the minimum age for a stoker. Nevertheless, Lilley had 
been in the top stream of Devonport School and was being groomed to sit the 
competitive dockyard apprentice examination but was forced to leave school at 
the age of fourteen to help his family out. After starting work Lilley continued his 
education by attending night school three nights a week where he studied 
subjects such as essay writing, mathematics, geometry and algebra. After 
eighteen months service in the Navy and while still only barely eighteen years of 
age, Lilley passed the naval educational certificate which qualified him to take 
on the duties of Assistant Naval Schoolmaster for which he received six pence 
a day supplement to his pay.  
 
Despite claims that education had changed the nature of the lower-deck, 
the Admiralty did not appear to seek to nurture or develop the educational 
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provision for the men. According to stoker Lilley, the naval education system for 
men at sea, ‘even for a battleship with over one thousand men,’ was not 
organised by commissioned officers who had a much better education but by 
the men themselves.111 The normal schoolmaster complement for an average 
ship would comprise a sergeant of marines, a seaman rating and a stoker, all 
the schoolmasters having achieved their naval education certificate. As an 
assistant schoolmaster, Lilley taught men twice his age to read and write, 
recalling that at the time (1911) ‘half the men in the Navy could not read,’ 
therefore Lilley had to read their letters and answer them on their behalf.112 
Moreover, Lilley also found on his first ship that that while most men could 
understand their pay, many were unable to complete even simple arithmetic. 
When teaching numeracy, Lilley used a box of matches giving each man ten 
matches, one at a time, until the man could count to ten. He would then build on 
this, adding and subtracting matches until the man he was teaching could add 
and subtract satisfactorily.113  
  
Stoker Henry Boin also left school at age fourteen and joined the Navy in 
1917 at age eighteen. Boin recalled that he studied for the mechanician 
examination onboard the scout cruiser Forward under an assistant 
schoolmaster but was constantly ribbed by other stokers for his studies. As a 
mechanician Boin would have received an intensive two year engineering 
course to qualify him as a higher skilled man. Boin declared that many stokers 
were illiterate with the observation that ‘more didn’t go to school than did.’  At 
the time Boin remembered that there was more emphasis on a stoker being a 
good worker than on whether he had completed any sort of education.114   
 
Accidents and breakdowns in the stokehole  
 
With the advent of new boiler technology and materials, working steam 
pressures began to rise. By the turn of the century the average boiler pressure 
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was 300 pounds per square inch (p.s.i.). Boiler explosions, steam leaks and the 
dangers posed from working around moving machinery were occupational 
hazards which had to be faced by stokers; therefore, as steam pressures 
increased so did the chances of a stoker being injured or killed.   
 
In 1872 the Thunderer, sister ship to the first mastless ship Devastation, 
suffered a catastrophic boiler explosion which killed forty-five men including her 
captain despite her early 'box' type boilers being limited to the relatively low 
pressure of thirty p.s.i. This disaster led to the introduction of the cylindrical 
boiler and the publication of the first official Steam Manual in 1879.115 In 1887 
an Admiralty paper was published outlining a number of accidents which had 
occurred on torpedo boat destroyers. The entry describing an incident on boat 
number 47 was typical for the period and simply stated: 
  
Boiler furnace crown came down; engine room and stokehold staff scalded; 
three subsequently died. Accident caused by deficiency of water in the boiler.116  
 
Two years later, the first class cruiser, Terrible, sister ship to the 
Powerful, two of the most modern ships of their day, suffered a boiler explosion 
in one of her forty-eight Bellville boilers caused by a burst tube which killed 
Stoker Edward Sullivan and injured three others. In 1901 the brand new 
Highflyer class cruiser Hermes was plagued by boiler problems during its first 
deployment to the West Indies station. While on passage, the feed water pumps 
failed and could not be restarted, as a consequence the boilers lost their water 
levels and the remaining water quickly evaporated causing the boilers to 
become ‘red hot.’ The stokers on watch were said to have become ‘panic 
stricken’, while the engineer lieutenant suffered a breakdown which required 
him to be invalided home. As it was thought the stokers might mutiny an 
executive lieutenant was dispatched from the upper-deck to the stokehole to 
maintain order.117  
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However, in a parliamentary debate on this episode one member blamed 
defects with the machinery, rather than on the actions of the stokers when he 
argued:  
 
British stokers will never hesitate to go into danger when it is necessary in the 
service of the country; but when a danger is gratuitously put upon them by 
having to attend boilers which are continually giving out and causing explosions 
at the most unexpected times, the result will be, as in the case of the ’Hermes,’ 
that insubordination will arise, necessitating a lieutenant to go down into the 
stokehole to maintain that discipline which the engineers have no power to keep 
because they are not executive officers.118 
 
The pointed comment that ‘engineers had no executive powers to 
maintain discipline’, was an issue of the times and one which affected all non-
executive officers and men including engineers, artificers and stokers. The 
traditional principle that only officers and men from the seaman or ‘executive’ 
branch could possess military authority over all others will be examined further 
in chapter five.  
 
After a number of water tube boiler explosions in the last decade of the 
twentieth century, the Admiralty published a paper documenting the causes and 
the effects of each. The summary shows that between September 1894 and 
July 1901 there were eleven boiler explosions all caused by burst tubes in water 
tube boilers. These killed seven men and injured a further twenty. Following on 
from these incidents, and after concerns were raised with regards to the safety 
of Bellville type boilers, an Admiralty committee was formed in 1901 to 
investigate the use of ‘modern’ water tube boilers for naval purposes. The 
committee came to the conclusion that water tube boilers offered a real military 
advantage over cylindrical boilers; however it decided that due to the continuing 
problems of operating Bellville boilers, they should no longer be fitted, and only 
retained when construction of new ships was too far advanced to remove 
them.119   
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Evidence suggests that the lack of foresight shown by the Admiralty 
towards implementing a rigorous policy of training in the operation of water-tube 
boilers also resulted in a severe reduction in the operational efficiency and 
capability of the fleet. During the 1903 summer naval manoeuvres a number of 
problems emerged which reignited the debate regarding stoker manning and 
training issues which had been previously raised in 1891. One naval 
correspondent who witnessed the manoeuvres reported that out of a 
complement of two hundred and three stokers on the brand new battleship King 
Alfred, ninety three were second class stokers; ‘who had never been to sea 
before.’120   
 
One of the anomalies of naval service during this period was the manner 
in which ships were commissioned for a specific period of time (normally two or 
three years depending on the station) with a ship’s company which served in 
the ship for the duration of the commission. On de-commissioning, the entire 
ship’s company left the ship to be replaced by a brand new complement of men 
for the next commission. As a result, there was no way of ensuring that the men 
drafted to commission a particular ship had the necessary knowledge or 
experience to operate its multitudinous systems safely and efficiently, 
particularly when considering the complexity of machinery to be found in the 
stokeholes and engine rooms of the most modern ships of the era. The series of 
breakdowns suffered by the King Alfred during manoeuvres were attributed to a 
lack of experience amongst the engine room personnel rather than to any 
problems with defective machinery, which were regarded as being ‘relatively 
unimportant.’121   
 
The Admiralty was also berated for not having the foresight to man the 
King Alfred with a ‘nucleus crew’ in order to gain experience of the machinery 
before accepting the ship from her builders.122 Despite being a brand new ship it 
transpired that only the Chief Engineer and one petty officer had actually 
witnessed the engines move under steam before the King Alfred sailed for the 
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start of the summer exercises.123 Not unexpectedly, stokers received the most 
criticism with the remarks:  
 
The stokers are largely men of the second class, many of whom had probably 
never been to sea in a man-of-war before and everywhere there is an absence 
of that personal familiarity with machinery and surroundings which, as every 
engineer well knows, counts for so much in the working of engines and 
boilers.124  
 
With little leadership from the Admiralty, it fell to individual senior officers 
in the Home Ports to identify the level of skills held by the stokers under their 
command. The following letter from the C-in-C Devonport to the Admiralty in 
1907 requested formal approval of a scheme which had obviously been 
operating for some time. The scheme consisted of a series of abbreviations for 
inclusion in each man’s service certificate which indicated the level of training 
he had undertaken, (See Table 1: below) 
 
Table 1: Abbreviations of stokers’ specialist qualifications 
Abbreviation    Signification 
FT     Passed Field Training 
SA     Qualified Small Arms 
TB     Passed Torpedo Boat Training 
TBD     Passed Destroyer Course 
OF     Qualified in Oil Fuel 
Turbines    Qualified in Turbine Machinery 
WTB     Qualified in Water Tube Boilers.125 
 
Notwithstanding the improved training syllabus for stokers which was 
implemented in the first decade of the twentieth century, concerns regarding 
lack of effective training and the relative inexperience amongst second class 
stokers were still being raised in 1910. This was a subject which had some irony 
for Stoker Petty Officer John Walker Reynolds. In May 1910 Reynolds was re-
called from his ‘quiet little job’ initiating second class stokers in mechanical 
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duties, and ordered to join the second class armoured cruiser Lancaster for a 
two year Mediterranean commission.126   
 
Prior to receiving his draft to the Lancaster, Reynolds was an instructor 
on the training hulk Acheron attached to Pembroke at Chatham. The Acheron 
was the former ironclad Northumberland which was launched in 1866 and which 
reverted to a harbour depot ship in 1898 before finally becoming a stokers’ 
harbour training ship in 1904. With regards to the difficulties already discussed 
surrounding the lack of training for second class stokers and the complexities of 
the Bellville water-tube boiler the rationale of training stokers on Acheron’s 
ancient machinery that was by then some forty-four years old, was more than 
questionable. Reynolds noted that the Lancaster had received ‘a good many 
second class stokers without any previous experience of watch-keeping on 
moving machinery.’ As a consequence, he noted that there had been ‘one or 




At this juncture, it would be prudent to ask the question, ‘what induced 
men to volunteer to join the Navy as stokers?'  As the Lancaster was 
proceeding down the river Medway towards the open sea Reynolds asked the 
same question. He mused in his diary that ‘many poets and novelists had 
written about the glories and mysteries of the sea.’ However, he came to the 
conclusion that in his case it was not ‘from any romantic point of view, but from 
the standpoint of one driven by economic pressure’ that forced him to adopt the 
life of a stoker.128   
 
Prior to the introduction of the continuous service scheme in 1853, men 
signed on to serve for as long as an individual ship remained in commission; 
when the ship de-commissioned, the men's services were dispensed with. This 
was a wasteful use of a valuable trained resource, particularly when men were 
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required at short notice. The continuous service scheme guaranteed a first 
period of service of twelve years followed by an optional further ten years to 
qualify for a pension. Seamen ratings traditionally joined the Navy as boys 
between fifteen and a quarter and sixteen and three quarters years of age or as 
youths from sixteen and three quarters to eighteen years of age.129  Thereafter, 
entry was through the 'special service' or 'non-continuous' service scheme 
which was designed to attract men between the age of eighteen and twenty-five 
years who did not want to commit themselves to twelve years service; instead 
they could sign for five years service followed by seven years in the Royal Fleet 
Reserve.130 As a consequence, boys joining as seamen received up to three 
years training in a harbour training ship, which included a period of dedicated 
‘sea training’, before they joined their first ship at age eighteen, while youths 
were sent directly to sea for a period of six months on a sea-going training 
ship.131  
 
By contrast, prior to 1907 stokers were recruited as ‘able bodied men’ 
between the ages of eighteen to twenty-eight years of age provided they could 
demonstrate ‘good character.’ Stokers could engage for either a continuous 
service period of twelve years or under the 'special service' scheme mentioned 
above. After 1907 the character requirement for stokers was changed from 
‘good’ to ‘very good.’ This change may well have been implemented to reflect 
the disquiet shown by the Admiralty after the 1906 Portsmouth Barracks 
disturbances. In The Quest for National Efficiency, G. R. Searle suggested that 
expenditure on the Navy remained virtually static from 1865 to 1885 with naval 
estimates being reduced by Gladstone to a low point of £9.5 million in 1870.132 
The lack of investment in the Navy during this period is clearly reflected in the 
downward spiral of naval recruitment. Between the years 1864-1870 the 
number of stokers and seamen in service slightly decreased apart from a small 
upward spike in recruitment in 1867, thereafter both branches remained virtually 
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static until 1886. During this twenty-two year interval, the number of stokers 
entering service increased by just 2,989 men so that by 1886 their numbers 
stood at 6,989 compared to 48,500 seamen, thereby making stokers an almost 
invisible minority.133 The lack of growth in the recruitment of stokers was no 
doubt caused by the long transition to an all-steam Navy which made the 
recruitment of stokers a low priority. However, after 1886 their numbers began 
to increase exponentially in line with the renewed expansion of the Navy. 
 
The long transition from sail to steam was alluded to by the First Lord, 
Lord Selborne, in a 1902 memorandum in which he noted: 
 
the Navy has reached a critical period in its development, a development which, 
steady and comparatively slow for the greater part of the last century, has now 
for fifteen years proceeded with startling rapidity. The application of steam to 
ships of war as a source of motive power was the first sign that the old order 
was beginning to change. At first admitted grudgingly as an occasional auxilliary 
to the sails, then acknowledged as an equal partner, then winning for itself 
supremacy.134 
 
 Then again, when recruitment began in earnest after 1886 the Admiralty 
appears to have had a problem in recruiting sufficient engine room ratings. The 
Admiralty issued an Orders-in-Council in 1886 which authorised the payment of 
a ten shilling bounty to recruitment officers for each E.R.A. and stoker 
recruited.135 This bounty may have been approved to overcome a temporary 
slump in the recruitment of engine-room ratings or it may have been recognition 
that large numbers of artificers and stokers would need to be recruited to meet 
the manpower demands of the new water-tube boiler in line with the expansion 
of the fleet. The passing of the 1889 Naval Defence Act and the formal adoption 
of the 'two-power' standard called for an unprecedented increase in both ships 
and men. As a result, the years 1889-1900 saw the number of stokers treble 
from 7,900 to 24,800 men.136 
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In her book From Jack Tar to Union Jack, Mary Conley observed that the 
development of a modern Navy and faster ships in the early decade of the 
twentieth century led to a greater need for stokers and engine-room ratings. 
Moreover, Conley suggested that there was a shortage of stokers caused in 
part from the perception of the exhausting nature of their work, together with 
their low pay. There is no doubt that the pay of naval ratings in general was very 
low compared to civilian wages of the day. In 1912 Winston Churchill, then First 
Lord at the Admiralty, commented in a paper supporting an increase in naval 
pay: 
 
A boy getting the minimum wage receives more money wages for eight hours' 
work bank to bank than a 1st class stoker in the Navy for eight solid hours of the 
hardest work I have ever seen done. The boy lives with his parents; the stoker 
has to keep a home without enjoying any of its economies.137 
 
However, while naval pay in general was poor, stokers were paid more 
than their seamen counterparts. Prior to the general increase in pay awarded in 
1912 an Able-Seaman earned 1s 8d a day while a Leading Seaman's rate was 
1s 10d. By comparison a Stoker 1st Class earned 2s 1d which was more than a 
Leading Seaman while a Leading Stoker earned 2s 4d which was more than 
that earned by a Seaman Petty Officer. Therefore, there was a definite financial 
incentive to join the Navy as a stoker. Moreover, even though the subsequent 
1912 pay award reduced the differential in pay between stokers and seamen by 
increasing the pay of seamen to a higher rate, stokers still earned around 6d a 
day more than seamen.138  
 
Mary Conley also suggested that because of difficulties in recruiting 
sufficient stokers, Admiral Fisher included engine-room and stokehole duties in 
the instruction of boy seamen and ordinary seamen, 'so that seamen would be 
capable of augmenting engine-room staff when warranted.'139 However, Conley 
appears to have misunderstood Fisher's intention with regards to this initiative. 
The reasons behind this proposal and its effects on relationships between 
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stokers and seamen is more fully explored in chapter five but requires a brief 
comment here. The use of seamen in coal-trimming had been a long 
established practice from the earliest use of steam propulsion, particularly when 
ships were being steamed at a fast-rate over extended periods of time, when 
stokers would inevitably become fatigued. As the syllabus covering masts and 
sails was finally abolished from the seamen's training programme in 1903, 
(another indication of the reluctance to abandon sailing rigs), the Admiralty 
looked for other skills that seamen could acquire. One initiative was the 
introduction of a system of mechanical and stokehole training for seamen which 
was officially introduced in 1903 after a proposal by Admiral Fisher. However, 
Fisher never intended that seamen should become proficient in the skills 
demanded of stokers.  
 
 Under a committee set up by Admiral Hood to investigate the training of 
seamen in stokehole work, evidence was presented that suggested that 
seamen were of no practical use in the stokehole. One senior naval engineer 
suggested that the training of seamen in stokehole work was 'too short to be of 
any practical use' and that it would have been wise to abolish the training 
entirely.140 Another engineer made the comment that while he had tried to 
instruct seamen in firing he claimed, 'they cannot learn that...... they cannot 
learn stoking at all.'141 Moreover, it was pointed out to the committee that it took 
a minimum of eighteen months to train a stoker capable of steaming a boiler at 
high speed.142 When questioned by the committee on the use of seamen for 
coal trimming duties, all engineers agreed that the mechanical training 
programme did much to improve the ability of seamen to work in coal-bunkers. 
However, despite this observation the consensus was that they preferred to use 
marines for trimming duties with one engineer observing, 'marines are bigger 
and older men and understand what work is, more than the others.'143 
 
While naval pay can be considered to have been poor by comparison to 
civilian wages and those of the merchant marine, Mary Conley suggested that 
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the Admiralty had expectations that a more comprehensive pension scheme 
would induce men to volunteer for service and also make re-engagement to 
serve to achieve a pension a more attractive proposition for those nearing the 
end of their first engagement.144 Conley also noted that the implementation of a 
formal pension scheme had the unintentional consequence of contributing to 
the professionalism of the Navy by severing the perception of a pension as 
charity by structuring the pension as equitable compensation for hard-earned 
service. Part of the Admiralty's expectations with regards to the naval pension 
appear to have been met when an 1886 Admiralty committee on pension reform 
concluded that while pensions did not induce men to join, they did serve as an 
incentive for men to re-engage.145  
 
During the last decade of the nineteenth century the Admiralty conducted 
a number of surveys in order to measure the effectiveness of the re-
engagement system. These surveys measured a number of variables with 
regards to re-engagement and also made direct comparisons between the 
number of seamen and stokers who re-engaged or left the service never to 
return. The following table, (See Table 2:) presents a breakdown by percentage 
of seamen and stokers who re-engaged to complete time for pension or who left 
the service on termination of their first engagement but who then re-joined 
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Table 2: Percentage of Seamen and Stokers who re-engaged to 




















1887 68.4 7.4 75.8 77.16 9.05 86.21 
1888 59.6 8.0 67.6 70.47 10.28 80.70 
1889 56.0 10.8 66.8 65.88 20.0 85.88 
1890 58.8 8.8 67.8 76.84 7.91 84.75 
1891 58.0 9.0 67.0 75.37 6.87 82.44 
1892 60.80 8.40 71.0 73.16 12.09 87.02 
1893 65.20 10.40 77.40 74.35 10.78 85.50 
1894 66.40 11.40 79.0 72.73 14.80 87.79 
1895 65.80 11.10 77.40 83.40 8.80 93.20 
 
The table above shows that in each year from 1887-1895 substantially 
more stokers than seamen volunteered to re-engage for pension as soon as 
their first engagement was completed. Furthermore, apart from the years 1890, 
1891 and 1895, while more stokers than seamen left the service on termination 
of their engagement, they were more likely to re-join the service within twelve 
months. In 1890 the Admiralty analysed a representative sample of 500 seamen 
and 500 stokers to determine the percentage of men who re-engaged after ten 
years service against those who were lost to the service through death, 
desertion (run), discharge (undesirable or objectionable), invaliding or purchase, 
(men who purchased their discharge). The results of this analysis are 
reproduced below in Table 3: 
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Table 3: The number of seamen and stokers who were discharged 
    before completing their first-engagement.147 
 
Discharged Before Completing First Engagement 
 Entered Dead Run Discharged  Invalided Purchase Other 
Causes 
Total 
Seamen 500 31 59 35 88 16 1 230 
Stokers 500 21 52 23 91 7 2 196 
Percentage of all Seamen 
entered 
 
6.2 11.8 7.0 17.6 3.2 0.2 40.0 
Percentage of all Stokers 
entered 
4.2 10.4 4.6 18.2 1.4 0.4 39.2 
Percentage of all Seamen 
discharged during first 
engagement 
13.48 25.08 15.22 38.26 6.86 0.43 100 
Percentage  of all Stokers 
discharged during first 
engagement 
10.71 20.53 11.73 46.43 3.57 1.02 100 
 
While the table above is a 'one-off' survey and therefore could be 
considered to have limited value, nevertheless, it offers an insight into differing 
perspectives of the two largest branches on the lower-deck. While the survey 
shows that ten more seamen than stokers died in service, slightly more stokers 
were invalided from the service suggesting that attrition rates for deaths and 
accidents or disease were broadly similar for both classes of men. However, 
with regards to desertions (run), more seamen than stokers deserted while less 
stokers than seamen were discharged as undesirable or objectional which adds 
weight to the argument proposed in this thesis that stokers were better 
disciplined than they were given credit for. The 'other causes' column in Table 3: 
above, referred to three men out of the one thousand surveyed. One was a 
seaman who became a dockyard rigger and the other two were stokers, one 
having been discharged without purchase while the second was stated to have 
been 'handed over to the military authorities.' This suggests that the man had 
possibly deserted from the Army before joining the Navy in similar fashion to 
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former Army trumpeter and stoker George Wells, who features later in this 
chapter. The influx of former Army men and Royal Marines into the stokers' 
ranks is discussed in more detail in chapter seven. 
  
The following table (See Table 4:) also adds weight to the suggestion 
that stokers were more satisfied with service conditions than seamen; whereby 
substantially more stokers re-engaged at the end of their first ten year 
engagement than seamen, while fewer stokers claimed their discharge never to 
re-enter.    
 
Table 4: Statement Showing the Percentage of Seamen and Stokers 
who re-engage after completing a first period of Ten Years 148 
 
Complete First Engagement 




Claim Discharge and 
Never Re-Enter 
Total 
Seamen 500 148 29 93 270 
Stokers 500 218 39 47 304 
Percentage of all completing first engagement  
Seamen 500 54.82 10.74 31.44 100 
Stokers 500 71.71 12.83 16.48 100 
 
Overall, the data reproduced in the tables above appear to show that 
stokers were probably more settled and satisfied in service than seamen, as a 
result they were more amenable to remaining in service or to extending their 
service on completion of a first engagement. On all counts this would challenge 
contemporary and modern perceptions that stokers lacked the discipline and 
tradition of seamen and were, as a consequence, less loyal towards the service.  
 
While the Navy could be considered to have been both 'British' and 
'English,' the Admiralty and Parliament consciously worked to make the Navy 
more appealing to a wider voting British public in order to increase 
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recruitment.149 As a result, Mary Conley suggests that the Navy increasingly 
drew working-class recruits from the industrial centres of England and from 
Scotland and Ireland. However, Conley et al argue that it is difficult to determine 
the geographical composition of the fleet at any particular time because the 
statistics are embedded within diverse Admiralty recruiting records, port stations, 
ships' muster books and ratings certificates of service that leaves the 
uncovering of those numbers 'a real challenge of naval research.'150  
 
Be that as it may, there is one method of determining the geographical 
composition of the Navy that may have been overlooked by Conley et al. During 
1911 the national census was conducted and at midnight on Sunday April 2nd 
1911 every ship in the Royal Navy was required to complete a census return. 
The census return for the Royal Navy by individual ship for 1911 is available 
from the National Archives. From a ship's Enumeration Book it is possible to 
determine the name, rank, age, place of birth and marital status of every officer 
and man onboard a particular ship at the time of the census which offers a 
fascinating snap-shot in time of the composition of the Navy.  
 
In light of Mary Conley's claim that uncovering the geographical 
composition of the fleet was 'a real challenge of naval research,' the Lancaster's 
census return which was acquired in order to investigate the composition of the 
stoker complement of the Lancaster may offer an insight into this under-
researched aspect of naval history. Interestingly, while an analysis of the 
Lancaster's census return appears to follow the pattern suggested by Conley 
with regards to a geographic composition including representation from the 
industrial centres of England and from Scotland and Ireland, the geographical 
spread is not nearly as varied nor as equal as that suggested. A detailed 
examination of the Lancaster's census return for the seamen and stoker 
divisions gives an unusual picture of recruitment for these two divisions of men 
being centred predominately on the south and south-east regions with a 
particular emphasis on London. A tabular list taken from the Lancaster's census 
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return for the seaman division is given at Appendix (2) and the stokers' division 
at Appendix (3). The following table, (See Table 5:) presents details by region of 
the place of birth for the men in each division.  
 
Table 5: Geographic composition of Seamen and Stokers serving in 
              H.M.S. Lancaster by place of birth 
 
Region Stokers Seamen 
Scotland 5 7 
Ireland 11 8 
North East 8 12 
East 10 9 
South East 88 121 
South 40 29 
South West 4 5 
West 0 3 
North West 19 19 
Midlands 8 7 
Overseas 1  2 
Total 194 222151 
   
The above table shows that while the total number of men between the 
two divisions was broadly similar, there was also a remarkable similarity in their 
geographic composition. It would appear that a majority of the men in both 
divisions originated from the south and south-east in very similar proportions 
with 264 men out of the combined total of 412 having been identified from that 
region (64% of the total). Moreover, while these men were spread 
geographically throughout these two particular regions, exactly half of the 
stoker's division and forty-three percent of the seamen division originated from 
the metropolis of London and not from the southern naval ports of Portsmouth, 
Sheerness or Chatham as might have been expected, (See Table 6: below). 
                                            





Table 6: A comparison between Seamen and Stokers born in the south 




















of men from 
southern 
region out of 
total 
Percentage of 
men from London 
out of total 
Seamen 144 82 62 222 66% 28% 
Stokers 120 60 60 194 61% 31% 
Total 264 142 122 416 63.5% 29.5% 
 
 
 The table above shows a high incidence of men originating from the 
south and south-east while a significant number in both the stoker and seaman 
divisions (29.5% of the total) originated specifically from London. It seems 
probable therefore, that as Lancaster commissioned for her 1910-1912 
Mediterranean cruise at Chatham that this may explain the pattern whereby an 
unusually high number of men originated from one specific area of the country. 
While it has not been possible through lack of space to widen this particular 
study to other ships in order to make comparisons, it appears probable that an 
analysis of a Plymouth based ship for example might expose similar clustering 
of men to that specific (west-country) region.  
  
Strikingly, the Lancaster's census return indicates that the total number 
of men born in Scotland and Ireland as a total of both divisions, appears to have 
been higher than those born in the north-east and only just short of the total for 
the north-west, while there were twice as many men from Scotland and Ireland 
serving onboard Lancaster than men from the Midlands region. The west region 
(Wales) also appears to have been very under represented with only three 
seaman and no stokers originating from this region. Moreover, the two largest 
naval towns of Portsmouth and Plymouth were also underrepresented with only 
two seamen originating from Portsmouth and no stokers from either port. The 
lack of men from these two major naval towns would support the idea proposed 
earlier that ships were manned according to where they commissioned thereby 
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attracting the bulk of their complement from men originating from that particular 
region.  
 
While the issues surrounding pay and allowances and the unrest leading 
up to the disturbances at Invergordon in 1931 are dealt with in more detail in 
chapter seven, a comment may be made here regarding the difficulties relating 
to married men in the Navy compared with their counterparts in the Army or 
Marines. In 1912 the First Lord, Winston Churchill, made the following comment 
with regards to the state of naval pay: 
 
In 1902 during the South African War Parliament approved an increase in 
soldiers pay. No corresponding increase was made however, in the pay of the 
Navy and in consequence their position in relation to the soldier has been 
substantially impaired and all pecuniary recognition of the hardships of the 
sailor's life has been swept away. In consequence of these facts, there is a 
deep and widespread sense of injustice and discontent throughout all ranks and 
ratings of the Navy.152 
 
This was particularly true with regards to the position of married men on 
the lower-deck. While married sailors were ignored by the Admiralty, in the 
Army all Warrant Officers, fifty percent of Sergeants and a minimum of three 
percent of the rank and file received free married quarters or lodging allowance 
at 1s 1d in lieu and in addition they also received separation allowances when 
separated from their family of 4d per day for their wife and 1½ d for each 
child.153 However, the Admiralty consistently ignored the lower-deck plea for 
similar allowances prior to the First World War; while the treasury blocked the 
funds to pay for them out of the naval budget despite the First Lord Winston 
Churchill being fully supportive of pay increases for the Navy in 1912. The issue 
of separation pay and marriage allowances for sailors remained unresolved until 
the outbreak of war in 1914 forced the government's hand. As a result, Carew 
argued that unmarried men pre-1914 could just about survive on the existing 
rates of pay but married men with families would have been forced to exist on 
'starvation wages.'154 The lack of additional financial support for married men in 
the Navy probably accounts for the relatively small number of married men 
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serving in the Lancaster reproduced in the table below (See Table 7:). The 
number of married men for each rank is given alongside the figures in brackets 
which denote the total number of men for that particular rank. 
 
Table 7: Number of Married men serving in H.M.S.Lancaster 
 
Married men Chief Petty 
Officer 
Petty Officer Leading rate Able-Seaman 
& Stoker 
Seamen 1 (2) 10 (20) 8 (20) 4 (170) 
Stokers 5 (7) 6 (17) 7 (19) 14 (151)155 
   
From the table above it can be determined that only fifty-five or thirteen 
percent of the men serving in the seaman and stoker divisions of the Lancaster 
were married, (the figures given for seamen excludes boys). This small 
percentage probably reflects the difficulties that married men faced when trying 
to maintain a family on a single man's pay without any additional support. 
Moreover, while the numbers of married men amongst the higher ratings (Chief 
Petty Officer to Leading rate) are roughly similar between both stokers and 
seamen, there appears to be a variance at the lowest end of the ratings scale. 
While there were nineteen more able-seamen than stokers in the Lancaster's 
complement, there were significantly more married stokers; albeit the overall 
numbers are small. This was probably due to the fact that stokers received 
higher wages than seamen which might have encouraged a higher percentage 
of stokers to start families even though they would have undoubtedly struggled 
financially. In order to determine whether the lack of financial support caused 
men to marry at certain ages or when they reached a particular rank, the 





                                            






Table 8: A Comparison of the ages of Married and Single Men serving 
               in the Seamen and Stoker Divisions of H.M.S. Lancaster 
 
Married Men Single Men 
Division Rate Youngest Oldest Youngest Oldest 
Seamen Chief Petty Officer - 36 - 34 
 Petty Officer 28 36 30 39 
 Leading Rate 25 31 22 38 
 Able-Seaman 22 31 18 37 
 Ordinary-Seaman 0 0 18 21 
Stokers Chief Stoker  35 40 36 38 
 Stoker Petty Officer 28 40 24 36 
 Leading Stoker 23 35 20 32 
 Stoker 1st Class 20 32 19 48 
 Stoker 2nd Class 0 0 19 22156 
 
The ages given in the table above cannot be taken as the age at which 
the men actually married as this could have been several years earlier in the 
case of the more senior men. However, the table does allow some observations 
to be made with regards to the age differential between the married and single 
men of both divisions. The table indicates that at the chief and petty officer level 
there was little difference in the age range of married men in either division. 
However, it is noticeable that the youngest single seamen petty officers appear 
to have been somewhat older than their stoker counterparts. Furthermore, the 
table would tend to support the idea that stokers married, and married earlier 
than seamen on account of the higher wage differential between the two groups 
of men. The relatively young age range of the ordinary seamen and second 
class stokers with their correspondingly low rate of pay obviously precluded 
them from marrying until they reached at least the next higher rate.  
 
                                            





 Mary Conley also identified the fact that while the Navy became ever 
more 'British,' foreigners were added to ship's complements as 
supernumeraries from Africa, India, Asia and the West Indies when ships were 
abroad.157 The Lancaster's census reflects this practice albeit with locally 
entered personnel from the Mediterranean where she was cruising, rather than 
further afield. The following table, Table 9: shows a variety of locally entered 
personnel engaged while on station:  
 
Table 9: Supernumeraries serving in the Lancaster 
 
Position in ship's books Place of origin 
Cooper x 1 Mosta Malta 
Bandmaster x 1 Naples Italy 
Band Corporal x 1 Malta 
Musician x 1 Messina Sicily 
Musician x 3 Syracuse Sicily 
Musician x 2 Valletta Malta 
Musician x 2 Salerno Italy 
Musician x 3 Victoria Malta 
Musician x 1 Acireale Sicily 
Musician x 1 Calabria Sicily 
Officers Steward 1st Class x 1 Valletta Malta 
Officers Cook 1st Class x 1 Floriana Malta 
Officers Cook 2nd Class x 1 Valletta Malta 
Officers Cook 3rd Class x 1 Cospicua Malta 
Officers Cook 3rd Class x 3 Valletta Malta 
Officers Cook x 1 Little Vecchia Malta 
Oficers Steward 2nd Class x 1 Bormla Malta 
Officers Steward x 1 Corfu Greece 
Officers Steward x 1 Valletta Malta 
Officers Steward 3rd Class x 2 Valletta Malta158 
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It is apparent from these entries that the Lancaster's officers took 
advantage of the cheaper labour rates in the Mediterranean and engaged a 
number of cooks and stewards to serve their needs even though the census 
lists several British naval cooks, stewards and domestic auxiliaries. The 
inclusion of a number of locally entered musicians is an interesting facet of the 
ship’s commission. The Lancaster had a complement of twenty men from the 
Royal Marine Light Infantry including two buglers, but no musicians. Therefore it 
can be assumed that the musicians were engaged by the Lancaster's 
commanding officer for the entertainment of the officers or for more formal 
occasions such as inspections (Divisions) and divine service.  
 
Apart from the locally entered men described above, several officers and 
men serving in the Lancaster were born outside the United Kingdom reflecting 
the spread of Empire as shown below in Table 10: 
 
Table 10: Men born outside the United Kingdom 
 
Position Place of Birth Nationality 
Lieutenant San Francisco USA British 
Lieutenant Dimbula Ceylon British 
Midshipman Agra India British 
Midshipman Bangalore India British 
Stoker 2nd Class Cairo Egypt British 
Leading Seaman Jaulanda India British 
Able Seaman  Sydney Australia British159 
 
Mary Conley observes that the recruitment poster for stokers, (See 
Illustration 1, p. 67) was produced by the Admiralty as part of a recruitment 
campaign to attract men to the stokers' branch from the interior industrial areas 
as it was recognised that the more modern and faster ships of the day required 
a greater need for stokers.160 In order to make the job appear more attractive to 
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potential recruits, Conley argues that the poster was deliberately designed in 
order to 'idealise' life in the stokehole and glossed over the dirty and gruelling 
nature of the work. In the poster, the stokehole is depicted as a relatively 
pleasant, clean and bright place where work and conversation went hand in 
hand, making the amount of work required by stokers to appear to be 
minimal.161  
 
However, while the poster may well have deceived the agricultural 
worker or someone from the inner-cities who had no experience of industry, the 
stokers whose testimony has provided the underpinning knowledge for this 
thesis had previously worked in heavy industries such as coal mining, the 
railways, foundries, blacksmiths' shops and manufacturing processes of all 
kinds. Having been used to regular employment they turned to the Navy after 
being made redundant during a recession or after being put on 'short-time' 
hours. As a consequence of their previous employment, these men would have 
had first-hand experience of working in dirty, labour intensive occupations, 
therefore, it is unlikely that they would have been deceived by the idealistic 





                                            





Illustration 1: Stokers Recruiting Poster circa 1910 






With regards to the reasons why men were attracted to joining the Navy, 
Conley observed that during the early Edwardian period young men were stirred 
by 'popular imperialism, literature and the lure of the sea.'162 However, many of 
the subjects whose testimonies form a part of this thesis had more mundane 
reasons for joining as suggested above. For some like S.P.O. Reynolds it was 
more a question of 'economic pressure,' than any ideas of romanticism over the 
glory or mystery of the sea.163 For others, such as stoker Richard Rose who had 
been made redundant from the green-grocery business, the promise of a free 
kit, food and accommodation was the main attraction; although the promise of a 
free kit was falsely given, as will be explained further in chapter four.  
 
In The Quest for National Efficiency, G.R. Searle observed that the 
'efficiency movement' had become embedded in British consciousness during 
the latter half of the nineteenth century. The debate over national efficiency was 
said to have been triggered after 'Black Week' when the British Army suffered 
three disastrous defeats at the hands of the Boer irregulars during the Second 
Boer War.164 Searle suggests that the fear that sustained the ideology for 
national efficiency was fuelled by anxieties about whether the British Empire 
could cope if it ever found itself at war with a major European power. This led to 
calls to improve the 'national physique;' a need which stemmed in part from the 
poor quality of the recruits who presented themselves to the Army during the 
Boer War as discussed in the preceding chapter. However, the poor physique of 
recruits was not a problem unique to the Army. Twenty-seven years prior to the 
outbreak of the Second Boer War the Admiralty raised concerns with regards to 
the poor physique of naval stokers with the following observation:  
 
If for any reason, as, for instance their well-known inferior physique, it were 
found to be impossible to sufficiently increase the numbers of our stokers, 
indifferent as many of them are, so as to enable them when in three watches 
(with aid from the deck for trimming), to maintain their ship at, say 13½ knots 
speed, with the "Admiralty mixture" as fuel, for 48 hours, without being unduly 
fatigued, then it would appear that only two courses would be open for their 
Lordships' adoption, viz, either to obtain and retain the services of the same 
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class and style of men that are to be found in the stokeholes of the great steam 
companies, or to largely reduce the speed claimed for each class of men-of-war. 
The combination we have aimed at in many of our modified types, viz a full rig, 
and full engine power requires a full complement of seamen and stokers. 
Unfortunately, at present the complements of seamen are often insufficient in 
number while the stokers are not only insufficient in number but also of a very 
inferior physique.165            
  
 Therefore, it would appear that concerns had been raised within the 
Navy regarding the physique of stokers long before the movement to improve 
the 'national physique' took hold. Moreover, when it became necessary, such as 
during times of under-recruitment, the Admiralty had no hesitation in reducing 
the physical standards for stokers or seamen in order to meet agreed 
recruitment targets. Without the benefit of hindsight, the Recruitment Committee 
decided after reviewing the monthly recruiting figures for April 1914 to reduce 
the physical standards for stokers with the comment: 
 
Stoker numbers decreased by eighty-five and Marines by eighty-one. In view of 
the falling off in recruiting for the former, the chest standard was reduced by half 
an inch on the 30th April and 'specials' are allowed one inch under standard 
height or chest (as compared with two inches under height and one and a half 
inches under chest in the first half of 1913-14). Recruiting is poor at this time of 
year and in order not to fall too much in arrear with the entry of stokers it is 
proposed to reduce the standard to normal, without altering (at present) the 
rules for "specials." 166     
 
 The mention of the term 'reduce the standard to normal' given above 
intimated that the entry standards for stokers were temporarily reduced down to 
the seaman or 'normal' standard. The term 'specials' was a reference to the 
practice whereby a recruiting officer was authorised to enter men or boys who 
fell below the physical standards but were otherwise suitable in all respects for 
service. Then again, naval recruiting officers did not always apply the rules as 
rigidly as they were intended. When James Maloney presented himself at the 
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Chatham naval recruiting office in 1911 at the age of nineteen he was found to 
be half an inch short of the minimum height requirement and also lacked the 
minimum chest measurement for a seaman. As a result, Maloney was rejected 
and advised to re-apply after six months at which point he would have 
presumably have 'filled-out.' However, when Maloney asked whether he could 
join in another position he was entered straightaway as a stoker, despite not 
meeting any of the minimum requirements.167 
  
 Apart from stokers, the only other men in the Navy who required a larger 
physique were the Royal Marine Light Infantry and Artillery, which would 
support the use of marines rather than seamen for trimming duties as 
suggested previously in the paragraph concerning the training of seamen in 
stokehole duties. However, the Admiralty statement made with regards to the 
perceived poor physique of stokers is not one that is commonly associated with 
men of their calling.  
    
Christopher McKee in Sober Men and True, perpetuates the notion that stokers 
were a different breed of men to seamen by stating that they were viewed as, 
'big, strong, illiterate, dumb guys; all brawn and no brain recruited to do the 
ships heavy lifting in torrid, coal soiled engine spaces.'168 While acknowledging 
this as a stereotype, McKee admitted that the negative stereotype stuck to 
stokers ‘with all the adhesive excellence of 'Tar Baby.’169 Tar Baby was a 
fictional doll made of tar and turpentine which featured in the Uncle Remus 
stories (1881). The doll was used to trap Br’er Rabbit but because of the sticky 
nature of Tar Baby, the more the rabbit struggled the more it became trapped. 
McKee’s analogy between the fictional Tar Baby and stokers is clear; the more 
often the stereotype was applied, the more it stuck.  
 
In similar vein B. W. Beresford described the stoker in comical terms that 
perfectly mirrors a caricature drawn by Ernest Ibbetson in 1910 (See Illustration 
2, p. 72), in which the stoker is portrayed as a strong, but simple character with 
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the hint of an 'ape-like' appearance. This illustration can be compared with 
another drawn by Ibbetson of a 'bluejacket' (See Illustration 3, p. 73) which has 
none of the underlying negative traits depicted in the stoker.  
 
Having described the stoker in a comical vein, Beresford then implied his 
reputation both ashore and afloat was something more sinister, categorised by 
‘low intelligence, brute force and ill-discipline.170 Without any evidence to 
support his claims, Beresford, like others, could only repeat a traditionally held 
naval and historical viewpoint that longstanding animosity existed between the 
seaman and stoker branches. Moreover, working class people in naval towns 
could also adopt a critical attitude towards sailors treating them with hostility 
and snobbery. One critic made the observation that boiler-room stokers, ‘were, 
and remained, the lowest form of shipboard life.’171  
 
Interestingly, while relationships between stokers and seamen were often 
strained, there has always been a strong suggestion that stokers enjoyed very 
good relationships with Royal Marines who, as previously described, had very 
similar physical attributes. In his research for Men from the Dreadnoughts Henry 
Baynham suggested that a large number of discharged marines and ex-soldiers 
were attracted to re-join the Navy as stokers, which may explain the good 
relationships that existed between these men.172  
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Illustration: 2, ‘The Stoker and his little spade,’ Ernest Ibbetson 1910  










Illustration: 3  The Able Seaman, Ernest Ibbetson 1910 









These bonds may have been further strengthened when an official order 
was promulgated in 1919 in order to boost the numbers of stokers, which 
allowed serving seamen and Royal Marines with over six months seniority to 
transfer to the stoker branch with the rate of acting stoker first class.173   
 
George Wells joined the Army as a boy trumpeter in the Army Service 
Corps towards the end of the second Boer War. The war ended while Wells was 
still under training and becoming ‘fed up’ with Army life he decided to desert 
while still a boy soldier. Wells found a good job working for the Maple Dairy 
Company earning 24s a week, however apart from the long hours he had to pay 
12s a week board and lodgings. He was living in Southampton at the time and 
was informed by a sailor that he could earn 10s a week in the Navy all found. 
However, this was not strictly true. On joining the Navy as a stoker Wells would 
have found that he was liable to pay for his kit as described in chapter two. 
Nevertheless, Wells signed on in 1904 while still only seventeen years of age 
having been forced to lie about his age in order to meet the minimum age 
requirement of eighteen years.  
 
During his service, Wells served alongside many stokers who had 
previous Army service with some having served for up to seven years in India 
prior to joining the Navy. Wells remembered that during one particular Sunday 
Divisions in the Good Hope the Captain queried why none of the senior men 
were wearing decorations. The Captain ordered his ship’s company to wear 
their medals on divisions ‘no matter where they had earned them.’ The following 
Sunday over half of the stokers’ division turned out with Army Service medals; 
by contrast none of the seamen had any decorations of any sort.174 This 
incident adds weight to the argument that stokers had more discipline than they 
were given credit for. If half of the stokers serving in the Good Hope had Army 
Service medals they would have earned them in service abroad having seen 
action in a military campaign. Therefore, they would have already been 
disciplined men prior to joining the Navy. The fact that none of the seamen had 
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any decorations of any sort suggests that in this ship at least, the stokers 
appeared to have been more mature, experienced and possibly more 
disciplined than their seamen counterparts. 
 
Apart from meeting the physical characteristics required for entry, 
prospective recruits for naval service were also required to undertake a medical 
examination in order to determine that they were free from ‘any physical defect 
or disability.’ In addition, under the heading ‘educational test’, all potential 
recruits were informed that candidates for naval service were required to be 
able to ‘read and write fairly’, while specific ratings such as E.R.As, sick berth 
attendants and writers were required to undertake further educational tests.175  
A 1907 recruiting pamphlet described the educational test as follows: 
 
The lowest test for any candidate is that he shall be able (a) to read a short 
passage from a standard IV. reading book, or if not available from a newspaper; 
(b) to write a similar passage of about six lines slowly read over and then 
dictated; (c) to have a fair knowledge of the first four rules of arithmetic.176      
 
Richard Rose left school in Bognor Regis at the age of twelve in 1908. 
Thereafter, Rose spent the following three and a half years as a newspaper boy 
and then as a grocer. However, in 1912 Rose was made redundant from his job 
as a grocer after several large national grocery companies forced the small 
independent traders out of business. Although Rose enjoyed working in the 
grocery trade there appeared to be little opportunity for him to get another 
position as a grocer; therefore he decided that the Navy would offer him a more 
stable lifestyle where he wouldn’t have to worry about buying clothes, ‘which 
was a big problem in those days’, while he could also be assured of where his 
next meal was coming from.177  
 
Rose completed the necessary pre-joining tests and medical at 
Portsmouth. Surprisingly, when contacted for his 'characters' (references) 
neither of Rose’s previous employers thought to mention that he was only 
sixteen and a half years of age, a fact also lost on the recruiter. Many years 
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later Rose admitted that he had lied about his age in order to join the Navy by 
substituting his elder brother’s date of birth for his own.178 Rose claimed he did 
this to avoid being entered as a boy seaman as he had been told that the boys’ 
training ship Implacable was a ‘real disciplined place.’179 Having deceived the 
recruiter Rose decided to enter as a stoker because a cousin who was a 
leading seaman had informed him that there were no prospects in seamanship.  
 
The first three days of Rose’s training were taken up with issuing and 
marking kit, learning how to sling his hammock, and lectures on discipline. 
Thereafter, the next four months consisted of rifle drill, marching, gymnasium 
work and the naval swimming test which Rose successfully passed at the 
second attempt. Surprisingly, stokers’ training took up only the last two out of 
the total six months which constituted the new entry training programme. During 
his training Rose would have been issued with a personal copy of the Stokers’ 
Manual which detailed everything a stoker needed to learn during his time in the 
Navy with regards to the operation of marine machinery and common naval 
engineering tools, materials and practices. Rose was taught the principles of 
boilers and reciprocating engines on the training ship Renown and although she 
was an old ship she was fitted with Bellville boilers, which may have been fitted 
specifically for training purposes. However, instead of using coal for learning 
how to fire a naval boiler, trainee stokers were taught how to fire a boiler ‘cold’ 
using flint boulders as a substitute for coal.   
 
Despite the artificiality of using boulders for training purposes, the 
evolution was made more realistic by making the trainee stokers dig the 
boulders out from the coal bunker and transport them in the ‘skids’ from the coal 
bunkers to the stokehole, before firing them into the boiler. Moreover, at the end 
of the day’s instruction, every boulder had to be raked out of the furnace and 
replaced in the bunker ready for the following day’s classes. Rose described 
this process as ‘hard physical work,’ nonetheless he saw the benefit of using 
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flint boulders rather than coal as ‘the stones were clean so you didn’t get 
black.’180  
 
Rose kept watches alongside trained men who were supposed to explain 
the workings of dynamos and refrigerating machines, although Rose 
remembered that some of the trained men were ‘reluctant to pass on 
information as they weren’t paid for it.’181 The information that was not passed 
on had to be gleaned from the Stokers’ Manual. At the end of his six months 
training Rose sat an oral examination conducted by an engineer officer onboard 
the training ship.  
 
While Rose had enjoyed a stable and caring family life, Ernest Bullock 
who also joined the Navy as a stoker had a more difficult time at home. Bullock 
was one of seven siblings although his eldest sister had gone into service 
leaving six children at home. Due to the strained family finances Bullock was 
forced to leave school at thirteen without having a chance to learn about 
'decimals or fractions.’ After a time as a chemist’s errand boy his father obtained 
him a new job as a store boy in the Wantage engineering works.  
 
Bullock’s first six months in the stores’ department gave him an 
opportunity to learn all about the tools that were used in the factory which he 
considered was a sensible practice. On completion of his six months in the 
stores Bullock was allowed to choose a trade which was ‘taught free without 
having to pay a premium.’182  Bullock surprised everyone at the works when he 
elected to learn the trade of blacksmith as nearly all the young men at that time 
normally chose to go into the turning or fitting shops. Over the following three 
years, Bullock learnt how to operate steam hammers and make a variety of 
agricultural and mining equipment; however a slump set in and, with short time 
working and wages of just five shillings a week, Bullock began to look for a new 
post. Again his father stepped in and found him a job as a brake man on the 
local steam tramway where he learnt how to fire and drive a steam engine.  
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After Bullock's mother died his father arranged for him to join the Navy 
without informing him, although Bullock claimed he was not dismayed at the 
turn of events. Bullock entered the Royal Navy at Chatham in 1911, on 
completion, he was drafted to the Natal where he began stokehole duties with 
the other second class stokers.  Before joining the Navy Bullock had trained as 
a blacksmith yet he elected to join as a stoker. By contrast, James Leary trained 
as an ‘engine-smith’ manufacturing parts of engines and working with forgings 
and therefore thought his trade would allow him to become a blacksmith in the 
Navy, however like Bullock he also ended up as a stoker.183 Prior to joining the 
Navy Leary was a Sapper in the Territorial Army. He joined the Navy because 
he thought the Army consisted of ‘a very low grade of people’ and considered 
that people used to ‘look down at soldiers, but looked up to sailors.’  
 
Leary’s training also included the practice of firing boilers ‘cold’ with flint 
boulders before being allowed to fire a lit furnace. Leary described how he was 
taught to fire the boiler by numbers in the following sequence. At the order ‘one’, 
the shovel would be held at the ready, at ‘two’ the shovel would be driven into 
the pile of stones at the foot of the boiler, at ‘three’ the shovel would be offered 
to the furnace and at ‘four’ it would be fired in.184 This training continued 
throughout the day although there were breaks when the ‘imitation fire’ would 
be drawn back and the trainees given instruction on how to deal with clinker and 
ash. As soon as Leary was judged to be competent on the ‘stones’, he was 
given one of the ship’s thirty Bellville boilers to light up and stoke under 
supervision. Leary was also given instruction in the use of simple hand tools 
and used an engineer’s vice, chisel, file and hammer to fill square holes in 




On being rated stoker second class, Rose joined his first ship the 
Irresistible as a coal trimmer. He described trimming as being ‘hard work….very 
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hard work.’186  The job of coal trimmer entailed filling a steel box like structure 
known as a skid with coal and then transporting it from the coal bunker to the 
furnace. Rose described the skid as being similar to a ‘double ended baby’s 
pram with two runners on the bottom like a sleigh.’187 The skid weighed 
between two and three hundredweight empty and held approximately two 
hundredweights of coal when full which had to be shovelled out of the bunker 
and into the skid and then dragged over the steel deck to the furnace with one 
trimmer pulling the skid on a rope, while another pushed from behind.188 In 
order to facilitate the journey of the skid from bunker to furnace, the Irresistible 
was fitted with what was described as a ‘railway’ which consisted of a walkway 
with steel walls that helped the coal trimmer’s exercise some control over the 
four hundredweight steel skid, which was liable to go out of control should the 
ship heave or roll.   
 
The trimmers continued the process of transporting the skid from bunker 
to furnace and back again throughout the entire four hours of their watch 
without respite. Each pair of trimmers supplied coal to two boilers, each boiler 
having four furnace doors. With regards to the nature of a trimmer’s work, Rose 
could not make up his mind which was the hardest part of the job…’filling up the 
skids or pushing them back into the stokehole.’189 
 
The Irresistible’s coal bunkers held 1,800 tons of coal which took two 
days to get in from the collier but which lasted only seven to ten days, 
dependent on the number of boilers in use.190 Moreover, because the 
Irresistible was fitted with anti-torpedo nets, the bunkers extended right to the 
stern increasing the distance between the bunker and the furnaces which made 
the job a lot harder.191 Rose estimated that by the time he had emptied his skid 
in front of the furnace and gone back for another load, the stoker firing the boiler 
would have used up all the coal in front of him thereby making his task a 
continuous cycle. Inevitably, this demanding job conducted in conditions of 
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extreme heat, noise and coal dust took its toll on the men and Rose would often 
be in a state of ‘nervous collapse, wet through with sweat and as black as a 
sweep’ at the end of his watch.192   
 
The German Navy had a different arrangement for transporting coal from 
the bunkers to the stokehole. Onboard SMS Seydlitz coal-trimmers filled 
baskets with coal from the bunkers which were then hooked up to transporters 
on an overhead travelling rail system. The travelling rail allowed trimmers to 
push each basket of coal far more easily and with much less effort than the 
skids used by British trimmers. Each stokehole was connected to the bunkers 
by a coal delivery hopper which allowed the German trimmer to deliver his 
basket of coal directly to where it was required. In action, 100 stokers were 
needed to man sixteen ‘action’ bunkers on Seydlitz with additional stokers 
required to push the baskets to the bunker hoppers.193  
 
It has been claimed that coal bunkers gave protection to the hull from 
penetration by enemy shell with two feet of coal considered equivalent to one 
inch of steel.194 However, this argument was challenged by a ship’s engineering 
officer who served in the Agincourt during the First World War. He described 
how it was necessary to start trimming down from the ship’s upper coal-bunkers 
as soon as possible after leaving harbour in order to ensure that there was an 
adequate supply of coal in the immediate vicinity of the stokehole ready for 
action. This routine, probably repeated in most other ships would therefore have 
destroyed any possible protection afforded by the coal by the time the ship 
made contact with the enemy.195 Furthermore, in ships requiring good 
endurance a large amount of coal had to be stowed in reserve bunkers which 
were often situated under the waterline and difficult to access because of closed 
watertight doors, scuttles and hatches making the coal all but unusable when 
ships were closed up for action.196  
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As an added burden, Rose described how trimmers actually handled the 
coal twice, once when trimming the bunkers and delivering the coal to the 
furnace and the second time when the trimmer had to remove the ash and 
clinker from the stokehole.197 This was also a problem for Ernest Bullock whose 
ship, the Natal, was fitted with ash ejectors in all stokeholes except the one 
Bullock was assigned to. He described the ash ejectors as being ‘very efficient’, 
however because his stokehole was not fitted with one he was forced to fill his 
skid with ash at the end of each watch and drag it to a stokehole which had an 
ejector in order to dispose of the ash overboard.198   
 
The ash ejector consisted of a large hopper with steel grills over the top 
in a lattice of eight bars each way so that any clinker or ash larger than the 
space between each set of bars had to be broken up to prevent it from blocking 
the ejector pipe. The ash hopper was connected to a sea water pump which 
discharged the ash and clinker overboard through a ‘U’ tube which was 
designed to prevent water being sucked back and flooding the stokehole. 
Another means of disposing ash and clinker was by an electric or hand 
operated hoist to the upper deck. The ash would be bagged up in old coal bags 
and hoisted to the upper deck by ash parties made up from seamen who would 
collect the ash bags and then ditch them over the ship’s side. Because the 
Irresistible was a relatively old ship by the time Rose joined her she was still 
fitted with a hand worked ash hoist with a forty to fifty foot long ash chute, 
whereas the newer Birmingham, a ship he later served in, was fitted with an 
electrically driven hoist.199   
 
When he began duties as a coal-trimmer on his first ship, the Natal, a 
Duke of Edinburgh class armoured cruiser in 1911, Bullock used to enter the 
bunker equipped with a short round nosed shovel and a ‘duck lamp’ lit by rape 
seed oil. He described the coal dust as being so thick that his windpipe would 
get clogged with coal dust, forcing him to clear it by ‘much hawking and spitting.’  
On completion of his watch, Bullock would be so drained of energy he 
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remembered that, like all the other new second class trimmers, he would have 
to wait at least half an hour before he had the strength to bathe himself in the 
stokers’ bathroom, a condition which the ‘old salts’ described would either 
‘make or break’ him.200 Bullock regarded a stoker’s life during the coal-era as 
worse than being in ‘chokey’ (prison) as he claimed that in ‘chokey at least you 
could guarantee a full night’s undisturbed sleep and rest.’201 
  
On joining his first ship a stoker could expect to undertake the gruelling 
duties of coal trimmer for six months before he would be allowed to fire the 
boilers. Every new stoker assigned as a coal-trimmer spent the first six months 
of their job under the direct supervision of a chief stoker, during which time their 
progress was monitored and recorded. After six months, and provided they had 
shown good progress and efficiency and had demonstrated that they could work 
a boiler at full power, the second class stoker would be selected to sit for the 
first class stoker examination. The syllabus for first class stoker included: 
 
Ability to attend and lubricate a bearing, 
Names and uses of the principal tools used in the engine room department, 
Demonstration of an intelligent use of the more simple hand tools (spanner, 
hammer and chisel, file, screw driver), 
Ability to plait a gasket for packing glands, 
A fair knowledge of the Stoker’s manual, 
 
In addition, second class stokers had to demonstrate a fair knowledge of 
rifle exercises before they could be passed for first class rate.202 On successful 
completion of the first class examination, which was conducted orally by an 
engineering officer, the newly rated stoker first class would be promoted from 
coal-trimmer to stoker on a boiler front.203 Dependent on the type of ship and its 
boiler arrangements, a first class stoker would have one or two boilers to stoke 
during a watch. S.P.O. Reynolds gave the following description of the scene in 
a stokehole when the Lancaster was working up to full power: 
 
Groups of boilers would be lit and connected in turn, until all thirty-one boilers 
were ‘on-line’ and supplying steam to the engines. At full power the stokehole 
                                            
200 E. W. Bullock, 'Recollections of Naval Service,' 6. 
201 Ibid.  
202 Stoker’s Manual 1912, 121. 
203 E. W. Bullock, 'Recollections of Naval Service,' 6. 
83 
 
reverberated to the ‘roar of the furnaces’ and the ‘noise of the fan engines.’  
These were interspersed with the ‘shouts of the leading stokers’ and the ‘curses 
of the coal-trimmers’ as they drew the coals from the bunkers and deposited 
them onto the plates prior to their delivery in the ‘miniature hells’ that yawned up 
in front of them.  
 
Reynolds observed dryly that ‘Dante’s Inferno was nowhere in it.’204 If 
that was not enough discomfort, Reynolds recalled the ‘blinding’ coal dust and 
the ‘terrific heat’ commenting that ‘taking it all around, it [the stokehole] was no 
place for a Parson’s son.’205  However, this was not a clue as to Reynolds’ birth 
status, as an examination of his birth certificate shows that he was registered as 
being born ‘illegitimate’ on 5th February 1871 to Margaret Reynolds, whose 
occupation was given as ‘house servant.’206   
  
Reynolds joined the Royal Navy at Pembroke Chatham in 1893, signing 
on for twelve years. Prior to joining the Navy Reynolds was employed as a 
‘seaman’, therefore he probably served in the merchant service or possibly as a 
fisherman. This being the case, it is surprising that Reynolds was not steered 
towards joining the Navy as a seaman by the recruiting staff due to his previous 
experience when he applied to join. It took Reynolds some eleven years to 
make leading stoker before his service expired and he left the Navy in July 1905, 
signing on for the Royal Fleet Reserve before he left. However, times may have 
been hard in civilian life as Reynolds only spent three months as a civilian 
before he applied to be discharged from the R.F.R. to enable him to re-join the 
Navy, which he did in October 1905.207 By this action, Reynolds followed the 
pattern established earlier in this chapter whereby stokers were more liable than 
seamen to leave the service after their first period of engagement but then re-
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Firing the boilers 
 
On the Irresistible, Stoker Rose had one boiler with four furnaces to 
manage, a job which he considered ‘easy.’ For Rose, the hardest work for any 
stoker was ‘definitely trimming.’208 Rose observed that one of the most 
important tasks of a boiler front stoker was to keep the ash pits under his 
furnace clear of ash and his fire bars clear of clinker. Removing the clinker from 
the fire bars required two men. (See Illustration 4, p. 85). One would hold open 
the doors to the furnace, while the other would grab hold of a ninety pound slice 
which was a nine foot long iron bar, described by Rose ‘as big as a room’, with 
a wedge shaped head at one end. Before inserting the slice into the furnace the 
end would be wrapped with sackcloth to prevent heat travelling through its 
length and burning the user. Having inserted the wedge end of the slice into the 
fire the stoker holding it would use a continuous lifting motion to agitate the fire 
until the clinker rose to the surface. Then, with the use of a two pronged rake 
known as a ‘devil’, the clinker would be dragged out of the furnace onto the 
deck plates where the second stoker would play a salt water hose on the clinker 
to cool it down.209   
 
When he was cleaning fires Stoker Sidney Knock described how the 
furnace appeared to ‘vomit forth white hot clinker’, while the hand-rags which he 
wrapped around the slice would smoulder from the heat transmitted through the 
length of the slice.210 Because the hot clinker had to be dragged out of the 
furnace onto the stokehole deck plates, stokers wore wooden clogs in the 
stokehole rather than leather boots. Rose explained that wooden clogs were 
impervious to direct heat whereas leather boots would quickly melt under those 
conditions.211 In addition to wooden clogs, stokers wore a flannel vest, a soft  
cap and ‘fearnought’ trousers which were made from a heavy woollen fire-proof 
material.212  
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Illustration 4:      Cleaning the Fires   
 
Source :  © Imperial War Museum Q_018773. 
 
Stokers removing clinker from a furnace with a ‘slice’ or ‘clinker knocker.’ The ‘clean’ 
stoker in the foreground looks experienced and was probably demonstrating the task. 
He is wearing new fearnought trousers, he also appears to be wearing leather boots not 
clogs which were the normal footwear in the stokehole. Only officers wore gloves in the 
machinery spaces, therefore, the officer in the direct foreground watching the evolution 
was either a Commissioned or Warrant Engineer. The grimy stoker in the background 








When Rose stood up after bending down to fire coal into the furnace the 
material would touch his legs remembering , ‘it made you wonder what the 
dickens is against your leg…..red hot.’213 James Dunn recalled that while 
fearnought trousers were made of heavy material they did not last long in the 
harsh conditions of the stokehole. Dunn was issued with three yards of 
fearnought material every six months from the ship’s Paymaster which he would 
then have made up into trousers by the tailor or ‘Jewing firm.’214   
  
The First World War appears to have introduced some relaxation in 
stokers’ dress regulations. Stoker Leary remembered that the Arab’s stokers’ 
used to wear ‘any old clothes they had’, or ‘the oldest suit you had’ in the 
stokehole, although the stokers still retained their own ‘clogs.’215  Then again, 
conditions onboard some of the older ships of the fleet before the war also 
demanded ad hoc alterations to regulation uniform. Stoker First Class 
Crowhurst serving in the Leviathan in 1902 recorded in his memoirs: 
 
The ship is in bad condition, the bilges are in a bad state and unhealthy. All 
boilers are leaking and not fit to steam with….I have had to fire with a bag round 
my head on account of hot water dropping on my neck.216 
 
The act of firing the furnace was timed by a ‘Kilroy system’, which was a 
‘tell-tale’ arrangement, operated off the main engine through a mechanical 
linkage which lit a lamp above each furnace in turn. The Kilroy system would 
show above each furnace ‘fire’ or 'fire number one’, at the same time a bell 
would ring to draw the attention of the stoker to which furnace to fire next. 
However, experienced stokers like Rose would ignore the Kilroy indicator and 
use their own judgment when it came to firing the boilers, (See Illustration 5, p. 
87). Rose described the importance of maintaining the correct steam pressure 
which was typically 250 to 300 pounds per square inch. Another important task 
was to ensure that the fire was kept even across its whole length and breadth 
so that no holes appeared in the fire.  
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Illustration 5:  Example of ‘Kilroy’s Stoking Indicator’ as fitted to RMS Titanic. 
       













If the fire became ‘thin’ a hole would appear in the fire which would send 
sparks up the funnel, a problem which Rose suggested would be ‘fatal’ in 
wartime, as sparks could be observed by the enemy at night.217   
 
Leading Stoker Mechanic Jack Cotterell was born in the Welsh coalfields 
and followed his peers down the pit at the age of twelve. At the age of fifteen 
Cotterell was made redundant from the pit but was fortunate enough to obtain 
another job in a local steel works firing the boilers. By 1912 having had ‘enough 
of coal,’ Cotterell decided to join the Navy for some adventure only to find 
himself at Devonport barracks being trained for the job of stoker.218 After taking 
part in steam trials on the Centurion, Cotterell was drafted to the light cruiser 
Gloucester which experienced some hard steaming in the first month of the First 
World War while shadowing the German battlecruiser Goeben and the cruiser 
Breslau in the Mediterranean. The stokers on the Gloucester were said to have 
‘gone mad’ with the excitement of the chase, making so much steam that the 
Captain had to order them to slow down.219 Cotterell described firing boilers as 
a ‘skilled job’ which required much care to ensure that the fire was spread 
evenly and that all hollow spots were filled so that the fire glowed with a white 
heat (See Illustration 6, p. 89). In order to closely watch the fire without hurting 
their eyes, Cotterell and the rest of the stokehole crew wore blue-tinted 
glasses.220   
 
In order to keep the stokers clean and in good health they were 
subjected to a strict regime on completion of their watch in the stokehole. 
Having washed themselves in their own bathroom, stokers were required to 
dress in ‘dry, clean clothes’ and then parade in front of the Chief Stoker of the 
watch who would inspect each man before allowing him to go down to his 
mess-deck.221   
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Illustration 6:   Firing the boilers 
 
Source: ©   Imperial War Museum, Image Q18593. 
 
Stokers firing the boiler. One stoker holds the furnace door open while the second man 
in the team fires the coal in. The SPO or Chief Stoker is looking intently at his boiler  
water level gauge glasses directly in front of him while another team of stokers fire the  












In 1914 the journalist Filson Young obtained an unusual temporary 
commission in the Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve which was  authorised by 
Admiral Fisher to enable him to serve on Admiral Beatty’s staff in the First Battle 
Cruiser Squadron. In his description of the workings of the squadron, Young 
observed that while stokers saw ‘nothing during action’, he thought they had the 
hardest work of all as they remained in the greatest peril where they could have 
been ‘blown up or boiled alive’, should the ship be damaged.222  Despite these 
disadvantages, Young described the stokers of Beatty’s flagship Lion as having 
the most enthusiasm of all the ship’s company for action, recalling that the 
stokers were so eager for a ‘scrap,’ the Lion would literally ‘hum’ with songs 
from the stoker’s mess-decks once the order to raise steam was given. During 
the Dogger Bank action where the battle cruisers were steamed at up to twenty-
nine knots for several hours, Young praised the ‘superhuman’ efforts made by 
the stokers in keeping up steam pressure.  
 
To emphasise the spirit of the stokers while in action, Young described 
how a S.P.O from ‘D’ stokehole had pleaded with the Senior Engineer to ban 
his stokers from singing at the boilers, ‘because he could not make himself 
heard during the high speed chase.’223 Describing stokers as ‘great heroes’, 
Young credited them with playing a ‘mighty part in winning the war.’224 However, 
he acknowledged that stokers were ‘tough nuts’ and as such were not included 
in the ‘ornamental part of the service.’ As a professional journalist Young would 
have had a keen eye for detail. Moreover, with no prior knowledge or 
experience of the trials and tribulations of a stoker’s life, his views would not 
have been coloured by any of the prejudice which stemmed from the class 
divisions separating the wardroom from the lower-deck and stokers from 
seamen. Therefore, Young’s description of stokers in action provides an 
illuminating pen-picture which suggests that the value of a stoker’s work was 
held in high esteem by many in the service but the man himself did not quite fit 
in with the traditional ideals and values of the Navy. In reversing a well-known 
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proverb, this attitude almost suggests that within the Navy, stokers were 
expected to be ‘heard but not seen.’   
 
L. V. Bedford, joined the Navy as a stoker in 1910 at Chatham barracks. 
After completing his training Bedford joined the Arromanche an old minelayer 
fitted with ancient tank boilers and reciprocating engines. Bedford described the 
ship as ‘good tuition, but hard living.’225 Bedford was rated Stoker First Class 
after only six months early in 1911 and then drafted to the new cruiser Falmouth. 
In contrast to the Arromanche, Falmouth was fitted with the latest Yarrow water-
tube boilers which burnt both coal and oil to generate steam. Bedford was made 
mate to the chief boilermaker who ‘taught him a lot’ and helped him to prepare 
for the leading stoker’s examination.226   
 
Contrary to Christopher McKee's description of the physical stature of 
stokers and other contemporary and modern opinion, not all stokers were 
physically large men. Bedford was barely five feet four inches in height and 
weighed just ten and a half stones. Nonetheless, he observed that men with a 
small stature were preferred in the stokehole, ‘particularly when it came to 
conducting boiler cleans.’227 Despite the fact that while on watch he hardly 
stopped throwing coals into the furnace, Bedford described the work of a stoker 
as being a ‘great job.’ However, after only nine months onboard Falmouth, he 
was unfortunately drafted back to Chatham to join the old Cressy for two 
months steam trials prior to the ship going for refit. Bedford described the 
Cressy as ‘murder’ as she had thirty boilers and eight stokeholes with no 
watertight doors down below.228 With hindsight, Bedford observed that without 
the protection of watertight doors it was, ‘no wonder she went down like a stone 
with the Hogue and Abokuir.’229 Moreover, he reflected on his luck in having left 
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the ship before the war started, as he judged the Cressy would certainly ‘have 




Not all first class stokers worked in the stokehole, some became engine-
room or outside machinery (auxiliary machinery) watch-keepers. In the engine-
room first class stokers would ‘watch over’ (watch-keep) on the triple-expansion 
or turbine engines, condensers and their associated pumps and systems. 
Others would undertake duties as ‘outside watch-keepers’ (outside the engine-
room). These men would be responsible for operating steering gear, dynamos, 
refrigeration and distilling plants. E.R.As and mechanicians also kept watches in 
the engine rooms and stokeholes but as they were more technically trained men 
their duties were to supervise the stokers and to conduct repairs and 
maintenance rather than mind the machinery.  
 
On battleships or battlecruisers stokers could be found undertaking 
duties far from the stokehole or engine room. Prior to going into action the 
battleship Queen Elizabeth would station two E.R.As and one stoker in each of 
her main fifteen inch gun turrets to effect emergency repairs to the turret 
operating systems. One E.R.A. and the stoker would be stationed in the working 
chamber while the second E.R.A. would be stationed in the shell room. In the 
event of damage to the hydraulic pressure or exhaust system outside the turret, 
the E.R.A. from the shell room would be sent to investigate together with the 
stoker from the working chamber, ‘provided the stoker could be spared.’231  
 
Stokers also had their own specialist sea and harbour jobs when they 
were not engaged in stoking or in engine room or outside machinery space 
watch-keeping. Each E.R.A. had a stoker allocated to him as a ‘mate,’ often 
maintaining a working relationship for an entire commission.232  Stoker Bullock 
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became a ‘boiler maker’s mate’ on the Natal in 1911 and with thirty-one boilers 
to look after, ‘there was always plenty of repair work to be done.’233  However, 
boiler repair work was not to everyone’s liking. Upon being detailed off as boiler 
maker’s mate, Stoker Rose used to think, ‘oh God!’ Rose was thankful that he 
eventually grew too obese to get into the boiler through the access door, a 
sensation he described as ‘shocking.’  To climb into a boiler, Rose would stretch 
his arms into the access and then ‘swim’ through the small access hole. He 
thought being inside a boiler was a ‘horrible sensation’, and suggested that 
anyone suffering from claustrophobia, ‘would be driven mad.’234 When working 
inside boilers, stokers would wear a minimal amount of clothing usually just a 
flannel, a pair of pants and a pair of light shoes as the residual heat made them 
sweat freely.  
 
A common repair job given to stokers was to replace the slabs of zinc 
that were bolted inside boilers in order to minimise corrosion. However, ‘the 
worst job of the whole lot’, according to Rose, was conducting a boiler clean. 
During a boiler clean every one of the hundreds of tubes that made up a water-
tube boiler had to be individually cleaned using a special tool. Wearing goggles, 
the stoker would use the cleaning tool in a ‘sawing’ action up and down each 
tube in turn. This work covered the men in carbon dust and Rose noted that 
despite the use of goggles, ‘it blinded you and made your eyes sting like 
blazes.’235 Rose noted with some irony, that when ships were on foreign 
stations local labour was employed on these dirty and dangerous jobs.236  
However, while this may have come as a great relief to every stoker in the fleet, 
the fact that they could so easily be replaced with cheap native labour could 
only have added to the low status accorded them. 
 
Louis Le Bailly served as an Engineer Lieutenant in the Hood and left the 
following description of a typical boiler clean:  
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To prevent corrosion of boiler drums and tubes it was frequently necessary, 
depending on sea time, to remove all heat-insulating lagging, open up each 
boiler, clean and black-lead the internal fittings and then, through a small 
manhole, perform the same rites inside each of the three boiler drums, brushing 
through every tube. By dropping carefully counted balls down each of several 
thousand tubes we ensured that there was no blockage which, when steaming, 
could inhibit the water’s circulation and cause a tube to melt and explode into 
the furnace with probable casualties. Leading Stoker bricklayers with their 
unskilled mates would be breaking up damaged fire brick walls in the furnace 
and removing the rubble before building and cementing new ones. Yet another 
gang would be inserting ten foot saws between the tubes to remove soot and 
clinker and sweeping down and oiling Hood’s huge funnels. Meantime artificers 
and mechanicians would be refitting steam, water and oil valves, repairing 
steam leaks and associated auxiliary machinery. Finally, each boiler would be 
pumped up to its working pressure and tested for leaks. With twenty-four boilers 
in four boiler rooms this job was never ending. Asbestosis had not been heard 
of and we all lived for long hours in a fog of brick dust, asbestos fibre and soot. 
Work went on round the clock in six or eight hour spells depending on the heat 
and urgency, until completed.237 
 
Other stokers could be trained as blacksmiths or plumbers’ mates 
particularly if they had previous experience before joining the service. While 
serving in the Dahlia off the port of Aden, Stoker Bullock repaired the rudder of 
the ship’s motor boat, a job which would normally have been undertaken by the 
blacksmith. However, while the Dahlia had a forge she did not carry a 
blacksmith, neither were any of the E.R.As able to repair the boats broken 
rudder hinge. Therefore, as Bullock had served an apprenticeship in a 
blacksmith’s shop before entering the Navy, he successfully repaired the hinge 
himself despite the engineer’s doubts as to his competence.238   
 
In conclusion, this chapter has shown that for forty-seven years from the 
first steam ship Comet in 1822 until the arrival of the first E.R.As in 1869 stokers 
were highly regarded and relatively skilled men capable of taking charge of an 
engine room or stokehole. Despite opposition from certain quarters many 
stokers became engineers in their own right, indeed the rating of Chief Stoker 
was specifically introduced for this reason. The contribution that a skilled team 
of stokers could make to the speed and efficiency of a ship was widely 
recognised by senior officers and stokers were well looked after receiving 
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higher rates of pay and special privileges which were denied to seamen ratings. 
However, after the E.R.A. branch was introduced and the rate of Chief Stoker 
was abolished, stokers were subjugated to the position of semi-skilled labourers 
to the more highly skilled E.R.A. From this point on, stokers appeared to occupy 
a lower place in the naval hierarchy than they had hitherto.   
 
Until the last decade of the nineteenth century, stokers entered the Navy, 
were kitted out and then sent directly to a ship where they were expected to 
learn ‘on the job.’ By contrast, seamen were trained for up to three years prior to 
going to sea. The sudden influx of a new draft of untrained stokers on a ship’s 
company would undoubtedly have brought scorn and derision upon them from 
trained and confident sailors of all types. Moreover, as machinery became more 
complex problems arose through a lack of experience leading to deaths, injuries 
and machinery breakdowns. These incidents were widely reported within the 
service and by naval correspondents in the press which gave second class 
stokers in particular an undeserved reputation for being unskilled.   
 
While the Admiralty persisted in sending untrained stokers to its newest 
ships which then suffered from a lack of efficiency, emerging navies such as the 
Imperial Russian Navy led the way by adopting a novel training regime. After a 
lengthy course in stoking at a training base, the Russian stoker was sent to 
France to learn how to operate the water-tube boiler from the boiler 
manufacturers before joining his ship. Even after the Royal Navy introduced a 
formal training system at the end of the nineteenth century, a stoker was still 
liable to be trained in an ancient training ship with outdated machinery and then 
sent to a modern vessel where he would have to re-learn everything.     
 
As the water tube boiler became more widely fitted in ships, the 
requirement for stokers’ outstripped demand. Evidence presented suggests 
recruiting officers were prepared to pass men fit for service as stokers 
regardless of whether they met the age or physical standards required. The 
lowering of recruitment standards at a time of great demand was to be expected. 
However, when the demand was caused through the introduction of new 
technology this became a mistake. This mistake was compounded by the 
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complacent attitude shown by the Admiralty towards providing sufficient training 
for the large numbers of stokers entering the Navy. The First Sea Lord 
acknowledged that untrained stokers were being rushed into the fleet but was 
adamant that it would not slow down the boiler replacement programme. The 
result was inevitable. Stokers were blamed for machinery failures and 
breakdowns while the men who had been recruited in haste and who were not 
physically mature for the job of stoking only added to the already strong notion 
that stokers were not up to the job. Despite these problems, evidence has been 
presented which suggests that overall, once recruited, stokers tended to remain 
in service longer than seamen and were more prepared to return to service 
once discharged. This evidence challenges contemporary and modern 
accusations that stokers lacked the traditional values of seamen or that they 
were less loyal to the service.  
 
The recruitment of stokers and other engine room personnel continued 
throughout the first decade of the twentieth century until the unthinkable 
occurred in the Navy. In 1914 the engine room branch became the largest 
branch of the lower-deck surpassing seamen, who, from the very beginning of 
the Royal Navy, had always been the dominant force. However, it was not to 
last, as predicted by Lionel Yexley, this was the heyday for stokers. Ironically, at 
a time when the need for stokers to man the water-tube boiler was at its highest, 
the introduction of oil fuel resulted in an overall reduction in the number of 
stokers needed to man the new oil-fuelled boilers. While coal-fired ships 
remained in the Navy for several more years, the end of the First World War 
allowed seamen to reclaim their dominant position. The introduction of the 
water-tube boiler could have gone some way to restoring stokers to the status 
of skilled men, as they were the men specifically tasked with operating it. 
Unfortunately, the failure of the Admiralty to provide stokers on entry with the 
necessary training resulted in a lost opportunity and stokers were unable to 
capitalise on this new technology. While trained stokers were undeniably 
masters of the art of stoking, their overall status became tarnished with the 
perception that stokers were relatively unskilled men. This perception was made 






Heat exhaustion, stokers’ cramp and other stokehole maladies 
 
The following chapter has extensively relied on the published annual 
'Statistical Report for the Health of the Navy' from the years 1897-1936 together 
with additional medical reports and journal articles that extend the period up to 
the 1950s. Life in the stokehole exposed stokers to physical dangers including 
accidents, occupational diseases, illnesses and particular medical conditions 
that arose as a direct result of the type of work they were engaged in. While it is 
recognised that seamen and others would also have suffered from 
'occupational' medical conditions, the purpose of this chapter is to place the 
medical history of stokers on record and to examine how their work affected 
their health. Wherever possible comparisons will be made in order to determine 
whether there were any noticeable differences between the health of stokers 
and other men of the lower-deck.  
 
While the annual reports for the 'Health of the Navy' are detailed 
documents covering every known medical condition, the returns from individual 
ships, commands and stations were as a rule, only given as a total number of 
men afflicted. As a result, apart from isolated exceptions it has proved 
impossible to extrapolate stokers out of the total numbers given for most 
conditions reported. One exception was the recording of tuberculosis (TB). After 
1906 each return for TB was broken down to identify the numbers of men 
afflicted from each branch including officers, therefore this disease can be 
reported with some accuracy. However, if a ship's surgeon had a particularly 
interesting case the return from that vessel might identify the patient as a stoker, 
seaman or marine with a description of the treatment given and the subsequent 
outcome. These individual case studies have allowed some judgements to be 
made with regards to the health of stokers compared to others.  








As previously described by Stoker Richard Rose, the least attractive of 
all jobs undertaken by stokers was that of coal-trimming, not least because of 
the potential dangers from asphyxiation through a build-up of noxious gases or 
through becoming trapped or crushed by the weight of coal. D. J. Hoare, served 
as an engineer lieutenant in the Collingwood and in the unpublished memoir of 
his service life he recounted two incidents which arose through asphyxiation 
caused when men entered coal-bunkers containing ‘foul-air.’   
 
In the first incident, a team consisting of a chief stoker and three stokers 
entered a coal bunker in the Collingwood in order to determine the amount of 
coal remaining. This calculation was made by estimating the average level of 
coal in the bunker and measuring the remaining space between the top of the 
coal and the deck-head (roof or ceiling of the bunker). On this particular 
occasion, having tested the bunker for ‘marsh gas’, (also called methane or fire-
damp) with a safety lamp and determining that the bunker was free from gas, 
the chief stoker and his small team of stokers entered the bunker each carrying 
a ‘tea-pot’ type spirit lamp with a wick and naked flame. Lt Hoare specified that 
the lamps were lit by ‘causer oil’, although Stoker Bullock used the same type of 
spirit lamp lit by ‘rape seed oil.’239  Nonetheless, despite having checked that 
the bunker was free from ‘marsh gas’, an explosion occurred a short time after 
the men had entered the bunker which killed the chief stoker outright.240   
 
On another occasion after coaling ship in the rain at Lamlash, Hoare 
ordered the coal bags to be left to dry on the upper deck guardrails overnight. 
However, the Commander gave Hoare a reprimand for cluttering the ship's 
guard (safety) rails with dirty coaling bags and ordered him to remove them. 
Unfortunately, the bags were still damp when they were thrown down a coal 
scuttle to the foremost coal bunker which was where the coaling bags were 
normally stowed in between coaling ship. Later that day, Chief Stoker Flynn 
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went down the coal bunker which was only accessible through a manhole cover 
on the upper deck, to stow the bags properly when he suddenly stopped 
communicating to the stoker above. Another stoker was sent down the bunker, 
only to find Flynn dead from the fumes in the bunker.241 
 
The circumstances which led to the unfortunate demise of Chief Stoker 
Flynn were in direct contravention of an Admiralty directive contained within the 
Stokers’ Manual which warned against the stowage of damp coaling bags. 
Paragraph 201 stipulated that in order to prevent sufficient heat being 
generated to cause spontaneous combustion by the oxidation of the coal dust 
remaining in them, used coal sacks and bags were to be ‘quite dry’ when 
stowed. In addition, the directive ordered that coaling-bags were to be removed 
and ventilated from ‘time to time’ and stowed in such a way that air could 
circulate between them.242    
 
Despite strict precautions to prevent accidents to men working in 
confined spaces, deaths through noxious gases appear to have been a 
relatively common feature of naval life, particularly during the coal-era. 
Admiralty Instructions regarding the entering of closed spaces that had been 
insufficiently ventilated warned against two main dangers. The first was the 
danger from the presence of a gas which could form an explosive mixture with 
air causing it to ignite when a naked light was brought into it. In the second, 
men were warned regarding the absence of the air necessary to support life, 
owing to it having been used up, or excluded by another gas.243  Both of these 
conditions were liable to be encountered in coal bunkers and ships double 
bottoms used as fuel or water tanks, areas in which stokers commonly worked.   
 
In 1910 twenty-eight cases of poisoning were recorded caused through 
men working in insufficiently ventilated closed spaces. The most serious of 
these were five cases of poisoning by carbon monoxide which occurred in the 
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Cochrane.244 The Cochrane was coaling ship at Cromarty when it was noticed 
that coal was not being cleared from the chutes leading to ‘D’ port lower bunker, 
whereupon a leading stoker was sent to investigate the cause. On entering the 
bunker the leading stoker found five coal-trimmers in the bunker unconscious. 
After medical intervention, four men recovered, however one man died despite 
being given hypodermic injections of strychnine, the administration of ether, and 
artificial respiration which was continued for one and a half hours. The exact 
nature of the atmosphere that was liable to be found in confined spaces was still 
a relatively unknown science at this time as suggested by the statement made 
by the Fleet Surgeon:  
 
As regards the origin of the gas which caused the accident opinions are divided, 
and the matter is still being investigated. Prima facie it seemed to me that it 
must have been evolved in some way by the coal that was being taken in.245 
 
In the preceding year, there were a number of similar examples of coal 
bunker accidents. Four stokers were overcome by gas while trimming a bunker 
in the Euryalus, although fortunately they all later recovered.246  A stoker in 
Black Prince suffered an ‘epileptiform seizure’ after becoming partially 
suffocated by coal dust in a bunker while coaling, while a bunker explosion in 
the Hogue resulted in general burns to eight stokers, two of whom died from 
their injuries.247 In addition, the Implacable, Euryalus and Inflexible all reported 
burns to stokers from coal-bunker explosions that year.248   
 
Being crushed by coal in the bunker was another danger that stokers 
needed to be aware of. In the Leviathan a stoker was suffocated in a bunker 
after being trapped when the coal slipped and buried him. The accident report 
stated that an ‘arch’ of coal had probably formed in the bunker which gave way 
causing the coal to slide and fall on top of the man. After several tons of coal 
had been dug away and removed through the bunker door, a task which 
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probably took several hours; the man was found dead.249  In a further example 
the annual Fleet Medical returns for the St Vincent reported in 1911 that a 
stoker, who had fallen asleep in a bunker prior to coaling ship, had 
subsequently been crushed to death when a hundredweight of coal was shot 
down the chute on top of him.250   
 
Tropical climates brought their own particular problems and dangers for 
the unwary stoker detailed to work in a coal bunker. While serving as a S.P.O. 
in the Bluebell, Ernest Bullock remembered arriving in Port Moresby, New 
Guinea, where the Bluebell was directed to coal from a mound of coal which 
had been ‘over-run with jungle vegetation.’ In Bullock’s judgement the coal had 
lost its ‘goodness’ being just about perished through having lain out in the open 
for too long but it had to be taken in all the same. On completion of coaling ship 
it was found that a number of snakes had been brought aboard with the coal no 
doubt making the stokers a little hesitant when entering a darkened bunker.251  
 
Scalds, burns and explosions 
 
While coal-trimmers were subjected to the dangers of asphyxiation, 
explosions and burns, being crushed by coal and even snake bites, the first 
class men stoking the boilers had their own particular medical conditions and 
injuries to contend with. In 1905 a steam pipe burst in the Implacable while on 
the Mediterranean Station which killed eight stokers.252 Similar accidents 
occurred over following years. Six stokers were scalded and two killed after a 
boiler tube burst on the torpedo-boat destroyer Dragon in 1907. In 1909 a joint 
in a boiler door gave way in the destroyer Otter at Wei-hai-wei which scalded 
four stokers and killed two others.253  The following year a similar accident 
occurred when a boiler tube burst in the Sutlej which blew off a furnace door 
and enveloped five stokers in ‘heat and flame’, killing four of them.254   
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Heat exhaustion  
 
Apart from burns and scalds, the two most common ailments that 
affected stokers working in the stokehole were ‘heat exhaustion’ and ‘stokers'-
cramp.’ The terms ‘heat exhaustion’ and ‘heat stroke’ appeared to have been 
interchangeable during this period with both terms often used by ship’s 
surgeons to describe heat related conditions. Furthermore, it is apparent that 
the medical profession at the time did not fully understand the underlying 
complexities or the differences between heat stroke and heat exhaustion, as 
pointed out by Staff Surgeon Rees of the Fox, who observed:  
 
our present knowledge is not sufficient to differentiate between the aetiology 
(cause) of the two diseases.’255   
 
Present medical knowledge defines heat exhaustion as a condition 
arising from exercise or work conducted in a hot, humid place where body fluids 
are lost through sweating, causing dehydration and overheating of the body 
giving rise to a maximum temperature of 40 degrees Centigrade. By contrast, 
heat stroke is defined as a ‘life threatening condition’ caused when a person’s 
cooling system which is controlled by the brain, stops working. Without cooling 
the internal body temperature rises to 40.6 degrees (C) or greater at which point 
brain damage and damage to other internal organs will result.256  The following 
chapter will record all temperatures in Fahrenheit as given in the original 
records. 
 
The 1904 medical return from the ‘Irregular Force’ reported fifty-six cases 
of heat stroke with two deaths.257  In the following year the same squadron 
reported ninety cases of heat stroke among the fifty-three vessels which made 
up the command. Two of these cases were fatal with the medical report 
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highlighting the fact that the great majority of all heat-stroke victims were 
‘stokers, when steaming in the tropics.’258   
 
In 1906 the ‘Irregular List’ reported fifty-seven cases of heat stroke which 
included one man who had to be invalided home and one death. The ‘Irregular 
List’, contained all medical returns from ships on independent passage, or those 
proceeding to or from a station, and included crews carried in transports to 
commission ships on a foreign station, or on passage home after paying off. 
Again, the great majority of these fifty-seven cases were identified as ‘stokers, 
while steaming in the tropics.’259  In 1907 the Irregular List reported seventy-
eight cases of heat stroke, fifty-one of these occurring in the Colombo while on 
passage through the Red Sea. This time the report stated that the majority of 
cases occurred amongst the ‘young stokers’ who were making their first trip in 
the tropics.’260   
 
In 1908 the Cape of Good Hope Station recorded forty-nine cases of 
heat-stroke during the year, of which the majority occurred either in the Red 
Sea or between Aden and Hong Kong. However, by this time the symptoms of 
heat related conditions were better understood and these cases were divided 
into heat-stroke, caused through exposure to the direct rays of the sun, and 
heat-exhaustion, which afflicted men working in stokeholes and engine rooms 
under high temperatures. The medical return for the Cape station stated that the 
majority of the forty-nine cases, ‘were attributed to the latter.’261   
 
  Staff Surgeon Rees of the Fox conducted a study into the symptoms 
and effects of high air temperatures on stokehole and engine-room ratings 
combined with the incidence of heat in the tropics. His study suggested that the 
idea that the temperature of the body as a fixed and certain quantity, capable of 
being set down in absolute figures; ‘must at once be given up.’262 As part of his 
study, Rees conducted a self experiment over a two day period in order to 
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determine his average body temperature while the Fox was on passage through 
the Red Sea. The surgeon recorded that his rectal temperature ranged between 
98.2 and 102.6 degrees (F), while his temperature by mouth was 97.5 to 99.6  
degrees (F).  The surgeon admitted that his highest recorded temperature had 
been ‘accidental’, from which it can be deduced that he had probably spent too 
long in a particularly high temperature area of the machinery spaces. 
Nevertheless, Rees came to the conclusion that, despite the variances between 
oral and rectal temperatures, the rectal temperature would always be between 
one and two degrees higher than that taken orally.263   
  
Body temperature is controlled by the regulation of heat production and 
the regulation of heat loss, the first being a chemical agency while the second is 
a physical one. With regards to the regulation of heat loss, Surgeon Rees 
considered it as comprising three main aspects. These were described as 
evaporation, conduction and convection. In one experiment carried out in the 
stokehole of the Fox, Rees demonstrated the effect of evaporation on the body 
when he lost two and a half pounds in weight by simply sitting in an area where 
the wet bulb temperature recorded 84 degrees and the dry bulb 104 degrees 
(F).264   
 
The only difference between a dry and a wet bulb thermometer is that the 
wet bulb thermometer is encased in a cloth material and kept wet through a 
‘wicking’ arrangement. As the water evaporates it cools the wet bulb 
thermometer thereby allowing the relative humidity and dew point temperature 
to be calculated through the use of a psychometric chart. In air that is less than 
saturated (one hundred per cent relative humidity) the wet bulb temperature will 
always be lower than the dry bulb temperature.265 From this experiment Rees 
concluded that the rate of evaporation of sweat depends on the relative 
humidity of the surrounding air, therefore the greater the difference between the 
wet and dry bulbs, the greater the loss of heat through water evaporation.266   
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Rees suggested that in order for men to be kept cool through conduction, 
much depended on the co-efficient cooling of the body relative to its 
temperature and the temperature of the surrounding air. However, conduction 
was dependent on the form of the body, taking into account its colour, the 
condition of the surface, the type of clothing worn and on the presence of layers 
of subcutaneous fat. Rees argued that a small, wiry stoker would lose heat 
more rapidly than a ‘fat’ one, as fat has only half the conductivity that muscle 
has. On the other hand, Rees suggested that the ‘fat man’ would lose heat 
through water evaporation at a much greater rate than a thin man.267   
 
Rees also suggested that the colour of a man’s skin played its part in 
radiating heat. Using the Black man as an example, Rees argued that his dark 
skin would be an advantage in sunlight, while it would also radiate heat 
(convection) better than a light one in the stokehole.268 However, one point that 
confused Rees was the reason why coal-trimmers working in coal-bunkers often 
appeared to be more susceptible to heat stroke than those who were engaged 
in firing the furnaces. His analogy of the Negro suggested that coal trimmers 
should have been able to keep cool because they were covered from head to 
foot with a thick coating of black coal dust. Therefore, their ‘artificial’ colour 
should have allowed them to radiate heat much faster than the uncovered body 
was able.269 Then again, Rees may have overlooked the fact that the 
temperature of a coal-bunker would naturally be greater than that in the 
stokehole, due to the complete absence of any natural or forced air circulation.   
 
It could be argued that the ability of a stoker to withstand the heat in an 
enclosed coal-bunker was more a matter of the individual constitution of the 
man rather than any differences in skin colour be that natural or artificial. When 
Stoker Vincent joined the Aspasia as a new second class stoker one of the first 
jobs he was given was to clean out the reserve coal-bunker. The reserve coal-
bunker was long and narrow with a deck head height of less than six feet and 
was situated immediately over the engine room with the main-steam pipes 
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running directly under the bunker floor. At the time it held around ten tons of 
coal and Vincent described it as being as ‘hot as an oven and completely 
devoid of breathable air.’270 The coal was removed in large baskets which were 
hand filled and then dragged along the deck of the coal-bunker to be deposited 
down a chute. It took Vincent and two other stokers all day to complete the work 
of clearing out the bunker. Due to the extreme heat, the men worked naked 
apart from their boots taking it in turns to carry out the work. They changed over 
every fifteen minutes in order to give themselves sufficient time to recuperate 
after each exertion. Due to the heat and choking coal dust, Vincent declared 
that it was impossible for any man to work for longer than fifteen minutes. 
Indeed, the conditions were so bad that one man began to vomit after coming 
out of the bunker and he eventually had to be relieved after suffering a ‘fainting 
condition.’271 
 
While stokers appeared to have looked upon the ever-present choking 
coal-dust as an unfortunate by-product of their work, it would nowadays be 
regarded as a dangerous occupational hazard which would require extreme 
preventative measures, much like the current precautions which are required to 
be employed when working with asbestos. In 1936, a challenge was made in 
the House of Lords over the question of the number of naval stokers who had 
been discharged from the service with diseases of the chest. Although the Navy 
by this time was almost entirely oil fired, some of these men may have 
contracted the disease during the early years of their naval service when coal –
firing was the norm. Nonetheless, Lord Stanley considered that no special 
precautions were considered necessary, ‘to improve the conditions under which 
Royal Navy stokers worked in order to reduce the risk to their health.’272 Be that 
as it may, according to stoker James Leary, the coal dust 'used to get up your 
nose, in your eyes and down your ears you see. It really got on your lungs, 
there’s no doubt about that.'273 
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One aspect of heat exhaustion that puzzled Staff Surgeon Rees was why 
it only afflicted some of the men from the engine room and stokehole crews and 
not all of them. He thought differences in the atmospheric conditions that 
existed between the engine room and the stokehole of his ship might offer an 
explanation; therefore he conducted measurements on air flow through these 
compartments. HMS Fox was an Astraea class protected cruiser of 4,360 tons 
launched in 1893 and fitted with eight cylindrical boilers and triple expansion 
engines giving her 7,500 indicated horse power (ihp) with natural draught. Rees 
noted that the engine room was not fitted with any means of forced artificial 
ventilation, the air currents being natural or supplied un-forced through upper 
deck cowls. Rees could not detect an air current using an anemometer on the 
engine room plates adjacent to the engine starting position, although he 
suspected that a natural air circulation existed. These conditions led Rees to 
conclude that the absence of a free air circulation should have presented ideal 
conditions for the production of heat stroke in the engine room. However, after 
observing stokers on watch in the engine-room the surgeon noted that they 
‘avoided muscular exertion, other than carrying around an oil can’; therefore he 
judged the likelihood of heat cramps or heat exhaustion to be very much 
reduced.274   
 
Then again, despite the relaxed image of the engine room presented by 
the surgeon above, life in the engine room of a ship fitted with triple expansion 
engines could be as trying as any stokehole. A contemporary visitor to the 
engine room of the Irresistible described the following scene: 
 
the noise from the triple expansion engines was deafening, it was impossible to 
make a remark heard while telephones were useless. The deck plates were 
greasy with oil and water making it difficult to walk without slipping. Some gland 
was certain to be blowing which made the atmosphere murky with steam. One 
or more hoses would be playing on a bearing which threatened trouble while the 
officers would be seen with their coats buttoned up to their throats and perhaps 
in oil skins, black in the face and with their clothes wet with oil and water.275  
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In order to measure body temperature and its effects on men working in 
heat, Surgeon Rees planned to enlist the participation of one watch of stokers 
so that he could plot their core temperatures over a period of time. Deciding on 
one particular watch in the stokehole, the surgeon asked each man to take his 
core body temperature every ten minutes throughout the four hour period of his 
watch using a rectal thermometer. However, from the comments the surgeon 
made in his final report, it can be assumed that the stokers refused to 
participate in the experiment with the surgeon noting, ‘the help of the stokers in 
this work proved impossible.’276 Rees also observed, ‘the stoker was not 
sufficiently educated to understand that a temperature of 100 degrees (F) and 
over, need be nothing abnormal.’277   
 
From his experiments and observations, Rees concluded that the 
atmospheric conditions of the engine room by comparison with those to be 
found in the stokehole were completely the reverse. Whereas, stokers in the 
engine room carried out minimal manual labour in an atmosphere devoid of air 
circulation, stokers in the stokehole carried out ‘severe muscular work’ in air 
currents that may have been anything from 150 to 600 feet or more per minute. 
However, Rees noted that the intense manual labour conducted in the 
stokehole was of an ‘intermittent nature.’ This was because the actual throwing 
of coal onto the fires had to be done in ‘quick time’ so as to minimise the cooling 
effects of the air on the fire, thereby reducing the likelihood of a reduction in the 
production and pressure of steam. In a similar manner, the job of cleaning the 
fire had also to be done quickly. As a result, while they were carrying out these 
tasks, Rees noted that the stokers involved were always under the direct heat 
and glare of the furnace. However, in between these tasks the men were able to 
rest in air currents which varied up to 600 feet per minute while the air current 
rose with the harder the ship was being steamed.278      
 
From data gained through a series of experiments, Surgeon Rees 
concluded that the critical wet-bulb temperature should vary in each ship 
                                            





depending on local conditions such as the rate of steaming, position and variety 
of furnace together with the use of forced draught. Furthermore, the surgeon 
observed that as no stoker in the Fox succumbed to heat-stroke until the wet-
bulb temperature reached an average of 87 degrees (F), he deduced that the 
critical temperature also varied for the individual with the ‘seasoned’ stoker 
having a higher critical wet-bulb point than the un-seasoned one.279   
 
A similar conclusion was reached by the medical officer of the Arrogant, 
who recorded three cases of mild heat-exhaustion upon leaving Malta. Staff 
Surgeon Norris noted from their medical records, that the three men had 
previously served in a destroyer and he was therefore of the opinion that as 
they were experienced hands they should have been able to cope with the heat 
in the stokehole. However, as the Arrogant was a cruiser, the amount of coal 
that was required to be handled per hour was far greater than that of a 
destroyer, moreover, the length and weights of the slices used in the furnaces 
were also correspondingly larger and heavier. As a result Surgeon Norris was 
forced to accept that the additional labour required on watch in the Arrogant 
was the determining factor in the causation of heat exhaustion in the case of 
these three stokers. Having reached this conclusion Norris put forward the 
suggestion that ‘physical exhaustion, coupled with heat, is more productive of 
ill-effect than a greater heat with less exhaustion.’280   
 
Several ships serving on the China station, reported cases of heat- 
stroke during 1909 including the Kent whose medical return listed a S.P.O. who 
became unwell from the affects of heat stroke, while on passage between 
Colombo and Singapore. This man had been working in the stokehole where 
the highest temperature recorded was 130 degrees (F). On being taken to the 
sick bay, the man’s rectal temperature recorded 108.6 degrees (F), 
unfortunately the S.P.O. could not be revived. In another case, while the same 
ship was on passage between Wei-hai-wei and Hong Kong, a stoker was taken 
to the sick bay unconscious after suffering from heat stroke with a temperature 
of 105 degrees (F). Despite having an internal body temperature above that 
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which is now considered to be critically life-threatening, the stoker recovered.281 
At the time, Staff Surgeon Rees believed that the human body could not 
withstand a temperature greater than 102.6 degrees (F), for any length of time, 
‘without serious injury.’282 In order to alleviate the problems of heat exhaustion 
in the Terrible, the stokers were put into a four-watch system, which gave them 
longer time in between watches to recover (twelve hours off watch, as opposed 
to eight hours in a three-watch system). In addition, the stokers were also given 
an extra ration of lime juice and were accorded the rare privilege of being 
allowed to sleep on the upper deck, a privilege not normally granted to 
stokers.283   
  
Another aspect which was thought to have contributed to heat stroke was 
that of ‘over feeding.’  Staff Surgeon Rees made this assumption in the Fox 
after witnessing stokers bringing up what he described as ‘an enormous amount 
of partially digested food’ through vomiting after being given rectal injections of 
saline solution during treatment for heat exhaustion. The surgeon particularly 
noted the fact that stokers usually went on watch after consuming a large meal 
and then attempted to take quantities of liquids on top of their partially digested 
food. He concluded that this process subjected their stomachs to severe strain, 




Henry Nancarrow, ex-policeman, part-time boxer and a one-time engine 
driver from Grampound in Cornwall was a stoker in the Royal Naval Volunteer 
Reserve. While undergoing his annual two week naval training in July 1914, 
Nancarrow was caught up in the naval mobilisation order forcing him to inform 
his family by postcard that he was ‘off tomorrow-destination unknown.’285  On 
passage to St Helena in the Albion, Nancarrow wrote in his diary that the heat in 
the stokeholes was ‘unbearable’ causing a great many stokers to go sick. 
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However, because of the continuing doubt amongst ships’ surgeons and 
engineers with regards to the effects of sudden changes to assisted or forced 
draughts, the Senior Engineer gave the order to stop all fans in the stokeholes 
until the surgeon could determine the cause of the sickness.   
 
This action would have made matters very much worse, as with all the 
fans stopped the heat in the stokeholes would have continued to rise to 
unacceptable levels. As it transpired, the cause of the sickness could not be 
established and the ship’s surgeon ordered the fans re-started with strict 
instructions that the stokehole temperature was not to exceed 100 degrees (F). 
Nancarrow lamented that the climate had been ‘cruel for us stokers,’ while he 
thought it a great pity that the stokers were not thought of a bit more by the 
public, ‘for some comforts to protect them from the fires.’286 Nancarrow thought 
that stokers had the hardest and toughest time of many who served in the Navy 
during the hostilities.287  Unfortunately, Nancarrow never returned to Cornwall, 
he died after being bitten by a rabid dog while on shore leave and was buried in 
Salonika in late 1915. 
 
The harsh conditions and danger experienced by stokers ‘down-below’ 
made a great impression on a midshipman appointed to the Invincible in 
December 1915. While under training, Alexander Scrimgeour was required to 
undertake a three month period understudying an engineer in the Invincible’s 
stokehole and engine rooms. In his illegal wartime diary Scrimgeour recorded: 
 
The engine and boiler rooms are hell, at sea; one cannot realise the life of the 
stokers and other ‘saints who toil below’ until one actually experiences it. These 
men’s work can vie with any trenches and deserts not excluded; their whole life 
in war time is a vivid succession of discomforts and hardships, unparalleled in 
severity and monotony.288 
 
Like Stoker Nancarrow, the young midshipman was another casualty of 
war going down with the Invincible during the Battle of Jutland in 1916.   
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During a steam trial conducted between Hong Kong and Wai hei wei, 
forty members of the ship’s company of the Monmouth were affected by heat. 
Fleet Surgeon Robinson reported that the majority were suffering from ‘heat 
exhaustion’ although he also diagnosed several cases of heat cramps, which he 
stated had a ‘peculiar train of symptoms which he had never met before.’  
Robinson described one case where a ‘big strong stoker’ was taken to the sick 
bay with violent convulsions and delirium. His temperature in axilla (underarm) 
was 105 degrees (F), although the surgeon believed it was probably higher but 
due to the man’s convulsions, the thermometer could not be kept in place long 
enough for a reliable reading.289   
 
The usual treatment for this condition was to place the man in an ice 
pack, but again due to his convulsions this was not possible, therefore he was 
continually sponged down with iced water. After a quarter of an hour he became 
quieter with only occasional convulsions and cramps. However, his pulse was 
weak and uncountable and his respirations were very shallow. By the evening 
the man was fairly well recovered and his condition was recorded as hyperaxia, 
with convulsions and cramps and threatened cardiac failure.290       
 
 The subject of heat cramps was also of interest to Staff Surgeon Rees of 
the Fox. He acknowledged that previous investigation into heat stroke and 
cramps in the stokehold had identified the symptoms as being characterised by 
‘cramping of the voluntary muscles, often accompanied by excruciating and 
disabling pain.’291  It was commonly believed that stokers brought cramps upon 
themselves through their habit of ingesting large quantities of cold water while 
on watch in the stokehole. Surgeon Rees thought the ailment was worthy of 
further investigation as it was not clear at the time whether the symptoms were 
caused through physical work under the direct effect of heat, or whether the 
condition was precipitated by sudden change to assisted or forced draughts.292  
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From his previous investigation into temperatures in machinery spaces, 
Rees suspected that a ‘high wet bulb temperature’ was primarily responsible for 
the condition known as ‘stoker’s cramp.’ Rees had diagnosed two cases where 
he noticed a very marked symptom of spasm occurring amongst certain groups 
of muscles, which he categorised as being the flexors of the thumb and 
forefingers, the wrists and elbows and the flexors of the calf and abdominal 
muscles. These groups of muscles were the ones which stokers exercised most 
frequently, during the action of firing the boilers.293   
 
A stoker of five years-experience who had suffered cramp was found to 
have an oral temperature of 106 degrees (F) which convinced the surgeon that 
the cramps were due to injury of the central nervous system which had been 
induced by a high wet-bulb temperature. However, as the condition of stokers’ 
cramp had been previously attributed to the ingestion of large quantities of cold 
water, Surgeon Rees decided to undertake some experiments in order to 
determine whether the amount of fluid taken by stokers while at work in high 
wet bulb temperatures, had any correlation to the condition of ‘stokers’ 
cramp.’294 (See Appendix 2).   
 
Rees concluded from his experiments that provided the work conducted 
was of the same character, there was very little difference in the amount of fluid 
taken by men in the stokehole and engine rooms. The surgeon measured the 
fluid intake of six men while firing in the stokehole. Their consumption was 76.8 
ounces (2), 105 ounces (2) and 120 ounces (2) of fluids respectively. From this 
experiment the surgeon noted with interest that the two men who drank the 
most were stokers with over seven years-experience each, whereas it was 
commonly assumed that it was the young and inexperienced men who were 
most likely to suffer ill effects from drinking to excess. However, Rees offered a 
valid explanation for this assumption, when he observed that the most 
inexperienced stokers would always be detailed off to work in the hottest 
positions in the stokeholes or engine rooms, therefore they would be more 
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susceptible to feel the need to take more fluids than other men in their vicinity of 
work.295   
 
The problems caused by men being unable to complete their watch 
through becoming overcome by heat exhaustion were taken seriously by 
stokers, not least because someone else would be required to ‘go out of turn’ to 
relieve them. Stoker Vincent observed in his memoirs that it was considered to 
be the ‘height of bad form’ for stokers to exhibit the effects of fatigue during their 
watch, which explained why stokers would continue working until they literally 
dropped. With regards to their determination, Vincent described how a stoker 
would curse his ship, the engineers, and the chief stoker, ‘but he would never 
say that the work was too much for him.’296   
 
Recalling a particularly difficult watch in the stokehole of the Aspasia, 
Vincent described how despite his best efforts, he could not get the coal to burn 
properly. Having removed the draught plates entirely in a bid to get more air 
circulating around the fire, Vincent was forced to spend the entire watch using 
the slice and rake on the fire which he found, ‘dreadfully fatiguing.’297  It didn’t 
help that Vincent was working in number one stokehole, which he described as 
the hottest of all the stokeholes, as the ventilation cowls on the upper deck 
which were supposed to feed air down below were blanketed by the fore-bridge 
and 'monkey’s island', and as a consequence, the stokehole was devoid of any 
fresh air.   
 
On being relieved, Vincent went to the stoker’s wash place and finding it 
empty he laid down on the tiled surface of the wash room deck, which he found 
‘delightfully cool.’ However, he later realised that this was a foolish thing to do 
as one of his mess-mates observed him and thinking he had collapsed from 
over exertion, reported him to the chief stoker of the watch. The chief stoker 
immediately went to see Vincent and proceeded to examine him, although 
                                            
 




Vincent was able to convince him that he was not fatigued, but simply 




In a twist to the lengths that stokers would resort to in order to show that 
they could cope with the demands made on them while on watch, Vincent 
described how stokers would often ‘overdrive themselves’ if they felt the effects 
of fatigue. Arguing that it was ‘a hard job at the best of times to keep the 
required steam pressure up’, Vincent recalled that not only would the men 
accomplish this but, out of ‘sheer cussedness’, they would deliberately overdo it. 
As an example, Vincent related one occasion when he was on the upper-deck 
taking in some fresh air when he was hailed by the chief engineer, who ordered 
him to go below immediately to inform the chief stoker of the watch that he was 
blowing off steam from the funnels. Vincent attributed the anger displayed by 
the chief engineer to the ‘waste of coal and precious water’ venting through the 
funnels. Despite having attracted the attention of the ‘Chief’, Vincent noticed the 
expression of ‘dour satisfaction, on the heated and grimy faces’ of the stokers 
as they came up from their watch below, suggesting to Vincent they had ‘over-
driven’ themselves in an effort to make the point that they could handle, 
‘anything thrown at them.’299 
    
In a series of related incidents, the medical officer of the Charybdis on 
passage through the Red Sea in 1910, reported that he had received an 
unusual number of casualties from the stokehole, with stokers suffering from 
extreme high temperatures and loss of consciousness. Staff surgeon 
Woolcombe observed that as all of the cases occurred at the end of each watch, 
it seemed probable to him that the final straw in the causation was, ‘the extra 
attention given by the out-going watch to the cleaning of fires, for the incoming 
watch to take over.’300   
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This was a reasonable conclusion for a medical officer to make, 
particularly one who may not have had a detailed working knowledge of the 
nature of stokers or their working practices. In point of fact, at the changing of 
each watch one fire would be allowed to burn down ready for the relieving 
watch to clean as soon as it took over. Steaming regulations stipulated that all 
fires to be cleaned were to be finished in the first three hours of the watch 
leaving the last hour for ejecting ashes and cleaning up generally.301  As an 
example, if a ship was steaming with twelve boilers it would mean that eleven 
fires had to cleaned in three hours, or one every fifteen minutes with one fire left 
ready for the incoming watch to clean.   
 
This was also the practice in the merchant fleet. Fireman (stoker) Albert 
Khan described a typical watch handover in the merchant service: 
 
When you relieve the watch you’re on what they call a ‘burn down.’ You’ve got 
two fires already banked up for you and another on a ‘burn down’, that means 
it’s ready to be cleaned. The first thing you do is clean your fire. When you 
clean your fire you get your clinkers out. You’ve got a long bar and you’re 
pricking between the bars in the fire and then you rake it all out. You put the 
clinker in a pile on one side and the good stuff in a pile on the other. Then you 
fill up the fire with some good stuff, some of it perhaps from another fire as well 
and then fill it up with good hot stuff. When you go off watch you leave things in 
the same way for the fellow coming down.302 
 
Therefore, Woolcombe’s observations as to the cause of collapse 
amongst stokers could not be attributable to cleaning fires at the end of the 
watch. On the other hand, it could be argued that no self-respecting stoker 
would hand over a poor fire to his relief, no matter how tired he was at the end 
of his watch. For that reason, rather than being the ‘final straw’, as described by 
the surgeon, it is more likely that in the heat of the Red Sea, the stokers may 
well have been forced to ‘overdrive’ themselves throughout the whole of their 
watch, rather than succumb to heat induced fatigue with the consequent loss of 
face to their mess-mates. The fact that they waited until the end of the watch 
before succumbing to fatigue and collapse, appears to suggest that they only 
did so once they were satisfied that they had, ‘done their duty.’   
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Dehydration and water intake 
 
The effects of heat on the body were graphically illustrated by the 
measurements Staff Surgeon Rees undertook of his own physiology while 
conducting his observations on the Fox’s stokers. Rees spent two hours in a 
sitting position doing no work, other than observing the men at work and one 
further hour visiting various locations in the stokeholes and engine rooms, 
where he had set up his wet and dry bulb thermometers. The surgeon 
calculated that he lost one pound in weight or two pints of water while doing 
‘practically no work.’  From this observation he concluded that it would not be 
abnormal for a hard working stoker to lose between twenty to thirty ounces of 
sweat per hour. From his measurements (See Appendix 2) Surgeon Rees 
determined that stokers did not appear to take more fluids than they actually 
required, although he declared that he was still unsure as to whether the 
consumption of this minimal amount would produce symptoms of distress.303    
 
The Minotaur, serving on the China Station reported twenty cases of 
gastritis amongst the stokers which the ship’s surgeon put down to a chill 
following overheating. In this instance, Fleet Surgeon Handyside concluded that 
the stokers had brought the condition upon themselves because they ‘persisted 
in drinking water to excess whilst being overheated in the course of their 
strenuous work.’304 Handyside offered the opinion that drinking water to excess 
under such conditions would not actually allay thirst, but would instead have the 
undesired effect of water-logging the mucous membrane of the stomach. 
Thereafter, the body being unable to rid itself of this excess water would 
succumb to congestion, which would in turn lead to inflammation resulting in a 
general collapse.   
 
The Imperial Japanese Navy claimed to have prevented this problem by 
restricting the water intake of their stokers while on watch. The experience 
gained in action during the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-05 allowed the 
Surgeon General of the I.J.N. to observe:  
                                            
303 O. Rees, 'Papers on Stoker’s Cramp,' 186.  
304 'Statistical Report of the Health of the Navy for 1910,' 70.   
118 
 
None of the men in the engine room were affected by heat-stroke in spite of the 
heat in that part of the ship. Our stokers were instructed to drink as little as 
possible. Their usual beverage was cool distilled water, but sometimes, as a 
treat, they were allowed water mixed with arrowroot and sugar.305   
By contrast, the French Navy from as early as 1875 had recognised that 
stokers required extra nourishment in order to be able to maintain the high 
energy levels required in stoking. To this end, French stokers received an extra 
allowance of wine and farinaceous foods such as wheat-flour, rice, sago and 
tapioca while they stood their watch.306  By digesting these starch-based foods 
during a watch the stokers would have naturally converted the starch into sugar 
which would have boosted or maintained their energy levels. However, because 
alcohol is a diuretic it actually promotes dehydration by increasing the excretion 
of water from the body, and also interferes with the body's ability to regulate its 
own temperature. Therefore, the extra allowance of wine, unless taken in 
minimal quantities, would have had a detrimental effect on the ability to prevent 
dehydration, resulting in the increased likelihood of heat exhaustion or ‘stokers’-
cramp.’ 
    In order to prevent a recurrence of gastritis in the Minotaur, Fleet 
Surgeon Handyside recommended that all stokers should adopt the old stoker’s 
practice of keeping a piece of coal in the mouth while in the stokehole, a 
practice which he claimed ‘used to be prevalent in the service.’ The surgeon 
argued that keeping a piece of coal in the mouth would help to maintain a gentle 
flow of saliva; therefore he considered that there would be no need for stokers 
to continually drink water.307   
 
The advice given by Fleet Surgeon Handyside to Minotaur‘s stokers in 
1910 was corroborated by Stoker Vincent in 1915, while serving in the coal 
burning protected cruiser Aspasia. In 1915 the Aspasia was operating off the 
west coast of Africa and the heat in the stokehole caused Vincent to sweat 
‘tremendously.’ He recalled, that while resting for two to three minutes in 
between stoking his boiler, his sweat would ‘pool on the deck plates of the 
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stokehole.’308  This hot work gave Vincent a ‘tremendous thirst’ which forced 
him to continually drink from the water can throughout his watches. Vincent’s 
actions did not go unnoticed by his contemporaries and he remembered that he 
was continually rebuked for drinking too much water, being told by stokers ‘old 
and young’ and by all the chief stokers of his watch, to place a piece of coal in 
his mouth instead.309 Despite going against the practices of his contemporaries 
and the medical advice of the day Vincent declared that he never suffered from 
any of the ill-effects attributed from drinking too much water.310   
Then again , unbeknown to Stoker Vincent, he may have unwittingly 
prevented the onset of ‘stokers’ cramp’ by simply replacing his fluid loss through 
sweating, by drinking frequently while on watch in the stokehole. As Staff 
Surgeon Oswald Rees of the Fox observed, stokers’ cramp was not at the time 
fully understood. While the medical knowledge of the day had not yet made the 
connection, we now know that there is a direct link between fluid loss through 
sweating and the cramping of groups of voluntary muscles attributed at the time 
to stokers’ cramp.  
Following on from the ground breaking work of Staff Surgeon Rees, 
naval medical opinion would later support the actions of Stoker Vincent and 
recommend that stokers’ replace their lost fluids by drinking sufficient water to 
keep them hydrated, while supplementing their lost sodium and chloride levels 
through the ingestion of salt tablets.  
 
Like other men, stokers were also susceptible to accidents and disease. 
Stokers also formed landing parties or were attached to Naval Brigades where 
they suffered injuries or death in action and were also exposed to disease which 
they might not have contracted onboard ship. In one example, the Forte landed 
a mixed party of men including twenty-eight stokers on the Gold Coast, to take 
part in an operation to intercept the West African Regiment which had mutinied. 
Out of the twenty-eight stokers, twenty men came down with Malaria. Surgeon 
Mathew Vaudin, of the aptly named river gunboat Mosquito, described his 
                                            





preferred treatment for Malarial fevers which included rectal injections of warm 
salt solution with the addition of a ‘little gin in order to maintain the skins 
moisture.’  With regards to diet, the surgeon recommended it should be 
restricted to such liquids as well-diluted milk, good champagne or genuine 
brandy, together with chicken broth or light farinaceous foods.311 
Diseases of the chest 
A common disease of the coal-firing era and one which particularly 
affected men from the engine room department was pneumonia. Pneumonia is 
caused through an infection which inflames the alveoli (lung air-sacs) which fill 
up with fluid or pus, causing symptoms such as a cough with phlegm, fever, 
chills, and trouble with breathing. The King Alfred reported five cases while on 
the China station in 1909, one of these was an E.R.A. whose condition proved 
fatal while three leading stokers and a stoker became seriously ill. Fleet 
Surgeon Beadnell highlighted the significance of the fact that the four engine 
room ratings all fell ill between July 20th and August 13,th  a period which he 
observed ‘practically corresponded to the hottest time of the year for Wei-hai-
wei.’312  In the case of the E.R.A. the medical opinion was that there had been a 
suspicion of tubercle being the underlying cause, although the connection 
between heat and pneumonia was not established.  
Pneumonia and its symptoms can vary from mild to severe. Many factors 
affect how serious pneumonia is, such as the type of germ causing the infection 
and the age and overall health of the patient with the very young and elderly 
being at most risk. The five men from the King Alfred can be assumed to have 
been in relatively good health. However, one of the more serious complications 
with pneumonia can arise when the disease is contracted by someone who is 
also suffering from chronic obstructive pulmonary disease C.O.P.D., also called 
emphysema or chronic bronchitis. The main cause for C.O.P.D. is smoking, 
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however long term exposure to lung irritants such as air pollution, chemical 
fumes or dust can also contribute to the condition.313   
With stokehole and coal-bunker atmospheres heavy with coal dust, 
asbestos and other dangerous air-borne irritants, stokers were in constant 
danger of exposure to pulmonary disease which could affect their health while 
in service, but could also manifest itself in occupational disease later on, long 
after they had retired from the Navy. The Canopus recorded an incident where 
a stoker attracted bronchitis after using compressed air to clean boiler tubes. 
The medical officer suggested the case arose because the stoker failed to wear 
the mask which was normally worn during boiler cleaning operations and had 
suffered from the ‘irritant actions of the lime in the deposit in the boiler tubes.’314   
 
Unusually, when it came to the contagious bacterial lung disease 
tuberculosis (TB), stokers appeared to be less affected than seamen and other 
officers and ratings. Prior to 1906 TB was only reported by numbers of men 
afflicted, however from that year on the medical returns were broken down to 
identify the classes of men diagnosed with the various types of the disease. The 
medical returns show that from 1906 to 1914 a higher percentage of seamen 
than stokers were diagnosed from all types of TB in each year. For the years 
that identified classes of officers (1906 to 1909) the returns also showed that 
more seamen officers than engineers were diagnosed with the disease. The 
following table (Table: 2 below) indicates the actual numbers of men diagnosed 
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Table 11: Incidence of Tuberculosis 1906-1914315 
 
 






1906 94 112  4 3 
1907 92 124 6 0 
1908 96 126 7 0 
1909 88 118 5 2 
1910 72 98   
1911 89 107   
1912 87 112   
1913 82 91   
1914 103 121   
 
The common causes of the spread of TB included frequent contact with 
those who had already contracted the disease, poor nutrition, and crowded or 
unsanitary living conditions. As will be presented in the following chapter, life on 
the average mess-deck during this period perfectly suited the spread of TB with 
poor diet and crowded and unsanitary living conditions endemic throughout the 
service. In 1927 Surgeon Captain Alderson suggested that ‘infection with 
aggregation in a small space plays a large part in the causation of TB in the 
Navy.’316 Making comparisons between living space in the Army and the Navy, 
Alderson stated that the Army required a standard six hundred cubic feet air 
space with sixty square feet floor space and six feet wall space for each man in 
barracks. While Alderson thought this was impossible to implement in ships, he 
had to admit that even naval barracks could not meet the Army standard.317   
 
Furthermore, Alderson suggested that the incidence of TB was higher in 
‘modern’ battleships than other ships, due to their close living and working 
conditions together with a general lack of sunlight and poor ventilation between 
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decks. These conditions were stated to have particularly affected sick berth 
ratings, victualling ratings, cooks and telegraphists; men who normally spent all 
of their time between decks. However, Alderson could not fail to note that 
engine-room ratings had a lower incidence of TB than seamen, despite the fact 
that they probably spent more time below decks in poor conditions than any 
other rating. Alderson explained this anomaly, by suggesting that engine-room 
ratings did not work in as close proximity to each other as other men while the 
‘cleaner air’ in the machinery spaces, was continually replaced by powerful 
exhaust fans.318 While Anderson used the term ‘exhaust fans’ he probably 
meant ‘supply’ fans as most stokeholes were supplied with a positive pressure 
of air from steam or electrically operated fans in order to provide a draught for 
the fires. Because this pressurised the stokehole, access and egress could only 
be made through use of a two-door air-lock.  
 
Lionel Yexley instigated a very animated and widespread newspaper and 
letter campaign over the use of ‘deck cloths’ which were used to protect the 
decks and paintwork during the weekly ‘water carnival’ routine which is 
explained in more detail in the following chapter. Yexley’s campaign called for 
the abolition of deck cloths on the grounds that they seriously affected the 
health of men on the lower-deck. Once a deck had been scrubbed or polished 
or paintwork cleaned down and brass-work burnished in preparation for the 
weekly inspection by the captain known as ‘Captain’s rounds,’ canvas cloths 
would be placed over every surface to protect it from foot-traffic or from dirty 
hands. However, Yexley argued that this practice had developed over the years 
to the point where deck cloths remained in-situ between decks week in and 
week out just to keep paintwork clean for the next inspection. The cloths would 
only be taken up and stowed away out of sight a few minutes before the captain 
commenced his inspection at nine o’clock on Sunday morning and re-laid 
directly afterwards.319 Furthermore, Yexley argued that while the deck under the 
canvas cloths may have been clean, the canvas itself was always filthy thereby 
creating a perfect breeding ground for the bacillus tuberculosis.320   
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Part of Yexley’s concern over the widespread use of deck cloths was for 
the health of young stokers. He described how they would ‘fling themselves 
down’ on the damp canvas to rest after their exhausting watch below thereby 
exposing themselves to unknown diseases.321  Yexley used his challenge on 
deck-cloths in 1911 to link the practice with deaths in service from TB, which he 
argued was responsible for an average loss to the service of 340 men each 
year with an average of thirty-seven deaths. While highlighting the tragic loss of 
deaths through disease, Yexley’s main concern was for the residue of men who 
were invalided out of service.322 Annual fleet medical returns showed that 
Yexley’s figures were broadly correct with 286 cases of TB declared in 1911. 
This resulted in 237 men being invalided from the service and thirty-eight 
deaths. However, while certain ships had more cases than others, many ships 
reported no cases of tuberculosis. Moreover, the fleet medical returns did not 
provide any medical evidence to link any of the cases of tuberculosis to the 
practice of laying deck cloths throughout a ship.   
 
The deck-cloth debate begun by Yexley continued unabated throughout 
1911. One commentator suggested that Yexley’s description of the unhygienic 
situation with regard to the extensive use of deck-cloths was very fair, ‘but was 
by no means an exhaustive statement.’ 323 The living conditions on the newer 
ships were described as ‘notorious’ and much more uncomfortable and 
unsanitary than older ships. As an example, the correspondent suggested the 
contemporary King Edward and Dreadnought classes of ships were merely 
‘steel boxes’ and prone to excessive moisture in the atmosphere, which caused 
the ship’s sides and decks to run with moisture within two hours of putting to 
sea. As a result, deck-cloths became ‘slimy’ from the debris of the mess-decks 
and the moisture in the air which caused the general atmosphere in the ship to 
become ‘sickening.’324 Badly designed ventilation was given as the chief cause 
together with the tradition which allowed individuals responsible for certain 
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compartments and flats (passageways) to close hatches or restrict access on 
their own authority, in order to keep them ‘ready for Captain’s rounds.’  
 
This chapter has outlined the appalling conditions that stokers were 
expected to work in and the injuries, illnesses, accidents and deaths they 
suffered as a result. While it may have been uncomfortable keeping watches on 
the exposed upper-deck in winter, most seamen would not have swapped the 
fresh air for the dust infected atmosphere, heat, noise and physical labour of the 
stokehole; even for a stoker’s wages. In an age long before the effects of coal-
dust and asbestos were linked to diseases of the chest  stokers were expected 
to suffer the daily rigours of hard physical work conducted under conditions 
which on a good day could result in burns, injuries or collapse and on a bad day 
life threatening conditions which often resulted in serious injury, death or 
debilitating conditions such as asbestosis or pneumoconiosis. Boiler explosions, 
steam leaks, asphyxiation in coal bunkers and bunker explosions were an ever 
present threat to a stoker’s work. Moreover, because the machinery was 
situated in the lowest part of the ship stokers were shut inside their 
compartments when the ship was in action, therefore they worked in the 
knowledge that if their own machinery did not claim them, the enemy probably 
would.   
 
One of the most common medical issues that stokers faced in the 
stokehole was the condition known as ‘stoker’s cramp.’ This unusual ailment 
became a critical problem in stokeholes and coal bunkers particularly when 
steaming in areas of high ambient heat such as the notorious Red Sea. With 
temperatures typically exceeding 100 degrees (F) stokers often collapsed, 
some terminally, causing disruption to the steaming efficiency of the ship. This 
in turn led to ‘outsiders’ drafted in from the ship’s company to help bolster the 
stokers below. In ships that carried them, Royal Marines were always 
volunteers and the first choice for this task, adding value to the notion that 
marines were the only other branch of the lower-deck to bond with stokers. 
However, it is apparent that while stokers were regularly debilitated from 
cramps, the causes of the condition were mostly speculation and the Admiralty 
conducted no official medical investigation despite the obvious detrimental 
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effect to steaming efficiency that occurred when large numbers of stokers were 
afflicted. It was only through the efforts of a small number of ships’ surgeons 
most notably Staff Surgeon Oswald Rees, who conducted their own 
experiments that the effects of heat on the body began to be slowly understood.   
 
We now know that the condition termed stoker’s cramp was caused 
through excessive sweating leading to dehydration and loss of vital sodium and 
salts from the body leaving the motor muscle groups in spasm. Remarkably, at 
the time the common consensus amongst most naval medical surgeons was 
that the cramps were brought on by the men themselves through drinking water 
to excess while on watch. Had the men seen to their own needs, like stoker 
Henry Vincent who kept himself regularly hydrated while stoking against the 
advice of his surgeon and not minimised their water consumption, the effects of 
stokers cramp would have been far less widespread or as serious as it became. 
 
Despite the effects of heat and the other debilitating conditions stokers 
endured while on watch, they were in the main a hardy and stubborn body of 
men who did not give in easily. During the coal-firing era when a ship’s speed 
and endurance was determined solely by the skill and physical effort of the 
stokers on watch, their job was vital, if not more so than any other onboard. 
When faced with high rates of steaming in excessive heat stokers would rise to 
the challenge by ‘overdriving’ themselves. In effect they would find another gear 
and somehow gather together sufficient extra energy to complete their watch 
and while some eventually succumbed to the combined forces of heat and 
labour, most endured. As stoker Henry Vincent remembered, a dour smile on a 
grimy face was a sure sign that a stoker had risen to the challenge, and had 












‘Off watch’- mess deck affairs 
 
During the nineteenth century many advances were made in the use of 
new materials and technology that transformed naval materiele in general. D.K . 
Brown in Warrior to Dreadnought argued that while the nineteenth century Navy 
has often been accused of being reactionary to new advances, it was usually 
the leader and even when it was not, there were usually good reasons and it 
was never far behind.325  This view is echoed by J. R. Hill in Accelerator and 
Brake who observed that even though some of the important innovations in 
naval technology and materiele were introduced by foreigners, the power of 
British industry allowed the Navy to maintain its dominant position, even when it 
came from behind.326  
 
When the Dreadnought was commissioned in 1906 it was a ship so 
advanced compared to every other ship built to that date that it revolutionised 
naval construction and the term 'Dreadnought' became universally adopted to 
describe all ships subsequently built to the same overall design. Despite the 
many challenges to the superiority of the Royal Navy at the beginning of the 
twentieth century, Dreadnought was a clear indication that the Admiralty had 
adopted the technical changes it required in order to maintain its dominant 
position. However, while embracing advances in technology the Admiralty 
appeared to have ignored the corresponding advances in social change ashore 
so that by the introduction of Dreadnought while the ships were very much of 
the twentieth century era, the men lived under a social regime that belonged to 
a previous century.  
 
This chapter will address the main social issues that caused discontent 
amongst the lower-deck during the nineteenth and early twentieth century's 
particularly with regards to uniform, victualling, barracks and shipboard living 
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conditions which led to the subsequent rise of the lower-deck movement for 
change. 
 
Prior to 1912 lower-deck pay at 1s 8d per day had remained unchanged 
for over fifty years and would not be increased until some six years after the 
commissioning of Dreadnought. Out of this paltry sum British sailors were 
forced to compulsorily purchase and maintain their own uniform and to 
subsidise their basic rations if they were to remain healthy and well-fed. Like 
pay, the standard daily ration issued to each man had remained unchanged for 
a century and comprised the same basic salted and dried articles that had been 
issued throughout the nineteenth century. Moreover, two years prior to the 
laying of Dreadnought's keel in 1905, sailors at that port and those at Chatham 
were still living in rotting and unhygenic wooden hulks because the Admiralty 
had dragged its heels over the construction of new naval barracks. 
 
Naval barracks 
Stoker James Leary joined the Royal Navy at Keyham barracks 
Devonport in September 1913. Keyham barracks was the Navy’s first purpose 
built barracks and was designed to replace the unhealthy wooden hulks which 
remained as shore accommodation for sailors right up to 1903 when the last 
two naval barracks at Chatham and Portsmouth were finally completed. 327  By 
1859 prison hulks had all been abolished in favour of purpose built prisons, yet 
the Navy insisted on retaining hulks for a further forty-three years on the 
grounds that discipline would be maintained if the men were kept in the same 
poor conditions while on shore as they were at sea.328 With regards to the 
suitability of the hulks for accommodation purposes a Commissioners’ report 
into Naval Manning noted in 1859:  
The witnesses complain of the condition of the hulks, in which the men are 
lodged, while their ships are fitted out. They state that the hulks are so 
uncomfortable, that both officers and men have the greatest dislike to them; all 
desire to escape from them, as soon as the day’s work is over, preferring a 
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residence on shore, to the great detriment of the infant discipline of the newly 
raised crew.329 
 
The first two accommodation blocks in Keyham barracks were completed 
by 1886, however, due to wrangling at the highest levels of the Admiralty the 
first 500  hundred men from the hulk Royal Adelaide did not actually move 
ashore to occupy the new accommodation until 4th June 1889.330  The reason 
for this delay which unnecessarily forced men to endure a further three 
uncomfortable and unhygienic years living aboard hulks can be explained 
through the sentiments of the First Sea Lord Sir Anthony Hoskins who on 
inspecting the new barracks in 1892 declared them to be ‘a wicked waste of 
public money.’331  Hoskins may have shared the view expressed in the 1859 
Commissioners report that the only way to maintain discipline in the Navy was 
to keep men in squalor. This could also explain why the new barracks appeared 
to have been deliberately designed to replicate as far as possible conditions 
that existed in the hulks and ships of the fleet being devoid of any comfort, 
privacy or ‘modern’ amenities. While a step in the right direction, the design of 
the naval barracks together with the sentiments of the F.S.L. suggest a late 
nineteenth century Admiralty intent on maintaining eighteenth century living 
standards for the lower-deck.   
 
Stoker James Leary remembered that the lower-deck accommodation 
blocks were three storied and laid out in a square with a large canteen 
occupying the centre space. The first floor and upper floor of each 
accommodation block acted as the men’s living quarters, while the basement 
contained the bathrooms and wash room which was equipped with wooden 
washing tubs, hand operated clothes’ mangles and a large coal-fired drying 
room manned by stokers.332 
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Each barrack room could accommodate approximately 400 men who 
lived in self-contained messes of twenty to twenty-four men to a mess. The 
room was divided by a central kit bag and hammock stowage rack which ran the 
full length of the room dividing it into two halves so that approximately 200 men 
could live either side of the partition.333 (See illustration 7 p. 131). As was the 
custom in the Royal Navy, there were no attempts to provide privacy for the 
men, the barrack rooms were ‘open plan’ with no partitions between the 
individual messes while the bare wooden floors were caulked in the same 
manner as decks on a ship. Each mess consisted of a mess table 
approximately twelve feet long by two feet six inches wide with two wooden 
benches, one each side.334  Apart from a small number of coal or coke fired 
stoves in the centre of the large barrack rooms, no other heating was provided 
and while night toilets were sited at each end of the blocks, the bathrooms, 
toilets and urinals were located in the basement accessible by an outside steel 
staircase.335 
 
The mess tables were arranged on each outer wall of the barrack room 
and could be lashed back to the wall during the silent hours to make room for 
men to sling their hammocks.  The men's hammocks were slung from hooks 
attached to steel girders which ran the full length of the barrack room in two 
double rows, not grouted into the walls as suggested by Hampshire.336   
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Illustration: 7  A typical barrack room Chatham Barracks. 
Source:    © Medway Archives-Couchman Collection. 
 
Note the hammock hooks in the central girder with the ‘lashing bar’ opposite, one man 
has already slung his hammock a second row would be slung directly in front of him. 
The kit bag and hammock racks are behind the standing ratings hiding a similar 
arrangement on the opposite side of the room. The mess ‘traps’ or utensils are 
displayed at the end of the table with the washing-up tub underneath.Each side of the 
room could accommodate approximately 200 men in eight messes containing twenty-
twenty four men. The layout of each mess and the space allocated each man was 
exactly the same as that found aboard every ship in the Navy. Note also the complete 
absence of chairs or other ‘normal’ furniture. These messdecks existed into the 1960s 
the only alterations being the removal of the mess table and hammocks which were 









Each mess was allocated a shelf where the mess cooking and eating 
utensils were stowed unless they were required to be displayed for inspection 
when they would be put out on the mess table as in illustration 7. The men had 
no privacy and nowhere to keep their valuables other than in their kit bag and 
‘ditty box’, which was a small twelve by nine by five inch lockable wooden box. 
Stoker Leary used to keep his letters and writing material in his ditty box but 
would never keep anything valuable in it as he recalled that if you didn’t keep 
your hands on your own personal things, then ‘somebody would help you.’337   
 
In contrast to the spartan accommodation and facilities provided by the 
Navy for the lower-deck at Keyham barracks, the barracks constructed for the 
Army at Windsor were designed and equipped to provide every amenity and 
comfort for the private soldier. The Coldstream Guardsmen who moved into 
Victoria barracks slept in individual cubicles with a cot, lockable steel wardrobe, 
window and coat hanging hooks. Lavatories for night service were provided on 
each floor while the main bathrooms contained shaving cubicles and a range of 
wash basins, showers and baths. All areas of the barracks were heated with 
steam radiators and equipped with electric light. In addition, the men’s cubicle 
doors were hung with a space at the bottom so that the orderly officer could 
make his evening inspection by passing down the centre passage without 
disturbing the men, thereby giving them a degree of privacy unheard of in the 
Navy.338    
 
On joining Victory barracks at Portsmouth, Stoker Frank Rose was met 
at the main gate by a chief petty officer and taken directly to a basement 
bathroom which had a bare concrete floor and was equipped with a number of 
tin baths in small alcoves. Rose remembered looking around in vain for 
‘sponges and towels, the usual articles that go with a bathroom.’339  After a 
quick bath in tepid water he was ‘blue…., standing in bare feet on this concrete 
floor, no boards or nothing you know, really tough, and I realised then I’d joined 
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the Navy.’340  After his first experience of naval life, Rose would have probably 
disagreed with the following excerpt from a 1907 Royal Navy recruiting 
pamphlet which stated:  
 
Excellent provision is made for the comfort and convenience of men on Home 
Service at the Royal Naval barracks at the Home Ports.341    
 
James Dunn came from London’s East End, only son of a ‘drunken’ 
greengrocer whose drinking habits ensured that the family existed on the edge 
of poverty. By the age of eighteen, Dunn was earning eighteen shillings a week 
casting fire-bars for furnaces in a foundry which was provident work, as being 
reduced to short time working he decided to join the Navy as a stoker. However, 
on arriving at Vivid (ex-Keyham barracks) at Devonport for training he 
remembered that he had ‘wanted to go home the first night.’342 Dunn thought 
the East End was rough, but ‘not as rough as life in Vivid.’ He described the 
petty fights that broke out between the large groups of men who came from all 
over the British Isles and the daily jostling for food, disputes over gambling and 
men coming back off shore drunk and belligerent. One aspect of the poor living 
conditions at Vivid that Dunn particularly remembered were the constant 
epidemics that raged through the large, open barrack rooms where all the men 
had to sleep and live together. He recalled that if one man came off shore with 
influenza within a matter of a few days ‘everyone in the barracks would go down 
with it.’343   
 
James ‘Spike’ Maloney was born in 1892 and came from Shoeburyness 
from a ‘very poor family.’  Upon leaving school at thirteen years of age, Maloney 
obtained work making bricks at a local brick works for just a few pence a day. 
After a series of short term poorly paid posts, he finally found full-time work as a 
‘live-in’ hand at the Salvation Army, Naval and Military Home at Chatham at ten 
shillings a week all found. Working in the home Maloney had first-hand 
experience of the lifestyle of sailors as his duties included emptying ‘chambers’,  
cleaning the wash basins and lavatories and generally keeping the place clean. 
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Maloney particularly remembered his impressions of the stokers who 
frequented the home as they always looked as though they were only ‘half 
clean’ when they booked in for a room for the night. He was later to learn from 
personal experience that this was a consequence of the poor washing and 
bathing facilities to be found on warships, rather than on any lack of personal 
hygiene by the stokers themselves.344   
 
After encountering a recruiting officer in Chatham High Street one 
afternoon in 1911, Maloney decided to join the Navy as a stoker.345 After he had 
‘signed on’ and completed the necessary paperwork Maloney was issued with 
his bedding and uniform kit. However, unlike men joining the Royal Marines and 
Army who were issued with free bedding, uniform and kit on entry, sailors were 
obliged to purchase their bedding and kit; a tradition introduced with the ‘official 
uniform’ in 1857.346   
 
Naval uniform  
 
Lionel Yexley, put his thoughts on the naval kit issue on record by stating: 
 
The British Navy is the only uniformed fighting service of any civilized state that 
has the very doubtful honour of paying for its own uniform.347 
 
By the beginning of the twentieth century men of the lower-deck were still 
expected to purchase their bedding and kit on entry although the Admiralty had 
introduced a gratuity to off-set the cost of the kit to each man. However, unlike 
seamen who received a full clothing gratuity, the gratuity for stokers was set at 
three pounds ten shillings, which only paid for half an initial kit leaving the 
remaining articles of a stoker’s kit to be purchased out of his pay by weekly 
debit. This anomaly caused friction among stokers despite the fact they 
received a higher daily rate of pay than seamen. In December 1902 the 
Inspector of Marine Recruiting raised concerns over the requirement for stokers 
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to have to purchase their kit claiming that a number of potential stokers had 
refused to ‘sign on’ when they learnt that they would have to purchase their kit. 
Moreover, having refused to sign on these men then opted or were ‘cajoled’ into 
joining the Army with the promise of a free kit.348  
 
The issue of the stoker’s kit gratuity was raised with the Treasury, who 
declared:  
 
we are not prepared to demur to the principle that stokers should be placed in 
the same position in this respect as ordinary seamen.349   
      
In January 1903, the Captain of Duke of Wellington, the largest of the 
Portsmouth hulks, wrote to the C-in-C Portsmouth acknowledging receipt of an 
order granting a clothing gratuity of nine pounds to the ‘stoker-class.’ The order 
authorised a gratuity to be paid in two separate instalments of four pounds on 
entry to offset the cost of a stoker’s initial kit and a further five pounds when the 
man was kitted up for sea.350 However, the first half of a stoker’s kit cost six 
pounds, while the second or sea-going half of a kit cost almost three pounds. 
This anomaly placed a stoker in debt to the Crown to the sum of two pounds, 
three shillings and nine pence on entry which took seven weeks to clear leaving 
each stoker with only five shillings a week pay; approximately half of their 
allotted sum.   
 
Eventually an error was discovered in the calculations when it was 
noticed that stokers had previously been entitled to a one pound gratuity in 
respect of their bedding on first entry.351 As a result, the stoker's kit gratuity was 
increased to ten pounds under the following Order-in-Council:   
 
We beg to recommend that your Majesty may be graciously pleased by your 
order in Council, to sanction as from 1st October 1902 the issue of a total 
                                            
348 TNA, ADM 116/626, 'Clothing Gratuity Granted to Stoker Ratings on First Entry,' ed. 
Admiralty (1902). 
349 Letter N.P. 3436 21 October 1902 in TNA, ADM 116/626. 
350 TNA, ADM 116/626, 'Clothing Gratuity Granted to Stoker Ratings on First Entry.' Letter no. 
199 from Captain Duke of Wellington to C-in-C Portsmouth, 8 January 1903. 
351 'Orders in Council for the Regulation of the Naval Service 232: Clothing Gratuity to Newly-
Entered Stokers,' ed. Admiralty (London, Eyre and Spottiswoode for HMSO, 1902). 
136 
 
gratuity of Ten Pounds for this purpose to all newly-entered Stokers, the 
conditions of payment to be at our discretion.352 
 
The specific wording, ‘conditions of payment to be at our discretion’, was 
an Admiralty ploy deliberately inserted in order to ensure that the stoker’s kit 
gratuity would be paid in such a manner that as before, the first payment did not 
cover the full cost of the first half of a kit. This penny pinching attitude 
unnecessarily placed stokers in Crown debt in order to recover some of the 
expense of issuing a not so ‘free kit.’ The Captain of Duke of Wellington 
returned to the debate by observing that despite the new regulations recruiters 
had continued to inform prospective stokers that they would receive full pay of 
eleven shillings and eight pence a week and a ‘free kit.’ Once again, the 
prospect of incurring Crown debt was said to have caused ‘considerable 
dissatisfaction’ amongst the stokers, and many ‘refused to sign.’353   
 
By discriminating against stokers on this issue the Admiralty not only 
unfairly penalised the men and hampered its own recruiting targets but by its 
own admission the dissatisfaction over having to pay for their kit became a 
‘fruitful cause of desertion amongst stokers.’354   
 
Prior to 1890 the lower-deck appeared ‘quite content to pay for their 
clothes without looking on it as an injustice.’355  Moreover, because the men 
purchased their kit out of their own personal funds they saw it as being their 
own personal property. The Navy appeared to agree as prior to the introduction 
of new uniform regulations in late 1890 it had adopted a policy of ‘non-
interference’ with kit. However, Yexley noted that the proper dressing of the 
men had then assumed ‘a new importance to the uniform strategist’ with the 
introduction of the new uniform regulations. 356  This brought about much 
resentment from the men who objected to having to pay for a uniform kit which 
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was then subject to petty inspections and regulations.357 The main complaint 
made by men serving in naval barracks appeared to be the petty rules and 
regulations imposed on them with regards to clothing inspections. Stoker James 
Maloney recalled that there was ‘rigid discipline’ at Chatham barracks while 
dress codes were also ‘rigidly enforced.’358   
  
The paragraph in HMS Victory’s ‘Red Book’ which detailed the 
regulations of the barracks laid down the following routine for kit inspections:   
 
Every man joining barracks is allowed time for mustering his bag, completing kit, 
or making his bag uniform as follows,  
If from Foreign service = 48 hours 
If from Home service = 24 hours 
If from Harbour service = Half a day. 
If after he has had his full time he fails to pass the Clothing Officer, his leave will 
be stopped until such time as his bag is uniform.359 
 
  The sailors ‘housewife’ was a good example of what Yexley considered 
‘the stupid red tape of authority.’ A ‘housewife’ was a small sewing kit which 
was regarded as part of a man’s kit. However, because the uniform regulations 
stipulated that there was to be ‘no deviation from the mustering list’, many 
officers took this to mean that the ‘housewife’ had to be complete and to scale. 
Yexley observed that some officers were so keen to follow instructions to the 
letter, that they were known to count individual buttons and needles and to 
check the length of the measuring tape in the ‘housewife’ to ensure that each 
item was present and correct. This attention to detail meant that for all practical 
purposes, the ‘housewife’ could not be used for its intended purpose, therefore 
most men kept it in their ‘bag’ for mustering purposes only. As a result, the men 
were forced to provide themselves with a separate ‘Jewing bag’ which 
contained sufficient sewing materials to enable them to keep their uniform kit in 
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The term ‘Jewing’ was a traditional naval term to describe the act of 
making clothes or a generic term given to a ship’s tailor. Most ships had a 
‘Jewing’ firm which made up uniform articles for men from serge and flannel 
purchased from the ship’s Paymaster. Chief Stoker Ernest Bullock noted in his 
memoirs, that the catering arrangements in force in the Navy during the first 
decade of the twentieth century resulted in many of the married men struggling 
to pay their share of the communal mess-bill each month. The burden of having 
to find the money to meet a large monthly mess-bill, together with the need to 
send as much of their pay as possible home to their dependants, explained why 
so many married men went into business operating lower-deck firms.360   
 
In her study of the naval ‘internal economy’ Elinor Romans pointed out 
that economic activity on the lower-deck took two forms being either a ‘one-off’ 
transaction or a business conducted over a longer period of time.361  While 
regulation of the internal economy varied from ship to ship, men required 
permission from the captain to set up a firm which was generally granted unless 
there were too many firms. Romans suggested that a firm would consist of one 
man but generally operated with up to four men.362  Although not noted by 
Romans there was a valid economic reason why a firm would wish to have 
more than one operator. In order to maximise its profits a firm would need to 
ensure its members were in opposite watches in the watch and station bill so 
that the firm was able to trade around the clock.    
 
Traditionally, the ship’s blacksmith and plumber made up the ‘snobbing’ 
or cobbling firms while the ship’s painter and shipwright would team up together 
to craft various types of object d’art mostly made from wood and highly 
decorated to be kept by the men as mementoes of the commission or given as 
gifts to their mothers or sweethearts. Because they had access to measuring 
equipment and utensils and a ‘clean area’ to mix their brew or develop 
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photographs, the sick berth stewards ran the ‘goffer’ and photography firms.  
‘Goffer’ is a traditional naval term for a soft drink and in the pre-canteen days 
before bottled soft drinks could be purchased onboard, the goffer firm would 
make up quantities of iced lemonade and hawk it around the mess-decks for a 
penny a glass (with or without sherbet).363   
 
On the Lancaster in the heat of the Mediterranean, S.P.O. Reynolds 
bemoaned the fact that sailors were denied ‘liquor of any kind onboard except 
the daily half gill of rum.’ He argued that the Navy was ‘years’ behind the Army 
in this respect and reminisced of the time he had been ’royally entertained’ in 
the Argyle & Sutherland Highlanders Sergeants’ mess in Malta where he had 
sat in a ‘comfy chair’ drinking ‘the finest spirits and beer.’364  The best that 
Reynolds could do was to join the rest of his shipmates around the ‘Fo’c’s’le, 
Arms’ as the Lancaster’s Maltese run lemonade bar was called.365 
 
The smokers amongst the lower-deck were each entitled to draw an 
allowance of one pound of tobacco per month, if serving in home waters, and 
two pounds if on foreign station. The tobacco was issued in its natural leaf state 
and needed to be treated to allow it to mature to each man’s particular taste. 
Should a smoker be too busy or too lazy to roll their own leaf tobacco, the 
‘bacca’ firm would oblige and after treating the leaf tobacco, it would be rolled 
and twisted in a small piece of canvas much like a rolled up hammock for three 
pence a pound.366  One of the ‘perks’ for the ‘bacca’ firm was that they kept a 
quarter of each man’s tobacco for their services which they could then re-sell 
thus further maximising their profits.367 
 
Most ships had a barbering and shaving firm known as ‘Sweeny Todd’, 
usually operated by stokers or marines. The late centenarian and former Chief 
Stoker William (Bill) Stone took up tobacco rolling while serving in his first ship 
HMS Tiger as a second class stoker in order to supplement his service pay. On 
                                            
363  Sydney, Knock, Clear Lower-Deck, 158. 
364 J. W. Reynolds, Diary of the Mediterranean Commission of H.M.S. Lancaster, 34. 
365 Ibid.15. 
366 Sidney Knock, Clear Lower-Deck, 153-8. 
367 Elinor Romans, 'The Internal Economy of the Royal Navy in the Twentieth Century,' 84. 
140 
 
being drafted from Tiger to ‘Guzz’ (Devonport Barracks) in 1921 he bought his 
first set of barber’s tools from a retiring chief petty officer for the grand sum of 
one pound. Over the following twenty-six years which included time in the Hood 
and service at sea during both World Wars, Bill Stone, when not on watch in the 
stokehole operated a  ‘Sweeney Todd’ firm.368  The savings he made from his 
‘firm’ allowed Stone to open his own barbers shop when he retired from the 
Navy which he successfully managed until he finally retired. Bill Stone was the 
last man alive to have served in the Royal Navy throughout the two World Wars 
when he finally died at the age of one hundred and eight years in January 2009.  
  
One of the more important firms was the ‘dhobying’ firm. ‘Dhobying’, was 
a colloquialism inherited from British association with military service on the 
Indian sub-continent and a term used by the lower-deck to describe the act of 
washing clothes or bathing. In ships up to the size of cruiser class during the 
first decade of the twentieth century, only E.R.As and stokers had the luxury of 
bathrooms, the rest of the ship’s company had to make do with a wooden mess-
tub. The mess tub served the dual purpose of a daily scrubbing out tub for 
washing up the mess utensils and ‘traps’ (pots and pans) and for scrubbing 
down the mess table. In addition, it served as a weekly mess bath for the men 
who would take it in turns to wash themselves down in the water remaining from 
cleaning the mess ‘traps’ and scrubbing out the mess.   
 
In most ships stokers had sole use of a tiled bathroom, unlimited hot 
water and access to a stokehole, engine room or other convenient machinery 
space in which to hang up the wet dhobying to dry, therefore they had a virtual 
monopoly on running the all-important ‘dhoby’ firms.369  However, small ships 
such as torpedo boat destroyers, destroyers and submarines were not fitted 
with bathrooms. Stoker Frank Rose recalled that before going off watch, each 
pair of stokers from the boiler rooms would fill a bucket with boiling water taken 
from the boiler gauge glass test cock. The men would then heave the bucket 
out of the stokehole on a long length of rope and take their portable bathroom 
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onto the upper-deck in the lee of the break of the fo’c’sle (fore-part of the ship). 
Trying to keep out of the weather as much as possible, the men would take it in 
turns to strip and wash in the bucket. However, Rose remembered that in rough 
seas they would quite often get soaked by breaking waves making the whole 
business ‘a waste of time and energy.’370    
 
On the other hand, while making a healthy profit for their operators, ships’ 
firms could be a financial drain on men who were forced by necessity to use 
them. While gambling and money lending were forbidden under the Naval 
Discipline Act, services could be brought onboard by signing a ‘chit’ and paid for 
when the men were paid; or by illegally bartering their rum ration. The 
contemporary post card, (See Illustration 8, p. 142) clearly depicts the financial 
pressure that faced men through using ships’ firms.  Cleavely bemoaned the 
fact that while he had been paid three days previously he had been unable to 
afford to go ashore for the preceding two weeks, observing, ‘you can see what 
‘it,’ [his pay] goes on.’ Cleavely’s premonition that he would never see 
‘civilization’ again proved correct. Just five months later and only a few hours 
from Greenock the battleship Barham collided with the Duchess which sank 
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Figure: 8 Postcard from J. G. Cleavely, H.M.S. Duchess, (1939)  





Figure: 8 Postcard from J. G. Cleavely, H.M.S. Duchess, (1939)  








Naval victualling- the Fixed Ration and Savings System 
 
Prior to 1907, catering arrangements for the lower-deck had remained 
virtually unchanged for 120 years. The men were victualled under the ‘Fixed 
Ration and Savings System’ which was known to the men as ‘Canteen Messing’ 
because they were forced out of necessity to purchase extra food from the 
canteen in order to subsidise the fixed ration. The ‘fixed' part of the ration 
comprised a daily allowance of basic food items which was termed the 
‘standard ration.’ In addition, a system known as ‘savings’ which had been an 
unauthorised but common practice during most of the eighteenth century, was 
officially included within the fixed ration from 1799. ‘Savings’ allowed men to 
leave a portion of their daily 'fixed ration' with the Paymaster in return for a 
money equivalent which was paid monthly to the caterer of each mess, (See 
Appendix 5). This system allowed men to either purchase other items of 
foodstuffs from the Paymaster or ship’s canteen or to save some money each 
month which could be disbursed back to each man should the mess find itself in 
credit. 
 
The standard ration in 1902 allowed each man one and a quarter pounds 
of biscuit or one and a half pounds of soft bread, together with one pound of 
fresh meat and one pound of fresh vegetables. When fresh provisions were 
unavailable, one pound of salt pork and half a pound of split peas was issued 
every other day. On the other day, one pound of salt beef together with flour, 
suet and raisins was issued although these items could be replaced with 
oatmeal or split peas. This basic diet was supplemented with preserved meat, 
preserved potato and compressed vegetables. In addition, the men received 
small quantities of tea, sugar, chocolate, mustard, pepper and vinegar.   
 
A contemporary writer promoted the standard ration as a ‘good system’ 
for the men because it remained the ‘same all over the world, no matter where 
the ship may have been.’372  Whereas, in practical and dietetic terms, the 'fixed' 
nature of the standard ration meant that there was absolutely no variation in the 
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diet of the lower-deck from ship to ship or station to station, nor did the standard 
ration take into account variations in the availability of different foodstuffs due to 
changing seasons or particular climatic conditions.   
 
Due to long running discontent amongst the lower-deck with regards to 
the poor quality of the provisions, the monotony of the staple diet and the high 
cost of mess bills, Lionel Yexley mounted a strong campaign for victualling 
reform which eventually forced the Admiralty to instigate a series of victualling 
committees. Yexley had the support of Admiral Sir John Fisher, who accepted 
many of Yexley’s proposals which eventually transformed the feeding and 
clothing of sailors. Anthony Carew observed that these reforms constituted the 
biggest single improvement to the quality of lower-deck life in over half a 
century for which he gave all the credit to Yexley.373  
 
It could be argued that despite the many technical innovations introduced 
into the Royal Navy during the early 20th century, the welfare and health of the 
lower-deck was badly neglected. While ships became ever more dependent on 
electricity, wireless, steam turbines and water-tube boilers, the living conditions 
on the lower-deck remained as basic as the ships of the line which had 
preceded the steam Navy. In particular, the Navy lagged behind most other 
navies when it came to providing modern conveniences such as onboard 
bakeries, cool and cold rooms and fresh and refrigerated provisions; while there 
was also a dire shortage of trained cooks.   
 
Yexley pointed out that every other Navy but the British were fitted with 
cool and cold rooms to preserve fresh and frozen produce and bakeries to bake 
fresh bread each day, while every other Navy had a full complement of trained 
cooks.374  The United States Navy had entirely dispensed with dried and salted 
provisions by 1908 and was able to supply its men with a wide variety of fresh, 
frozen and chilled victuals (See Appendix 6). By comparison, the first class 
protected cruiser Terrible had a simple ‘beef-screen’ for the stowage of fresh 
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beef which was not only ‘too small and un-refrigerated’, but was inappropriately 
sited being directly outside the ‘heads’ (toilets) used by 600 men.375  Because it 
had no effective way of maintaining fresh or frozen provisions, the twentieth 
century Navy relied on the same salted and dried provisions that were served to 
men in the eighteenth century, (See Appendix 7). Moreover, the Admiralty 
responsibility for victualling the men ended with the issuing of provisions to each 
man, thereafter, the men themselves were left to their own devices with regards 




Having laid down a standard daily ration, it was left to each individual 
mess to decide the menu for the one and only hot meal of the day. Each day 
two men would be allocated the duties of ‘cooks of the mess.’ Their first duty 
would be to draw the mess meat ration at 7 o’clock in the morning. Thereafter, 
they had to decide how to prepare and cook the dish for the noon time dinner. 
Having prepared the meal from the rations provided supplemented with any 
extras the men had purchased themselves, the dish would be taken to the 
galley for cooking.   
 
Shore based galleys were obviously not as limited by space as ship 
board galleys, nonetheless, the daily routine in naval barracks remained the 
same on shore as it did at sea. Men in barracks drew their standard ration in the 
same manner as those at sea and prepared their dinner in similar fashion on 
the mess-deck table. One of the main complaints made by the men with regards 
to the preparation of their dinner was the lack of time allocated to them as the 






                                            




Chatham Barracks Standing Order 219 issued in 1908 stipulated: 
 
Dinners are to be prepared during the breakfast hour and taken to the galley 
before the ‘hands fall in’; failing this, it must be understood that cleaning the 




Having prepared their daily rations into a suitable dinner on the mess 
table, the mess cooks would take it to the galley for cooking. However, as the 
men prepared the meal for cooking themselves the use of the term ‘cook’ to 
describe the person who boiled the offering was something of a misnomer. In 
the galley vegetables (if issued) were placed in nets, each net bearing a ‘tally’ to 
show which mess it belonged to. The pudding or ‘duff’, as the sweet is known in 
the Navy would be placed in a duck canvas bag. Due to a lack of experience 
and limited catering equipment the meal could only be boiled in a large copper 
therefore the meat, vegetables and duff would all be boiled at the same time.   
 
If the meat was to be roasted, or if the mess-cooks had the necessary 
culinary skills to prepare a pie dish, this would be placed on a tray within the 
copper boiler to steam cook alongside the vegetables and ‘duff’ before being 
placed in an oven to ‘brown off.’  This mode of cooking was employed because 
few ships’ galleys had ovens sufficiently large enough to cope with the demand. 
Yexley observed that a meal prepared in this fashion could not be described as 
an ‘eatable article’, leaving him to suggest that his readers ‘must bring their own 
imaginations to bear on the subject.’377    
  
There were a number of ways in which the mess-cooks could show off 
their culinary skills. The ‘straight-bake’ was meat placed on a roasting dish and 
offered to the galley. Other variations included ‘schooner-on-a-rock’ where the 
meat was surrounded with potatoes and the ‘royal-roast’ which included all the 
trimmings of a traditional roast dinner.378  On joining their first ship, men had to 
quickly learn the culinary arts from their peers. These included the intricacies of 
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using a rolling pin, making flaky pastry and preparing roasts, suet, and milk 
puddings. The more experienced men would be able to make fish cakes, fillet 
fish and to make sauces, gravies and stuffing.379 Stoker Frederick Wigby joined 
the Navy at Chatham in 1933 and after completing his initial new entry training, 
spent a month in the main galley learning how to make pie crusts, dumplings 
and batter puddings; although he recalled spending ‘slightly more time peeling 
potatoes and onions.’380  
 
As noted, the daily standard ration issued to the men only allowed for 
one cooked meal a day. Breakfast consisted of one pint of cocoa without sugar 
or milk and ship’s biscuit. Lunch, commonly known as dinner, was served at 
noon and consisted of the bulk of the daily ration of fresh meat and vegetables 
or a salt meat and preserved vegetable substitute. Supper, at half-past four 
consisted of one pint of tea (no milk) and biscuit. If the mess could afford it, 
extra provisions could be purchased from the Paymaster or the ship’s canteen 
to provide a variation in the diet or something for the men to have for supper 
such as tinned herrings or cheese. 
   
As one of few men to achieve commissioned rank from the lower-deck 
during the early part of the twentieth century, Henry Capper remembered the 
deprivations of the standard ration. In his memoirs he described the long hours 
between supper and breakfast, with two night watches in between, and nothing 
to eat, as being ‘the most trying time.’381  
 
With regards to the quality and training of Royal Navy cooks, a 
committee reported in 1876 that ship’s cooks ‘generally know nothing about 
cooking, in the proper acceptance of the term.’382 This statement is unsurprising 
as the first naval school of cookery was only established in 1872 with the 
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appointment of a single cookery instructor.383 The situation with regards trained 
cooks was not much improved by 1931 when it was disclosed by the committee 
tasked with investigating the relative benefits between the standard ration and 
the proposed new system of messing allowance, that there were still ‘insufficient 




Ernest Bullock was drafted to the Bluebell on the China Station in 1924 
and recalled that although the Bluebell had a small ice making machine, she 
was not equipped with a refrigerator, consequently fresh provisions were in 
short supply. As a result, the men were issued with preserved rations including 
‘hard tack’ (salt-pork). On the last occasion this item was issued Bullock claimed 
that the barrel was date stamped 1878, some forty-six years earlier. Having 
queried the date, he decided that he could not be sure that it indicated the date 
in which the barrel had been packed; nonetheless he observed that ‘if you did 
not like eating fat bacon, you couldn’t stomach the pork issue.’385  While 
describing ‘salt pork and pea-doo’ (cooked split peas) as ‘very tasty’, Bullock 
was not at all keen on salted cod. The ‘old salts’ according to Bullock, referred 
to salt cod as ‘toe-rag’ and even after a twenty-four hour soak in fresh water he 




Brian Vale claimed that from June 1800 ‘the conquest of scurvy in the 
Royal Navy could really be counted,’ however, this did not necessarily mean 
that the disease had been eradicated.387 The Navy’s reliance on a diet 
consisting of mainly preserved and salted provisions together with a general 
lack of fresh vegetables, meat and fruit ensured that the means of preventing 
                                            
383 'Orders in Council for the Regulation of the Naval Service 18: School of Cookery and Trained 
Cooks,' ed. Admiralty (Eyre and Spottiswoode for HMSO, 1872). 
384 TNA, ADM 1/8756/174, 'Committee of Messing in H.M. Ships Victualled on the Standard 
Ration and Messing Allowance System,' ed. Admiralty (1931). 5. 
385 E W Bullock, 'Recollections of Naval Service,' 36. 
386 Ibid, 7. 
387 Brian Vale, 'The Conquest of Scurvy in the Royal Navy 1793-1800: A Challenge to Current 
Orthodoxy,' The Society of Nautical Research 94, no. 2 (2008). 172. 
149 
 
scurvy were absent; therefore scurvy was a recurring problem well into the 
twentieth century. Fresh meat was a suitable preventative for scurvy, however, 
as previously described, even when fresh meat was available at sea it was not 
always suitable for cooking and eating due to difficulties in maintaining it in a 
fresh condition. In 1915 Leading Stoker Henry Nancarrow on passage to St 
Helena in the Albion recorded in his diary:   
 
the heat is unbearable in the stokeholds and it seems ridiculous to keep on 
drawing fresh provisions, the ship’s butcher has to throw meat overboard as it 
only keeps for a few hours.388  
 
Stoker Thomas Cooper served in the Exmouth during the naval operation 
to force the Dardanelles in 1915 and described the food onboard the Exmouth 
as being ‘very bad.’ He noted that the men were ‘lucky if they got a slice of dry 
bread for the first meal of the day at breakfast.’  Moreover, he remembered that 
the arrangements for the stowage of fresh meat on the Exmouth were so limited 
that the men would only receive a ration of fresh meat on the first day at sea, 
thereafter their ration would be salt meat or corned beef rations on alternate 
days.389  The lower-deck of the Kent was also reduced to dry bread for 
breakfast in 1915. Thomas Dixon, the ship’s junior surgeon recorded in his diary 
that the ship had run out of all fresh provisions and with no news of a supply 
ship being sent ‘the men were reduced to a diet of dry bread and tea for 
breakfast, tea and supper.’390  
 
The Philomel reported in 1909 that an outbreak of scurvy had rendered 
ten men unfit for duty. One of these, a stoker, eventually died in hospital at 
Aden from severe dysentery.391  In his report, Staff Surgeon Pope pointed out 
that the ship’s company of the Philomel had been on salt or preserved rations 
for eighty-five days out of 159; this amounted to almost one salt ration issued 
every other day. Moreover, the ship’s surgeon declared that green vegetables 
had been unavailable while the only fresh meat issued to the men had been 
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‘inferior mutton’, which had been derived from animals that had previously 
suffered from tuberculosis.392 The staff surgeon concluded that the health of the 
men had been weakened by long continuous service off the Somali coast under 
‘depressing conditions and great heat.’  In his estimation, the heat had 
‘particularly affected the stokers as he noted that the ship had been under-
weigh, or at short notice for steam on 122 days out of 159.393   
  
The Rice Victualling Committee 
 
In response to various campaigns to bring about reform to naval 
victualling arrangements the Admiralty appointed Vice-Admiral Rice to chair the 
first of a series of committees tasked to investigate the naval victualling system. 
The ‘Rice Committee’ was specifically ordered to look into the question of 
‘victualling of the men of the Royal Navy with particular reference to the men’s 
meal hours, the prices paid for savings and the management of naval canteens.  
However, despite ordering the inquiry, the Admiralty demonstrated that it was 
not prepared to consider major changes to the system then in force. The 
Admiralty advised Admiral Rice that despite any disadvantages arising from it, it 
would not consider abolishing the system of savings. Furthermore, the 
Admiralty was not prepared to consider the abolition of canteens or of their 
management being placed directly under Admiralty control despite wide-spread 
allegations of corruption.394 Carew suggested that while the Rice Committee 
was a ‘triumph for naval reformers’, it was a qualified one because the Admiralty 
had failed to comprehend the interrelation between the ‘official’ and ‘unofficial’ 
ration. Therefore, Carew questioned whether the terms of reference laid down 
for the Rice Committee allowed it to tackle the roots of the problem.395   
 
One of the most contentious items in the standard ration was Admiralty 
produced ship’s biscuit, which was not at all popular with the men. Yexley 
observed that the men refused to eat the service ration biscuit unless as a last 
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resort; preferring instead to pay six to eight pence per pound for biscuit supplied 
by the canteen, when soft bread was unavailable.396  However, this view was 
not shared by the Rice Committee who declared that with regards to the biscuit, 
‘no real grounds for complaint existed.’  Dismissing the men’s objection to the 
biscuit, the committee came to the conclusion that the men were ‘prejudiced 
against the biscuit for no good reason.’397   
 
Chief Stoker Ernest Bullock, had good reason to be prejudiced against 
ship’s biscuit. As a joke and also as a practical demonstration of the inedible 
nature of the biscuit, he posted one to his fiancée from onboard the destroyer 
Oberon at Portsmouth. With just an address label pasted onto the biscuit and 
with no other wrapper or protection, the biscuit arrived safely in Plymouth in one 
piece.398 
 
Despite having concluded that ‘no real dissatisfaction existed with 
regards to the Standard Ration’, the Rice Committee nonetheless decided to 
add jam, coffee and preserved meat to the ration. It also gave the men two 
extra meal hours so that the lower-deck could have a formal breakfast and a 
late supper meal break on top of the early morning cocoa, lunch and tea breaks 
that already existed; although no extra rations were provided for these times.     
 
Yexley was quick to condemn the new ration on the grounds that two 
ounces of jam and four ounces of preserved meat issued day after day would 
become just as monotonous and nauseating as the previous ration.399  As 
predicted by Yexley, the novelty of the new ration eventually wore off leaving 
the Admiralty with 269,000 pounds of spoiled jam in its storehouses which had 
become ‘unsuitable for issue’ because the men refused to take it up.400 It 
appears not to have occurred to the Admiralty that an issue of jam was of little 
use to men who were bereft of soft bread?    
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While serving in the Bluebell Bullock relied on tinned food to supplement 
the staple standard ration. He was particularly fond of Maconochie’s ‘tinned 
dinners’; describing the most popular supper dish on the Bluebell as tinned 
sausages and mash, or fish cakes made from tinned salmon.401  However, 
many men refused to eat tinned meats. During a further victualling committee 
which sat just five years after the Rice Committee allegations surfaced 
regarding American tinned meats. These allegations were said to have had a 
considerable effect upon the minds of the men, so much so, that they had 
created a ‘prejudice amongst them with regard to tinned foods.’402  Because of a 
low take up of the preserved meat ration the Admiralty attempted to force the 
men to accept it by making the preserved meat ration a compulsory item of the 
standard ration for which no savings were allowed. However, Yexley observed 
that most men refused to eat their eight ounce weekly ration of preserved meat, 
‘because of fears generated by the Chicago meat scare.’403   
 
The reference to the Chicago meat scare may have been prompted by 
the novel The Jungle, written by Upton Sinclair an early American socialist 
journalist who uncovered corruption and other malpractices within the American 
meat industry which was alleged to have processed and canned ‘diseased and 
rotten meat.’ 404  The novel was published in 1906, the same year the Login 
Victualling Committee began to take its evidence and may have been 
responsible for turning the men off the tinned meat ration. Whatever the cause, 
the lower-deck boycott left the Admiralty with over 2,000,000 pounds in weight 
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The ‘Login’ Victualling Committee 
 
Rear-Admiral Spencer Login was appointed in 1906 to review the 
findings of the previous Rice Committee. The Login committee reported in 1907 
that in its review of the 1901 statement on ship’s biscuit made by the Rice 
Committee, ‘it could not contest the statement as to its dietetic value’ but could 
re-affirm that it was ‘thoroughly unpopular with the men.’ The ‘Login Committee’ 
heard evidence from various sources that there was a strong desire amongst 
the men for the introduction of a biscuit more of the type issued by the Army 
and the leading steamship companies. In its deliberations, the Login committee 
discovered that between 1905-1906 2,800,000 pounds of biscuit was issued to 
the lower-deck. However, only 150,000 pounds was actually ‘taken up’ by the 




In his memoirs S.P.O. Reynolds accused the Admiralty of ‘strenuously 
opposing ships’ bakeries.’ He noted that in 1903 the Admiralty acquired two 
new warships (Triumph and Swiftsure) which were originally ordered for Chile. 
Unlike ships of the Royal Navy, both of these vessels were fitted out with 
bakeries, however, Reynolds recalled that because the Admiralty drafted ‘ships’ 
cooks’ and not bakers to the two ships; ‘no lessons were learned.’407  The 
decision not to provide bakeries appears to have been initially made by the Rice 
Committee on the flimsiest of grounds with the justification that baking 
appliances ‘could be damaged in action in time of war,’ while it also considered 
that bakeries would take up too much space at a time when space onboard 
warships was at a premium.408  However, having belatedly accepted that the 
men refused to eat ship’s biscuit, the Login Committee finally recommended 
that in ships not fitted with bakeries, three days ration of fresh bread should be 
carried while further supplies could be obtained from ships fitted with bakeries. 
                                            
406 Spencer Henry Metcalfe Login, 'Report of the Committee Appointed to Inquire into the 
Question of the Canteen and Victualling Arrangements in H.M. Fleet,' (Navy: Canteen and 
Victualling Arrangements), ed. Admiralty (HMSO, 1907), 8. 
407 J. W. Reynolds, 'Diary of the Mediterranean Commission of H.M.S. Lancaster,' 16. 
408 'Report of the Committee Appointed to Inquire into the Question of Navy Rations,' 17-8. 
154 
 
Furthermore, the committee authorised ships to bake their own bread ‘where 
the cooks were capable of doing so.’409 The caution in this statement may well 
have been justified. Some twelve years later during the Hood’s initial sea trials a 
report recommending alterations to the galley noted:   
 
In view of the unskilled men who will use the galley and bakery burners an 
ample supply of spare gear should be supplied.410 
   
Savings 
 
As previously stated, the standard ration or ‘bare-Navy’ was unvaried, 
unappetising and issued in insufficient quantities to satisfy the lower-deck. 
Therefore, men relied on ‘savings’ from the standard ration in order to purchase 
alternative items from the ship's canteen to provide them with a more varied and 
appetising meal. However, the canteen was as much a source of discontent 
amongst the lower-deck as the standard ration itself. The irony of canteen 
messing was that while fresh food was unavailable on the official standard 
ration it could be bought at a price from a ship’s canteen. Stoker Ernest Bullock 
remembered that aboard the Natal ‘no mess ever lived on the official ration 
alone’ as each mess was able to purchase ‘all kinds of green-stuff, bacon and 
ham from the canteen to supplement their ration.’411  This statement would 
suggest that there was something drastically wrong with the service standard 
ration if it could only provide the men with salted meat, compressed vegetables 
and dried peas when a civilian run ship’s canteen could offer the men fresh 
greens and other fresh produce.   
 
Stoker Bullock remembered that at the end of the month a statement of 
the mess spending and allowances would be placed on the mess-deck notice 
board noting that, ‘if you lived too well during the month, you found that you 
were in debt to the canteen.’  He also observed that many of the married men 
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struggled to make ends meet at the end of the month because some men would 
leave the last halfpenny to their wives ‘as there was no marriage allowances 
then.’412   
 
While the lower-deck appreciated the variety of fresh and other foods it 
could purchase from ships’ canteens, bribery and corruption were said to be 
rampant while the men were regularly ‘fleeced and robbed.’413 Many of the 
complaints regarded short measures, high prices and inferior goods. Although 
the Rice Committee had concluded that ships’ canteens were most favoured by 
the men, the men themselves appeared to have been far from unanimous as to 
which system they actually preferred. Canteens could be run by an individual 
ship, or by a tenant usually representing a civilian catering enterprise or more 
usually by an individual Maltese proprietor. Through its strategic position in the 
Mediterranean, Malta became an important naval base and as such the island 
enjoyed a long-standing association with the Navy. Over the years Maltese 
businessmen became adept at providing the goods and services that the Navy 
required. One important part of this service was the provision of ships' canteens. 
However, many men were unhappy with the corruption that is alleged to have 
been associated with canteens and expressed a wish for the Admiralty to take 
over the running of them but this was discounted by the Admiralty in its brief to 
the Rice Committee.   
 
When asked by the Login Committee which type of canteen they 
preferred, stokers representing the three Home Port Divisions voted as follows:  
     Portsmouth Devonport Chatham 
    
      
Chief Stokers  Ships   Tenant Tenant 
Stoker Petty Officers Ships             Official Official 
Stokers             Ships   Official Official414 
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From the results above it is clear that opinions differed between the 
Home Ports. All classes of stokers from the Portsmouth division particularly 
favoured a ship's canteen system, while the majority of S.P.Os and stokers from 
the Devonport and Chatham divisions preferred an official Admiralty run 
canteen system. Only the Chief Stokers of the Devonport and Chatham 
divisions supported tenant run canteens. These preferences were replicated by 
the other fifty-eight, senior and junior lower-deck ratings of all branches of the 
service who also gave evidence to the Login Committee. Out of these, the 
majority (twenty-two) voted for an official canteen system, (twenty) voted for a 
tenant system with only (sixteen) men supported a ship’s canteen system. 
These results indicate that the committee chaired by Admiral Rice that 
purported to reflect the mood of the lower-deck with regards to its support for 
ship run canteens, was far from correct.415   
 
The views of the Devonport division were summed up by S.P.O. Patrick 
Shea serving in the Niobe who, when asked by the committee which was the 
best type of canteen, answered, ‘none.’  After being pressed to give an answer 
Shea advised the committee that the men in his division recommended the 
Admiralty take over the running of all canteens.416  Furthermore, when asked by 
the Director of Contracts to comment upon the quality of ‘service provisions’ 
onboard his ship, Shea described the corned beef served in the Niobe as ‘not fit 
to be eaten’, the flour ‘out of date’, and ship’s biscuit ‘not up to the mark.’417   
 
Stoker Elliott of the Hogue, also answered ‘none’ when asked by the 
committee which ‘canteen system’ he preferred. Furthermore, when invited to 
suggest how the ‘canteen system’ could be improved, Elliott replied that the 
stokers in his division wished to ‘abolish the canteen system entirely.’418  Elliott 
advised the committee that the men of the Devonport division were all 
unanimous in their desire for ‘properly cooked meals.’  Furthermore, Elliott 
advised the committee that in the overwhelming opinion of his division, the 
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Admiralty should take over full responsibility for victualling, cooking, and feeding 
the men. In order to reinforce this message, Elliott pointed out to the committee 
that the Devonport Stokers ‘did not want to play any part in the ‘preparation or 
accounting for their food.’419   
 
Despite the declaration from the Rice Committee that the system of 
savings which had been in force for ‘upwards of one hundred years’ was one 
that the men of the Navy were ‘much attached’,420  Stoker Elliott forcibly argued 
that the stokers in his division ‘did not want any savings.’  In a final plea, Elliott 
stated that the Devonport stokers simply wanted to be ‘well fed,’ making the 
point that, ‘money matters did not come into the argument at all.’421   
 
At this juncture in the history of the lower-deck, petty inter-branch 
rivalries usually prevented any collective decisions being made which might 
have benefited all men whatever their branch. However, in order to reinforce the 
argument so forcefully presented by Stoker Elliott, the Devonport stokers 
managed to enlist the support of the other Devonport branch representatives to 
submit a joint written plea to the Login Committee. The inclusion of E.R.As, sick 
berth staff, and writers in the joint plea is an indication of the level of support for 
victualling reform. These men usually saw themselves at the top of the lower-
deck social hierarchy and would not normally support a plea from men they 
considered to be lower down the social scale.   
 
From examination of the evidence given by the Home Port lower-deck 
representatives, it is clear that the Login Committee found themselves at cross-
purposes with the lower-deck representatives. In their attempts to determine 
which of the three ‘types of canteen’ the men preferred, the Login Committee 
found that the stokers in particular were only interested in discussing the need 
to abolish the ‘canteen messing system,’ a system which forced men to 
subsidise their rations out of their own pockets. Moreover, all of the Devonport 
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representatives were united in their wish to see canteens and the standard 
ration and savings system of victualling abolished entirely in favour of ‘properly 




General messing was a revolutionary system for the Royal Navy, but a 
relatively common feature of other navies and the Army, whereby each man 
was allocated a monetary daily messing allowance instead of a ration of food. 
The ship’s Paymaster used the collective messing allowance of the ship’s 
company to purchase provisions which were then prepared and cooked for the 
men by fully trained cooks in galleys equipped for the purpose.   
 
Trials which took place on selected ships in 1908 proved that general 
messing would satisfy most of the men’s complaints with regards to the poor 
state of naval victualling. In the Furious all catering was managed by a First 
Class Petty Officer Cook while the cooking was carried out by trained cooks 
assisted by one seaman, two stokers and two marines. These men were 
relieved every three months, and worked alongside the cooks in the galley to 
prepare meals for the entire ship’s company.422 The combined daily standard 
ration together with alternative rations purchased from the canteen using the 
10d. daily messing allowance enabled the men of the Furious to be fed three 
hot meals and a cold tea each day with a daily menu posted on the ship’s main 
notice board which included the following fare: 
  
Breakfast:  Kippers, bloaters, haddock, faggots, brawn, sausages. 
           Dinner:  Joints, (extra vegetables not supplied by the service), various 
                      puddings. 
Tea:   Bread and butter, cake, jam, watercress, celery, etc 
Supper:         Liver and bacon, Gloucester cheeses, German sausage, fried fish, 
                      cold cuts. Bread and butter available ad-lib at all meals.423  
 
This much improved victualling system cost each man no more than 1s. 
6d. a month which was a pittance compared to the twenty-five shillings Yexley 
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estimated most men spent per month in subsidising food from their own 
wages.424  Despite the plea made by the Devonport Division in 1906 for 
‘properly cooked dinners’, and the undoubted success of the general messing 
trials in 1908, the 1931 Committee of Messing in H.M. Ships disclosed that only 
half the Royal Navy’s ships benefited from general messing. Furthermore, 
‘cooks of the mess’ lasted well into the 1950s until the Navy eventually built 
every new ship with the facilities to be able to offer ‘general messing.’425 On the 
other hand, the final demise of ‘savings’ was not appreciated by all men as the 
following contemporary poem explains: 
‘GENERAL MESSING’ 
What is it fills our bitter cup  
And makes our hearts feel sore?  
Why does the dismal queue line up  
Outside the canteen door? 
Why can’t we put a quid away  
Ten bob or even less? - 
O messmates, ‘tis misfortune’s sway:  
The woes of ‘General Mess’ 
O tis not to our liking;  
My wife, my only friend,  
Believes I’m hunger striking  
or ‘going round the bend.’  
She moans for her poor hubby,  
She’s not to blame, I know  
They used to call me tubby  
They call me Snakey now.426 
 Obviously written by a married man, this poem suggests that the more 
experienced men may have been able to eke out an existence on the standard 
ration while managing to save a few shillings each week from their ‘savings’ in 
order to send to their families. However, the men of the Furious may have 
disagreed with the sentiment that general messing contributed to ‘starvation’. 
The long delay in changing from standard, to general messing, resulted 
in a two-tier Navy with widely differing mess bills dependent on whether a man 
was serving in a general messing or standard ration ship. The Director General 
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of Victualling observed, ‘there is no doubt that there is a tendency in standard 
ration ships for the men to live up to the general mess standard, with 
consequent unduly high mess bills.’427 Moreover, the 1931 Messing Committee 
which sat after the September 1931 Invergordon mutiny concluded that the high 
cost of lower-deck mess bills was a contributory factor to the lower-deck unrest. 
The following evidence was submitted to the post Invergordon inquiry from 
respective C-in-Cs:   
 
Portsmouth 
Heavy general mess bills particularly abroad and in non-general mess ships 
which should be remedied. 
 
Plymouth 
Investigation of mess bills and high rates of messing in non-general mess ships. 
Also rates for stations abroad vary and some are extremely high. 
 
Nore (Chatham) 
In standard ration ships and even general mess ships, and particularly in ships 
abroad, mess charges are incurred of widely differing rates.428  
 
It is apparent that despite the evidence given by lower-deck 
representatives to Admiral Login’s Committee which clearly pointed to great 
dissatisfaction amongst a majority of the lower-deck with regards to ‘canteen 
messing’; there was a reluctance amongst senior officers to ‘modernise’ the 
naval victualling system. In an illuminating paragraph the 1931 Messing 
Committee appeared to justify the retention of the standard ration system by 
observing: 
 
It is a convenient and well understood method of feeding the men which does 
not require a specially trained department or individual to manage it. 
Consequently landing parties and men in camp can be messed without an 
elaborate cooking organisation. In fact it helps to teach men to look after 
themselves and contribute to the maintenance of the traditional ‘handiness’ of 
the sailor.429  
 
This statement perfectly highlights the lack of appreciation senior officers 
had for the conditions that the lower-deck had to contend with and completely 
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contradicts the wishes of the lower-deck. Some twenty-six years previously 
Stoker Elliott of the Hogue had informed the Login Committee that all the men 
wanted was a ‘proper cooked dinner,' moreover a dinner that they did not have 
to prepare themselves. Another senior naval officer argued that the high cost of 
messing in standard ration ships was due to ‘inefficient mess caterers.’  At a 
stroke, this statement removed the responsibility for the inefficiencies in the 
service system of victualling from the Admiralty and placed it unfairly on the 
men themselves. In order to improve matters it was suggested that an officer, 
‘preferably a volunteer’, should supervise mess-caterers.’430   
 
The unprofessional and cavalier manner in which naval officers 
supported the archaic method of naval victualling was in direct contrast to the 
Army which had introduced a professional messing system in 1911. Selected 
Army officers were required to complete professional courses in the 
management of soldiers’ messing, while each military unit had a messing 
committee comprising an officer as president together with elected 
representatives of the rank and file. Army mess committees were tasked with 
meeting the wishes of the majority of the men with regards to their catering 
arrangements ‘as far as was possible.’431   
 
According to Searle, the Boer War had revealed organisational 
weaknesses, not only in the Army, but in the whole machinery of government.432 
The worst of British military amateurishness and the propensity to 'muddle 
through' problems was exposed during 'Black Week' leading to a renewed call 
for 'National Efficiency;' particularly with regards to putting the Army and Navy 
on a more professional footing. It could be argued that the new messing system 
introduced by the Army in 1911 was a reaction to this criticism and a sign that it 
was introducing the changes it required to enable it to become a more 
professional service. Yet, twenty years later, the Navy demonstrated that it still 
maintained an amateur policy with regards to the victualling of the lower-deck 
and had no great desire to introduce change.   
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Then again, it could also be argued that by forcing the men to fend for 
themselves in the most important area of victualling, the Admiralty unwittingly 
produced men who became independent by nature and who proved adept at 
feeding themselves with absolutely minimal support from an Admiralty that 
appeared unwilling to accept that it had any responsibility for feeding the men 
itself. The comment repeated earlier that the naval standard fixed ration system 
'contributed to the maintenance of the traditional ‘handiness’ of the sailor,' was 
undoubtedly given in order to support an outdated victualling system, 
nevertheless, there may have been a grain of truth in the idea. 
During the Second Boer War (1899-1901) part of the British military force 
ran out of supplies and was reduced to short rations. Commander Grant RN of 
the Doris who commanded the naval brigade described his 'bluejackets' as 
being ‘guileless’ when it came to foraging for food, but applauded the stokers 
who were said to have seldom returned from the veldt without a sheep allowing 
the wardroom to dine on leg of lamb every night.433 These actions suggest that 
stokers at least, had through necessity, become independent of mind and 
actions proving that they were more than able to fend for themselves. 
Off duty routines 
 
Despite having to subsidise their food from their meagre wages many 
men opted to incur additional extra living expenses by choosing to pay to sleep 
ashore whenever possible, rather than suffer the petty discipline and basic 
amenities provided free by the Navy. A room for the night in one of the 
temperance establishments run by the Salvation Army or Royal Sailors Rests 
cost 1s. at 1906 prices and was therefore a relatively expensive luxury for many 
on the lower-deck. Nonetheless, the price must have been considered good 
value for money despite the fact that 1s. for a stoker second class represented 
just over half his daily rate of pay of 1s/8d, while for a S.P.O. with three years 
seniority 1s. equalled one third of his daily rate of pay.434   
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That the men were willing to sacrifice such a significant amount of their 
daily pay to enjoy a nights rest between clean sheets, rather than live at no 
extra expense in barracks or onboard their ship, could be taken as being 
indicative of the feeling amongst the lower-deck with regards to the poor 
standard of naval accommodation and to the excessive level of discipline then 
in force in the Navy. HMS Victory’s ‘Red Book’ detailed the establishments rules 
and regulations and gives an insight into the reasons why men would prefer to 
spend as little time as possible within the constraints of the naval barracks. 
Some of the restrictions placed upon the men under the heading ‘Notes and 
Orders for Information and guidance of men joining Royal Naval Barracks’; 
warned men:   
 
GAMBLING OF ANY KIND AND THE USE OF CARDS ARE STRICTLY 
PROHIBITED (emphasised by capital letters) 
The inside patrol have orders to report any man loitering about the grounds 
improperly dressed. 
All men who remain in barracks are to be in their rooms by 1015 p.m. and 
turned in. Any man found loitering about the blocks or grounds after that time 
will be placed in the report. Men returning from leave after 1015 p.m. are to turn 
in at once. No loitering about in rooms or anywhere else is permitted. 
Smoking Regulations, smoking in the mess or barracks room is strictly 
prohibited neither will smoking be allowed in the kitchen or room opposite, or on 
the staircases or passages leading from block to block. Smoking is to cease at 
9.45 p.m. and whenever the ‘Cease Fire’ bugle is sounded. Smoking is allowed 
in all the canteen rooms (excepting the recreation room) in the billiard room, but 
not the reading room. 
Leave, those who are entitled to leave may do so at either, or any of the times 
named, without pipe or bugle call, the barrack clock being taken as the signal, 
on striking the hour or half hour.   
Men will not be permitted to pass out of the Gates at intermediate times:-  
9.20 a.m. 1 p.m. 1.30 p.m. 2 p.m. 4 p.m. Then every half hour till 6.30 p.m. 
All leave expires 6.45 a.m. Liberty men will assemble in the vicinity of the Guard 
House for inspection by the Officer of the Day, and are to be strictly in 
uniform.435 
 
By contrast, life in a Royal Marine barracks was conducted at a far more 
leisurely pace where marines were given the freedom of personal responsibility 
which enabled them to come and go as they pleased. At Eastney barracks 
Portsmouth, all Non Commissioned Officers and gunners with very good 
conduct were allowed a standing reveille pass until 7. 30 a.m., which meant 
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they could go ashore whenever they pleased and return to their barracks at any 
time during the night. Unlike the naval practice where all men were formally 
inspected by an officer before proceeding ashore, marines were not inspected. 
Instead the NCO on gate duty was responsible to check that no man proceeded 
out of barracks improperly dressed. Smoking was allowed at any time and in 
any place in Eastney barracks, except on the parade ground or whilst on 
duty.436   
 
However, while conditions in naval barracks were basic and restrictions 
petty and numerous, life onboard the lower-deck of a ship whilst at sea or 
alongside in harbour could be a lot worse. SP.O. Reynolds reflected that life in 
an onboard mess was as ‘prison like’ as the Navy could make it.437  While the 
Lancaster was in Malta, Reynolds had an opportunity to visit friends in the 
Argyle and Sutherland Highlanders Sergeant’s mess who he had first met when 
the regiment was stationed at Chatham. He described how the sergeants 
enjoyed billiards, smoking and reading rooms, and a comfortable bar where 
‘liquors of the highest quality were supplied at the lowest possible cost.’  
Moreover, while sitting on the mess veranda with a ‘long cool glass of beer’ 
Reynolds mused on the differences between the treatment of Army non-
commissioned officers and those in the Royal Navy. Noting that a naval chief 
petty officer was the most senior rating on the lower-deck, Reynolds observed 
that they were allowed ‘practically no more privileges’ than the most junior rating 
carried. He reflected that a chief petty officer was not allowed any form of 
privacy nor were they allowed to smoke in their mess, take refreshments, or 
relax in their mess during the working day. In addition, Reynolds complained 
that during Captain’s rounds every man, including all chief petty officers, were 
required to open their private lockers for inspection.438 
 
Reynolds noted in his journal that he never visited naval canteens 
because they were always ‘supervised’ by the naval police or by the ‘Scotland 
Yard brigade’; the latter probably being a reference to the duty chief and petty 
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officers who were required to undertake supervisory duties in naval canteens.439  
Stoker Sidney Knock described naval ‘wet’ (beer) canteens as violent places 
where ‘there were some real good fights and many ghastly brawls.’ Despite the 
limited opening hours of the canteens and the strong force of patrols posted to 
ensure each man only received the two pints of beer allowed each day, Knock 
stated that ‘gambling schools were in abundance.’ Naval canteens for both 
junior and senior ratings were basic in the extreme with rough wooden benches 
and tables and bare floor-boards.440  
 
Agnes Weston and the Temperance Movement 
 
When Stoker James Leary was ‘off duty’ in Devonport barracks, he 
would always ‘make a dash for the four o’clock liberty boat’ in order to escape 
from the rigid discipline then in force in barracks.441  The ‘liberty boat’ was a 
procedure whereby men wishing to go ashore at the end of the working day 
would fall in to be inspected by the duty ‘Officer of the Day’ before proceeding 
ashore. Any man whose uniform dress did not reach the required standard 
would be refused permission to leave barracks or their ship. Leary suggested 
that because of the strict discipline of barracks routine together with a general 
lack of amenities ‘few people who were off duty-would stay in barracks.’442   
 
Once ashore, Leary would make straight for Ford Street Devonport in 
order to book a room for the night at ‘Aggie’s’ (Agnes Weston’s Royal Sailors’ 
Rests) in an attempt to beat the competition for the relatively small number of 
rooms available prior to engaging in a nights drinking and entertainment.443 By 
contrast, Stoker James Maloney who was teetotal, enjoyed the singing and 
communal worship to be found in the ‘temperance’ atmosphere of these 
establishments rather than the pubs and bars of Devonport or the strict 
discipline of Keyham barracks.444   
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As previously noted, Mary Conley described the great interest shown by 
the general public in naval affairs and its seamen during the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries. However while some representations portrayed 
seamen as dutiful, patriotic servants of the Empire, others presented them as 
drunken, irresponsible, gallivanting tars who became ‘social misfits’ once 
ashore.445 Conley argued that while Agnes Weston became famous among the 
British public for her efforts to reform the morals of the Navy, she never gained 
widespread support among naval men for her teetotalism. In fact, Conley 
suggested that Agnes Weston’s Christian temperance mission often elicited 
scorn from naval men who, by the early twentieth century, criticized the 
maternalism of her naval charity. Furthermore, Conley pointed out that while 
naval men were fully aware of their responsibilities as husbands and Christians, 
they resented Weston’s benevolence because it reduced them to the status of 
children who required constant guidance and protection, instead of treating 
them as autonomous adults.446 
 
Lionel Yexley was a fierce critic of Weston and in a long running 
newspaper editorial and letter campaign he accused Weston of profiteering 
under the guise of providing relief for ‘poor Jack’; Jack Tar being a pseudonym 
for the British sailor. Yexley published a booklet entitled ‘Charity and the Navy’ 
in which he challenged Weston’s general accounts while criticising the relatively 
small amount of charity given by Weston to sailors and their dependents out of 
her profits.447    
 
Stoker Sidney Knock was another critic who, while admiring her devotion 
to her charitable cause, nonetheless thought Weston’s temperance campaign to 
have been an ‘ill advised tragedy and a complete fiasco’ which was viewed by 
the lower-deck with ‘mistrust and suspicion.’448 Knock suggested that ninety 
percent of the men who used the temperance establishments did so for the bed 
only and not for any religious reasons, because the Sailors’ Rest’s were usually 
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situated conveniently next door to the dockyard.449  Stoker James Dunn also 
thought ‘Weston’s’ was looked upon by the majority of the men as a ‘bit of a 
laugh.’  However, while enjoying the religious services and fellowship found at 
‘Weston’s’, Dunn also made use of the weekly training classes where he 
studied mathematics and engineering drawing in preparation for taking his 
S.P.Os examination.450   
 
Knock voiced some misgivings with regards to the style of the rooms to 
be found in Sailors’ Rests. Describing the ‘bedroom’ as a ‘five feet by eight feet 
matchboard cell’, he observed that apart from the bed and a small mat the room 
was devoid of any furniture; while the ceiling consisted of stout wire netting. 
Knock observed that the netting was deliberately designed to enable the janitor 
to ‘spy’ on sailors during the ‘silent hours’ with a type of ‘periscope.’ On 
reflection he thought that this arrangement only strengthened the impression 
that the morals of the British tar were ‘extraordinarily lax’, while he questioned 




Acting Midshipman Alexander Scrimgeour joined the Navy as a thirteen 
year old cadet in 1910 but the onset of war in 1914 interrupted his naval 
education. Until his untimely death at age nineteen while serving in the battle-
cruiser Invincible during the battle of Jutland in 1916, Scrimgeour kept a diary of 
his life as a young officer. After one particularly rowdy gun-room guest night, 
Scrimgeour admitted that he had had a ‘terrific gamble’ with his guests, and had 
‘lost heavily at cards.’452 
 
Playing cards was prohibited on the lower-deck and gambling for money 
attracted severe penalties if caught. Nonetheless, sailors liked to amuse 
themselves by playing cards and many liked to gamble. Submarine Signaller 
Ashley Claude stated that playing cards or ‘Housy-Housy’ (Tombola) were the 
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two most popular pastimes at sea in both general service and submarines and 
were ‘always’ played for money. 453 Unlike gambling on cards, playing Tombola 
for money was permitted in the Navy. Ten percent of the takings went to the 
ship’s Sports Fund or the establishments expenses, and the remainder went to 
the winner of the line (30 percent) and the house (60 percent). Claude 
acknowledged that gambling in the Navy was illegal, but claimed ‘everyone did 
it.’454  As the proprietor of a Crown and Anchor board while serving onboard the 
submarine depot ship Forth, Claude would have been well aware of the 
penalties for gambling.  
 
Crown and Anchor was originally a fast paced gambling board game 
utilising three, six sided dice on a numbered board. Sometime during the 
Napoleonic war era the numbers were substituted in the Navy for symbols 
depicting a crown, anchor, diamond, spade, club and heart. The six squared 
‘board’ was usually brightly painted canvas which could be quickly rolled up and 
hidden should the naval police interrupt the players. Each Crown and Anchor 
board was operated by a ‘banker’ who controlled the game, paying out the 
winners and keeping the profits for himself.    
 
Claude was obliged to pay another signaller five pounds a month to act 
as his ‘lookout’ in order to protect his enterprise from the ships’ police onboard 
the Forth. This not inconsiderable sum would have substantially added to the 
signallers pay which at 1917 pay rates would have been three pounds and three 
shillings a month. Then again, Claude admitted that he once had to pay out 
thirty pounds to a winner which equated to an average nine months wages for a 
typical young rating.455 This admission gives an indication of the relatively vast 
sums that could be won or lost at Crown and Anchor and the reasons why it 
was so popular on the lower-deck. Claude was not ashamed to admit that he 
used ‘loaded dice’ which were specially made for him to ensure the banker 
always ‘came out on top.’456   
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In order to attract men to play the game, Crown and Anchor bankers 
would have a selection of ‘shouts.’ One popular shout was: 
 
Anybody say the old stokers’ friend-for a bit more 
 
The stokers’ friend being the spade symbol replicated from the playing card 
suite. Another shout encouraged: 
 
What about a bit on what the ladies crave for (the diamond)457 
 
When the fleet visited Weymouth prior to the First World War men were 
transported ashore by local steamers. Many men would board the steamer only 
to return back onboard penniless without ever making landfall as Crown and 
Anchor schools would be stationed onboard the steamers ready to fleece the 
unwary. Similarly, it was said that at Rosyth there were so many Crown and 
Anchor schools operating in the hedgerows between the canteen and dockyard 
that they were known as ‘Will-o’-the-Wisps’ for the flickering lights coming from 
their candles.458  While gambling on cards and board games was prohibited, 
placing bets on fleet regattas was condoned. Lionel Yexley estimated that up to 
5,000 pounds was wagered on a cutter race during one particular naval regatta 
in the Mediterranean Fleet not including the bets made by ships’ officers.459   
 
In conclusion, 20th century lower-deck life was little changed from the 
century preceding it. The men who served in the steel-hulled, turbine driven 
Dreadnought of 1906 purchased their own uniform and bedding and ate the 
same rations and drew virtually the same wages as the men who served in the 
1866 Minotaur class ironclad Agincourt. Despite determined resistance from 
certain senior naval officers men were finally moved out of the rotting hulks 
which had been their ‘shore-side’ home from time immemorial and into purpose 
built barracks at Devonport which had lain empty for three years after 
completion. This delay and the comment by one serving admiral that the 
barracks had been a ‘shocking waste of public money’ provide evidence to the 
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indifference and lack of concern shown by senior naval officers for the welfare 
of the lower-deck. Moreover it is clear that the Board of Admiralty were 
hidebound in the belief that the only way to maintain discipline was to keep the 
men in the same conditions ashore, as they would find at sea. This perverse 
reasoning resulted in barracks built on the same lines as hulks or seagoing 
ships which offered the men a roof over their heads but precious little in the way 
of comfort or convenience.   
 
This contrasted sharply with the Army and Marines who provided a much 
higher level of accommodation for their men together with more amenable 
levels of discipline. Moreover, the fact that Royal Marine officers granted their 
junior NCOs more privileges than naval officers granted senior Naval Chief 
Petty Officers indicates a vast disparity between the attitudes of officers of the 
two branches of the service towards their men. Rather than suffer the petty and 
repressive regimes that existed onboard ships and in barracks, men would elect 
to sleep ashore in temperance ‘wire ‘cage’s’ where, for a few hours, they might 
find respite from naval routine. The extra expense this incurred was an 
additional drain on the wages of men who, by necessity were already required 
to heavily subsidise their rations as a result of the Navy’s archaic attitude 
towards victualling.   
 
Despite being responsible for the building of the innovative and 
technologically advanced Dreadnought, the Admiralty remained hidebound with 
tradition when it came to the victualling of the fleet. A lack of modern catering 
conveniences meant that the Navy was deprived of fresh provisions at sea. This 
resulted in a standard ration as reliant on salted meats and dried processed 
vegetables as those proscribed for the nineteenth century Navy. Furthermore, 
because it had not kept pace with modern catering developments the Admiralty 
had not seen fit to organise a fully trained or skilled catering branch. As a result, 
the preparation of the one hot meal a day fell to the men themselves which they 
accomplished on a mess table with the most basic utensils and without any 
formal training. As Yexley observed, despite the mens’ best efforts at preparing 
their main meal, the dubious method of cooking everything in a single boiler 
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overseen by cooks who may, or may not, have had any formal training; were 
beyond imagination.   
 
Despite clear evidence of lower-deck support for the replacement of the 
fixed ration and savings system the Admiralty resolutely refused to accept 
responsibility for the proper feeding of the men. After much persuasion and two 
different victualling committees, the Admiralty finally acceded to making minor 
changes to the fixed ration, but to its cost. By ignoring the tastes and 
preferences of the lower-deck, it ordered victuals that the men refused to accept 
leaving it with storerooms full of unwanted biscuit, jam and tinned meat. The 
jam fiasco perfectly exemplifies an Admiralty out of touch with its men and 
reality. By rejecting the need for onboard bakeries and then granting the men an 
issue of jam the Admiralty demonstrated complete ineptitude and ignorance. It 
could be argued that it suited the Admiralty to maintain its outdated and 
perverse system of victualling because as long as the men were forced to 
accept responsibility for purchasing and preparing their own food, it absolved 
the Admiralty from having to do so.   
 
The incidents that took place at Invergordon in September 1931 came as 
an unexpected and heavy blow to the Admiralty and the officer class of the 
Navy. Yet, the testimony given to the Login Committee by the Devonport 
stokers’ clearly indicate that discontent over the victualling question had been 
brewing since the turn of the century. Furthermore, post Invergordon inquiries 
instigated by the home port C-in-Cs disclosed that the lower-deck had been 
concerned for many years over the drain on their pay through being forced to 
subsidise their food long before the cuts in pay which resulted in the 












Working relationships and social hierarchies 
 
The social hierarchy of the Royal Navy could be regarded as a mirror 
image of wider British contemporary society. It comprised an upper-class 
composed of commissioned officers, a middle-class of senior non-
commissioned officers and a lower or working class comprising its sailors, 
stokers and marines. However, within this standard class system the Navy had 
a bewildering array of sub-division. Between the commissioned officer class and 
the lower-deck were commissioned warrant officers. These men had elevated 
themselves from the lower-deck but had not quite been accepted as 'officers' in 
the true naval sense. During the nineteenth century Warrant Officer Henry 
Capper became a leading campaigner for improvement to the status of warrant 
officers. However, Capper recognised that the system whereby officer 
candidates were nominated by the Admiralty Board or were entered from a 
community of 'naval families' who for generations had provided officers for the 
Navy, prevented him from aspiring to join the naval 'upper class.' The reality of 
this system was brought home to him during a conversation with the mother of a 
sub-lieutenant he had served with who declared: 
 
I have the greatest sympathy with you personally in your desire to rise, but you 
have chosen the wrong service. The Navy belongs to us, and if you were to win 
the commissions you ask for it would be at the expense of our sons and 
nephews whose birth-right it is.460 
 
 This statement would suggest that naval officers were perceived to 
occupy a particular place in higher society. Ross McKibbin noted in Classes and 
Cultures England 1918-1951 that even before 1939 the cultural unity of the 
upper-class had fragmented. McKibbin suggested that politics, the Church, the 
civil service and even the armed forces, where members of the upper class who 
needed occupation found it, were now dominated by the upper middle class. 
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 Because of its traditional military role in fighting the ship, the seaman 
branch had always been regarded as the 'executive branch' of the Navy, as 
such it had an elevated notion of superiority over all others. However, by the 
beginning of the twentieth century the lower-deck comprised several different 
and distinct branches many of them were highly technical and required men 
with varying levels of education and training. These ranged from writers and 
sick berth attendants to signallers, stokers, cooks, telegraphists, marines and 
artisans such as blacksmiths, coppersmiths, and shipwrights. Separate and 
distinct from these men were the artificers, these were tradesmen who joined 
the Navy after having completed formal apprenticeships as engine fitters, fitters 
and turners, boiler-makers, electricians or armourers or who had joined the 
service as boy artificers and undertaken apprenticeships in the Navy's own 
training schools.  
 
 The senior petty officers and chief petty officers of these branches made 
up the Navy's 'middle class.' However, even this class was divided. While being 
classed as belonging to the lower-deck, artificers through the special status 
granted to them by the Admiralty, lived an entirely separate existence from all 
other men having their own separate mess, uniform and other privileges, 
including the provision of 'mess-men' to serve their meals and tend to their 
needs. Moreover, despite the similarities between artisans and artificers, 
artificers considered themselves superior on account of their perceived higher 
technical skills. As a result, artificers, like warrant officers, lived an isolated 
lifestyle somewhere between the lower-deck and the wardroom (officers’ mess) 
but not quite a part of either.   
 
 The ordinary ratings of the lower-deck also occupied a particular place in 
the lower-deck working class hierarchy. Mary Conley declared that naval 
hierarchies were distinguished by rank, which was reinforced through the 
different uniforms and badges and maintained by ritualistic obedience to 
discipline.461 However, while the naval lower-deck was underpinned by a rank 
structure it was organised around a much more powerful system of branch 
hierarchies. As Christopher McKee noted in Sober Men and True, while lower-
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deck status hierarchies flourished they were perceived, subjective hierarchies, 
therefore, there was no common agreement on the relative status of the 
branches.462 Be that as it may, McKee was clear where the stokers' position lay 
in the heirarchy when he declared, 'only the existence of stokers prevented the 
seamen from being the lowest-rung on the lower-deck's perceived status 
hierarchy'.463  
 
This thesis acknowledges that stokers were regarded as the 'lowest of 
the low' in contemporary naval society, a perception that is often repeated in the 
wider historiography of the Royal Navy. However, in the telling of the story the 
reason 'why' stokers should have been relegated to this lowly position has been 
universally ignored. Therefore, instead of challenging the hierarchical position of 
stokers, this chapter will seek an explanation for the reason why they were so 
labelled. One way to approach this task is to explore the relationships that 
existed between stokers and other men on the lower-deck in order to determine 
where conflicts divided men and friendships brought others together. By gaining 
an insight into the perceptions of their peers, a better appreciation may be 
gained with regards to how others viewed the position of stokers.  
 
Articles within Kings Regulations and Admiralty Instructions effectively 
neutralised any attempts by the men to collectively lobby the Admiralty in order 
to gain concessions for improvements to their conditions of service. In order to 
circumvent these rigid regulations the men formed individual branch societies 
from which a system of 'class-appeals' became established whereby each 
branch would lobby for improvements to its status or for improved conditions of 
service. Provided a branch society had sufficient leverage an individual class-
appeal might become integrated with the annual lower-deck appeal commonly 
known as the 'Magna Charter' which was another unofficial appeal but one 
which the Admiralty tolerated in order to monitor the militancy of the lower-deck. 
These appeals stemmed from the rise of branch societies which were 
themselves born out of lower-deck sickness benefit and mutual aid societies. 
The rise of these societies and their part in the shaping of lower-deck 
                                            




relationships and hierarchies will also be explored in this chapter in order to 
show the divisions that existed between the various branches and the effects 
these had on the position of stokers. Despite actual and perceived notions of 
superiority between officers and men or between individual factions on the 
lower-deck, the coal-fired Navy practiced one particular evolution that 
temporarily made all men equal, this was the arduous and much disliked task of 




J. R. Hill argued that the root of all animosity between the executive 
officer and engineer was the ‘residual filth and dirt from coal-firing and coaling 
ship which tended to cover both ships and men.’ Hill observed that the Navy 
had adopted a regime of cleanliness since the Napoleonic Wars and this blow, 
towards what he declared to be a ‘cherished naval custom’, was met head on 
with an insistence on cleanliness that became ‘something of an obsession for 
the steam Navy.’464  
 
Coaling ship was an evolution that no-one in the Navy enjoyed, although 
it is true to say that sailors’ humour always allowed them to make the best out of 
a poor job. In relating his experiences of coaling ship, Stoker Sidney Knock 
described how the men would lighten their arduous task by dressing up in 
clothing which he described as resembling the types of costumes typically worn 
for a ‘fine arts ball or a carnival’ with men dressed ‘for tennis or wearing morning 
suits.’ 465  While Stoker Ernest Bullock remembered that stokers always had the 
clothes for coaling ship whereas the other hands ‘looked a motley crew wearing 
an odd assortment of clothes both old and new’; adding the comment that some 
men even took to wearing women’s underwear on coaling ship day.466   
However, while photographs of the period show a variety of different headgear, 
men normally wore overalls or any old service uniform they had which they kept 
especially for coaling ship, (See Illustration 9, p. 176).  
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Illustration 9:  HMAS Australia Coaling Ship 













The general atmosphere of coaling ship could indeed have been described as 
something resembling a carnival with every man (other than those excused for 
watch-keeping and other essential duties) employed in coaling including all the 
ship’s officers. In a matter of a few hours everyone involved in coaling ship 
would be unrecognisable having been covered from head-to-toe in coal dust 
and with no visible uniform ranks or rates it was difficult for men to pay the 
customary respect to senior ratings and officers; therefore during coaling ship 
normal naval routine was placed in abeyance.    
 
Stoker Ernest Bullock remembered that he got into trouble during his first 
coaling of the Inflexible at Sheerness when he was asked to identify himself to a 
man he did not recognise, being covered in coal-dust like himself. Bullock 
replied a ‘D of cheese’ which was an off the cuff reply meaning a penny-worth of 
cheese, however, the man who had challenged him was a warrant officer who 
promptly gave the young stoker a cuff around the ear for his cheek. Bullock 
knew the Warrant Officer would not charge him having given him a blow which 
was in itself a chargeable offence; therefore he thought ‘least said-soonest 
mended’, and promptly carried on with coaling.467   
 
Junior officers, cadets and midshipmen, were expected to toil alongside 
the men while the more senior officers supervised the work; nevertheless 
officers and men alike suffered the rigours and discomforts of coaling together. 
Thomas Cooper a former coal miner who joined the Navy as a stoker, because 
it was ‘damn hard work down the pits’, admitted that when compared to coal-
mining, coaling ship, was ‘far harder.’468   
 
Surgeon T.B. Dixon of the Kent received special permission from the 
ship’s Principal Medical Officer to participate in coaling ship in 1914 while the 
Kent lay anchored off the Abrolhos rocks Brazil. Normally ship’s surgeon’s were 
excused this duty as they were required to deal with the numerous accidents 
which were an occupational hazard and an inevitable result of this dangerous 
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evolution. Dixon described how the officers turned up for coaling at breakfast in 
the ‘most weird costumes’ taking their breakfast below decks as the wardroom 
was closed for the duration of coaling. Within an hour of taking on the first bags 
of coal the decks were inches deep in coal dust which permeated every part of 
the ship despite careful precautions to keep dust out of compartments and 
mess-decks. Dixon remembered that during coaling ship everything onboard 
‘tasted, smelt and felt, like coal.’469   
 
With an engineer officer as escort Dixon was allowed into a bunker. He 
described the following scene:  
 
Imagine a space 30 by 15 feet with sloping floor and you have the upper-bunker. 
The coal is dropped into the upper bunkers and owing to the slope much of it 
finds its way into the lower bunkers. Here it has to be helped into various out of 
the way corners by the trimmers. We entered through a door into the upper-
bunker and took small smoky lamps with us. The dust is thick and choking and 
the light is invisible six feet away. One’s lungs refuse to breathe the thick stuff at 
first and you cough and choke in it. Feeling our way we dropped through a hole 
into the lower-bunker. Here the dust and heat were worse still. Men were at 
work here stowing the coal under a shelf. I never saw them I only heard them, 
though they were only six feet away. I was about to ascend when some fool 
above started pouring coal in from above. Foremen shouted from below to tell 
him to stop. I could hear the stuff thundering down and lumps were hitting me. I 
tried to get near the chute; more and more coal came down. The air was now 
solid with dust; my lamp was out and visions of being buried under the 
avalanche loomed big. 470       
 
Dixon eventually found another chute and escaped from the lower-
bunker and his dangerous predicament. The Kent’s ship’s company worked 
tirelessly under unremitting heat for seventeen hours to take in 13,000 bags of 
coal. Nonetheless, Dixon reserved particular praise for the stokers describing 
trimming coal bunkers as ‘appalling work.’471 He also noted:  
 
The stokers of the Navy deserve far more of their country than they get poor 
beggars, especially in war time.472 
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Stoker Ernest Bullock serving in the Inflexible at Malta remembered the 
‘great rivalry’ amongst the fleet when coaling ship. When the Inflexible prepared 
to coal ship, ‘stages’ (planks of wood) were rigged to connect the ship with the 
collier or coal-lighters with three stages connected to each lighter. Each lighter 
carried one hundred tons of coal and there were three lighters stationed to port 
and three to starboard, thereby giving the ship the opportunity to take in up to 
600 tons of coal simultaneously. The stages were manned by six men working 
in pairs and coaling was completed ‘at the double’ until the lighters were empty. 
Bullock reflected that if two lighters were emptied by a gang, then between them 
the men would have lifted 200 tons of coal remarking, ‘no wonder it made your 
back ache.’473 Inflexible carried 3,084 long tons (Imperial tons) of coal and 700 
tons of fuel oil which was sprayed onto the coal in the furnace in order to 
produce a faster burn rate to produce more steam.   
 
Seamen manned the coal lighter filling sacks with coal which were then 
lifted aboard using ships’ or dockyard cranes, or the lighter’s own derricks. 
Using two wheeled hand carts, marines collected sacks of coal from the ‘dump 
point’ and took them to their nominated coal scuttle at various locations on the 
upper-deck.474  Stoker Arthur Lilley recalled that leading stokers were often 
detailed to operate the steam winches which hoisted the coal from the colliers to 
the ship’s deck a duty he had undertaken ‘many times.’  This duty required 
precision as the hoists lifted ten, two hundredweight coaling bags in one go and 
the men were encouraged to work as fast they were able. Lilley claimed that he 
saw many accidents and at least one death due to wire hawsers breaking and 
depositing their two-ton load of coal onto the men below.475 In the case of the 
fatality, Lilley remembered that the man was taken to the sick bay and coaling 
continued without interruption.476 In order to calculate the amount of coal being 
taken in by the receiving ship a leading stoker would select bags at random and 
weigh them on the ship’s scales. The average weight would then be taken and 
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multiplied by the number of bags hoisted onboard and the running total was 
entered into the engineer’s log.477    
 
Herbert Smith served as a Marine Light Infantryman in the Cornwallis 
during her time in the Dardanelles. His duty during coaling was handling a 
trolley from the fo’c’sle dump point. Smith described one particular coaling at 
Mudros as ‘a mad undertaking’ designed to get the coal in as ‘quick as they 
could.’478  While waiting for the hoist to come across one bag which had not 
been properly secured to the strop came away narrowly missing him but injuring 
his foot. Smith recalled that he could have easily lost his life.479   
 
Coaling was a dangerous evolution made worse by the Navy’s tradition 
for completing tasks ‘at the double’ for reasons of smartness and efficiency. 
Therefore, coaling ship like many other evolutions in the Navy was treated as a 
competition with individual ships competing to see who could bring in the largest 
amount of coal in the quickest time. While there was undoubtedly an operational 
necessity to coal ship as quickly as possible in war time, there was arguably 
less reason to complete such a hazardous undertaking at break neck speed in 
peacetime. By turning coaling-ship into a competition it was inevitable that 
accidents would occur. During the period 1910-1913, twenty-four serious 
accidents were reported, which would suggest that there were many more 
deemed to be less serious which did not warrant reporting such as the injury 
described by Herbert Smith in the preceding paragraph.480   
 
Rank had no privileges while coaling-ship. Amongst those seriously 
injured were a sub-lieutenant and a lieutenant, while two midshipmen and a 
warrant mechanician were killed. The most common accident was caused 
through falling objects, either pieces of coal, bags of coal, or parts of the coaling 
rig and equipment falling onto men working on deck or in the collier. Other 
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accidents were caused by men becoming crushed between the ship’s 
superstructure and the coaling rig or being struck by broken winch cables or 
other equipment. 
 
 Typical accidents reported included one from the Hibernia where a 
beam belonging to the collier was ‘jerked’ into the hold killing two seamen 
outright. The Prince of Wales reported that a link on the ship’s coaling stay 
fractured causing a hoist of coal (two tons) to fall onto the deck and crush a 
man to death; while a hoist of empty coal bags on the Ariadne knocked a petty 
officer overboard. Because stokers were employed below trimming the bunkers 
they were relatively immune from these types of accidents although as 
previously stated, working in coal-bunkers brought the danger of crush injuries, 
suffocation or injury or death from explosion.   
 
Stoker James Maloney’s first experience of coaling ship was trimming a 
bunker on the light cruiser Yarmouth, however he couldn’t keep up with the 
amount of coal which came down the chute. Eventually Maloney became 
trapped in the bunker and cried out for help. The Chief Stoker was summoned 
and encouraged him to ‘keep scratching’ at the coal ‘a little at a time’, until he 
could fill all corners of the bunker and make enough room to extract himself.481   
 
Stoker Dunn remembered coaling ship at Inverkeithing (Rosyth) on the 
outbreak of war in 1914 with unemployed coal miners who had been hired to 
help trim the bunkers. However, as soon as coal started to drop through the 
scuttle into the bunker the coal miners scrambled out of the bunkers and walked 
off the ship, ‘fearing for their lives.’  Dunn presumed that the men must have 
been ‘surface men’, as he thought coal-face workers would have been more 
comfortable working in a confined space ‘with coal falling down on top of 
them.’482  
 
In preparation for coaling ship, seamen would prepare the upper deck by 
removing deck fittings and gear in order to clear a path from the coal dumping 
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point to the coal scuttles. Meanwhile, stokers would be busy below decks 
rigging canvas or metal chutes to enable the coal to pass from the upper-deck 
coal scuttle into the coal bunkers. The bunkers could be several decks below 
the upper-deck, therefore a chute would be required to be rigged at each deck 
level to form a closed passage for the coal to flow from the upper deck down to 
the bunker.   
 
Stoker Frederick Groves recalled that the coal chutes invariably passed 
through the mess-decks and were a constant source of irritation to the lower-
deck as the canvas chutes would often tear or burst open depositing coal and 
coal dust throughout the mess-deck.483 Stoker Henry Vincent recalled similar 
problems when rigging steel coaling chutes on the Aspasia which was 
described as a ‘really awkward job.’484 Vincent remembered the steel chutes 
being manufactured from a heavy weight steel and due to their size and weight 
they required much ‘coaxing’ with a fourteen pound hammer in order to bring 
them together so that they could be firmly bolted in place.485 While the steel 
chutes were more durable than canvas they were not much better at keeping 




Three weeks into her two year Mediterranean commission, the Lancaster 
tied up alongside the coaling wharf at Gibraltar in order to coal ship by hand 
baskets. Once coaling was completed, S.P.O. Reynolds observed that it was 
the custom not to grant leave to the ship’s company until the sailors had had 
their ‘water-carnival’ (washed down the ship.) 486 There were two regular ‘water 
carnivals’, the first took place on Saturdays in preparation for the weekly 
ceremony of Captain’s Sunday rounds and the second, which took place 
immediately after completing coaling ship.   
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Water carnivals were the cause of much of the animosity between the 
‘black gang’ (stokers) and seamen. In the first place, stokers resented the 
disruption that cleaning ship after coaling caused to movement between decks. 
While seamen blamed stokers for the filth and coal dust that coaling ship 
deposited throughout the ship. Furthermore, stokers resented the extra burden 
that cleaning ship placed upon them as in harbour stokers were always kept 
busy cleaning boilers, repairing defects or completing routine maintenance 
while seamen had little to do other than cleaning ship. However, there were no 
real ‘winners’ or ‘losers’ from coaling ship as everyone onboard shared the 
same hardship. As Winston Churchill noted, ‘the ordeal of coaling ship 
exhausted the whole ship's company, in wartime it robbed them of their brief 
period of rest and subjected everyone to extreme discomfort.’487 
 
During cleaning ship routine prior to an inspection by a new rear-admiral, 
Reynolds remembered that movement below decks aboard the Lancaster was 
restricted because large areas had been closed off by the men responsible for 
reporting them. This caused the entire ship’s company to practice ‘walking on 
air’ for a week prior to the inspection.488   
 
Another disgruntled petty-officer writing on the perils of the ‘water-
carnival’ observed:  
 
I am writing this on a Saturday night, a good, unadulterated naval Saturday 
night. All paint-work, bulkheads, upper-deck and lower-deck are covered in the 
usual tuberculosis canvas; every available bit of space on deck with the 
exception of a narrow gangway, is wired off to keep the deck free from 
footmarks. Down below ladders are ‘up’ all over the place, thus blocking access 
to different parts of the ship, and crowding us into the smallest available space. 
Everything is in preparation for the great Sunday forenoon fetish. If the Lunacy 
Commissioners were to come on board I verily believe they would bag the 
crowd of us.489       
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The length to which preparation for inspection came before comfort and 
safety below decks was highlighted by Yexley, who reported that in order to 
keep the bathroom wash basins on an unidentified ship of the Home Fleet 
brightly polished for rounds they were kept permanently out of bounds to the 
ship’s company. As a result, a violent facial skin eruption occurred amongst the 




The week long preparation for Captain’s rounds was the prelude for 
‘Sunday routine’ which was the most hated day of the week for the lower-deck. 
Sunday routine began with ‘call the hands’ at six o’clock, half an hour later than 
normal. Thereafter, Reynolds observed that ‘chaos reigned supreme’ with the 
prospect of breakfast or an extra hour in bed looked on as ‘taboo’ as the men 
scurried around the ship all ‘brooms and buckets, buckets and brooms’ making 
last minute touches to their part of ship prior to ‘rounds’. At nine o’clock the men 
were mustered on the upper-deck in their number one (best) uniform while the 
‘cooks-of-the-mess’ stayed behind to clean up and stow away anything that 
might offend the ‘eagle eye of the captain and his following entourage.’491   
 
Captain’s rounds began at half past nine and depending on the size of 
the ship could take up to an hour, during which time the men were kept on the 
upper-deck regardless of weather. After ‘rounds’ the captain would inspect the 
men by division, on completion church would be rigged. The Sunday church 
service would be taken by the ship’s chaplain if one was carried or by the 
Captain and was compulsory for all men of the Church of England. Men of other 
religious denominations were taken ashore to attend their own services should 
the ship be lying alongside or at a convenient anchorage.   
 
Reynolds reflected in his journal that his watch in the Lancaster used to 
work out in advance which would be the ‘lucky’ watch to have the forenoon 
watch (8 am to 12 noon) in the stokehole on a Sunday morning so that they did 
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not have to clean into number ones and undergo the ‘screaming farce’ of 
Captain’s rounds, divisions and Sunday church service. To Reynolds mind, 
Sunday routine had developed into such a disagreeable morning that he 
wagered ‘ninety-nine out of every hundred men in the engineering department 
would rather work below.’492   
 
As with so many other aspects of organisation, the Royal Marines 
approached inspections and cleaning routines in a much more agreeable and 
enlightened manner. Marines cleaned their barrack rooms in their own time 
once a week or even fortnightly. They were inspected while the men were at 
work daily by the Captain of the Company, weekly by the Field Officer and 
monthly by the Colonel Commandant. Yexley highlighted the fact that marines 
were ‘never’ inspected on Sundays. Moreover, he claimed that they were also 
not required to participate in evening quarters or dog-watch (4 pm to 6 pm and 6 
pm to 8 pm) evolutions.493  Both of these naval traditions were designed to keep 
sailors’ busy for as long as possible during the day on the premise that ‘idle 
hands make mischief.’     
 
   Lower-deck sentiments towards certain naval customs, notably 
‘Sunday routine’ received support from some naval officers. One anonymous 
officer writing on the topic in the Naval Review asked the question ‘has it ever 
struck anyone what a travesty of a Sunday we keep on board’?  In support of 
his argument the writer observed, ‘everyone knows that the bluejacket has to 
scurry around and work harder for the first four hours on Sunday than any other 
day of the week, what a farce it all is.’494  Another officer noted that the service 
treated the sailor as a man during the week, but as a ‘feckless child when he 
communicated with his God’, noting with some irony that the naval service 
lacked the courage to re-name the ceremony of ‘Divine Service’ to that of 
‘Church Parade.’495 The suggestion was made that as men over a certain age 
were capable of deciding whether physical drill was good for them, then the 
same rule should apply to church attendance. However, the writer pointed out 
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that when it came to religion the Navy did not consider the lower-deck to be 
competent judges of how, where, or when, they should worship –‘not even 
whom.’496  
 
Two radical proposals were put forward to improve the quality of Sunday 
for the lower-deck. The first proposal suggested bringing forward Captain’s 
rounds from Sunday to Saturday directly after the great ‘water-carnival.’ The 
second was to leave the decision of whether to attend Divine service or not, to 
the men themselves.497  Obviously, Sunday morning ‘Divisions’ the traditional, 
ceremonial mustering of the men before their captain, was not up for discussion, 
being the oldest tradition of the service.   
 
In reply, an officer of the ‘old school’ suggested that ‘rest’ in the true 
sense of the word meant a change in ordinary routine, and in his considered 
opinion the service Sunday more than met this criteria. Conversely, he 
considered ‘rest’ in the inferior sense would lead to ‘mental atrophy’ and if men 
were stood-down then ‘something would need to be done to fill in the blank.’498  
These sentiments appeared to have been shared by a majority of officers as 
another correspondent declared that it was ‘accepted as gospel’ that the men 
should be kept busy, otherwise those who weren’t became troublemakers.’499  
Therefore, in the Navy men were kept as busy on a Sunday as they were on 
any other day of the week; the very opposite of what the men themselves 




Signaller Ashley Claude thought that seamen and stokers ‘never got on’, 
while marines never mixed with seamen and were not liked by other 
branches.500 Stoker ‘Buck’ Donovan remembered the Rodney as an unhappy 
ship because of the many cliques which kept men apart. Donovan also 
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suggested that ‘you’d never get a stoker and a seaman to be friends.’  Donovan 
recalled that stokers made fun of seamen calling them ‘dab-dabs’, because as 
they cleaned or painted the ship they went; ‘dab.... dab... dab with their cloths or 
paint brush.’501 Claude suggested that the social hierarchy of the lower-deck 
was in the order of signalmen first, followed by wireless operators, torpedo-men, 
then gunners, with stokers at the very bottom of the hierarchy.502  However, 
other ‘non-combatants’ such as E.R.As, writers, the Master at Arms and sick 
berth attendants also saw themselves as having a superior position within the 
lower-deck hierarchy.503   
 
Claude shared a common lower-deck belief that stokers did not have to 
pass any educational test to join the Navy, as a result he stated that stokers 
were looked down on and regarded as the ‘scum of the Navy.’504 While clearly 
mistaken with regards to the educational test, Claude was prepared to accept 
that stokers ‘had a hard time and were worked hard, particularly on coal 
ships.’505 Despite this common assumption, stokers sat the standard naval entry 
tests of arithmetic and English comprehension that all naval ratings were 
required to take in the recruiting office prior to being accepted for service. 
Moreover, illiteracy in the early twentieth century navy may have been more 
common than was suggested by signalman Claude and not exclusively confined 
to the stokers' ranks as explained by stoker and assistant schoolmaster Arthur  
Lilley in chapter two when he declared that 'half the navy were unable to read.'  
 
Naval Cook Reginald Willis remembered the ‘arrogance’ of seaman 
ratings ‘who always wanted their own way.’ Willis recalled that they would 
threaten the galley staff with being reported to the commander if they didn’t get 
what they wanted. However, Willis looked back fondly on his relationships with 
stokers and marines who he said were always polite and respectful to ships’ 
cooks. One of the duties of the morning watch cook on a coal-fired ship was to 
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bring up coals from the stokehole in order to light the galley ranges. Willis stated 
that he never had to do this task himself as stokers or marines would always 
bring the coals up for him. In addition, he claimed that stokers and marines 
would also prepare the morning cocoa so that the cook could get on with his 
other jobs. No doubt by being respectful and helping the cooks out, stokers and 
marines received favours in return. Willis understood how the practice worked 
by explaining that if a stoker gave him ‘knobs’ (coal) ‘he would cook his grub.’  
However, Willis was adamant that he wouldn’t ask for, nor do, any favours for 
seamen.506 
 
Remarkably, for an organisation with such a strict hierarchical rank 
structure and disciplinary code there were certain working practices in the Royal 
Navy which would not have seemed out of place in civilian factories or 
dockyards where restrictive practices between certain trades were the norm. As 
an example, Reynolds complained in his journal that although the stokehole 
crew had been given a ‘make and mend’ (afternoon off) by the engineer, the 
men were not able to relax onboard because as a ‘non-executive officer’ the 
engineer ‘had virtually no command over the department he was supposed to 
rule.’  Reynolds explained that naval protocol dictated that if an engineer 
granted a ‘make and mend’ to his staff which did not coincide with the upper-
deck, E.R.As and stokers had to ‘hide themselves away’ in case they were 
spotted by seamen officers, ‘who ruled the ship.’507 
 
Stoker James Dunn, recalled that even though a S.P.O. or a Chief Stoker 
might be in a ship’s boat on service business, the coxswain of the boat (usually 
a leading seaman) ‘would be in-charge-he gave the orders’, not the senior 
engine room ratings in the boat.508 This anomaly also applied to engineer 
officers. As a relatively junior engineer lieutenant serving in the Hood during the 
first year of the Second World War, Louis Le Bailly noted in his memoirs that no 
(E) (engineering officer) ‘could give orders’ to shipwrights or sailors, while by 
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comparison, no E.R.A., mechanician, or stoker ‘would take any orders’ from a 
‘Chippie’ (Shipwright).509     
 
Even in wartime, the hierarchical anomalies remained. In the Hood, the 
First Lieutenant (a commander) was in charge of the ship’s damage control 
organisation. This job required a technical understanding of the construction of 
the ship together with a detailed knowledge of pumping and flooding 
arrangements and the ability to correctly shore up bulkheads and hatches using 
timber to reinforce them after damage. It also required comprehensive 
knowledge of the ship’s electrical, hydraulic and fire-fighting systems so that 
they could be cross-connected after damage. Le Bailly dryly observed that the 
knowledge of the Hood’s first lieutenant in these matters could be written on a 
‘postage stamp.’ Nonetheless, the first lieutenant retained the title of ‘damage 
control supremo’ in the Hood despite the fact that the engineering department 
undertook the responsibility for damage control. This resulted in all orders 
appertaining to damage control being written by the engineers but issued under 
the first lieutenant’s name, thereby maintaining the superior status of the 
executive branch.510 
 
Because the seaman executive division ‘fought the ship’ Stoker Dunn 
believed they were entitled to regard themselves as the ‘military branch’ of the 
Navy. This idea allowed seamen to adopt a ‘superior status’ towards all other 
ratings which was mostly felt by stokers.511 Stoker Lilley shared a similar belief 
to Dunn noting in his memoirs that when stokers were formed up on parade or 
undertaking rifle practice or general military training a seaman would often be 
put in charge of the stokers even though there may have been several more 
senior stokers than seaman in the party.512   
 
From his perspective, Le Bailly thought that prior to the Second World 
War there had been an even greater gap between stokers and seamen than 
                                            
509 L. Le Bailly, The Man around the Engine, 51. 
510 Ibid. 
511 J. Dunn, I.W.M. 769, Reel 4. 
512 A. E. Lilley, I.W.M. 750, Reel 4.  
190 
 
between engineering and executive officers.513 However, there was one area in 
which stokers could get their own back and that was by taking on and beating 
seamen during inter-departmental sport and other competitions such as pulling 
(rowing) regattas. Stoker Rose recalled that there was real rivalry between the 
two branches in sport but what the stokers may have lacked in finesse they 
more than made up for by utilising their ‘extra strength’ to maximum effect. 
Rose suggested this was most noticeable in sports which required strength and 
stamina such as boat pulling and in practice gunnery where the stoker’s team 
invariably beat the seamen in ‘loader-drill.’514            
 
Relationships - Engineering Officers and stokers 
 
Despite his complaint regarding the difficulties of enjoying a make and mend 
without the authority of the executive department, Reynolds declared in his 
memoirs, somewhat tongue in cheek, that he was ‘never overly concerned’ as 
any free time he had was usually spent in the engine room or stokehole ‘toying 
with crankshafts or hunting down after leaks.’ Reynolds observed that this extra 
work normally made the stokers ‘C.B.F,’ which was an acronym for ‘choke-a-
block-full;’ meaning that the men had had enough of some particular task, or 
were generally fed up with the Navy.515 The fact that stokers were ‘overworked’ 
in comparison to seamen was not contested. In describing the need to provide 
recreation for men of the Baltic Fleet in 1919 an Admiralty memorandum 
observed: 
 
As leave is extremely limited, it is very necessary to provide occupation for the 
personnel. This need is greater in the case of seamen than in stokers as their 
leisure time is greater.516      
 
Reynolds also resorted to the lesser known acronym ‘W.W,’ in his 
memoirs which had a similar meaning to C.B.F. but was a term used only by the 
engineering department. When a boiler was shut down in harbour for any length 
of time, unless it was opened up for inspection, repair or cleaning it was always 
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filled with feed water to the very top of the gauge glass and dosed with oxygen 
scavenging chemicals in order to reduce corrosion. This action was termed 
‘water-wedging’ (See Illustration 10, below). When a stoker was thoroughly fed 
up with something he would declare to all and sundry that he was ‘W.W,’ or ‘full-




Illustration: 10  Boiler water-wedged  
Source:      Crossness Pumping Station Abbey Wood. 
 
The idea that lower-deck men should be kept busy to occupy their minds 
and prevent them making trouble was not confined to the executive officers of a 
ship. While serving as a chief stoker in the Renown, James Dunn served under 
an engineer who could always ‘find work’ for the men to do. As an example, 
Dunn described how this officer ordered stokers to take down the bulkhead 
doors in order to strip the paint off them so that they could be burnished, giving 
stokers yet another cleaning job to do. On another occasion Dunn requested 
permission for the stokers’ football team to have a make and mend in order to 
play a match only to have his request refused with the reply, ‘certainly not, give 
them some work to do.’517                                                                                                                                
 
Then again, Reynolds had his own view on the usefulness of engineering 
officers. In his journal he observed that in books of fiction, engineers were 
presented as brave and fearless individuals, with square jaws and nerves of 
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steel. However, he stated that he was sorry to confirm that the ‘Navy type’ 
compared with these ‘heroes of fiction’ were ‘a sorry lot.’ In his estimation, naval 
engineers were ‘generally nervous wrecks’ and the only courage they 
possessed was ‘the Dutch order.’ In addition, Reynolds suggested that when 
anything went wrong such as a breakdown of machinery, the naval engineer 
would stand with his gloves on like a cat which couldn’t catch a mouse, 
‘shouting at the E.R.As and stokers who did the actual work.’518   
 
Reynolds observed that while engineers knew all the theory of 
engineering, they ‘never picked up a tool’ to help out with maintenance or defect 
work. This led him to question the reason why engineers were carried in 
warships in the first place. Having reached the conclusion that a clerk could do 
the engineering ‘book work’ that took up so much of an engineer’s time, he 
declared that a warship should only require one engineering officer to supervise 
the engineering department instead of the seven or eight commonly carried on 
‘modern’ ships.519  It would appear that the Admiralty was also thinking on the 
same lines as Reynolds as a 1902 Admiralty memorandum noted:  
 
It has long been a complaint on the part of the Engineer branch that an 
Engineer officer on board each big ship is employed in clerical duties. It is 
proposed to remedy this by establishing a non-substantive rating of Engineer’s 
Writer, and the engine-room complement will in future include this rating to be 
held preferably by men of the stoker class.520 
 
That a job previously considered to warrant the education and training of an 
engineering officer should be so arbitrarily relegated to a stoker would suggest 
that engineers were either under employed as suggested by Reynolds, or 
stokers were credited with more ability and were more highly regarded within 
their own branch than outside of it. 
 
The qualifications required for this new, non-substantive rate, which 
attracted a remuneration of six pence per day were given as: 
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Ability to keep an engine-room register, including necessary calculations 
Conversant with the Engineer’s store accounts 
Must read and write well 
Must have an elementary knowledge of arithmetic, including the first four rules, 
simple and compound, simple, vulgar, and decimal fractions, and avoirdupois 
weight.521 
 
This was exactly the same criteria required of any first class stoker aspiring to 
reach the leading stoker rate, therefore most first class stokers would have 
been eligible to apply for this new non-substantive qualification.  
 
On the other hand, stokers often had excellent relations with their 
engineering officers. Stoker Rose recalled that the engineers he served with 
were very good at divisional work and were always ready to help their men by 
sorting out any service or domestic problems that they could not resolve 
themselves. In particular, he remembered that while he never had any contact 
with seamen officers who he thought of as being very ‘gentlemanly and 
unapproachable’, he could joke and converse with his engineers while on or off 
watch.522    
 
After the Armistice in 1918 Rose found himself serving in the Cleopatra 
as part of the British contingent supporting the ‘White Russians’ during the 
Russian Revolution. By then Rose had landed the relatively ‘cushy’ job of stoker 
of the ship’s motor boat. However, the job was not without its difficulties as oil 
operated motor boat engines were still a relative novelty at that time with most 
ships retaining steam launches. While the ship was in Copenhagen with the 
Admiral onboard Lieutenant Lowe who had charge of motor boats offered to buy 
Rose a new pair of boat shoes provided he was able to run the boat without it 
breaking down. Rose duly received his new shoes as promised. Unusually for 
the time, Rose kept in touch with Lowe after they both left the service in 1920. 
Lowe obtained a position as the commissioning engineer for a power station in 
Australia and offered Rose a permanent job; however due to his wife’s illness 
Rose had to decline the offer.523 
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While serving in the Hood Le Bailly set out to improve the lives of the 
younger stokers by organising evening classes for them which they shared with 
young artificers. He also obtained permission from Hood’s commander for 
stokers to stand on the bridge superstructure when the ship was entering and 
leaving harbour so that they could begin to understand the problems of ship 
handling and to see at first hand the effects of making too much smoke. Le 
Bailly also arranged for his stokers to join the seaman boys on ‘banyans’ 
(picnics) and persuaded the ship’s welfare fund to pay for coach tours in foreign 
ports. Through taking the time and trouble to improve their off-watch quality of 
life, Le-Bailly saw a dramatic improvement in the productivity and efficiency of 
his stokers, particularly in the disagreeable task of boiler cleaning. In addition, 
by arranging for his stokers to mix socially with seamen ratings the traditional 
barriers that had always separated the two branches began to break down and 
relationships improved to the extent that many young seamen and marines 
changed over to the stoker branch.524 
 
However, in general, naval officers remained aloof from their men. 
Montagu Consett joined the Royal Navy as a cadet in 1926 and resigned his 
commission as a Lieutenant in 1935. In the same year he applied for a 
commission in the Territorial Army as a 2nd Lieutenant receiving a regular 
commission on the outbreak of war in 1939.525 For the rest of the war, Consett 
served in an armoured brigade of the Welsh Guards finally retiring from the 
Army in the rank of Lieutenant Colonel. Having experienced life as an officer in 
both services Consett had a unique insight into the differences between the 
Army and Navy particularly in the way officers and men interacted. Having 
served in the York as a sub lieutenant during the Invergordon mutiny, Consett 
later reflected that the whole episode had been handled badly by naval officers. 
Comparing the two services, Consett suggested that naval officers were not as 
close to their men as officers were to their men in the Army. He voiced the 
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opinion that in the Army, ‘officers fought for their men, whereas they don’t in the 
Navy'.526   
 
Relationships-Stokers and Artificers 
 
On an individual basis, the working relationships between stokers and 
Engine Room Artificers were generally very good. Each E.R.A. was allocated a 
stoker who acted as his ‘mate’ when carrying out defect rectification or 
maintenance; as a result they often formed close working relationships. Stoker 
Rose thought E.R.As’ were ‘always willing to tell you things’, however while they 
enjoyed good working relationships onboard, the hierarchical nature of the rank 
system did not allow for much contact outside the ship such as socialising 
together when ashore.527 Stoker Ernest Bullock was ‘mate’ to an E.R.A. 
boilermaker while serving in the battle-cruiser Inflexibile and with thirty-one 
boilers he remembered that there was ‘always plenty of work to do.’ However, 
after a while the E.R.A. began to get on Bullock’s nerves and he requested a 
job change. After the senior engineer intervened the E.R.A. pleaded with 
Bullock to change his mind with the promise that he would mend his ways. After 
giving the matter some thought Bullock agreed to give his E.R.A. ‘another trial,’ 
which suggests that the working relationships between the skilled and semi-
skilled man were not entirely based on the naval hierarchical system.528     
 
Stoker James Dunn considered that stokers had very amicable 
relationships with E.R.As and could ‘learn a lot’ by watching or actively helping 
them carry out repairs and maintenance. E.R.A. William Bruty observed that 
stokers often felt ‘privileged’ to be an E.R.As mate because the E.R.A. gave his 
stoker the opportunity to use tools instead of being relegated to the eternal 
cleaning duties which usually took up much of a stokers time.529 Bruty also 
suggested that because men often found themselves in the same watch in the 
stokehole or engine room for an entire three year commission, the men had to 
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learn to rely on each other. He declared that E.R.As had to place their trust in 
stokers as every man in the watch had to depend on the other doing his job, 
much more so than ‘those on deck.’530  
 
The relationship between an E.R.A. and his mate often extended outside 
the machinery spaces. Stoker Sidney Knock recalled that an E.R.As mate 
would often act as a sort of unofficial ‘batman’ to his E.R.A. and for a small fee 
settled at the end of each month, he might undertake to do his dhobying, repair 
his kit or sling his hammock. In addition, although it was strictly forbidden under 
the Naval Discipline Act, Knock suggested that monetary loans were also 
conducted between the two classes of men under mutual agreement. Moreover, 
despite the fact that the E.R.A. was very much the better paid of the two, Knock 
revealed that it did not necessarily mean that he was the one on the lending end 
of the arrangement.531    
The Mechanician scheme 
During his tenure as Second Sea Lord during 1902-1903 Admiral Fisher 
oversaw many reforms in the Navy. The first of these initiatives known as the 
Selborne Memorandum unified officer training and finally integrated engineer 
officers with the executive branch of the Navy. The memorandum also directly 
affected engineering ratings and a subsequent 1903 Circular Letter established 
the rating of mechanician, C.E.R.A. and boy artificer. This was followed in 1905 
by the Cawdor Memorandum which brought stoker ratings into line with the 
standard rank system of the Navy. However, the introduction of the 
mechanician rate severely affected the working relationship enjoyed between 
stokers and E.R.As. The rationale for the mechanician scheme was outlined in 
a proposal which asked for a committee to report on methods 'for providing 
warrant officers capable of taking charge of the stokehold and engine-room 
watches in order to relieve the more highly trained officers of the ship from the 
routine duty of engine-room watch-keeping.'532 
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   The Admiralty accepted the subsequent proposal to train selected 
stokers to undertake this role and the first mechanicians entered the fleet in 
1906.533 The introduction of the mechanician rate was initially welcomed by 
stokers as it showed that amongst their ranks were men who had higher 
potential. It also offered a limited opportunity for a small number of selected 
stokers to aspire to warrant officer rank as the stoker branch was the only 
branch of service which did not enjoy that privilege. Selection for promotion to 
mechanician was available to leading stokers not over the age of thirty years 
who possessed technical aptitude and ability with the requisite seagoing 
experience. Men selected were required to sit the same educational 
examination as that undertaken by artificer entrants thereby setting a high bar 
for any aspiring applicant.534 Mechanician candidates undertook a two year 
training programme onboard the Indus II at Devonport which was the ancient 
hulk ex-Temeraire of 1876.   
However, E.R.As were strongly opposed to the mechanician scheme on 
the grounds that the Admiralty had usurped them and replaced them with ‘semi-
skilled’ stokers. E.R.As also voiced concern over the fact that in time a warrant 
mechanician could find himself in charge of chief artificers, men who saw 
themselves as being superior by virtue of their formal apprenticeships and 
training. This issue brought the internal ‘class-war’ between E.R.As and stokers 
out into the public domain. In 1911 the E.R.As' society forwarded a 
memorandum to members of parliament which argued that with regards to the 
mechanician scheme, the partially trained mechanic, ‘if such he can be called,’ 
is set in authority over the fully trained and specialised mechanic.’535 
E.R.As received support from the Member for Parliament George Barnes 
who, as a former mechanic, had completed a full apprenticeship followed by 
twenty-five years at his trade. Barnes argued that by the expenditure of public 
money the Navy was ‘attempting to cram into those poor men’s heads (stokers) 
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knowledge which can be of no use to them or to anybody.’536 Commenting on 
these charges in The Fleet, a supporter of the stokers using the nom de plume 
Sympathiser suggested, ‘the E.R.A. is a very much overrated individual and that, 
so far from the stokers encroaching on the work and privileges of the E.R.A., 
the reverse is the case.’537 Moreover, the writer noted that from the beginning of 
the E.R.A. branch they had been allowed to do work which, ‘by right, experience 
and custom belonged to the stokers and which his own trades union would have 
forbidden him to do in civil life.’538 
Using the working practices of the railways as an example the 
correspondent pointed out that in the great locomotive yards the artisan never 
handled a locomotive engine until it came to rest in the shed. He argued that 
engine drivers attained their position through being slowly promoted through the 
ranks of engine-cleaner and fireman until after many years of experience they 
qualified as a driver. Turning the argument around, it was suggested that had a 
qualified coppersmith been asked to drive an engine in civil life he would 
undoubtedly have refused, whereupon his union would have backed his actions 
to the point of a strike.539 Indeed, Stoker Sidney Knock recalled that many 
excellent E.R.As had suffered punishment for refusing to undertake duties 
‘outside’ of their respective trades.540 
The Sympathiser summed up his feeling towards the E.R.As position on 
this issue by observing:  
The whole objection of the engine-room artificers to the stoker ratings attaining 
to the ranks of mechanician is based on the assumption that the stokers as a 
class are of a lower order of intelligence than themselves. This the stokers 
indignantly repudiate!541     
The issue of mechanicians versus E.R.As was re-visited in The Fleet the 
following year and, while the author was not acknowledged, the article closely 
followed the arguments put forward by the Sympathiser. This anonymous writer 
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may well have been the paper’s editor, Lionel Yexley, who despite his seaman 
background had long been a vocal supporter of stokers. Using language such 
as ‘this sordid fight’ and ‘violent and too often scurrilous attacks on stokers’, the 
article suggested that the argument within the fleet between these two groups 
had escalated to the extent that it was in danger of getting out of control. The 
author was in no doubt that the attacks on stokers were being made through the 
E.R.As society. This society was arguably the most powerful of the lower-deck 
societies and one which was very successful in publicising its issues and 
requests, which it did through its links to various engineering trade unions and 
sympathetic members of parliament.542 
E.R.A. Harold Wright joined the Navy in 1909 as one of the early boy 
apprentices. He remembered that artificers ‘kept to themselves and always kept 
apart from other branches.’ Nonetheless, he recalled having ‘very good 
relationships’ with S.P.Os and Chief Stokers and always worked well with them 
on outside machinery. 543  Wright remembered that there were ‘problems and 
friction’ when mechanicians were introduced. He recalled when the first 
mechanicians joined the King George and the feeling at the time was that 
neither E.R.As or the ship’s engineers were keen on having them. Wright 
considered that mechanicians were not given a fair chance in the King George. 
As an example, he claimed that mechanicians were never given ‘technical’ jobs 
only the dirty jobs E.R.As were happy to dispense with such as working on 
boilers, valves, and engine room lifts.544   
It is difficult to see why E.R.As were so determined to undermine the 
introduction of the mechanician rate. An examination of the following table (See 
Table 3: p. 200) reproduced from 1912 manning records suggests that 
mechanicians were very much in the minority, therefore, complaints that E.R.As 
had been usurped hardly appear justified.   
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Table 12: E.R.A and Mechanician pay scales  
Rank       Numbers  Pay 
Warrant Mechanician    13  7s 6d-10s 6d  
Mechanician (Chief Petty Officer)   483  4s 6d-6s 6d            
Stoker Class (Petty Officers and men)  36,802 1s 8d-5s      
Warrant Chief Artificer Engineer   109  11s 6d-13s 6d        
Warrant Officer Artificer Engineer (C.P.O.) 479  8s 6d-10s 6d              
Chief Engine Room Artificer   1073  7s-7s 6d        
Engine Room Artificer (C.P.O.)   3267  5s 6d-6s 6d.545 
 
From analysis of the data shown above it can be determined that the two 
classes of E.R.A. warrant officers combined outnumbered warrant 
mechanicians by 45:1, while C.E.R.As outnumbered chief mechanicians by 
almost 9:1. These figures suggest that mechanicians were very definitely in the 
minority compared to E.R.As and therefore could not at any time have been 
considered a real threat to their existence.  
When compared to every other branch, the number of stokers qualifying 
for warrant officer rank showed a more depressing picture. The signals branch 
for example, had only 4,706 men but seventy-five warrant officers giving them a 
ratio of 63:1, while the even smaller writers’ branch had a better ratio of writer to 
warrant officer of 22:1. By comparison, stokers who could only achieve limited 
access to warrant rank through the mechanician scheme faced a 2,868:1 
chance of achieving warrant rank.546     
When making comparisons by earnings, the salary of the warrant officer 
mechanician was set at the level of a C.E.R.A., a man who was a rank lower 
than him while the chief mechanician was paid one shilling less a day than the 
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equivalent E.R.A. Therefore, it would appear that despite their protestations, the 
Admiralty had no intention of pitting the mechanician against the E.R.A. but was 
merely providing the means to relieve E.R.As from their watch-keeping duties in 
order to allow them to attend to their respective trades. Their qualified technical 
status as tradesmen was, after all, the reason why E.R.As demanded ‘special’ 
status within the Navy. 
In 1945, some forty-three years after the introduction of the mechanician 
rating, a serving engineer officer observed:  
What is the bait that persuades a man to become a stoker? I cannot believe that 
every stoker in the service did so purely from a love of mechanics. If he was 
looking for promotion, I can only assume that he had his eyes tight shut. It 
seems to me an admission that the warrant mechanician was introduced as a 
‘sop’ to the stokers and not as a requirement for the service. I offer two 
suggestions. Firstly, that suitable stokers who pass their leading stoker’s course 
sufficiently well should be allowed to turn over to the Artificer branch. Secondly, 
and more urgent: that the rank of warrant stoker is needed and should be 
introduced on an exactly similar basis to that of warrant officers from the 
Seamen branches. If there is a need for warrant cooks and stewards there must 
be one for warrant stokers.547  
Special privileges 
To improve their position, the artificers branch successfully lobbied the 
1919 Jerram Naval Pay Committee for increased ‘watch-keeping allowances.’  
The artificers society demanded additional payments for gaining the certificate 
of competency for taking a watch in the engine-room of a small ship and for 
taking charge of the engines. Both of these requests were granted and E.R.As 
received one shilling per day for taking charge of a watch and a further shilling 
for taking charge of an engine room. The committee upheld these requests on 
the basis that ‘watch-keeping’ was an additional qualification in addition to their 
trade qualification. However, the committee refused to make the same award to 
mechanicians on the grounds that watch-keeping was ‘the main purpose for 
which the class was introduced.’548  E.R.A. Wright remembered that his mess 
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specifically selected an outspoken C.E.R.A. to represent them at the Jerram 
Committee and claimed that they had ‘done very well out of it.’549 
From their introduction in 1869, E.R.As were treated as a ‘special case’ 
on the lower-deck, receiving privileges that were not offered or available to any 
other rating regardless of their rate. A contemporary report noted that E.R.As 
had particular requirements:  
E.R.As who have served their apprenticeship as fitters or boiler makers, and 
have thus placed themselves in a certain position of independence, join the 
Naval Service at an age of between 20 and 30, having already contracted the 
habits of their class on shore; they have been accustomed to regular limited 
hours of work and to pass their Sundays at home. On returning from their daily 
work they expect to find their meals ready, their house cleaned for them and 
themselves relieved from all supervision and work other than that of their 
trade.550 
 
As a result, the report noted that E.R.As found themselves living amongst 
men who had, by virtue of their own upbringing, become used to a mode of 
living which E.R.As considered a real hardship. In particular, E.R.As disliked 
having to clean out their mess and prepare their own meals, while they also 
resented being subject to the control of the ship’s Master at Arms with regards 
to obtaining leave to go on shore 
In the Royal Navy all petty officers and chief petty officers traditionally 
messed together by rate, regardless of any differences in branch. In a typical 
chief petty officers’ mess for example, the chief stoker would mess with the 
chief gunner, and cook etc. However, E.R.As demanded, and were given, 
permission to mess together, at once putting them in a privileged and superior 
position to other men. As E.R.A. William Bruty observed, 'the Navy was not a 
mixed society, E.R.As had their own society.’551 In addition, E.R.As were 
accorded the privilege of having their own mess-man (usually a stoker) who 
cleaned and tidied the mess, brought their tot (rum ration) and food, and slung 
their hammocks. On the other hand, Bruty was prepared to admit that by 
becoming a segregated society E.R.As attracted a considerable amount of envy 
                                            
549 H.S. Wright, I.W.M. 9072, Reel 2. 
550 'Re-Inventing the Wheel? Précis of Reports from Commissioners, Inspectors & Others 1877: 
Navy Engineers,' Journal of Naval Engineering 36, no. 1 (1995).137. 
551 W. G. Bruty, I.W.M. 759, 75. 
203 
 
from the rest of the lower-deck.552 The 1912 Magna Charta (lower-deck petition) 
highlighted the different standards enjoyed by E.R.As and the envy this created 
amongst the lower-deck. Item number (11) requested: 
 
That Mess Attendants be provided for Chief and Petty Officers by scale, under 
the definite authority of the King’s Regulations, as is now allowed for Engine 
Room Artificers.553 
 
Bruty’s perception of the differences that existed between E.R.As and the 
rest of the lower-deck was that all sections of the lower-deck aspired to the 
same privileges as E.R.As. He observed, ‘that was the catch phrase-same as 
the E.R.As.’554 Another privilege enjoyed by E.R.As included the ability to be 
able to ‘come and go’ as they pleased. Bruty recalled that while all other men 
would have to be inspected by the officer of the day before proceeding ashore 
and when returning onboard, E.R.As ‘were relieved of that sort of thing, they 
didn’t fall in on deck, they weren’t marched or ordered.’ To proceed ashore the 
E.R.A. paid his respect to the officer of the day by saluting and requesting 
permission to proceed and then he ticked his name off on a slate, a ritual which 
Bruty thought was ‘very nice.’555  
Relationships-Stokers and Seamen 
 
From the earliest days of steam, seamen and marines were required to 
supplement stokers in the stokehole during times of prolonged and intensive 
steaming when there was a great demand on the stokers. They were used to 
supplement the coal-trimmers in coal bunkers and to transport coal from the 
bunkers to the furnaces, a duty for which they were entitled to the equivalent 
daily stoker rate of pay. While marines apparently relished this type of work and 
many seamen may have welcomed the opportunity to earn extra pay, the 
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demands of working in the stokehole together with the lower social status this 
attracted would have undoubtedly caused resentment to many seamen. 
 
During the so called ‘battle of the boilers,’ when the new ‘Bellville’ boiler 
was tested alongside the standard naval boiler, a number of trials were 
conducted. In one long distance steam trial in 1903 the Bellville boiler fitted 
Hyacinth was pitted against the Minerva completed with the standard naval 
cylindrical boiler. The trials required both ships to steam at full speed from 
Portsmouth to Gibraltar and return. During the trial, coal and boiler feed water 
consumption was measured against indicated horse power. As this trial would 
have placed a great strain on the stokers of each ship they were supplemented 
with seamen, Hyacinth receiving twenty-two seamen and Minerva thirty-nine.556  
 
While the trial was designed to measure the relative worth of two 
different technologies, the healthy competition that existed between ships no 
doubt made this a trial of strength and endurance which would have stretched 
the stokers, let alone the seamen bringing up the coals. However, the animosity 
which existed between the two largest branches of men on the lower-deck 
reached new heights when an initiative pushed forward by Admiral Fisher 
introduced a requirement for seamen to undertake a compulsory thirty-day 
course in mechanical tools and stokehole work prior to sitting the examination 
for able-rate. The rationale for this initiative was discussed earlier in chapter two. 
However, it appears from the syllabus (See Appendix 10), that the type of 
mechanical instruction given to ordinary seamen was far more detailed than that 
initially proposed by Fisher.  
    
The syllabus prescribed fifteen days training in the use of mechanical 
tools including levers, jacks, the Spanish windlass, spanners and chisels etc. It 
also detailed the need for instruction in the working of watertight doors, sluices, 
fire-mains and ventilation systems. Instruction was to be under the tuition of a 
chief or leading stoker. Seamen were also required to participate in ‘ordinary’ 
stokehold day cleaning work including sweeping boiler tubes and backs. To 
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complete their mechanical training seamen were required to carry out routine 
firing duties in the stokehole while undertaking regular watches under ‘easy 
steaming conditions’ either in harbour or at sea. While undertaking their training, 
seamen were to be considered ‘in every respect, attached to the engine room 
department.’557  
 
Seaman Edward Pullen qualified for able seaman while serving in the 
Caesar but had to pass a six week stokehole training course before he could be 
rated up. During action, Pullen’s action station was in an upper-coal bunker with 
another seaman; their job was to pass coal down to the lower bunker.558  
Seamen such as Pullen can have been under no illusions as to their status 
while working in the stokehole. The Manual of Seamanship specifically warned 
seamen: 
 
Do not work any valve, wheel, lever or fitting connected with the machinery, 
boilers, or W.T. (watertight) doors, unless you understand what you are doing, 
and do not meddle with what does not concern you.559 
 
The regulations requiring seamen to undertake ‘stoking-duties’ appear to 
have been a continuation of an earlier trial in which stokers were employed on 
the upper-deck. In 1890, the Chief Inspector of Machinery proposed that every 
ship commissioned into the Navy should have a supplementary party of stokers 
drafted to the ship. This ‘extra watch’ of stokers would then be used to relieve 
the watch below so that each watch in turn could be employed on deck and 
taught ‘combatant duties.’560  A contemporary report described the proposal as 
being ‘warmly welcomed’ by the Admiralty. As a result, twenty-two stokers were 
drafted to the Aurora supplementary to her normal complement. With the 
addition of these extra stokers it was expected that the ship’s stoker 
complement could be trained in the ordinary working of the ship without 
interfering with ‘normal’ day-to-day work down below. Unfortunately, there are 
no reports as to the success or otherwise of this trial. It is likely that it was 
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abandoned due to the additional expense of over-manning and the difficulties of 
recruiting and training sufficient stokers to provide normal complements in an 
already expanding fleet.    
The Lower-deck reform movement 
The subject of lower-deck welfare representation was a difficult concept 
within the Royal Navy because ‘King’s Regulations and Admiralty Instructions’ 
which laid down the rules and regulations for officers and men on all matters 
that concerned the maintenance of good order and naval discipline, specifically 
forbade any complaint being made by ‘combinations of persons.’ 
 
Article 11 of Kings Regulations and Admiralty Instructions (1913) 
stipulated: 
 
Combinations: All combinations of persons belonging to the Fleet 
formed for the purpose of bringing about alterations in the existing Regulations 
or customs of His Majesty's Naval Service, whether affecting their interests 
individually or collectively, are prohibited as being contrary to the traditions 
and practice of the Service and injurious to its welfare and discipline. Every 
person is fully authorised individually to make known to his superior any 
proper cause of complaint, but individuals are not to combine either by the 
appointment of committees or in any other manner to obtain signatures to 
memorials, petitions or applications, nor are they collectively to sign any 
such documents.561 
 
Therefore, the idea of collective complaints, appeals or representations 
made by groups of men or branch committees was effectively prohibited on 
point of punishment under the naval discipline code. In addition, the regulations 
ensured that complaints from individuals were kept to a minimum through the 
act which stated that if a man made a complaint without reasonable grounds he 
was:  
 
Liable to be considered as having made a frivolous or vexatious complaint, 
which is an act to the prejudice of good order and naval discipline.562 
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This meant that any man considered by his commanding officer to have 
made an unjustified complaint would have been liable to punishment. As a 
commanding officer’s word was law, it would have taken a man with a 
particularly strong character to make a complaint about poor food and pay or 
the lack of leave. Therefore, service regulations effectively stifled any 
complaints from the lower-deck, while they also prevented men from bringing 
any matters with regards to their conditions of service to the notice of the 
Admiralty Board.  
 
 As a consequence, the only way of circumventing the regulations was 
through the submission of a petition to the Admiralty through a sympathetic 
civilian or M.P. However, as any joint complaint immediately contravened article 
eleven of K.R.s & A.I.s, this procedure could only be conducted through an 
anonymous written petition which, due to the nature of potential repercussions, 
was a measure usually only conducted by warrant officers or other senior 
ratings via their individual or collective branch societies.   
 
Anthony Carew noted that the system of petitioning was deeply rooted in 
the Navy, beginning with a petition from the seamen of the fleet in 1654 
together with further petitions in 1796 and 1858. However, after a petition by all 
the lieutenants of the Channel Fleet in 1860, the Admiralty put an end to 
petitioning by amending the naval discipline act to include article eleven which 
prohibited the making of representations by ‘combinations’ of men discussed 
earlier.563  It was from this amendment that lower-deck branch societies began 
to emerge from the earlier death benefit and mutual aid societies which had 
existed in the Navy for some time. 
 
Death benefit and mutual aid societies 
 
Death benefit and mutual aid societies were formed on the lower-deck in 
the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries in response to the failure of the 
Admiralty to grant pensions to the dependants of married men who died in 
service, despite the fact that officers’ dependants were granted service 
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pensions if in need.564 Registered friendly societies allowed members to raise 
subscriptions to pay for sickness pay or to pay for the burial costs of deceased 
members, thereby alleviating the burden from the family of the deceased. David 
Neave described English Friendly Societies as the ‘largest and most 
representative working-class organisation’ in late nineteenth century Britain.565  
It is surprising then that the naval lower-deck, bereft as it was from an official or 
collective voice, did not embrace these societies as a means to providing a 
platform from which it could lobby for improved service conditions. 
 
The earliest of the naval friendly societies was the Naval Warrant Officers’ 
Friendly Society originally formed in Devonport in 1792. Seamen petty officers 
later combined to form a unified branch society which had representatives in 
each of the three home ports and while it only attracted around 3,000 members, 
it spoke with one voice when it came to making class appeals. By comparison, 
the stokers’ branch was anything other than unified. Three separate friendly 
societies for different rates of stokers were formed, with two societies 
established in Portsmouth and one in Devonport. Initially, there did not appear 
to have been any interest from the Chatham stokers in establishing a stokers’ 
friendly society in that home port. The first to become registered was the ‘Royal 
Naval Leading Stokers’ Burial Society’ which registered under the Friendly 
Societies Act 1875 on the 12th June 1885 with its office address given as the 
Nelson Tavern, Portsmouth. Under its constitution the aim of the society was to: 
 
 
Raise a fund by entrance fees, subscriptions and interest on capital, for the 
mutual relief of members in time of sickness, and to provide a decent 
internment at the death of a member or a member’s wife566     
  
Members on the ‘active’ list contributed a monthly payment of 1s, while 
pensioned members contributed 1s 6d out of which 1d was taken for 
management of the society. Sick benefits were paid out at the rate of 12s for the 
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first twenty-six weeks; a figure which was set at the national average for towns 
and cities outside London.567 For the following twenty-six weeks, sick pay was 
reduced to 6s and then to 3s for any time thereafter.   
 
The rules of the society specified that any member in receipt of sick pay 
who was found to be: 
 
frequenting public houses, or found gambling, fighting or doing anything  
likely to hinder his recovery such as refusing to see the surgeon, will be liable to 
forfeit his sick pay.568   
 
The death benefit was set at £12 for members and £6 for their wives. In 
1888 the society opened up to all rates within the stokers’ branch including 
mechanicians. Contributions to death benefits were reduced to 7d a month 
while an entrance fee was introduced according to age to take account of 
differences in earnings between members so that those who earned more, paid 
more.569 The second and largest of the stokers’ benefit societies was registered 
in Portsmouth in 1887 and by 1911 had 2,000 registered members with a 
healthy benefit fund of £11,800. The last friendly society to be founded by 
stokers and the only one to be formed in Devonport registered in 1900. 
However, it struggled to attract members and by 1915 it only had 296 registered 
members with a mutual fund of £431. 
 
Prior to the First World War the numbers of stokers registered as 
members of friendly societies began to decline. In 1914 there were 40,000 men 
serving in the stokers’ branch including mechanicians, but only 1,600 of them 
were registered as members of one of the three stokers’ friendly societies.570  
There are a number of reasons for this decline. Nicholas Broten argued that 
ageing memberships and declining popularity for mutual schemes with younger 
men forced insurers into financial distress and tacit support for state insurance 
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schemes.571 The introduction of the National Insurance Act in 1911 by the 
Liberal government may also have swayed men to relinquish membership of 
their mutual society.     
 
The Portsmouth Sick Benefit and Burial Society would appear to support 
Broten’s argument with regards to an ageing membership. By December 1915, 
the society was reduced to 165 members. An examination of the Friendly 
Societies’ annual return for the year reveals that out of the 165 members only 
twenty-two were still young enough to be on ‘active service.’ By default, the 
majority of members must have been ‘retired’ men, probably naval pensioners 
employed in the dockyard.     
 
Then again, these results appear to fall into the national pattern for 
membership of friendly societies, whereby the twenty to fifty year age group 
showed a decrease of 3.4 per cent in national membership over the period 
1905-1910.572  It is to be expected that over a period of time members of naval 
friendly societies would retire from ‘active’ service and probably wish to remain 
as paid up members of the society, to be replaced by younger serving members. 
In point of fact, the regulations for one of the Portsmouth societies specifically 
stated that membership was restricted to an unlimited number of men ‘actually 
serving on the active list.’573  
 
 In 1914, Lionel Yexley attended a meeting of the Portsmouth Sick 
Benefit and Burial Society where he was introduced as ‘the champion of our 
cause.’574  In his address, Yexley announced that for the first time in naval 
history stokehole and engine room personnel had exceeded 40,000 men, 
outnumbering seamen by 1,265 men. While congratulating the assembly, 
Yexley issued a warning that this should be considered the ‘high water mark’ for 
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the engine room branch. Yexley correctly predicted that as more oil-firing ships 
were introduced and the labour intensive coal-burners were withdrawn, the 
need for large numbers of stokers would reduce.   
 
By 1919 Yexley’s prediction had proved correct as the stokers’ branch 
had reduced to 30,000 while the seamen branch had increased to 47,000 
Nevertheless, Yexley suggested that oil-firing could work to the advantage of 
stokers by elevating them into work of a ‘higher nature.’ With this in mind, 
Yexley warned that it would be the task of the stokers’ societies to monitor 
future developments in order to ensure that the stokers as a branch; ‘reaped 
every advantage due to them from the higher nature of the work they would be 
called upon to do.’575  
 
In his annual report, the Chief Registrar observed that it was a 
‘universally recognised fact’ that sickness increases with age. As a 
consequence he suggested that for a friendly society to prosper and stay 
solvent while having the funds to meet its commitments to its members, it would 
need to store up reserves contributed by the youth of its membership.576   
 
With dwindling membership, ageing members and a lack of new blood, 
stokers friendly societies slowly wound up. Young men at the beginning of their 
service would have surely been put off from joining a society in which the 
majority of its members were retired from active service as in the case of the 
Portsmouth society described above. This would have been further emphasised 
by a lack of more experienced men joining for the same reason, thereby leaving 
a vacuum which precluded a continuity of membership. Another reason for the 
demise of friendly societies can be attributed to the First World War. In 1931 a 
paper addressing the causes of the ‘disturbances’ at Invergordon, claimed that 
casualties amongst men of the lower-deck during the war, ‘were so great that 
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there were insufficient funds in the respective friendly societies to cope with 
claims.’577   
 
Stoker Ernest Bullock served in the Inflexible at the Dardanelles and 
recalled that when the ship went into ‘action’ two watches closed up in every 
compartment down below.578  Moreover, when the ship went to ‘abandon ship 
stations’ only the second watch below were allowed to go to their abandon ship 
station, the original watch had to remain below until the very last minute. When 
the Inflexible struck two mines at the Dardanelles, Bullock recalled that he 
‘tossed a coin’ with his opposite number to see who would go up top to prepare 
to abandon ship and he won, leaving his friend with a ‘pang feeling that all, or 
none, should have to remain below.’579 Conditions in the Kaiser’s Navy during 
action were exactly the same for German stokers. A post action report from an 
unnamed stoker who had served in the Kaiser during the Battle of Jutland also 
described how the stokers below were ‘completely cut-off’ from the rest of the 
ship during action as all the bulkheads were closed down.580   
 
The Devonport based Royal Naval United Stokers’ Sick Benefit and 
Burial Society was the last to be registered but the first to be dissolved on 2nd 
October 1916.581  This was followed in October 1917 by the Portsmouth Sick 
Benefit and Burial Society. However, while ceasing to enjoy the privileges of a 
registered friendly society, the directors of the society re-registered it as a 
branch of the United Ancient Order of Druids Friendly Society under the name, 
‘The Royal Naval Lodge of Druids 1026.’582 Former chief stoker James Dunn, 
recalled that in the inter-war years, Devonport was a ‘Buffalo port’, (Royal 
Antediluvian Order of Buffaloes), an international philanthropic and charitable 
society, while Rosyth was also known as a ‘hot-spot for the Buffs.’ Dunn 
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claimed that membership of this secretive society which conducted meetings 
behind closed doors; was essential in barracks if a man wished to change a 
duty, his job, or even to avoid a draft to an unwanted ship. On the other hand, 
membership of the order had no influence onboard a ship, ‘there was no place 
for it.’  Dunn recalled that during the pre-war years membership of the ‘Buffs’ 
was popular amongst the lower-deck although he stated that he was not aware 
of any great influence from Freemasonary.583  After the 1931 mutiny at 
Invergordon the Admiralty banned Buffalo Lodges from holding meetings 
onboard ships as naval intelligence warned the Admiralty that the mutiny had 
been planned in ‘secret lodge meetings.’584         
  
On the other hand, stokers were not unique in being unable to form a 
collective society. Anthony Carew noted that at its height, the lower-deck 
mustered some fourteen separate societies although not all of them were 
registered, while many were secretive with regards to their aims and 
membership. In addition, even when a single representative society formed, 
there was usually a dispute between branches in the separate home ports 
which divided the membership. For example, the Chief Petty Officers’ Society 
attracted men from all three home ports and successfully lobbied for an 
increase in pension rates. However, once the objective was reached and 
without any other common aims, the society became divided and formed three 
separate splinter groups. 585 
 
The better educated men of the lower-deck were the most successful in 
organising branch societies and as a consequence reaped the benefits of their 
individual petitions. E.R.As and writers attracted one hundred per cent 
membership for their societies while men belonging to the sick berth, electrical 
artificers, shipwrights, and joiners’ branches also enjoyed high rates of society 
membership. Stokers and marines had the lowest membership of any branch 
society with just thirty-three per cent of stokers and only thirteen per cent of 
marines belonging to a society.586 
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   There were many false starts during the last decade of the nineteenth 
century when attempts were made to bring the various branch societies 
together in order to seek improvements to service conditions. In 1893 
spokesmen representing warrant officers, stokers, painters and chief petty 
officers met in Portsmouth to discuss the idea of bringing all of their branch 
societies together into one federation, although no decision was reached. 
However, a breakthrough in the means to publicise the plight of the lower-deck 
outside the service became available in 1898 when Lionel Yexley become 
editor of the new newspaper the Bluejacket and Coastguard Gazette. Yexley’s 
aim from the start was to give maximum publicity to the serious grievances that 
existed on the lower-deck.   
 
In 1904 a general petition entitled The British Navy-Improvements 
Needed was published purporting to be issued by lower-deck societies although 
it was actually the work of William Behenna a chief writer and secretary to the 
Chief Petty Officers’ Society and vice-president of the influential Writers’ Society. 
In order to protect individual men the petition was issued from Cardiff by a 
sympathetic civilian shipping clerk. After being published in the Naval and 
Military Record, an accompanying editorial dubbed the petition the ‘Magna 
Charta’, a name which all subsequent appeals from the lower-deck were 
commonly termed. However, while arguing that the appeal was badly written 
and made little overall impact, Carew saw its significance as being the fact that 
it had been issued at all. Furthermore, by attempting to bridge the divisions 
between the various societies the appeal was considered to have been a 




One of the main requests included in the 1912 lower-deck Magna Charta 
was the right to petition the Admiralty through commanding officers, (See 
Appendix 11). With regard to the preparation of the Magna Charta, Yexley 
observed that from the first submission of the lower-deck loyal petition in 1904 
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until 1913 stokers ‘had no voice in framing the Magna-Charta.’588 Yexley did not 
offer any reason for the exclusion of stokers from the framing of this important 
document but it can be assumed that as stokers were looked down upon by the 
rest of the lower-deck, their numbers alone were insufficient to enable their 
voice to be heard. Another distinguished commentator with experience and 
personal knowledge of the politics of the lower-deck also noted that in the seven 
years up to the First World War successive Magna Charta’s successfully 
appealed for promotion to warrant rank for every branch of the lower-deck; 
‘except for the stoker’s branch.’589 The stokers’ loyal appeal for promotion to 
warrant rank was the only one ever rejected.         
 
The Admiralty never officially acknowledged lower-deck petitions nor did 
it attempt to expose the authors. No doubt it was content to monitor lower-deck 
grievances in order to judge the level of militancy within the fleet; offering what it 
thought were minor concessions in the hope it would keep the men content. 
However, by not officially challenging petitions the Admiralty set a precedent 
which it seemed unable to revoke without the potential for causing serious 
unrest in the fleet. As a result, by 1906 the annual ‘appeal’ had effectively 
become a semi-official document written by a joint committee representing the 
various lower-deck benefit societies. Had the joint committee been more 
representative of the men it purported to serve they may have been able to 
wring more concessions and changes from the Admiralty. As it was their 
weakness lay in a system dominated by warrant, chief and petty officers and by 
the smaller, better organised branches, such as the writers’ branch which 
tended to assume control of all meetings.   
 
During the First World War petitioning was abandoned. However, after 
the Armistice the lower-deck resumed its fight for the reform it had asked for but 
had been consistently denied.590 The most pressing lower-deck grievance was 
that of low pay. Despite an increase in pay in 1917 naval pay still fell far short of 
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equivalent civilian pay scales which had increased dramatically after the war in 
line with increases in the cost of living.   
 
After the 1918 Metropolitan police strike in support of demands for a 
wage increase and union recognition, Yexley became fearful that the lower-
deck would also attempt militant action. In his view this would have resulted in a 
crack-down by the Admiralty on lower-deck benefit societies which would have 
been a major set-back for the lower-deck. In order to avert this, Yexley 
submitted a memorandum to the Admiralty in which he listed a number of 
pressing outstanding grievances together with a warning regarding the urgency 
of the situation.   
 
Despite initially rejecting Yexley’s warning as the actions of an agitator, 
the Admiralty was forced to take the matter more seriously after intervention by 
the retired Admiral Fisher who lobbied both the Admiralty and the Prime 
Minister on Yexley’s behalf. In October 1918 the Admiralty established the 
Naval Personnel Committee under Rear-Admiral Jerram to consult with the 
Admiralty on all matters relating to lower-deck pay and conditions. However, 
while looking into how it could simplify the existing structure of naval pay the 
committee became bogged down with the complexity of the system leaving the 
question of the general low level of pay unanswered.   
 
After further agitation and intervention, the Admiralty finally agreed that 
an increase in the level of naval pay was needed in order to offset the cost of 
living increases which had left most men worse off in 1918 than they had been 
in 1914. As a result, the Admiralty reconstituted the Naval Personnel Committee 
in December 1918 and in an unprecedented move authorised twelve ratings to 
sit on the committee in an advisory capacity. The lower-deck advisory board 
attached to the Naval Personnel Committee comprised the following ratings; 
(See Table 13: below). The figures in brackets denote the total numbers of men 







Table 13: Composition of the Lower-Deck Advisory Board 
 
 
Portsmouth Command Sergeant Major Watts Royal Marines  (21,425) 
   Petty Officer Telegraphist Atkins        (4,065) 
   E.R.A. Hanbidge           (5,042) 
    Sick Berth Steward Leach          (1,492) 
 
Chatham Command  Leading Seaman Beaumont         (46,802) 
    Chief Cooper Knight         (212) 
   Chief Writer Kirby          (952) 
   Officers Chief Steward Penney        (4598) 
 
Devonport Command Chief Petty Officer Seaman Lobb        (46,802) 
Mechanician Essery (stokers)              (30,477) 
   Shipwright Figgins          (1332) 
   Chief Petty Officer Cook Pedrick        (4598) 591 
 
The table above indicates that senior ratings were over represented on 
the advisory team with just two junior ratings selected out of the ten members to 
represent the interests of the junior members of the lower-deck. Moreover, with 
regards to equality of representation across individual branches, the 
composition of the lower-deck advisory committee left a lot to be desired. For 
example, cooks and stewards were counted together, but despite collectively 
comprising only a fifth of the total numbers of stokers they had two 
representatives between them. 30,000 stokers were left with no direct 
representation other than a single mechanician; the same representation as the 
miniscule and obsolete coopers branch which numbered a bare 200 men. (See 
Appendix 10 for the numbers of men serving in each branch). Furthermore, the 
single mechanician representing the interest of the  stokers may have been 
pressurised by his peers into supporting the mechanicians’ own agenda, rather 
than the interests of stokers.   
  
The anomaly that resulted in stokers having virtually no representation on 
the welfare committee had not gone unnoticed and several letters on the 
subject were published in the officer’s journal The Naval Review. One 
contributor calculated that the seamen and combined signal branches shared 
three representatives amongst 49,000 men which gave them a representative 
                                            




ratio of 0.06 per thousand men, whereas the smaller, but more organised 
branches, such as the stores accountants and stewards had a representative 
ratio of 1.11 per thousand. On the other hand, while the seamen ratio was fairly 
low due to the size of the branch they were still better off than stokers whose 
ratio per thousand men was just 0.033. Reviewing these calculations the writer 
observed, ‘is it surprising that the seamen and stoker branches do not think 
much of the Welfare Committee’?592  This fact is borne out when the Port 
Admiral at Devonport noted in 1920 that only twenty stokers attended a meeting 
to elect a Welfare Committee representative for the mechanician and stoker 
branch.593   
 
Then again, we do not know the extent of political infighting between the 
various branches over elections of welfare representatives and the submission 
of branch appeals. Carew highlighted the case of a chief mechanician who was 
drafted to a ship ‘out of turn’ in 1922 because he allegedly volunteered to 
represent the stokers’ branch at a welfare conference. A letter was circulated in 
The Fleet purporting to be from one commissioned engineer to another which 
implied that the man had been drafted in order to prevent him from representing 
the stokers. Yexley’s interpretation of the letter was that while it had the 
signature of an engineer it was probably concocted by an E.R.A. who was 
paying off a political score on the mechanician.594 It is difficult to determine 
whether it was the case that stokers were disinterested in participating in the 
work of these committees or whether their voice went unheeded for so long they 
lost the will to continue to fight against the tide of discrimination that kept them 
at the bottom of the lower-deck social ladder.  
 
It was suggested that in order to remove the inequality of representation 
each branch representative should carry a number of votes in proportion to the 
number of ratings that were represented. Had this proposal been implemented, 
the seamen branch representatives would have had nine votes each and all 
other branches except the stokers one vote each. Stokers would have gained a 
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major boost from this proposal as it would have given them twenty-five votes 
per representative which would have enabled them to influence decisions made 
by the Welfare Committee instead of being sidelined by the smaller, but more 
politically astute branches.595   
 
In late 1918 Yexley warned the Admiralty that if it wanted to prevent a 
movement towards the amalgamation of lower-deck societies it should make 
some concession towards a permanent welfare department.596  Two years later, 
Admiral of the Fleet, Earl Beatty, acknowledged that the problem of welfare had 
‘become a matter of the first importance, which had increased from year to 
year.’597 He also observed that there was no naval division or department with 
responsibility for advising the Board of Admiralty on lower-deck issues within 
the naval service. During the war, a physical training branch was introduced in 
the northern ports to provide recreational activities for the fleet in order to boost 
flagging morale.598 The perceived success of the activities put on for the men 
led Beatty to make a proposal that the physical training branch should take on 
the lower-deck welfare role.599 
 
Beatty also suggested that individual canteen committees consisting of 
officers and elected representatives of the men could be used to discuss 
questions of welfare which could then be brought to the notice of the captain. 
Despite his apparent willingness to allow the lower-deck some say in welfare 
conditions Beatty stuck rigidly to the first principle of Admiralty management of 
the lower-deck by insisting that all requests or complaints had to be made 
through each man’s divisional officer and thence through the commanding 
officer, onwards and upwards, through the naval chain of command. The 
restrictions which this process placed upon the men ultimately thwarted their 
ambitions to make any type of collective representation and ensured that the 
Admiralty maintained the upper-hand at all times.   
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However, by 1920 Beatty appears to have had a change of mind with 
regards to lower-deck welfare representation. Upon reviewing a lower-deck 
welfare committee joint request submitted from the Orion to the Vice-Admiral 2nd 
Battle Squadron for certain concessions affecting pay and conditions of service; 
Beatty observed:  
 
It is not clear whether the Committee were acting throughout with the 
knowledge and permission of the Commanding Officer, but assuming this was 
the case, the procedure was nevertheless contrary to the spirit of Article 11, 
King’s Regulations, and should have been avoided, since it conveys the 
impression that Petty Officers and Men may be allowed to combine for the 
purpose of initiating joint requests.600   
   
The Orion’s joint request is a good example of the stokers’ dilemma with 
regards to a lack of representation on welfare committees and joint requests of 
this type. Apart from general requests such as the request for an increase in 
pensions which would have benefited all men there was not one single request 
from the stokers of the Orion. Instead the following individual branch requests 
were made:  
 
(1) That promotion from Petty Officer (Seaman Class) to Chief Petty Officer 
be accelerated. 
(2) That promotion from Leading Signalman to Yeoman of Signals be 
           accelerated. 
(3) That promotion from Yeoman of Signals to Chief Yeoman of Signals be 
accelerated. 
(4) That promotion in the Cooper branch be accelerated. 
(5) That promotion in Sick Bay Staff be accelerated.601 
  
The branches making these requests replicate the unequal composition 
of the lower-deck ratings advisory board presented earlier while the order in 
which they are presented are indicative of the social hierarchy which existed on 
the lower-deck. Moreover, while the seamen would have made up the largest 
group of men followed by the stoker complement, the signalmen, cooper and 
sick berth ratings of the Orion would collectively have made up just a small 
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fraction of the total ship's company. As an example, the first class armoured 
cruiser Lancaster in which S.P.O. Reynolds served in the Mediterranean, had a 
complement of 661 officers and men which was only 150 men short of the 
larger Orion's ship's company. Lancaster had just seventeen signalmen, one 
cooper and three sick-berth ratings in her complement compared with 201 
stokers and 224 seamen.602 Taking into account her greater size, Orion might 
possibly have had a few more signalmen and one or two additional sick-berth 
ratings, however, with just 200 coopers in the whole Navy it is unlikely Orion 
would have had any more than the one allocated to the Lancaster. The fact that 
these branches, despite their small numbers, had the  organisation and political 
persuasion to submit individual class requests  is indicative of the lack of 
cohesion of the stokers' branch and its apparent reluctance to engage in self-
promotion.   
 
When Beatty made his proposal in 1920 for changes to the lower-deck 
welfare system he overlooked the fact that the Admiralty had already introduced 
a permanent system of welfare committees on similar lines to the successful 
1918 Jerram Committee.603 Because this was an official service initiative the 
Admiralty had to circumvent Article 11 of King’s Regulations which prohibited 
group meetings or representation. In order to overcome this hurdle the 
Admiralty arranged for Petty Officers and men to be ‘ordered’ to hold their 
elections, thereby ensuring that the relevant articles were not contravened.604  
 
The early inter-war years began well for lower-deck benefit societies. 
Poor pay, the high cost of living and poor social conditions within the Navy saw 
the emergence of new societies and a resurgence in membership of those 
already established. However, class divisions continued to prevent the lower-
deck challenging the Admiralty with one voice. The first inter-port welfare 
conference met at Portsmouth in October 1919 but because there was no 
system in place to collectively agree on the proposals to be put forward to the 
Admiralty, three hundred and seven general and class requests were submitted 
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ranging from issues of great importance to petty requests that would interest 
only a small number of men.605  
 
From the outset there was a fair amount of scepticism amongst the men 
with regards to the welfare committee scheme. Carew, suggests this scepticism 
was well placed as the Admiralty had no intention of recognising a role for 
lower-deck societies within the welfare system and its intention was to re-
establish its grip on them once the tide of militancy which was sweeping the 
nation and Navy had died down.606  When the delegates met for the 1920 round 
of welfare conferences they found that the Admiralty had still not answered any 
of the requests submitted the previous year. With no reassurance that the 
Admiralty would make the welfare system any more effective a resolution of no 
confidence was passed and the representatives requested to dissolve their 
committees, a move which played straight into the Admiralty’s hands.   
 
The Stokers’ Class Appeal 
 
In 1914 a class appeal was issued by stokers suggesting that they had 
united sufficiently to consider their collective future. The class appeal was 
additional to the annual combined lower-deck ‘Loyal Appeal’ and was drawn up 
by stokers because they felt their grievances were being overlooked in favour of 
much smaller branches who were monopolising and dominating the lower-deck 
welfare system, (See Appendix 8). The Stokers’ class appeal evidently 
incorporated the advice given by Lionel Yexley at the 1914 Portsmouth benefit 
society meeting where he suggested the stokers should ‘reap every advantage 
due to them’ from the introduction of oil-fuel. The appeal began by pointing out 
to the Admiralty that the branch had noticed ‘with interest’ how it had 
outnumbered the executive branch for the first time in its history. The appeal 
used the argument put forward by Yexley that modern machinery and 
‘appliances’ found on board ships of war called for a ‘higher class of work’ and 
as a consequence  required ‘better men’ than formerly. This argument was 
supported with a modest appeal for an improvement in pay for all ranks of 
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stokers except the second class men upon entry, for which they wished no 
change.607 
 
Another request was for the status and position of the leading stoker rate 
to be improved, a request that would become more prominent during the 
aftermath of the Invergordon ‘disturbances’ of 1931. In addition, it was 
requested that the rating of ‘Chief’ be granted to the mechanician rating and that 
opportunity be given for chief stokers to attain warrant officer status. In support 
of this request it was pointed out that a committee under the presidency of Rear 
Admiral E.E. Bradford had been set up to inquire into the need for a single 
stores officer to take charge of all items of stores onboard H.M. ships. With this 
process in mind, the class-appeal suggested that chief stokers would be 
‘eminently suitable’ to fill the position of ‘store officer’ (with warrant rank) owing 
to their previous experience of accounting for stores and spare parts.   
 
Furthermore, the appeal requested that a small remuneration be payable 
for stokers who were qualified in internal combustion engines, oil fuel, distilling 
plants, dynamos, air compressors, and refrigerating and hydraulic machinery on 
the principle that seamen who were qualified in torpedoes and gunnery received 
extra pay. Finally, the class appeal set out a tabulated statement listing the 
1914 rates of pay for all stoker rates with the appropriate increases proposed by 
the branch committees that had contributed to issuing the class-appeal.608 It is 
unsurprising that given the status of stokers compared to other classes of men 
and with their previous treatment with regards to branch representation that 
none of these requests were granted.  
 
In conclusion, the lower-deck had a clearly defined hierarchical system in 
which every branch and sub-branch was accorded a certain social status 
according to the perceived worth of the job or role they occupied onboard. The 
seaman branch was the largest single branch of service and formed of one 
body of men. In deference to the traditional and historical role of sailing and 
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fighting the ship, seamen were deemed to represent the ‘military arm’ of the 
service and were accorded the title of the ‘executive branch’; a title which 
granted them supervisory authority over all other branches.   
 
However, the introduction of steam power usurped the seaman’s 
traditional role of sailing the ship while the engine-room branch grew to become 
a close second to the seaman branch in terms of numbers of men. On the other 
hand, while seamen were able to form death benefit and mutual aid societies in 
all the Home Ports to represent their interests, the engine-room branch became 
divided through its own hierarchical system which sub-divided the branch into 
E.R.As, mechanicians and stokers. In creating the mechanician sub-branch with 
opportunity to progress to warrant officer rank the Admiralty claimed that 
stokers had progression to warrant rank. However, this turned into an ‘empty 
promise’ as in practice only relatively small numbers of stokers became 
mechanicians and from those even fewer achieved warrant rank. Despite the 
class-war that broke out between E.R.As and stokers over the introduction of 
the mechanician rate, relations between these two groups of men remained 
relatively harmonious with each branch respecting the value of the other. While 
the rest of the lower-deck harboured resentment at the special status and 
privileges accorded to E.R.As, stokers accepted their special status in return for 
the opportunity to learn from them which in turn allowed them to improve their 
own skills. The fact that this was recognised and accorded the term ‘intellectual 
snobbery’ by a seaman officer, was in itself something of a rare compliment for 
stokers.609  
 
The evolution of coaling-ship was a necessary, but very disagreeable 
task involving everyone onboard. Coaling-ship also generated much extra work 
through the necessity to clean the ship from the inevitable accumulation of coal 
and coal dust which required the obligatory ‘water-carnival.’ As far as seamen 
were concerned, the need to coal-ship was attributable to the engine room 
branch as a whole and while a great chore it was recognised as a necessary 
evil. However, the resulting mess left behind after coaling ship was blamed 
directly at stokers. Because stokers were considered to be at the very bottom of 
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the naval social hierarchy, they received the full wrath of the seamen 
department every time their clean and tidy ship was covered in coal dust and 
filth. The common practice whereby seamen responsible for certain areas of a 
ship would arbitrarily rope off access to compartments and passageways in 
order to prevent stokers from leaving their hand or footprints behind was yet 
another source of deep resentment and antagonism between the two branches. 
   
In order to re-establish their primacy, seamen continued to insist on 
being regarded as the ‘executive’ or ‘military arm of the Navy’ and used every 
opportunity to let the engine-room branch know who its masters were. 
Regardless of the long hours spent below in harbour cleaning boilers or 
undertaking maintenance or repairs, engine-room personnel could only be given 
time off provided it coincided with the routine worked by the seaman department. 
Engineering officers did not have the authority to command their own 
department while engine room senior ratings often had to obey orders given by 
seamen junior ratings. Moreover, the nature of the naval hierarchy gave rise to 
certain restrictive practices amongst certain branches which even dictated 
which branch could give orders to another.   
 
The absence of any official provision by the Admiralty towards the 
welfare of the men or their next of kin should they be injured or die in service 
prompted the emergence of death benefit and friendly mutual aid societies 
which became a feature of lower-deck life during the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries. These societies expanded their remit to lobby the Admiralty 
through ‘class-appeals’ in order to elicit improvements in service for their own 
members. Had these societies been more unified they would have had an 
opportunity to bring greater leverage to the Admiralty in order to make 
improvements to the common cause rather than to their individual members.   
 
Despite the size of their branch, stokers failed to join friendly societies in 
any great numbers. Furthermore, they were denied their rightful representation 
on the Welfare Committee being usurped by the much smaller but more 
politically astute branches. Where other large branches such as the seamen 
branch joined forces, stokers proved unable to instigate a single society to 
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speak on their behalf. Instead, several individual societies were formed 
representing different classes of stokers in different Home Ports thereby leading 
to a dilution of the power that would have been available to them had they 
formed a more united front. As a result, when it came to presenting their own 
class appeal, stokers invariably lost out to much smaller branches. The 
perverse method of branch representation which gave the Coopers’ branch with 
212 men a single representative on the Naval Personnel Committee when 
30,000 stokers had none is a good example of the way in which the Admiralty 
stifled the stokers’ voice. The lack of direct representation ensured stokers 
remained firmly fixed to the bottom rung of the lower-deck hierarchical ladder.   


























 Chapter Six 
 
Emerging Technologies: oil fuel and submarines 
 
If the introduction of the water-tube boiler could be considered to have 
been one of the most technical challenges that faced the late nineteenth century 
Navy, then the introduction of oil-fuel and the development of submarines would 
further challenge the Navy during the early decades of the twentieth century. 
Like all new innovations, these technologies entered service slowly and were 
not without their detractors. Oil fuel offered many advantages, although there 
were many in the Navy who looked on the demise of coal as a backward step in 
much the same way that the breech-loading gun and the introduction of steam 
propulsion had been similarly resisted. Nevertheless, the Admiralty began 
investigations into the possibilities of using oil-fuel from the late 1890s and 
continued with trials throughout the first decade of the twentieth century with 
increasing confidence and success with the new fuel. However, while oil-fuel 
was simply an advance on the technology that already existed, the advent of 
submarines was a completely new technology for which there was no prior 
knowledge or experience.  
 
Each of these developments will be discussed in turn. The purpose of 
this chapter is not to give a comprehensive history of the introduction of oil-fuel 
and submarines but to analyse how these developments affected stokers in 
their everyday lives and to determine whether they made any material 
difference with regards to their position within the lower-deck hierarchy or their 
relationships with seamen. Throughout the coal-firing era the coal-dust and filth 
which was an unfortunate by-product arising from coaling ship together with the 
residues left by the soot that was ejected from the funnels was a constant 
source of irritation to the seamen who had to clean it up. While illogical, seamen 
and others appeared to have vented their anger towards stokers for this mess, 
as after all, it was the stokers who actually used the coal. In addition, the 
routines that became established whereby seamen would 'help-out' stokers in 
the coal-bunkers when they were hard pushed to cope together with the 
procedure which required seamen to undertake a qualification in working in the 
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stokehole as a precursor to achieving promotion to leading seaman; also added 
to the animosity between the two branches.  
 
The introduction of oil-fuel should have radically improved the quality of 
life for all those onboard. In particular, it should have improved the working 
conditions for stokers and done much to repair the broken relationships that 
existed between seamen and stokers. However, while oil-firing brought some 
improvements for stokers it also disadvantaged them to an extent while it 
appears to have done little to elevate their lowly position within the lower-deck 




When Churchill became First Lord of the Admiralty in 1911, coal was still 
the primary source of power for naval vessels, although the mixed-firing method 
of spraying oil on coal in order to increase combustion was routine for most 
navies by the early 1900s. In the Royal Navy, Admiral Fisher boasted that he 
was regarded as an ‘oil maniac’ by some of his contemporaries through his 
campaign to introduce oil into the fleet from as early as 1885. 610 However, while 
Fisher and Churchill were instrumental in pushing through the change from coal 
to oil, Fisher appeared to be more interested in adopting the heavy oil internal 
combustion engine for propulsion, than he was for oil-firing steam boilers. 
 
 The noted naval constructor and historian D. K. Brown suggested that 
up to the late 1890s the Admiralty carried out a few experiments with oil fuel but 
appeared content to monitor developments elsewhere.611 This was unsurprising 
as the Navy had access to Welsh steam coal which was regarded as the best 
steam coal in the world, together with well established strategic coaling stations 
to supply all of its needs. In addition, Britain did not at that time have access to 
a guaranteed supply of oil. Therefore there did not appear to be any economic 
or strategic reason to immediately abandon coal for oil.   
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The destroyer Surly was converted to oil fuel and trials were conducted 
in 1898-99 although they were disappointing. One of the benefits of oil was its 
higher calorific value, however this gain could not be realised in the Surly due to 
incomplete evaporation of the oil which caused large amounts of smoke. In 
order to overcome this problem the Navy utilised several experimental ships 
and shore-side plants to trial different methods of atomising oil in order to gain a 
higher evaporation rate including the use of steam and compressed air. Better 
mixing of air in an oil spray was achieved through use of a slotted cone nozzle 
which gave higher rates of combustion together with excellent economy and an 
absence of black smoke. By 1903, the training of engineer officers and ratings 
was extended to cover oil burning.612 The oil used in the Royal Navy was 
furnace fuel oil (F.F.O.) which was the consistency of treacle; and required pre-
heating through steam heaters in order to reduce its viscosity before it was 
admitted to the sprayers.613 Alan Ereira incorrectly stated that the Navy of 1931 
ran on diesel oil, whereas F.F.O. was still in use in the late 1960s until the last 
few ships were converted to burn diesel oil.614  
 
The most obvious benefit of an oil-fired ship was the fact that it could 
maintain a constant high speed until the oil ran out. An often overlooked aspect 
of the coal-fired era was that regardless of a ship’s laid down design speed, the 
maximum speed it could achieve was entirely dependent on the strength, skill 
and stamina of its stokers, together with the quality and amount of coal in its 
bunkers. Moreover, for a coal-fired ship to sustain a high speed for any 
appreciable length of time, the stokers firing the boilers would require to be 
relieved at regular intervals while seamen had to be drafted in from the upper-
deck in order to supplement the stokers trimming the coal-bunkers.   
 
This was why chapter one alluded to the dubious practice of using 
specially selected stokers and hand-picked, best quality coal, for initial full 
power trials in order to ensure that the ship met its design requirements. While 
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satisfying the Admiralty and the shipyard, this practice would have given a 
completely false indication of the normal steaming ability of the ship. When 
using an average complement of stokers working under stress or tropical heat 
and with poor quality coal, the ship would not have been be able to replicate or 
attain for any length of time, the speed reached during its initial full power trials.     
 
From the Admiralty’s perspective, one of the greatest savings through 
the introduction of oil fuel was the cost saving in personnel. As an example, the 
Lion, a 70,000 shaft horsepower, coal-fired battle-cruiser, fitted with forty-two 
Yarrow boilers, required 608 engine room personnel. By comparison, the oil 
fired Hood was able to produce 144,000 s.h.p. in twenty-four boilers with only 
306 engine room personnel.615 In addition, more oil than coal could be carried in 
a given space, while a ship burning oil fuel could steam a good knot and a half 
faster than one fuelled by coal due to its higher calorific value.   
 
The introduction of the Queen Elizabeth class battleships in 1913 which 
were designed from the outset to burn oil fuel finally signalled the Royal Navy’s 
intention to switch from coal to oil-fuel with all the attendant benefits that oil had 
over coal. However, the changeover was not without its critics, for a decade 
after 1920 a debate raged within the Navy over the decision to abandon coal 
firing. 
 
While accepting that oil had major operational benefits over coal, it was 
suggested that when it came to fuelling-ship, ‘coaling provided healthy exercise 
for the individual’ and was a ‘first class drill’ for the ship’s company as a 
whole.616  The reference to the supposed benefits of ‘coaling ship’, were a 
recurring theme in letters to the editor of the Naval Review during the 1930’s. 
Another correspondent remarked that the training derived from coaling ship 
both in seamanship and hardship, ‘was a worthy successor to the old training in 
sail.'  Furthermore, this writer suggested that the handling and stoking of coal 
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was rapidly becoming ‘a lost art, an art for which the opening of a few taps and 
valves was a poor and sorry substitute.’617   
 
From the rather blasé manner in which the real hardships of coaling ship 
were downplayed it could be assumed that these particular officers were either 
so senior that they had forgotten the deprivations involved or they were 
relatively new to the service and therefore had little real experience. Be that as 
it may, the concerted effort from a small number of backward looking officers to 
return the Navy to coal-firing was doomed to failure in the face of progress in 
much the same way that those who opposed the introduction of the breech 
loading gun and the steam engine also failed.  
 
With the introduction of the new fuel, the Admiralty foresaw the 
requirement for a new type of stoker. This resulted in the idea that the Admiralty 
wished to recruit ‘stokers with brains’.’ 618 As a result recruiting officers were 
instructed to be careful that no man who appeared ‘dull-witted or unintelligent’ 
was entered for service.619  
 
The benefits which arose from the change to oil firing were immediate 
and extremely favourable for stokers serving in oil fuelled ships. Stoker Richard 
Rose served most of his service in coal burners and had been very nearly 
crushed to death in a coal-bunker on the Irresistible while coaling ship. Rose 
noted the contrast between coal and oil by observing, ‘you could go down the 
stokehole in an oil fired ship in your Sunday best clothes and wouldn’t get dirty.’   
 
On the other hand, there were still some dirty tasks reserved for stokers. 
One of these was cleaning out oil fuel tanks. Rose recalled that whenever he 
was tasked with this chore he had to strip off his clothes and put on a thin 
‘mackintosh, all in one suit’, but he was not allowed to wear any shoes or boots. 
The job entailed cleaning the sediment and sludge out of the bottom of the tank 
and passing it up in buckets to be disposed of ashore. After a couple of days 
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standing barefoot in oily sludge he remembered that his feet would feel, 
‘wonderful-just like a ballet dancers.’620   
 
This experience was shared by stoker Ken Clarke who served in the 
Hood prior to the Second World War. Clarke was a member of the ship’s 
‘double-bottom’ party responsible for cleaning all Hood’s tanks and bilges for 
which he earned an extra sixpence per day. When cleaning the oil tanks the 
men were issued with a rubber suit and clogs. However, because the suits 
‘always leaked’, Clarke and the rest of the double-bottom party preferred to 
dispense with them altogether and clean the tanks completely naked.621   
 
With the advent of oil-firing the term ‘stokehole’ gradually gave way to 
‘boiler-room.’ As a fourth class E.R.A. William Bruty was in charge of the 
machinery in one of the boiler rooms of the Argus, the world’s first flush-decked 
aircraft carrier. Argus had originally been laid down as the Italian liner Conte 
Rosso but was purchased by the Admiralty and converted while still on the 
stocks, which probably accounts for her being designed from the outset to burn 
only oil-fuel of which she carried 2,000 tons. While Bruty looked after the 
maintenance of the boiler-room machinery, a S.P.O. and several stokers under 
the charge of a chief stoker were responsible for steaming the boilers.   
 
The speed ordered by a ship’s telegraphs determined how many 
sprayers needed to be in operation for each boiler. If a ship was steady 
steaming there was little to do for the boiler room crew other than monitor the 
boiler water levels and maintain the required steam pressure and temperature; 
this allowed time for other jobs such as cleaning or maintenance. However, if a 
ship was manoeuvring, particularly on entering or leaving harbour, the boiler 
room would become a veritable hive of activity. In the oil-fired Hood, steam 
pressure was maintained by a chief stoker who controlled steam to the boiler 
room fans with one hand while the other controlled the steam supply to the oil 
fuel pumps that served the sprayers. At the same time, a close watch had to be 
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kept through a periscope on the ship’s funnels, in order to check that the boilers 
were not making any smoke.   
 
In order to inform the boiler front stokers which sprayers were required, 
the chief stoker needed to be able to communicate with them. However, the 
noise and pressure of the fans supplying air for combustion made normal 
conversation in any boiler-room impossible. Therefore, a crude boiler room sign 
language was required. Engineer Lieutenant Le Bailly remembered that on the 
Hood, one particular chief stoker used to gain the attention of the boiler front 
stokers by banging an empty shell case with a spanner. Having gained their 
attention, the chief stoker then became a sort of ‘orchestral conductor’, waving 
his hands and using his fingers to indicate which sprayers he wished putting on 
or taking off.622   
 
Because the early type of oil from Venezuela or Trinidad was often 
contaminated with sand and other sediments it regularly blocked the fine cone 
nozzles. E.R.A. Bruty remembered that cleaning sprayer nozzles was a 
‘constant task’ during the First World War, however this could be described as 
‘light work’ compared to the coal era.623     
 
Having joined the Navy in 1910, James Dunn served in coal-burners until 
1916, thereafter he only served in oil fuelled ships. He recalled periods of 
concern for his safety during the First World War when he was serving in the 
destroyer leader Gabriel where he had charge of two boilers with thirteen 
sprayers on each. The young stoker who was ‘sprayer-punching’ for him was 
straight out of a factory in Bristol and therefore very new to the service and also 
very frightened while down below. At full power the stoker had to use a short 
ladder to reach the top-most sprayers on the boiler and Dunn remembered that 
with all thirteen sprayers on each boiler, the air in the boiler room literally 
‘roared’; while they both waited to be ‘blown sky high’ at any minute.624 
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In 1926 Dunn found himself for the second time in his career serving in 
the Hood. As one of Hood’s eleven chief stokers, Dunn was given responsibility 
for all aspects of the ship’s fuel system including fuelling the ship and cleaning 
and painting the ship’s double-bottom spaces. He recalled one particular 
fuelling evolution when taking on fuel from a tanker alongside just prior to 
proceeding to sea. This was to have been a ‘top-up’ fuelling which only required 
Dunn to take in ‘a few tons’ to ensure every tank in the ship was fully topped-up. 
Unfortunately, his team of stokers were not quick enough in changing over 
tanks, and with the tanker’s pumps delivering 500 tons an hour, a tank was 
overfilled causing it to gush oil out of the vent pipe all over Hood’s sparkling 
wooden decks, in full view of the bridge.625 For this misdemeanour, Dunn 
received a caution from the captain. Stoker Frederick Groves recalled a similar 
incident on a destroyer when a tank was overfilled flooding the stokers’ mess 
with ‘thick oil the consistency of treacle’, which required several days to clean 
up.626 
 
However, not all stokers immediately benefited from the changeover to 
oil firing. Stoker Sydney Greenwood joined the Navy in early 1935 at a time 
when just about every ship in the fleet had been built or converted to burn oil-
fuel. Prior to joining the Navy Greenwood had worked for a number of years in a 
steam laundry and thought he was ‘cut out for a stoker’s life.’ By this period, the 
Navy had abandoned coal training for new stokers and Greenwood was trained 
solely in oil firing procedures and fully expected to join an oil-fired ship. 
Unfortunately, on completing his training Greenwood was drafted to one of the 
last remaining coal burners in the Navy, the small coastal survey ship Flinders. 
By his own estimation, Greenwood was a small, undernourished and physically 
weak individual on entering the service. On entry he was just five feet six inches 
tall, although he remembered that the recruiter entered his height on his service 
papers as being five feet seven.627   
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Greenwood’s first watch in the Flinders was spent as a trimmer dragging 
coal out of the bunker for the stokers who were firing. However, it quickly 
became apparent that he lacked the physical strength to undertake stokehole 
duties. Greenwood was unable to lift the ninety pound slice, let alone use it to 
break up the clinker in the furnace. At his first unsuccessful attempt at cleaning 
the fire the leading stoker picked the slice up one handed and did the job 
himself.628 After a few watches Greenwood was taken out of the watch-bill and 
put on ‘day-work’ duties which involved cleaning the ‘stand-by’ boiler and 
getting the ashes up from the stokehole and ditching them over the ship’s side. 
Then again, even this relatively light task was almost beyond him, reflecting in 
his memoirs that he struggled with the bucket of ashes which weighed nearly a 
hundredweight.   
 
Nevertheless, despite having failed to make the grade in the stokehole, 
Greenwood passed the examination for stoker first class and was rated up after 
completing nine months service. However, after only eleven months serving in 
the Flinders and with no appreciable improvement in his physical stature or 
ability to undertake a stoker’s duties in the stokehole, Greenwood was returned 
to barracks as being ‘unsuitable for a coal-fired ship.’ Unfortunately, this meant 
he was reverted back to stoker second class, leaving Greenwood to claim that 
he was the only stoker in the Navy to have been reduced in rank from the lowly 
position of first class stoker to second class stoker.629  
 
While the change to oil firing dramatically improved working conditions 
for stokers by eliminating the hated coal dust, toil and filth, it actually 
exacerbated the heat in the boiler and engine rooms because oil-fired boilers 
allowed much higher steam operating pressures and temperatures. Moreover, 
as Le Bailly noted, Royal Navy steam pipe lagging techniques, heat removal 
practices, and steam pipe jointing materials had not kept pace, therefore, steam 
leaks were frequent which raised the heat below to intolerable levels. Le Bailly, 
observed that in the oil-fired Hood the heat and humidity generated below which 
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had always been bad during coal firing had worsened, ‘so that heat stroke and 
exhaustion were common.’630  
 
The Red Sea, long the scourge of stokers during the heyday of coal-firing, 
continued to claim victims to heat exhaustion towards the end of the Second 
World War in oil-fired ships. In 1944, Le Bailly then a lieutenant commander (E) 
was serving in the battleship Duke of York, a ship not quite four years old. 
During her passage through the Red Sea in order to join the American Pacific 
Fleet, Le Bailly commented that the Duke of York’s young stokers ‘dropped like 
flies’ in the machinery spaces through excessive heat. Apart from the myriads of 
steam leaks and the poor ventilation and heat removal systems, the most 
serious problem previously alluded to in chapter two, was that of salt deficiency 
through excessive sweating. Le Bailly noted that despite being sent to the 
Pacific theatre, the ship’s surgeon commander was unable to procure any salt 
tablets for the engineering department before sailing from England or from 
Malta during the ship’s brief stop-over.631 
 
The heat situation became so dire that Le Bailly had to organise a party 
of older stokers, led by a ‘burly S.P.O.’ to extricate the victims of heat stroke out 
of the boiler rooms and into the air locks where they could be revived until they 
were able to return to duty or carried to the sick bay or their mess-decks to 
recover. Due to a general shortage of manpower in the Navy at the time, the 
ship had sailed from England with an under complement of stokers, moreover, 
the majority were inexperienced through being either ‘hostilities only’ or very 
young and straight out of training. Nonetheless, the sudden loss of so many 
stokers to heat stroke caused serious manning problems. Le Bailly described 
how he found himself on watch in one particular boiler room with only the chief 
stoker and a S.P.O. water tender, all the stokers of the watch having collapsed 
and been evacuated with no spare hands available to relieve them.  
 
Using his knowledge and experience from earlier days on coal-fired ships, 
Le Bailly overcame his manning problem by implementing the paragraph in 
                                            




K.R.s & A.I.s which allowed marines to be employed and paid as stokers, noting 
in his memoirs that ‘Royal Marines and stokers had always got on well together.’ 
With approval from the Marine Major, the marines, being older and vastly more 
experienced than Duke of York’s young stoker complement, took to the job with 
relish and soon became proficient at ‘sprayer punching.’  By the time the ship 
reached Colombo the stokers had mostly recovered with Le Bailly noting that 
the marines ‘fairly gloated over their inflated pay packets.’632       
   
Despite the fact that Duke of York and her sisters in the class were 
relatively new ships they lacked the contemporary design, build and modern 
machinery of the American ships in the Pacific fleet; particularly with regards to 
insulation, the jointing of steam piping and the provision of air conditioning in 
working and living spaces. Le Bailly recounted the feelings of a United States 
Navy engineer from the Missouri who swapped duties with an engineer from the 
King George V. The American engineer was said to have described his time on 
the British ship as ‘the nearest thing to hell’ he had experienced, noting with 
horror that ‘the steam seemed to be mostly outside the pipes.’633 Due to the 
number and severity of the steam leaks which plagued Duke of York, replacing 
lost boiler feed water was a continuous problem. This was compounded by salt-
water contamination from leaking condensers which meant that steam that had 
been used in the turbines and condensed back into feed water could not be re-
circulated back to the boilers.   
 
These two problems meant that water for drinking and washing purposes 
was always severely rationed onboard Duke of York because the first priority for 
water distilled by the ship’s evaporators (which also suffered from salt water 
contamination) was to replace boiler feed water. The imposition of water 
rationing only added to the discomfort and ill-health of the ship’s company who 
suffered from ‘prickly heat’ in poorly ventilated compartments and mess-decks 
devoid of any kind of air-conditioning.634 The poor ventilation in this relatively 
modern ship caused Le Bailly to remark that British pre-war warship ventilation 
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was ‘disgracefully primitive’, and ‘a blot on the naval constructors and civilian 
engineers’ in the respective naval design departments at Bath.635  
 
In conclusion, the change from coal to oil firing had obvious benefits to 
every member of a ship’s company. The hated and physically demanding task 
of coaling ship together with its associated filth and the collective effort required 
to clean it out from every corner of the ship was gone forever. The interval 
between refuelling and the higher calorific value of oil over coal gave ships extra 
speed and extended time at sea while it only took a handful of stokers and a 
chief stoker a few hours to fill up the fuel tanks instead of involving the whole 
ship’s company in a full days labour. Down below, there was no longer any 
requirement for stokers to risk their lives in the dangerous atmosphere of 
unventilated coal bunkers while the physical effort of moving over two tons of 
coal each watch was also removed at a stroke. In its place came the relatively 
easy job of ‘sprayer punching’, a job that required little physical effort and none 
of the skill that was required in firing a coal-fired boiler.   
 
However, there was one aspect of life for stokers working in the new 
‘boiler-rooms’ as the old stokehole was termed which did not improve with oil 
firing. As Lee Bailey argued, the higher steam temperatures and pressures 
available with oil firing increased the already high temperatures in the 
machinery spaces causing more incidents of heat related illnesses amongst 
men working in them than were probably caused through coal firing. The rise in 
temperature was exacerbated by poor design and construction of British steam 
systems and fittings which saw the Royal Navy lag far behind the United States 
Navy in this respect. These issues would come to a head late in the Second 
World War when the new British Pacific Fleet struggled to undertake its duties 
in a theatre of operations which required ships to steam vast distances and 
maintain operational capability for several months without shore based support.    
 
Even when the numbers of stokers in the Navy exceeded those of the 
seamen branch for a brief period of time in 1914, stokers were never able to 
compete with the seaman branch nor were they able improve their standing 
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within the Navy. Oil fired ships required far less stokers than those fired by coal, 
therefore, as their numbers began to dwindle so did any hope of stokers ever 
competing with seamen on an even footing. Moreover, whatever officers or 
other men of the lower-deck thought privately about the character of stokers it 
could not be denied that during the coal firing era their fortitude and endurance 
in steaming a ship purely by their own personal skill and strength was a much 
admired trait. However, the advent of oil-firing appeared to remove much of the 
aura that had surrounded the man at the furnace front thereby further 
diminishing the standing of stokers in the Navy. From this point onwards, 
stokers were regarded as mere unskilled ‘mechanics’ rather than the skilled 
firemen of the coal-firing days. 
 
The Submarine Service 
 
The launching of Holland 'boat number one' at Barrow in Furness in 1901 
was something more than the introduction of new technology. Submarines were 
an entirely new concept in naval warfare and in the beginning the Admiralty, not 
unnaturally, had virtually no knowledge or experience with regards to the 
strategic value that submarines would offer later on in their development. This 
second half of the chapter will examine the part stokers played in the fledgling 
submarine service noting the differences in the terms and conditions of service 
between the submarine service and the surface fleet which hereafter will be 
termed general service (G.S.). The chapter will show that despite its best 
attempts, the Admiralty failed to prevent submarines from becoming an 
autonomous service within its own right. Had it succeeded, the Admiralty would 
undoubtedly have operated submarines under the same social and service 
conditions that existed in G.S. However, from the beginning, submariners 
recognised that the new service demanded different regimes from those 
imposed in G.S., therefore, they started from a 'clean-sheet' and developed  
new routines to suit their particular type of work. There was no social hierarchy 
in the submarine service, every officer and man shared the same discomforts, 
deprivations and danger. Therefore, the old animosities that existed in G.S. that 
portrayed the stoker as the 'lowest of the low' were left behind and stokers 
became fully accepted into the service.   
240 
 
While water rationing was an occasional problem in G.S. it was an 
accepted fact of life in the submarine service. S.P.O. Ridley served in H32 one 
of the ‘H’ class submarines which he regarded as ‘by far the most popular class 
among submarine crews.’636  The ‘H’ class served with the submarine service 
between 1915 and 1945 making them the longest serving type of submarine in 
the history of the Navy. Nonetheless, it is difficult to see why they were so 
popular considering the very basic comforts available for their crews. Ridley, 
noted the complete absence of any living accommodation for the men in H32, 
although officers shared a very small wardroom.   
 
H32 had only two bunks onboard, one was reserved for the Captain and 
one for the [Coxn] (Coxswain, the senior Chief Petty Officer seaman). However, 
Ridley stated that neither bunk was ever used for sleeping ‘on principle.’ Instead 
they became general stowage areas for oilskins and other ‘junk.’637  The chief 
and petty officers (including three E.R.As) messed at a temporary table in the 
‘fore-ends’ (the forward compartment of the boat) which would be rigged 
between the torpedo racks. Interestingly, and in comparison to life in the surface 
fleet,  Ridley observed that this was ‘the only time in the history of the Navy 
when E.R.As did not have their own mess.’   
 
The sleeping arrangements on H32 were equally as crude. Ridley noted 
that when men were ‘off watch’ and required sleep the ‘fore-ends’ table was 
unrigged and they slept on the deck, ‘wearing their overcoats and ‘lying like 
puppy dogs in a pile to keep warm.’ Ridley, however, preferred the warmth of 
the engine room and always slept fully clothed on the deck plates behind the 
main engines on a bed of cotton waste.638 Cooking was conducted in the motor 
room where the electric motor was sited. However, the only item of cooking 
equipment he identified was a two gallon electric urn which supplied hot water 
for making tea and for heating up tins of soup. It is probable that the men lived 
off tinned rations and very unlikely that any real cooking was completed while 
the boat was at sea.   
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Harry Masters was born in East Ham, London in 1909, eldest of eight 
children. His father worked as a stoker on the boilers of the local gas works. 
Their home was a two-up-two-down privately rented house until they were 
bombed out by a German Zeppelin during the First World War. Masters was 
obviously a bright boy; he left school in standard seven at the age of fourteen 
having been awarded a scholarship to a grammar school. However, there was 
insufficient money to allow him to continue his schooling and he was forced to 
find a job. Masters obtained work as a plumber and painter and decorator but 
became bored and with work scarce, he decided to join the Navy.639 
 
After arriving at Chatham barracks Masters began military drill straight 
away in his civilian clothes until he was issued with his kit two weeks later. From 
the outset Masters wanted to be trained as a stoker, not a seaman. His first ship 
was a minesweeper followed by a destroyer; however, Masters did not 
appreciate the strict discipline he found in general service so he volunteered to 
join submarines. While the less formal routine and more relaxed discipline of 
submarines was the initial attraction, the extra submarine pay was also a 
consideration in his decision to volunteer. Masters quickly found that while there 
was less evidence of formal discipline within the submarine service, it was 
replaced with a greater emphasis on self-discipline.640 
 
Masters first boat was the Phoenix which he joined in 1930. There were 
a small number of bunks onboard although Masters preferred to sleep in a 
hammock. Food at sea was ‘iron rations’ but the men bought their own food 
from the Navy, Army, and Air Force Institute (NAAFI) onboard the submarine 
depot ship prior to going to sea. Masters acted as the caterer for twenty-two 
men. He recalled that he wore nothing else but overalls while at sea and, 
because water was constantly rationed there was no means of ‘dhobying’ his 
clothes, therefore he never bothered to take his overalls off, even when 
sleeping.641   
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In the beginning, the fledgling submarine service was not such an 
attractive proposition. The Admiralty’s first call for volunteers in 1901 met with a 
disappointing response from the lower-deck. Only sufficient men to crew the 
first three of the five ‘Holland’ boats came forward, forcing the Admiralty to 
compulsory draft men from the battleship Jupiter in order to man boat number 
four and five for their respective sea trials in 1902.642 All Royal Navy 
submarines are traditionally referred to as ‘boats’ after the first submarine was 
launched as ‘His Majesty’s Submarine Boat Number One’ at Barrow in Furness 
in October 1901. Boat Number One was the first of a class of five Holland boats 
which were American designed but British built.   
 
In order to make service in submarines appear more attractive a decision 
was taken in the early days of the service to foster a less formal working 
environment on board both submarines and depot ships where discipline and 
dress codes were relaxed to a point that would never have been tolerated in 
general service.643  Another inducement was the introduction in 1903 of ‘hard 
lying’ pay for service in submarines. Extra pay had previously been granted to 
crews of torpedo boat destroyers (T.B.D.s) in the 1880s. In the beginning, 
T.B.Ds like submarines, were considered experimental, dangerous, and had 
virtually no living accommodation or facilities for the crews hence the term 
‘hard-lying.’  However, once the novelty of torpedo boats wore off, service in 
them was regarded as no more onerous than serving in any other ship and the 
Admiralty withdrew the extra ‘hard lying’ pay.644   
 
Submarine pay effectively doubled a man’s pay. The basic pay for a 
stoker in 1906 was 2 shillings a day; in addition as a submariner he received a 
further two shillings submarine pay, taking his earnings to four shillings a day. A 
stoker serving in general service earned two shillings four pence and a 
halfpenny while an able seaman earned one shilling eleven pence and a 
halfpenny. Therefore, a stoker drawing submarine pay would have been very 
well off compared to his contemporaries in general service. Lambert argued that 
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the Admiralty never intended for submarine pay to become a permanent feature 
of the service and expected that once the novelty of submarines was over it 
would be able to withdraw it as it had done with T.B.D. ‘hard lying’ pay.645  
However, as Lambert noted, numbers of volunteers for submarines among the 
lower-deck failed to come forward in sufficient quantities, while there was a real 
fear that removal of ‘hard lying’ pay would lead to an exodus of the most 
experienced and best trained men from the new service. Therefore, the 
Admiralty was forced to accept that the extra payment for service in submarines 
would become a permanent feature of the service.    
 
Submarine conditions of service 
 
While submarine pay was an obvious attraction for some men, the 
attrition rate had a negative effect on others. Tom Clayton noted in Sea Wolves, 
that in light of the losses of submarines ‘requesting a transfer to submarines 
was an odd decision to make.’646 Between 1901 and 1945 Britain lost twenty-
four boats during peacetime and 142 during the two world wars. Another reason 
why men were reluctant to volunteer for submarines was the limitation on the 
length of time a man could spend in the submarine service before being 
compulsorily returned to G.S.  Article 98 of the Naval Drafting Regulations 
limited this time to five years after which time a man had to be returned to G.S. 
for a minimum period of two years in order to qualify for promotion.647 On 
completion of the two years hiatus a man could request to return to the 
submarine service for his final three years service after which time he was no 
longer able to serve in submarines. This restriction was a ploy by the Admiralty 
designed to prevent submarines from becoming a specialised and autonomous 
service in its own right. The Admiralty also proposed that the term ‘service in 
submarines’ should be used rather than ‘submarine service’ which it thought 
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‘might convey the erroneous impression that submarines formed a separate 
service.’648         
 
The Admiralty’s strategy to prevent submarines from becoming a 
separate service failed for a number of reasons. In the first place, submariners 
required highly specialised training together with the ability and skill to 
undertake a wide range of duties outside their main branch specialisation. For 
example, stokers were expected to take a turn on the helm or diving planes and 
in later boats would form part of a submarine’s surfaced gun crew. Similarly, 
seamen were trained to operate electrical switchboards and expected to have a 
working knowledge of a submarine’s diving arrangements and air and hydraulic 
systems. While these individual attributes undoubtedly existed within the fleet, 
there was no ‘cross-training’ among branches such as existed in submarines. In 
G.S. service men operated strictly within the confines of their own branch with 
clear lines of demarcation that could not be crossed.  
 
In addition, volunteers for submarines had to be prepared to endure the 
not inconsiderable physical hardships such as those vividly described by Stoker 
Ridley in H32. While lower-deck living conditions in the fleet were basic in the 
extreme they could be described as somewhat luxurious when compared to 
those that existed in submarines. Finally, the close confines of a submarine 
forced officers and men to share the work, discomforts, and danger equally. 
This shared lifestyle generated mutual trust and respect and allowed 
relationships to develop between officers, senior ratings and men that would not 
have been possible in G.S. In the fleet, branch rivalry, class differences and the 
hierarchical social division that divided every part of the service ensured that 
officers and men remained separate at all levels forming barriers between them 
that could not be breached.   
 
The Admiralty’s plan to restrict the amount of time a man could serve in 
submarines eventually backfired, exposing a flaw in the regulations that had not 
been considered when the maximum term of service was originally set. When 
the reserve fleet was mobilised for the 1920 summer fleet exercises there was a 
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requirement for reservists to man submarines. However, many of the reservists 
called up for submarine service were men who had completed their five years in 
the submarine service and had then been compulsorily drafted back to G.S. 
Rear Admiral (S) (submarines) informed the Admiralty that ‘nearly all ex-
submarine ratings called up from G.S. stated that they were no longer 
volunteers to serve further periods in submarines.’649 These men refused further 
service in submarines claiming (rightly) that they had completed their submarine 
liability and were no longer ‘volunteers.’ The Admiralty reluctantly accepted the 
status quo and ordered all men who refused further service in submarines to be 
drafted to various ships in the reserve fleet.650 
 
The Admiralty informed Rear Admiral (S) that only volunteers were to be 
re-entered into the submarine service in view of: 
 
(a) The great development of the Submarine Service 
(b) Its present requirements 
(c) Its increased safety 
(d) The fact that reserves for the Submarine Service were now required, and 
(e) The uncertainty of optional service651 
 
Nonetheless, the Admiralty planned to modify the optional (voluntary) 
nature of service in submarines until such service became ‘as much a normal 
part of naval duties as service in destroyers.’ As part of this strategy it planned 
to withdraw the optional element of service in submarines once an officer or 
man had volunteered and entered the service, leaving the arrangements for a 
return to G.S. on similar lines to those already existing.652 In response to this 
proposal Admiral (S) accepted that any officer or man serving in a capital ship 
should have been capable, at any moment, of undertaking any duty in a 
destroyer, even though he may not have previously served in one. However, he 
argued the same could not be said of a submarine while he also thought it 
unlikely that this would ever change.653 
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It was also pointed out to the Admiralty that in the voluntary submarine 
service the worst punishment a man could receive was to be sent back to G.S. 
consequently a very high standard of morale existed within submarines. On this 
basis, it was felt that any form of compulsory service in submarines would 
ultimately interfere with the efficiency of the service.654   
 
    Lambert noted that the rapid expansion of the submarine service 
between 1906 and 1910 helped to foster the spirit of an exclusive service. 
Because of the need for additional crews to man the increased numbers of 
boats being built there was a need to retain experienced personnel within the 
service. This meant that officers and men got to know each other extremely well 
as they often worked side by side for many years, whereas it was the custom in 
G.S. to change at least twenty percent of a ship’s company each year.655   
 
In order to foster team spirit, submariners were encouraged to use the 
football pitches that had been laid out for them close by the depot ships on 
shore which, as Lambert observed, had the dual purpose of also improving the 
mens’ health. Leave was normally granted at four o’clock in the afternoon and, 
because the first boats were based in Portsmouth the crews were drawn from 
that home port, therefore they benefited by being able to go home most 
nights.656  Lambert speculated that submarine pay attracted married men to the 
service, particularly those of the higher specialisations, although equally the 
extra pay may have encouraged submariners to marry earlier than they would 
have contemplated had they been serving in G.S. 
 
The fact that the early submarines were based in Portsmouth obviously 
attracted many Portsmouth ratings to join the submarine service; however, the 
same could not be said for Devonport men. A 1924 Admiralty minute noted that 
‘the unwillingness of Devonport men to serve in submarines had always existed.’  
The minute suggested that it was ‘notorious’ that west country men were very 
loathe to leave the west, reasoning that as the Devonport division was so 
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remote from other ports, men for domestic reasons would not join a service 
which involved a continued absence from the west country.657 The reluctance of 
Devonport men to man Portsmouth based submarines replicates the manning 
pattern of the Chatham based ship Lancaster discussed earlier in chapter two 
which had a large number of men from the south-east regions but very few men 
from Portsmouth or Devonport.  
 
One man who had contemplated marriage was Leading Stoker John 
Steel. Steel had served in the armoured cruise Minotaur during the Battle of 
Jutland after which he volunteered for service in submarines in the autumn of 
1916. However, on joining the submarine service in December 1916, Steel was 
forced to relinquish his leading stoker rate which he had held for six years and 
revert back to stoker first class. This was a submarine practice designed to 
ensure that all men on entering the submarine service learned from the ‘bottom 
up.’  Steel noted in his memoirs that, ‘this was the normal procedure in those 
days.’658 However, by reverting to stoker first class, Steel found himself six 
pence per day worse off in his daily pay which dropped from two shillings and 
ten pence per day to two shillings and four pence a day (1912 pay scales), 
although his submarine pay still effectively doubled his money.   
 
The regulation which stripped Steel of his leading stoker’s rate was 
abolished in 1927 when it became clear that too many submarine leading 
stokers were leaving the service to undertake the mechanical training course 
which qualified them for mechanician training. In order to replace these men the 
Admiralty decided that the submarine service would accept a number of 
confirmed leading stokers direct from G.S. giving precedence to those who had 
already completed their first period in submarines. In order to ensure that these 
men were fully capable of integrating into the service they were given an 
extended and more intensive submarine training course to prepare them for 
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their duties; as a result they were not required to revert to stoker first class.659 
After initial submarine training at Fort Blockhouse Portsmouth, Steel was 
drafted to the newly built boat K-1 then fitting out in Portsmouth dockyard. He 
noted that unlike previous classes of boats, the ‘K’-Class were ‘self contained’ 
and the crew were expected to live onboard permanently.660 
 
The oil burning ‘K’ Class submarines 
 
The ‘K’ class submarine was designed to operate with the Grand Fleet in 
the role of a ‘fleet-submarine’, to which end the class was fitted with two oil-
fuelled boilers and a twin set of steam turbines. This novel design enabled the 
class to achieve twenty-four knots surface speed in order to keep up with the 
fleet, while a diesel-generator arrangement could re-charge the battery or drive 
the electric motor on the surface in an emergency. When dived, the class had a 
limited under-water endurance of one hour at full speed on the battery. Because 
of their exceptional size and much improved habitability, ‘K’ boats were the first 
submarines where the crews were expected to live permanently onboard. 
Unusually, while the boats had two large electric cookers, one situated in the 
officers bunk space aft of the torpedo room and one in the motor room for the 
men, they also had a coal-fired range located in the after part of the conning 
tower with an adjacent coal store which held two-tonnes of coal.   
 
While the design of the ‘K’ class was innovative and they achieved their 
surfaced design speed, the operational concept of integrating large submarines 
with the fleet in a traditional naval line-ahead formation was blatantly flawed. 
Unfortunately, this was proven during the ill-fated Grand Fleet exercise EC1 in 
January 1918 when five ‘K’ boats of the 13th Submarine Flotilla sailed from 
Rosyth in line-ahead formation sandwiched between battlecruisers and other 
elements of the Grand Fleet.661   
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As the fleet was passing the Isle of May in the middle of the Firth of Forth 
at twenty one knots, a series of five separate collisions occurred resulting in the 
loss of two ‘K’ boats and 104 officers and men. The events of this exercise have 
become known by the unfortunate title of the ‘Battle of May Island' and forever 
condemned the ‘K’ class as dangerous or ‘unlucky’ boats.  
 
The noted submarine expert, Richard Compton-Hall Submarines at War 
1914-1918, titled his chapter on K-class submarines, ‘K for catastrophe’ while 
referring to the boats as the ‘calamitous K class.’662 In addition, Compton-Hall 
observed that the boats were universally disliked and that officers and men who 
served in them were known collectively as the ‘suicide club.’663 Yet, despite the 
poor reputation of these boats, both in contemporary service and in the view of 
historians such as Compton-Hall et-al, the K-class remained popular in the 
memory of many of their crews. 
 
Stoker William Millett joined the Navy in 1914 just prior to the outbreak of 
hostilities and was trained in both coal and oil. After serving in the Royalist at 
Jutland, Millett volunteered for submarines and joined K-2 and, later on in his 
service, K-5. Millett considered the comradeship between K-boats’ crews and 
their officers ‘magnificent’, although he remembered that the K-class were 
considered ‘very dangerous’ leading to the need for crews to work closely 
together as they all knew they had to be ‘very careful with them.’664   
 
Stoker Christopher Reid started his working life as a pit pony driver in 
Seaham Colliery site of two infamous mining disasters in the late 19th century. 
Reid was serving onboard the Irresistible when an explosion blew apart the 
Bulwark lying at the next buoy taking his younger brother down with it. After 
service in the Dardanelles onboard Irresistible, Reid answered the call for 
volunteers and joined submarines in 1916 being immediately drafted to K-boats. 
In his memoirs Reid described the boilers in K-4 as ‘lovely steamers’ which 
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allowed the boat to ‘easily attain twenty-six knots.’665 Another man who had 
fond memories of the K-class was leading torpedo operator (L.T.O.) Jack 
Nicholas. Nicholas left a sympathetic account of his service onboard K-26 which 
he joined in 1929, affectionately referring to his boat as ‘my steam-




Nicholas left a detailed description of the unique ‘K-class’ coal-fired 
galley range which was situated  in the base of the conning tower. The galley 
was contained within a ‘free-flood’ space, a compartment which sat outside the 
pressure hull open to sea when the boat dived. The cook, who was a ‘specially 
selected seaman’, was paid sixpence per day and was referred to as ‘chef’ or 
‘cookie’ by the more junior ratings; however, those with more service often 
resorted to the more derogatory term ‘slushie.’ The equipment in the galley 
consisted of a ‘standard coal range’ with associated coal bunker, a hand pump 
to draw up fresh water, a table and a large copper boiler for providing hot 
water.667  
 
Adjacent to the galley was a small recess which contained the butcher’s 
block, ‘tied down to prevent it floating off.’  The coal used in the galley, referred 
to by Nicholas as ‘culinary coal’ was said to have been good quality which ‘lit 
easily and burned well’ enabling the cook to boil, fry, bake, stew and roast. 
Should the galley have been in use prior to the boat being ordered to ‘open up 
for diving’, which was the preliminary order to prepare the boat for ‘diving 
stations’, the cook would drain the copper, pull out the fire, close the coal-
bunker door and tie down his pots and pans before going below taking with him 
his portable electric lead which provided the only illumination in that dark 
space.668   
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This routine may have seemed like a dangerous and drawn out 
procedure as most submarines of the day would normally only take around sixty 
seconds to dive. However, it was not unknown for the captain of a K-boat to 
press the diving klaxon and to then take a leisurely walk around the casing to 
check all was well. In particular, it was imperative on the K-class to check that 
the electrically operated funnel hatches and the hydraulically sealed boiler room 
vents were properly shut before going below and shutting the conning tower 
upper-lid (hatch). Four minutes was considered to be a good diving time for a K-
boat, although five minutes was more the norm.669   
 
K-26 was victualled on the ‘canteen messing’ system exactly the same 
as G.S. However, Nicholas observed with some irony, that the boat did not have 
a canteen, neither did the crew have much opportunity of using the canteen of a 
big ship; therefore, he was somewhat bemused by the title.670  While the boat 
was in Malta he recalled that the petty officers’ mess had an arrangement with 
the ‘Olympia bar’ to supply their mess victuals under a written contract, while 
the artificers, seaman and stokers messes had similar arrangements with other 
suppliers.671 Despite not having an onboard canteen the men of K-26 ate similar 
food to those in G.S. although, with their extra pay and increased ration 
allowance they appear to have been able to have had a more varied diet. 
Breakfast dishes on the surface comprised kippers, eggs boiled and fried, 
sausages, bacon, porridge, bloaters and haddock, all rather more appetising 
than the slice of dry bread Stoker Cooper had for breakfast on the Exmouth. 
Lunch would consist of the usual sailor’s fare of baked, boiled, roasted and fried 
meats, pies and ‘ooshes’, while a typical supper menu on K-26 would include 
liver and onions, fried kippers, fried steak, toasted cheese, fried fish or curry. 
Cheese oosh was a submarine delicacy loosely related to a cheese soufflé but 
made heavy and flat like a Yorkshire pudding from cheese, eggs and milk.672 
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The extra funds available to submariners enabled them to procure what 
men such as Stoker Thomas Cooper, whose menu was described in chapter 
two would have considered to have been ‘luxury goods.’ Nicholas listed K-26’s 
fare as having included ‘grapes, the better sorts of cheeses’ and ‘out of the 
ordinary fruits, when they could be procured.’673  While submerged, highly 
flavoured foods were considered ‘taboo’ with cabbage, onions and curries in 
particular, being considered ‘fresh air only dishes.’674 On the other side of the 
coin, submarines had little stowage for food items while cold rooms were not 
fitted during this period; therefore, the type, amount and quality of food carried 
at sea varied considerably. During the First World War, submarine crews were 
issued with ‘War Emergency Comforts’ which included tinned items such as 
bacon, sardines, sausages and vegetables together with bottled fruit and cocoa 
essence. However, since submarines rarely surfaced during daylight hours and 
spent long periods of time at sea, even with their improved rations submarine 
crews still suffered from a deficiency of vitamin D.675  
 
As described earlier in this chapter, a majority of submariners were 
married and were allowed more freedom with regards to night shore leave by 
their officers in comparison to the more strict routines of G.S. This fact was  
highlighted by Nicholas who observed that in harbour ‘a fair number of the 
boat’s crew would eat ashore every night with their wives and sweethearts.’676   
 
Submarine working relationships 
 
Serving alongside Nicholas in K-26, was a first class stoker passed for 
leading stoker by the name of Tonks. Tonks was a married man of around thirty 
years of age with three medals from the ‘first war’ and two good conduct badges, 
denoting eight years-service with good conduct. However, while Tonks was said 
to have been thoroughly capable in all aspects of watch-keeping onboard the 
boat, he was unable to be promoted to leading stoker because he could not 
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swim. Nicholas, recalled that he recruited another seaman and together they 
taught Tonks to swim in the warm waters of the Mediterranean. Eventually, after 
Tonks was able to demonstrate that he could swim the required fifty yards and 
tread water for two-minutes he was duly rated up to leading stoker. Tonks never 
forgot the friendship and assistance shown to him by Nicholas and his 
accomplice calling them his ‘special mates - ‘my two sand-scratchers.’677   
 
The term ‘sand-scratcher’ was unique to submarines being a nickname 
given by stokers to seamen. It was a good natured jibe and referred back to the 
time when seamen scrubbed ships’ wooden decks on their hands and knees 
using a sandstone block called a ‘holystone’ and sand. This is a good example 
of the different relationships that existed between men in G.S. and submarines. 
On surface ships, men were divided by departments and forced to live in 
separate messes. Moreover, on some of stoker Lilley’s ships even the upper-
deck was segregated with seamen and stokers being allocated separate areas 
for them to congregate in.678 This type of segregation caused resentment and 
distrust to build up leading to open hostility particularly between seamen and 
stokers. Whereas, in the close confines of a submarine, even one as large as a 
K-boat, relationships amongst the different branches were harmonious leading 
to a camaraderie that was based on professional trust and mutual respect. 
 
In order to build upon this professional relationship, seaman submarine 
officers were required to have a far higher level of technical proficiency than 
their G.S. counterparts. The successful First World War submariner Lieutenant-
Commander Nasmith of E-11, the first boat to penetrate the Dardanelles, had a 
comprehensive knowledge of his boat’s torpedoes, engines and electrical 
systems. In addition, Nasmith insisted that every man onboard should be able 
to do any job; therefore on E-11 the stokers took turns at the ship’s wheel, 
E.R.As operated the hydroplane controls while seamen were trained to manage 
the electrical switchboard.679 On all submarines of this period the engineering 
officer would keep his watches in the control room where he would be 
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responsible for maintaining the boat’s trim. He would delegate the operation and 
maintenance of the engines and all associated machinery to his senior E.R.A.  
 
Nicholas observed that if the ‘tiffies’ (E.R.As) were taken out of a 
submarine, ‘it might go-but not for long.’680  K-26, had five engine-room artificers 
and one electrical artificer with the chief E.R.A. reporting directly to the 
Engineering Officer who held the rank of lieutenant. Nicholas noted that 
relationships between the stokers, artificers and officers were ‘very good’ and 
that sport, particularly cricket, football, water-polo and rowing were what welded 
the ship’s company together. With only sixty-three officers and men in the boat, 
the choice of sportsmen was not wide; however, Nicholas reported with pride 
that K-26 became the Mediterranean Squadron water-polo champions in 1930 





To the rear of the control room on K-26 was a watertight bulkhead with a 
door leading to a passage giving access to the two separate boiler rooms, the 
after boiler room having an escape hatch which led back into the passage. The 
boiler rooms were accessed through air locks, required because the boiler 
rooms were under pressure from fans which forced air into the boiler furnaces 
to increase combustion of the oil. Aft of the rearmost boiler room was the 
turbine room. As an L.T.O. Nicholas recalled that he was ‘none too keen on 
entering the boiler room, at sea at any rate.’ He remembered that on entering 
the boiler room his ears would pop with the pressure and the moving air flapped 
at his overalls ‘seemingly designed to throw you through a small aperture into a 
blazing mass of oil.’ Nicholas used to ‘shudder’ at the thought of all that ‘hot 
water, steam and flame.’  As for the stokers, he described them at work as 
looking like ‘devils in hell’, while tending their boilers.682  
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Writing in The Naval Review  in 1919 a submarine officer defended the 
concept of the ‘fleet submarine’ against its many detractors. The K-class was 
credited with being able to maintain a speed of nineteen to twenty knots in an 
emergency ‘in weather that would have forced a destroyer to reduce its speed 
to fifteen knots’, albeit it was admitted that some damage to the bridge and 
superstructure was to be expected.683 In describing these conditions, some 
sympathy was offered towards K-class boiler room stokers who were said to 
suffer ‘severe discomfort’ in bad weather when water cascaded down the air 
intakes and funnels. As a result, stokers were forced to wear ‘oilskins, 
sou’westers and sea boots while on watch.’684    
 
Leading Stoker Steel, described his first boat, K-1, as ‘the best steaming 
and diving boat of the lot.’  On her trials K-1 had achieved twenty three knots, 
but on patrol in the North Sea in 1917 while scouting for the German High Seas 
Fleet the boat made twenty-five knots for extended periods. Steel recounted 
that as K-1 was the ‘first of class’ she had flush bows and short, squat funnels, 
a design that caused water to break over the funnels and down through the 
‘mushroom tops’ (boiler room vents). Apart from putting out the fires, the water 
also stopped the boiler room fans which would have made conditions inside the 
boiler rooms intolerable with the build up of latent heat. When a K-class boat 
went to diving stations the conditions for the stokers who manned the boiler 
rooms was said to have been something of a ‘nightmarish’ ordeal with the heat, 
the roaring of the induction fans and pumps and the smell of hot fuel and oil 
which turned the boiler room into a miniature inferno. At the sound of the diving 
klaxon, the stokers would rush to shut off the fuel and stop the fans and pumps. 
As the noise died down the heat would rise; finally one man would climb to the 
top of the boiler to shut off the main-steam valves before staggering, in a state 
of near collapse with the heat, into the air lock which led into the engine 
room.685   
 
                                            
683 H. M. Fardell, "The "K" Submarines," The Naval Review VII, No 2 (1919). 234. 
684 Ibid. 
685 D. Everitt, K Boats:Steam-Powered Submarines in World War One, (1999), 69. 
256 
 
William Piggott was advised to join the submarine service in 1917 by the 
commander of the Royal Oak after losing both his parents during the war. The 
commander had told the young seaman wireless operator that he would be 
‘financially better off in submarines.’686 After submarine training, Piggott joined 
K-5, although he commented that he was far from impressed with the 
organisation of the boat. The captain was known as ‘mad Hutchins’ and Piggott 
claimed that he was universally disliked as he was prone to verbally abuse the 
crew. Piggott recalled that Hutchins had the fuses removed from the two electric 
galley stoves as he considered the battery to be sacrosanct and therefore it was 
required to be kept fully charged at all times in case of an emergency. As a 
result, Piggott recalled that while he served in K-5 no hot food was ever cooked 
on the electric ranges while the boat was at sea. Piggott did not mention 
whether the coal-fired range was ever used.687   
 
Piggott recalled that on 31st July 1918 he was in the conning tower of K-5 
struggling to raise the aftermost of the two hydraulically operated telescopic 
wireless masts. Hutchins, the Commanding Officer (C.O.), saw Piggott and, 
concerned for his safety, ordered the Chief Stoker and a stoker to relieve him 
with the comment that the boat would be lost if the wireless operator fell 
overboard, but wouldn’t, ‘if they only lost a couple of stokers.’688 This comment 
alluded to the fact that while there were several stokers amongst the crew of the 
boat there was only one signalman who the captain could ill afford to lose, 
nonetheless, the comment had tragic consequences. Shortly afterwards a wave 
washed Chief Stoker George Booker aged forty-one and First Class Stoker 
Michael Jordan aged twenty-six overboard. Despite a lengthy search neither 
man was recovered.689 The C.O. declared the cause of death of both men as, 
‘washed overboard and drowned.’690  Piggott was later ‘lent’ to K-4 and very 
nearly lost his own life during the ‘Battle’ of May Island when K-4 went down but 
managed to stay afloat long enough to be rescued.691     
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While the loss of these two stokers was a tragic and unusual accident, 
stokers would go on to earn a reputation in the submarine service for becoming 
masters of the art of submarine escape in extreme circumstances. S.P.O. 
William Brown survived an unusual double submarine tragedy during a 
submarine exercise conducted on 15th August 1916. Three ‘E- Class’ boats set 
out from Harwich for an exercise to practice attacking a surfaced submarine 
while remaining dived. During a dived attack on the surfaced E-41 something 
went wrong and E-4 struck E-41 causing both boats to immediately sink. E-4 
was lost with all hands while only thirteen out of thirty men initially survived from 
E-41. Remarkably, one and a half hours after the last of the survivors had been 
pulled out of the water S.P.O. Brown was spotted ‘bobbing’ out of the water like 
a cork.  
 
Chief Stoker Oliver added to the list of single handed submarine escapes 
by stokers when he became the sole survivor from the elderly H-49 after she 
was attacked by German anti-submarine trawlers off Texel, Holland in October 
1940. After a succession of depth charge attacks Davis Submerged Escape 
Apparatus sets (D.S.E.A.) were distributed amongst the crew, however there 
were not enough sets to go round so Oliver courageously volunteered to go 
without. After a final failed attempt to regain the surface the boat began to sink 
at which point Oliver became aware of a circular light above him in the engine 
room. During the depth charge attack the engine room hatch had lifted and 
Oliver by now only semi-conscious found himself drawn to it and onwards to the 
surface where he was picked up by one of the vessels which had  
attacked his boat.692    
     
A similar miraculous escape was made from the Perseus after she struck 
a mine in the Mediterranean in 1941. Stoker John Capes was a passenger 
onboard  the Perseus on his way to re-join his own boat Thrasher lying at 
Alexandria. Capes was asleep in the stoker’s mess in the after-ends (stern of 
the boat) when a devastating explosion sent Perseus to the sea-bed. On 
                                            
692 J. Parker, The Silent Service: The Inside Story of the Royal Navy’s Submarine Heroes, 
(London, 2001), 96. DSEA consisted of a mouthpiece connected by a flexible tube to a rubber 
bag which had an attached canister of oxygen enabling the wearer to breathe under water 
during escape.    
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investigation, Capes found the boat completely flooded forward of the engine 
room indicating to him that everyone in the forward section of the boat had 
perished. Retracing his way back aft Capes found all the electricians had been 
electrocuted in the motor room probably through falling on the live switch-gear. 
Apart from himself there were only three other survivors who Capes found badly 
injured in the engine-room.  
 
After an epic struggle Capes managed to flood the engine room and 
equalise the pressure in the compartment with the outside sea pressure. He 
dressed the three other survivors in D.S.E.A gear and after giving each man a 
tot of rum from his own bottle Capes pushed each man out of the boat being the 
last to leave. On gaining the surface Capes found that he was the sole survivor, 
the injured men having failed to reach the surface. After another trial of strength 
Capes swam six miles to shore where he was found and looked after by 
sympathetic Greek villagers until he was picked up by British agents in 1943 
and returned to Britain via Turkey.   
 
At the time, and for many years after the war, Cape’s story was thought 
to have been so far-fetched that many disbelieved he had ever been in the boat. 
However, in 1996 the Perseus was found by a Greek diver in exactly the state 
and position Capes had described. Divers subsequently verified that the aft 
escape hatch was still open and even found his rum bottle lying at the foot of 
the ladder where he had dropped it. As the son of a Diplomat and a former 
public school boy (Dulwich College), Capes was something of an enigma as he 
had the education to join the Navy as an officer but instead chose to serve as a 
stoker. For his wartime exploits Capes was awarded the British Empire Medal, 
he retired from the submarine service as a Chief Stoker in the 1950s.693   
 
‘Up spirits’ submarine rum issue 
 
One aspect of daily submarine life that differed greatly to the routine 
employed in G.S. was the tradition of ‘up-spirits’ at noon each day which 
signalled the issue of the daily ‘tot’ of rum to the lower-deck. The official ration 
                                            
693 J. Winton, The Submariners: Life in British Submarines 1901-1999, 137-43. 
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was an eighth of a pint of rum per man each day which was issued neat to G.S. 
senior ratings (petty officers and above) but diluted with two-parts water for 
junior ratings. However, because water was such a scarce commodity in 
submarines, both junior and senior ratings received their rum ration neat. 
Submarines traditionally remained dived during daylight hours, therefore the 
traditional routine of midday ‘up-spirits’ was impracticable. While a boat 
remained dived the crew were expected to display a high level of alertness and, 
even when a man was ‘off-watch’ and resting, he could be expected to be called 
upon at any minute to go to his action or emergency stations or to repair an 
important piece of machinery or equipment. At the same time, dependent on 
how long the boat had been submerged, the atmosphere inside the boat would 
have been subjected to increasing levels of carbon dioxide. In addition, while 
the boat remained dived the galley remained out of action leaving the men with 
empty stomachs. Issuing rum to men under these conditions would have been 
dangerous in the extreme; therefore, rum was only issued to submariners at the 
commanding officer’s discretion and then usually only during the hours of 
darkness when the submarine was on the surface charging batteries and after 
the men had had their hot meal. 
 
Because submariners’ received their rum neat, a widespread, but illegal 
practice developed whereby men would save their ‘tot’ by storing it in a bottle to 
be drunk when convenient or used to barter for ‘favours’ in the dockyard. Rum 
could also be smuggled ashore at the owner’s peril to be given as a present or 
shared with friends. In submarines a ‘blind eye’ was adopted towards this illegal 
practice and provided nothing untoward occurred the men were left to their own 
devices as far as their rum was concerned particularly when it might be used for 
the benefit of the boat. Signaller Piggott recalled that he traded his bottle of 
‘neaters’ (neat rum) in the dockyard for a submarine wireless generator when 
the generator on K-5 became flooded.694   
 
Eustace Godden tried to join the Navy as a boy artificer at the age of 
fifteen and three quarters before the First World War, however his parents 
refused to sign his papers so he obtained a job as a butcher’s boy. With the 
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outbreak of war Godden applied to join the Navy again but, being still under 
eighteen years of age he was classed as a boy and was refused entry. 
Undeterred, Godden travelled from his home in Colchester to London where he 
made another application at the Admiralty. Third time lucky, Godden was finally 
offered entry as a stoker with no questions asked about his age. After initial 
training Godden was drafted to the Chatham a four funnelled light-cruiser 
operating from Bombay. However, before his troop ship arrived at Bombay the 
Chatham had been ordered to the Dardanelles. Godden eventually joined his 
ship and remained in the Dardanelles until the evacuation in 1916. While he 
was in the Dardanelles Godden admitted that he was ‘stirred’ by the exploits of 
the British submarines which were operating in the sea of Marmora and 
particularly remembered E11 returning from her successful first patrol.695   
 
After further service on a small destroyer, Godden volunteered to join the 
submarine service claiming to have been ‘heartily sick of breathing in coal-dust.’  
On completion of submarine training Godden was drafted to Harwich where he 
joined E-42 as permanent crew. Godden remembered that it was 
‘superstitiously fatal’ to ask to leave a boat which was the reason why 
submarine crews stayed with a boat for as long as they could.696 On E-42 none 
of the crew consumed their rum ration, Godden remembered that they just had 
a ‘teaspoonful every now and then,’ the rest being stored in a gallon jar. 
However, on Armistice morning when the Cox’n issued rum Godden stated that 
everyone got ‘blind drunk’ and it took a long time the following day to get 
everyone back on-board and sobered up. After a ‘stiff lecture’ from the First 
Lieutenant the boat sailed to patrol the Dogger Bank, although because of the 
armistice the captain was under orders not to attack any targets.697    
 
In conclusion, this chapter has shown that despite the best efforts of the 
Admiralty its fledgling collection of submarines quickly became a specialised 
and separate arm of the naval service adopting its own unique operational 
ethos and language. In hindsight the Admiralty’s attempt to restrict the amount 
                                            
695 Eustace F. M. Godden, November 16th 1984. 1, Letter from Godden to Gus Britton, Curator 
Royal Naval Submarine Museum, 8-9. 
696 Ibid. 
697 Ibid, 10. 
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of time a man could serve in submarines in order to prevent this happening 
would never have succeeded as submarines are specialised vessels requiring 
men with the right temperament, skills and technical ability. In the early years of 
submarine development there was a distinct lack of volunteers despite the lure 
of extra pay therefore, every fully trained submariner was needed in order to 
train others and to provide continuity of service. Submariners then, and now, 
became much more attached to their boats than men in general service did to a 
ship. Submariners often spent several years in the same boat to the extent that 
it was thought ‘unlucky’ to move from one to another. 
 
In the early days submarines lacked any of the basic amenities that were 
taken for granted in even the smallest ships of the Navy such as hammocks, 
heads, and cooking apparatus. That men, willingly volunteered to serve, and 
indeed seemingly enjoyed serving in these dangerous, uncomfortable and 
unpredictable vessels is even more remarkable despite the attraction of 
increased pay. Submarines were inherently dangerous and many were lost in 
the first half of the twentieth century, nonetheless the service remained 
essentially a volunteer service and even men who were compulsorily drafted 
into submarines grew to accept the life. For stokers and E.R.As already used to 
the dangers of a working life deep in the bowels of ships surrounded by steam, 
hot oil, coal dust and fire, the additional hazards of service in submarines did 
not materially add to their concerns. They were more occupied with getting to 
grips with the new technical challenges that submarines offered and learning 
new skills such as manning the hydroplane controls that kept the boat on depth, 
acting as lookouts and steering the boat; the type of jobs that in G.S. were 
exclusively confined to seamen.  
 
Because of the poor living conditions that existed in submarines, 
submariners were often derided by officers and men from G.S. for their 
apparent slovenly appearance and lack of conformity towards naval traditions 
and procedures. However, these attacks only served to strengthen the bonds 
that existed between officers and men and between the various branches that 
made up a submarine’s crew. This unique bond ensured that stokers in 
submarines, unlike their counterparts in the Fleet, were firmly on an equal and 
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equitable social footing. There was no class distinction in a submarine, 
everyone faced the same danger and therefore each man was equal to the next. 
The irony of the development of submarines from a stoker’s point of view was 
that stokers (and E.R.As) successfully managed the change from the manual 
labour of coal fired steam to the new cleaner, but more dangerous petrol 
powered internal combustion engine. This was followed by the safer and more 
reliable diesel engine until the wheel turned full circle and submarine stokers 
found themselves once again in front of oil-fired furnaces. However, in ‘K-class’ 
submarines  stokers had to swap their fearnought trousers, wooden clogs and 
sweat rags for ‘sea boots and full oil skins.’ From the demise of the steam 
driven K-Class submarine in the early 1920s it would take another forty-five 
years and one more turn of the wheel before stokers once again found 
themselves in steam driven submarines, this time in the aptly named nuclear 

























Stokers – the weakest link? 
 
One common theme which this thesis has set out to challenge is the 
enduring contemporary and modern historical assumption that stokers lacked 
the traditions of the service and were ill-disciplined compared to seamen and 
others. One reason for this assumption lies in the fact that stokers joined the 
service as men at the age of eighteen years of age and after completing basic 
training went to sea to learn 'on the job' as relatively 'green hands.' Whereas, 
seamen by contrast, were recruited as boys or youths and 'grew-up' in the 
service inheriting the traditions that stokers were thought not to have had time 
to assimilate. However, it has already been shown in chapter two that stokers 
were more likely than seamen to re-engage for further service after completing 
their first engagement or to re-join the service within twelve months of leaving. 
Furthermore, from the evidence presented stokers were also less likely to have 
been discharged as undesirable or to have deserted; surely an indication that 
they had embraced the traditions and culture of the service?  
 
With regards to their lack of discipline, Stoker George Wells who served 
in the Good Hope provided evidence that half of the stokers in his ship had 
previously served in the Army and had been awarded the Army General Service 
medal indicating that they had completed active service in a military campaign. 
While it is not possible to quantify the number of former military men who joined 
the stoker ranks, there is sufficient anecdotal evidence to suggest that this was 
a relatively common occurrence. Therefore, the stoker ranks must have had 
more military experience than they were given credit for. It is inconceivable that 
men who had prior military experience would have been as ill-disciplined as we 
are led to believe. Finally, stokers had arguably the most physically demanding 
and dangerous occupation than any man onboard. They worked in 
claustrophobic coal-bunkers devoid of breathable air or in front of roaring 
furnaces deep in the bowels of the ship where escape in time of emergency 
was almost impossible. These were not jobs for the faint hearted and must have 
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Writing from his flagship Orion in 1921, the C-in-C Portsmouth made the 
following observation: 
 
           Having twice been concerned with insubordinate stokers at Portsmouth in 1906 
as Flag Captain to C-in-C and in 1921 as Vice Admiral Commanding the 
Reserve Fleet I submit the following for consideration. In 1906 a mutiny 
occurred among the stokers in Portsmouth naval barracks. In 1921 the stokers 
of number 2 battalion (Portsmouth) Reserve Fleet outnumbered seamen and a 
considerable higher proportion of the former had been insubordinate. So, 
evidently fifteen years after 1906, the stoker’s are still the weakest link in the 
chain of naval discipline.698   
 
While this rather damning accusation was made in 1922, it perfectly 
reflects the point made by Christopher McKee in 2002 when he observed that 
the negative stereotype had stuck to stokers with all the adhesive excellence of 
'Tar Baby.' Therefore, in order to determine the actual disciplinary record of 
stokers, this chapter will need to delve beneath the negative stereotype and 
concentrate on the facts.  
 
Between 1861 and 1937, fifty-nine mutinies or incidents of collective 
indiscipline occurred in the Royal Navy. These incidents include the Portsmouth 
Barracks and R.F.R. Battalion mutinies referred to above, together with the 
infamous Invergordon mutiny which involved upwards of 12,000 sailors and 
marines. Contrary to the statement that accused stokers of being the ‘weak-link’ 
in the chain of naval discipline, Admiralty records show that forty-eight mutinies 
were staged by seamen, eight by stokers, two by seamen and stokers 
combined and one by the 6th Battalion Royal Marines.699    
 
                                            
698 TNA, ADM 1/8627/118, "Training of New Entries: Report on the Training and Discipline of 
Stokers," ed. Admiralty (Admiralty, 1922). 
699 Admiralty, Mutiny in the Royal Navy: 1691-1937, ed. Tactical and Staff Duties Division, 2:  
vol. 1 & 2 (London, 1933). 
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The suggestion that stokers were ill-disciplined is clearly incorrect as 
seamen participated in mutiny at a ratio of 6:1 compared to stokers.700 One 
reason why stokers were invariably singled out for censure was their poor 
status within the Navy in general, and on the lower-deck in particular. In a 
debate on discipline and punishment in the Navy a naval officer contributed the 
following observation: 
 
Punishment must also vary according to the degree of responsibility held by the 
offender. For example, a young stoker who breaks his leave 36 hours is liable to 
a fine of 12 days’ pay, and in addition, to have 12 days’ leave stopped. When 
this punishment is completed it is done with, and will not affect his future career. 
An officer, on the other hand, who fails in a similar manner is liable to be tried 
by court-martial, the results of which he may never recover from professionally. 
The reason for this is obvious; the stoker has very little status, and no 
responsibility; his absence will not materially affect the ship.701   
 
The earliest record of a stokers’ mutiny was that which occurred in the 
Porpoise on the Australian station in 1898. The ship’s captain was unhappy with 
the rate of steaming and ordered the stokers into two watches as a punishment 
which meant they would only receive four hours off between each watch instead 
of eight. As a result, four men refused to go on watch. In order to regain 
discipline the captain sentenced the four offenders to ninety days hard labour 
and then mustered the stokers and threatened to flog them should there be any 
further disobedience. The captain and his C-in-C were both later censured by 
the Admiralty for threatening to flog the men after it was pointed out that the 
power to award flogging had been removed from ships’ captains in 1881.702 
 
Stoker Richard Rose remembered that while he was undergoing training 
at Victory barracks Portsmouth in 1912 he had to cross the parade ground at 
the ‘run’ as Portsmouth was considered to be still under punishment after the 
‘Collard mutiny’ that had occurred there in 1906. Rose considered the discipline 
at Portsmouth was the strictest of all the depots, describing the other depots as 
being ‘free, of that kind of thing.’ 703 
                                            
700 Admiralty, Mutiny in the Royal Navy: 1691-1937. 
701 "A Few Lectures on Naval Discipline," Naval Review 7, no. 4 (1919). 
702 TNA, ADM 156/157, Cases of Mutiny in the Royal Navy: H.M.S. Porpoise 1898.  
703 R.F. Rose I.W.M. 754, (London, Imperial War Museum), 18. 
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In her description of the disturbances at Portsmouth, Mary Conley 
incorrectly attributed them to discontentment by the stokers over 'work, pay and 
discipline,'704 an allegation that has also been made elsewhere.705 However, the 
incidents that occurred in the barracks over the 4th and 5th of November 1906 
had a much simpler cause and stemmed from a single order used improperly by 
an over-zealous Gunnery Lieutenant to a duty-watch of newly entered, second 
class stokers.  
 
During evening quarters on the 4th November the duty watch made some 
noise while being mustered after it began to rain. The stokers' were adjudged to 
have been to blame and the officer in charge Lieutenant Collard ordered them 
to go ‘on the knee’ so that he could reprimand them. This obscure and little 
used gunnery order was seen as a humiliation by the stokers who initially 
refused to obey until Collard persisted and they eventually went on the knee.  
 
Later that evening in the barracks canteen the stokers, who were no 
doubt aggrieved, were provoked after someone shouted at them, ‘on the knee.’ 
A large group of stokers rushed towards the wardroom officers’ mess on the 
opposite side of the road in the vain hope of obtaining an apology from Collard, 
however the duty watch managed to shut the barracks gate confining the 
stokers to the barracks. After a noisy protest on the parade ground the 
Commodore spoke to the stokers who eventually calmed down and retired to 
their respective messes. As a precautionary measure the barracks gate was 
locked that night and again the following night although this had an unforeseen 
consequence.  
 
The following evening, men returning from leave found they were unable 
to gain access to the barracks and congregated outside the main gate. They 
were joined by a large crowd of civilians at which point the crowd turned violent 
and stones were thrown at the wardroom windows. The stokers in their mess-
decks heard the commotion and attempted to leave their barrack blocks but the 
                                            
704 Mary, A. Conley, From Jack Tar to Union Jack, 45. 




guard had been called out and prevented them from leaving. Being unable to go 
anywhere, the stokers were alleged to have begun tearing their quarters apart 
while 'furnishings of all descriptions' were said to have been hurled out of the 
windows onto the parade ground below.706 Then again, as the photograph 
presented as illustration 7, p. 131 graphically illustrates, there were no 
furnishings of any description in the men's quarters, indeed they had precious 
little to destroy other than a mess table, some benches and pots and pans. After 
several hours, the crowd outside the barracks was dispersed after being 
repeatedly charged by city police and Royal Marines.  
 
Eleven stokers were subsequently arrested, charged and tried by courts-
martial for inciting or participating in mutinous conduct out of the 458 stokers 
who were in barracks over the two nights of the disturbances. Despite the fact 
that no violence was used, and only relatively minor damage caused, the eleven 
stokers identified as ring-leaders were sentenced to periods of imprisonment 
ranging from six weeks to five years. Inevitably, the incident allowed the popular 
press to depict the disturbances as much more serious than they actually were 
(See Illustration 11, p. 268). It also brought forth a backlash from the press and 
members of the general public who offered strong criticism towards the value 
and worth of stokers as the following example shows:    
  
It is we think an altogether new thing to bring together in any barracks such a 
large number of recruits, particularly when it is remembered that the stokers are 
not drawn from a very promising class of society, and are likely to chafe under 
the unusual restraints of naval life. The occurrence, in fact, cannot altogether be 
admitted or accepted as belonging to the Navy since these men, or the majority 
of them, had never been to sea and knew next to nothing of the conditions 
obtaining on board a man-o-war. It is obvious also that the measures and 
methods of preserving discipline on board ship may not necessarily be suitable 
or sufficient for the maintenance of order among such a large number of newly-
raised men on shore. It is conceivable, too, that among such a large number of 
men raised as these have been without, it would seem, any very high qualifying 
standard of character, or any strict inquiry of antecedents, there would exist, 
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Illustration: 11  Newspaper image of the Portsmouth Barracks Disturbances 
 
Source:       The Daily Graphic 8th November 1906. 
 
 
This image describes the stokers as acting ‘as madmen’. No stokers broke out of 
barracks or into barracks on the second night of disturbances. The crowd outside the 
barracks numbered several hundred and was composed of sailors locked out of 
barracks and civilians. The stokers inside barracks were all confined inside their 
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The author of the official history of Portsmouth barracks claimed in 
1961 that the story of this incident was still of importance because critics 
claimed at the time that the riots occurred through the policy of keeping large 
numbers of men in barracks for long periods of time.708 However, records 
indicate that there were only 390 stokers in barracks on the night of 4th 
November 1906 and 458 on 5th November, compared to over 1,000 seamen 
on each of the two nights that the disturbances occurred. Therefore, while the 
stokers were undeniably to blame for creating the disturbances, they were in 
the minority compared to seamen.709 
 
The large number of ratings absent from barracks on each night 
(approximately half of all seamen and two thirds of marines and stokers), further 
suggest that these men exercised their option to stay on shore at their own 
expense, as described by Stoker Leary in chapter four, rather than suffer the 
discomforts of barrack routine. After a short enquiry the Admiralty concluded 
that the disturbances stemmed from the following causes: 
 
1. A feeling of resentment on the part of the stokers caused by the misuse of 
the drill order ‘on the knee.’ 
2. The retention of the stokers on parade on the Sunday afternoon during rain, 
and the subsequent want of judgement shown in dealing with them. 
3. The want of proper supervision and control in the canteen.710 
 
By singling the stokers out and exaggerating the cause of the 
disturbances at Portsmouth, Mary Conley et al resorted to the negative 
stereotype and made it stick like the proverbial 'Tar Baby,' In her discussion of 
the 'stokers' mutiny' Conley ignored the fact that seamen had committed eleven 
out of the fourteen mutinies up to 1914 (stokers having committed three). There 
may well have been widespread discontent amongst stokers, particularly with 
regards to their being denied the right to promotion to Warrant Officer, a right 
enjoyed by every other branch in the service. However, this had absolutely no 
bearing on the disturbances. Despite the allegations made with regards to the 
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stokers mutinying over 'work, pay and discipline,' their protest was far more 
fundamental and involved a simple perceived injustice.711  
 
 Commodore Stopford, the Commanding Officer of Portsmouth naval 
barracks harboured his own views on the cause of the disturbances. In a private 
letter to the Second Sea Lord he admitted that the naval depot had been ‘like a 
volcano’ for the twelve months preceding the disturbances. In his opinion, the 
immediate blame for the events was attributable to ‘Army deserters, (a further 
reference to ex-military men re-joining the service as stokers), socialist 
vagabonds, and the other riff-raff we have as stokers.’712 Stopford obviously 
shared the fear that was common among many senior officers during the early 
years of the twentieth century that socialist propaganda was being promoted on 
the lower-deck. This led to suspicion that men were being influenced to join 
secret communist cells which would eventually lead to sedition and mutiny. In 
1924 the Admiralty Intelligence Division became so alarmed over the perceived 
spread of communism throughout the fleet that it prompted the Admiralty to 
issue a secret notice to all Commanders-in-Chief warning them that newspaper 
boys were spreading communist propaganda under cover of delivering 
newspapers to ships and establishments.713 Furthermore, Stopford's 
assessment that the barracks had been 'like a volcano' implies that the men 
were simmering with discontent. This is unsurprising bearing in mind the almost 
'prison like regime' forced upon the men by the barracks 'Red Book' regulations 
referred to earlier in chapter four.     
 
Lt Collard was tried by court-martial on two charges, the first accused 
him of giving Stoker Albert Acton an unauthorised punishment on 24th 
November 1905 (twelve months prior to the Portsmouth disturbances), and 
using abusive language towards him by ordering him ‘on the knee-you dog.’714 
There were unsubstantiated rumours that Collard had paid stoker Acton a sum 
of money to keep him from making an official complaint in 1905. Collard was 
                                            
711 'Mutiny in the Royal Navy,' (Admiralty, 1933), 2: vol.1. 171-2.  
712 A, Carew, The Lower Deck of the Royal Navy 1900-1939, 65.  
713 TNA, ADM 1/8657/48, Communist attempts at introducing propaganda into H.M. Ships by 
means of newspaper boys delivering newspapers on board ships in harbour, (Admiralty, 1924).  
714 TNA, ADM 1/7895, "Court Martial Lieutenant B St G Collard," ed. Admiralty (Admiralty, 1906). 
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found guilty of ordering stoker Acton 'on the knee' but the charge of using 
abusive language was not proven.  He was also acquitted on the second charge 
of committing an act to the prejudice of good order and naval discipline by 
making improper use of the order ‘on the knee’ that caused the stokers to make 
their public protest. Collard was ordered to be reprimanded.715  
 
In The Great Naval Game, Jan Rüger examined the importance of the 
mass market on the 'naval theatre' and the way in which it was expressed in the 
discourses and practices concerned with the role of the 'crowd' and 'the 
masses.'716 Rüger observed that while the naval authorities attempted to utilise 
the 'naval stage' for their own interests in order to educate the public, the forces 
of mass culture also had a strong grip on this arena through the power of the 
press. The following illustrations (See Illustration 12 and 13, p. 272) illustrate 
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Illustration: 12 and 13, Contemporary images of the Portsmouth  
              Barracks disturbances 1906.   




Beneath the humour, the two illustrations presented above suggest that 
the manner in which the stokers had been treated was at odds with the popular 
mood of the country despite some negative press in certain quarters. By 1906 
Britain was engrossed with the 'cult of navalism,' as a result, the Navy and its 
sailors were held in high regard by many sections of society who depended 
upon them to defend the nation and Empire. Illustration 12 above, uses British 
'bulldogs' to represent the stokers being ordered 'on the knee.' The choice of 
'bulldogs' would appear to be symbolic and deliberate, as the breed has long 
been associated with the 'British bulldog spirit.'717 Therefore, the choice of this 
particular breed strongly suggests that despite their involvement with the 
'disturbances,' and their subsequent treatment by the naval authorities, stokers 
were regarded by some as displaying the same strong, national bulldog spirit 
that the Navy represented in its defence of the nation and Empire. Moreover, by 
substituting the officer with a small and insignificant monkey in contrast to the 
strong dogs, would imply that naval authority had been small minded, weak and 
out of touch with the mood of the country, compared to the strength and 
determination of the stokers.  
 
Interestingly, while illustration 13 above, also used a dog to represent the 
stokers, it had a completely different symbolic meaning. The English nation has 
long been considered to be a nation of 'dog-lovers.' Equally, the dog is often 
used as a metaphor to describe a negative situation with the use of such terms 
as 'to lead a dog's life,' to be 'beaten like a dog,' or to be in 'the dog house.' 
Therefore this illustration implied that the Navy had treated its stokers as mere 
'dogs' and not as the strong and patriotic sailors that existed in the popular 
consciousness. Indeed, even though Lt Collard had not used the term when 
giving the order 'on the knee,' in 1906 it was alleged by the editor and naval 
advocate Stephen Reynolds that the order ‘down on the knee you dogs’ caused 
a ‘blaze of excitement throughout the Navy;’ not on account of the order alone, 
‘but because men felt that in general they were looked upon as 'dogs' by their 
officers.718  
                                            
717 George, C Nasmith, Canada's Sons and Great Britain in the World War, (J.C. Winston, 1919), 
Digitised by the University of California, 2010, 72. 'It was the unconscious expression of the 
British bulldog spirit and it carried the British Empire through to Victory.' 
718 Stephen Reynolds, "Navy Discontents," English Review 9 (1911). 522. 
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The order given to the stokers to go 'on the knee,' harked back to an 
earlier time when sailors were considered to lack responsibility and where they 
attracted the demeaning image of 'Jolly Jack Tar.' However, as Mary Conley 
pointed out, by the early 1900s the Navy had achieved a cult-like status while 
the heightened profile of the Navy within society encouraged naval men to 
begin to assert their own manhood as educated, responsible professionals.719 
The irony of the Portsmouth Barracks affair was that it occurred the month after 
H.M.S. Dreadnought put to sea to begin her trials. Therefore, instead of basking 
in the glare of its technical prowess, the Admiralty appears to have 
compromised its standing in the public arena by demonstrating that it remained 
locked in tradition with an out-dated attitude towards the lower-deck. This was 
aptly summed up by Stephen Reynolds who commented that reform in the Navy 
was unlikely since the Admiralty was, 'notoriously clever at moving without 
progressing.......at altering things without changing them.'720  
 
Eleven stokers were convicted of participating in the trouble at 
Portsmouth. Stoker Edward Moody was identified as the ring-leader and was 
convicted of two charges of inciting stokers to join a mutinous assembly for 
which he received the longest sentence of five years penal servitude. However, 
shortly after the judge advocate confirmed the sentence, it was reduced by the 
Admiralty to three years.721 Although Collard’s reprimand did not impede his 
naval career he was involved in a highly publicised scandal while serving as  
junior Rear-Admiral of the First Battle Squadron in the Royal Oak at Malta in 
1927. As a result of Collard’s bullying manner towards his junior officers two 
were court-martialled and while Collard himself was not charged he was  
immediately placed on the retired list after just three months as a flag-officer. 722 
This incident gives rise to speculation that Collard was prone to treating his 
subordinates badly, something that had already been demonstrated during his 
previous court-martial at Portsmouth in 1906.  
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Although the fictional character 'John Bull' had existed since the early 
eighteenth century, by the turn of the nineteenth century the figure had become 
popularly regarded as a representation of the heroic, archetypal Englishman, or 
as Mary Conley noted; the 'Imperial Father' figure.723 As such, John Bull 
became a popular feature in mass advertising of the period while he also 
appeared in British editorial cartoons and in political satire. John Bull was often 
portrayed with a bulldog at his side, therefore, it is unsurprising that his figure 
was used to question the validity of Stoker Moody's five year sentence as 
depicted in the following illustration, (See Illustration 14, p. 276.)  
 
Inevitably, there was a backlash in certain sections of the press towards 
the stokers' disturbances, but equally there was a measure of support from 
unlikely quarters. In offering a defence for their actions, one S.P.O. writing to 
The Fleet indignantly observed: 
 
From the tone of the press throughout the country of late anyone would think 
naval stokers were the scum of the country, refuse of the gutter. One writer 
claimed them to be “recruited from the lowest social scale”. The trouble at 
Portsmouth was entirely blamed on the stokers which has blackened their 
character while they have been accused of every social evil making the stoker a 
kind of social leper whose presence in the Navy is only tolerated as a kind of 
necessary evil.724 
 
The indignant S.P.O. would have been gratified to read the following 
extract of a letter to The Times which offered some support for the plight of the 
stokers. The correspondent pointed out that at the time of the disturbances 
there were over two hundred of the Nelson’s stokers resident in the barracks 
and not one of them became involved. Moreover, it was reported: 
 
The captain of His Majesty’s ship Nelson has, I am informed, lodged a protest 
with the Commander-in-Chief at Portsmouth against the unfounded slur cast by 
erroneous rumour upon these young stokers, and the public will, I believe, 
gladly assist to dispel the prejudice and the disfavour that has so unjustly fallen 
upon them. Further, the immediate cause of the incident shows that there 
should be a readjustment of the relationship between bluejackets and stokers, 
with a view to a nearer approach to amalgamation.725 
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Illustration: 14 John Bull cartoon 









The comment above suggests that despite there being several hundred 
stokers in the barracks during the disturbances, only a small number actually 
became actively involved. Moreover, because of the nature of the order given to 
the stokers it can be assumed that they reacted in the way they did because 
they were recent recruits, whereas the experienced men belonging to the 
Nelson did not become involved. In addition, the commentator correctly 
identified that there were serious underlying issues with relationships and 
working practices between 'bluejackets' and stokers.  
 
The stokers’ mutiny which occurred in the King Edward VII class 
battleship Zealandia in February 1914 offers another example of a lower-deck 
mutiny caused through excessive discipline and poor treatment from senior 
officers. The mutiny and the results of the ensuing courts-martial led Carew to 
suggest that the Zealandia affair ‘was potentially the most serious mutiny afloat 
before the Great War.’726 The Zealandia had commissioned in May 1912 and by 
the end of 1913 had settled down to what was described as a ‘very reasonably 
and happy ship.’ 727 However the announcement that the captain and 
commander were to be replaced by Captain Walter Cowan and Commander 
Halton Lecky caused a ‘wave of despondency’ to course through the ship, 
suggesting that these two officers may have had a reputation for strong 
discipline.728 
 
A midshipman serving in the Zealandia at the time described the mutiny 
as having been made ‘virtually inevitable by the sadistic paranoia of the ship’s 
commander.’ On taking over as commander of the Zealandia, Lecky introduced 
a raft of petty restrictions including limiting the times and places where officers 
and men could smoke while also changing established ship’s routines, stations 
and drills. The new routines were practiced on make and mend days so as not 
to interfere with normal ship’s routine thereby denying the men any time off. The 
happy ship was alleged to have quickly become an unhappy ship, without any 
apparent change in the standard of discipline.729 
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While most of the changes introduced by Lecky affected all of the ship’s 
company, some particularly disadvantaged stokers. When not on watch,  
stokers had to clean the ship’s upper-deck bright work (brass and other metal 
fittings), coal the ship’s steam-boats and then attend morning divisions.730 The 
subsequent court of inquiry noted that these jobs were carried out entirely by 
seamen in every class of ship in the squadron other than the Zealandia.731 
These orders were clearly designed to make life difficult for the stokers in some 
way as apart from the short lived requirement for seamen to qualify in the 
stokehole for promotion, seamen were never required to undertake cleaning 
duties in the stokehole.   
 
On 4th March 1914 the Zealandia coaled ship off Arosa Bay. It was 
described as a cold and wet day while the collier was small and poorly equipped 
for coaling which made the evolution difficult and unpleasant for all. Coaling was 
completed by four o’ clock in the afternoon and the men expected to be sent to 
tea, however before they could partake of any refreshment they had to 
complete Lecky’s special ‘clean ship routine.’ The men were given thirty 
minutes to clean down funnels and casings, all upper-deck paintwork and the 
upper-deck itself. Twenty minutes were allotted for cleaning internal mess decks, 
flats and passageways and an additional twenty minutes for the men to scrub 
their coaling suits. On completion, the hands were ordered to ‘divisions with 
coaling suits for inspection.’732   
 
All of the ship’s company mustered as ordered except the stokers. The 
stokers were still busy below decks trimming bunkers and stowing coaling gear. 
When they completed their work below at seven o’ clock that evening they 
washed and changed into clean clothing and were then ordered to fall in on the 
quarterdeck where Lecky challenged the stokers over their failure to obey his 
orders. Not being satisfied with their excuses Lecky charged all 168 stokers 
individually with failing to scrub coaling suits and failing to muster when ordered. 
The court of inquiry into the mutiny described this as an ‘unnecessary and 
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impossible order’ for the stokers to obey, as it recognised that stokers would be 
required to trim coal-bunkers long after coaling had ceased and their work 
would probably have continued into the following day. In addition, the court 
noted that twenty stokers had been ordered to remain on the upper-deck to 
polish bright work in the rain, from the moment coaling ceased therefore, these 
men were given no possible opportunity to wash their suits.733 The Admiral 
commanding the squadron noted:  
 
The Commander is to blame for the very foolish order given to the stokers to 
clean bright work.734   
 
During Lecky’s lengthy investigation into the reasons why the stokers 
failed to obey his orders, he chose six of the senior stokers at random and had 
them placed under arrest. The remaining stokers were eventually allowed to go 
below at half past ten that night, having been made to stand on the upper-deck 
for three and a half hours after having coaled ship all day with no food or 
refreshment of any kind. The following morning none of the stokers reported for 
work and the warrant engineer reported to the Officer of the Watch that they 
could not be found in their mess deck or anywhere on the upper deck.  
 
Unusually, the entire complement of stokers had mustered in the cell flat 
where men served their punishment and placed themselves ‘under arrest.’ The 
Master at Arms (ship’s policeman) was sent to bring them up onto the quarter 
deck but they refused to move until their comrades were released. Lecky then 
ordered the Captain of Marines to bring the stokers to the quarter deck ‘using 
violence if necessary.’  However, at this point the stokers quietly mustered on 
the quarter deck.   
 
The Zealandia’s commanding officer, Captain Cowan, had been ashore 
the previous evening and was seemingly unaware of any problems onboard his 
ship. When informed of the incident of collective indiscipline he took no action 
other than ordering the stokers to return to work which they did with great 
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reluctance. Later that morning a note was dropped through a skylight into the 
Captain’s cabin, which stated that the stokers would not raise steam the 
following day until the six men were released from cells and, that if anyone was 
to be punished it had to be a collective punishment. Cowan mustered all the 
stokers including the prisoners and informed them that they would all have their 
leave stopped for the remainder of the Spring cruise and would complete two 
hours of military drills every day until further notice. Cowan also reaffirmed that 
the stokers would continue to undertake work normally done by seamen.735  
 
On receiving a report of the incident the C-in-C considered the 
disobedience to have been more serious and requiring stiffer punishment than 
that meted out. As a result, eight representative first class and four leading 
stokers were charged with mutinous assembly and wilful disobedience. The 
eight first class stokers were tried by courts-martial onboard the Africa on 18th 
March 1914 and sentenced to two years hard labour and dismissal from the 
service. The four leading stokers were tried the following day but acquitted 
through lack of evidence.736 
 
During the courts-martial Lecky was asked whether he was aware of any 
lack of discipline or service routines by the stokers of his ship. In reply, he 
stated that his only complaint was that the stokers ‘had a habit of singing songs 
when cleaning the ship’s funnels.’737 After the incident Zealandia was ordered to 
be run on the same lines as the other ships of the squadron, thereby implying 
that the ship’s routines, which were designed to purposely disadvantage stokers, 
had a great bearing on the mutiny. Furthermore, the absence of any 
intervention by the Zealandia’s engineering officers was noted by the court of 
inquiry which censured the Engineering Commander for failing to make 
representations to the captain direct, an action which it was suggested may 
have averted the trouble.738  However, this suggestion overlooked the fact that 
like stokers on the lower-deck, engineers had no say in the running of the ship, 
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therefore it was improbable that an engineer would risk his career by criticising 
his captain’s orders.  
 
The court of inquiry noted with regards to the actions of Commander Lecky and 
Captain Cowan: 
 
That subsequent to the appointment of Commander Lecky on 1st February 1914 
and of Captain Cowan on 7th February 1914, considerable and, in some cases, 
unusual and, in the opinion of the court, unwise changes were introduced into 
the routine and treatment of the stokers after Zealandia had been nearly two 
years in commission. These orders appear to be the outcome of 
representations made by Commander Lecky. The court considers that orders 
for a steaming watch to attend divisions daily in harbour, to coal steam-boats 
and clean upper-deck bright work were unusual and injudicious.739 
 
Lecky was identified as being ‘chiefly to blame’ for the mutiny and 
ordered to be immediately superseded in his position, placed on half pay and in 
the opinion of the Second Sea Lord, Sir John Jellicoe; ‘should not be further 
employed.’740   
 
The convicted stokers made a plea to the court that, because they were 
selected to represent the stoker complement for punishment, their individual 
culpability was no better or worse than any of the other men. They also pleaded 
that as they had already been punished for the offences they should not be 
made to suffer additional punishment. The court rejected the first plea, which 
was commented on later by the Admiralty who made the point that ‘selecting 
men to face charges of mutiny by representation was an accepted custom.’741 
The court also rejected the second plea, however the First Sea Lord was of the 
opinion that the sentences awarded were ‘out of all proportion to the offences 
committed and out of relation to the circumstances.’  At a preliminary 
conference it was agreed in principle to reduce six of the sentences from two 
years hard labour to nine months detention, and two to six months detention.   
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At this conference the F.S.L. advocated ‘the utmost urgency in having the 
Judge Advocate General (J.A.G) determine the validity of the proceedings.’742   
 
The J.A.G. subsequently decided that ‘a serious and substantial 
irregularity’ had occurred during the courts-martial which had deprived the men 
of an effective defence.743 Therefore, the J.A.G. annulled all the sentences on 
the grounds that the court had not proved whether the prisoners had already 
been punished for the offences they were charged with, (the stoppage of leave 
and extra drill awarded by the Captain prior to the courts-martial).744   
   
Around the same time as the Zealandia mutiny broke out, five stokers 
were charged and sentenced to short periods in detention for insubordination 
onboard the Newcastle. Remarkably, just as in the Portsmouth barracks and 
Zealandia incidents, this was also a case where the stokers had been ill-treated 
by the ship’s executive officer. The C-in-C China deemed the Newcastle’s First 
Lieutenant ‘was to blame for his treatment of the stokers as a whole’ and he 
was summarily dismissed his ship.745 By comparison, after sixty seamen had 
mutinied onboard the minelayer Amphitrite in 1917, the captain ordered the 
marines to muster and munitions to be served out and then detailed off a 
number of ‘older-stokers’ to guard the prisoners as they were escorted out of 
their mess. This act demonstrated that in the Amphitrite at least, stokers 
appeared to have been more trusted by the ship’s officers than seamen.746   
   
The stokers’ mutiny which occurred onboard the Leviathan in 1918 while 
the country was still at war could be termed ‘the mutiny that never was.’ Any 
mutiny which occurred during hostilities had the potential to seriously 
compromise the Admiralty and jeopardise the war effort while equally offering 
the prospect of dire punishment to those convicted. Yet this particular mutiny 
was allowed to quietly die down without the normal immediate repercussions 
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and punishments that inevitably followed such incidents. As with the Zealandia 
mutiny, the blame for the outbreak on the Leviathan was laid squarely at the 
feet of the ship’s captain and commander who were both censured for their 
failings and poor management skills.747 The Leviathan was an old Drake-class 
armoured cruiser undertaking troop convoy duties between New York and 
Liverpool. The ship was dirty, overcrowded and through hard steaming had to 
take in 2,500 tons of coal at each port, a task that would typically take three to 
four days work from 6 am to 10 pm each day. This work seriously overworked 
the men, giving little time for leave or proper rest or to allow them to keep the 
ship and themselves clean.748  
 
After one eleven day troop convoy from New York to Liverpool the 
Leviathan went to Birkenhead to coal ship. While the ship’s company were 
engaged in coaling ship the captain announced that no leave would be given as 
a number of men had not returned onboard from the previous day and he could 
no longer trust them.749 In retaliation,150 men still in their working rig walked off 
the ship in protest at the perceived slight on their characters and at the 
excessive amount of work they were undertaking. Many of these men returned 
to the ship later that day by using ‘unauthorised gangways’ and remarkably 
managed to go ashore again having had their tea and changed into uniform 
without anyone apprehending them. Despite mounting a guard on the dockyard 
gates to prevent further men illegally leaving the ship, a number of men forced 
their way ashore the following day.750   
 
It quickly became apparent to the men that they could virtually come and 
go as they pleased as the ship’s officers had lost control of the situation and did 
not appear to know how to bring the protest to a conclusion. After two days the 
protest ended but through incompetence on the part of the captain and 
commander, no man who had absented himself from the ship had been 
properly identified or charged. 
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After conducting a court of enquiry the Senior Naval Officer for Liverpool 
reported to the Admiralty that the cause of the trouble was a tactless remark 
made by the captain that had left a large number of young stokers feeling 
aggrieved, and in a state of agitation they had walked off the ship.751  
Subsequently, the enquiry found that sixty-two stokers and thirty-three seamen 
had gone absent without leave over the two days. When questioned by the 
court of inquiry to explain his actions, Stoker Jobb, who was a hostilities only 
rating, complained that prior to walking off the ship he had been coaling ship for 
two consecutive days and nights and claimed that he had not seen his 
hammock for the previous four nights.752 In evidence the captain admitted that 
seven of his marines ‘all of good character’ with some awaiting promotion had 
also joined in the protest and had walked off the ship. However, when 
questioned, the marines claimed that they had not joined in with the main body 
of leave breakers, but had walked off the ship in order to find somewhere to 
bathe as they were ‘fed up being dirty.’753 The Leviathan as with other ships of 
that era only had one bathroom which was reserved for stokers, the rest of the 
ship’s company had to make do with buckets.754     
 
While taking a dim view of the proceedings the Admiralty appeared at a 
loss as to the best way to handle this outbreak of insubordination. One senior 
officer recommended paying the ship off and dismissing the captain as being 
‘unfitted to command one of H.M. ships’, however, this action was rejected on 
the grounds that the ship’s company would be seen to have ‘scored off the 
captain.’  Another senior officer recommended that the term ‘mutiny’ should not 
be used in this case as no action was taken to restrain the men when the 
outbreak broke out or to apprehend them when they returned onboard.755 
 
The Leviathan was allowed to complete coaling and return to her 
trooping duties with no action being taken against any of the officers or men of 
the ship, other than the captain and the commander incurring ‘their Lordships 
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severe displeasure,’ thus ending a most remarkable episode in the history of 
naval mutinies. Because no man had been charged there were no punishments 
forthcoming, equally the Admiralty, while being anxious to dismiss the captain 
and commander, were conscious of not giving the men any satisfaction in 
seeing their officers dismissed, therefore their hands appeared tied. By taking 
the line of least resistance, the Admiralty undoubtedly prevented poor publicity 
bringing the service into disrepute, while keeping the incident from the rest of 
the fleet thereby limiting any copy-cat walk outs.  
 
The 2nd Battalion (Portsmouth) Royal Fleet Reserve mutiny, referred to at 
the beginning of this chapter, could be considered to have been a mirror image 
of the Portsmouth barracks disturbances. The battalion comprised 
approximately 1,000 men with just over half being stokers. It was called up to 
aid the civil power during the coal strike of 1921 and sent to Newport. From the 
beginning there appeared to be an underlying sense of grievance amongst the 
men. Many of them were trade union members and most were unwilling to 
contribute towards breaking the strike. In addition, the men had had to give up 
their normal jobs and as a result were suffering financial hardship while their 
complaints with regards to poor food and unsanitary living conditions were 
ignored.756   
 
Despite an official inquiry, the ring leaders could not be identified. As a 
result, the Admiralty discharged 440 reservists including thirteen leading 
seamen, 128 able seamen, four signalmen, fifty-seven leading stokers and 238 
stokers. The observation made at the beginning of this chapter by the C-in-C 
Portsmouth that a higher proportion of the stokers had been insubordinate, is 
therefore both questionable and misleading. The battalion contained a higher 
proportion of stokers than seamen, as a consequence, stokers suffered a higher 
percentage of discharges (295 stokers to 145 seamen).  
 
Clearly stokers were not independently to blame for this particular mutiny. 
Indeed, the court of inquiry found that an unnamed able seaman who was 
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suspected to have been a trade union leader; ‘was influential and able to control 
the bulk of the battalion to the extent necessary to get a hearing.’757 
Subsequently, the captain of the battalion was court-martialled and reprimanded 
while other officers were censured.758   
 
In an otherwise excellent biography of HMS Hood, Bruce Taylor repeated 
an unsubstantiated rumour made in a diary kept by Boy Seaman Crawford, that 
the Hood’s stokers came close to mutiny in early 1940 on hearing that no 
Christmas leave would be given that year. From his assessment of Crawford’s 
diary Taylor observed:  
 
It may be that Boy Crawford’s entries do the stokers living on the adjoining 
mess decks a grave injustice. But if conditions in the Hood’s engine spaces 
were as they had been a year earlier it is not beyond the bounds of possibility 
that the stokers, traditionally less inclined to discipline than their seamen 
colleagues, could have collectively reached the end of their tether.’759   
 
Taylor’s suggestion that stokers were ‘traditionally less inclined to 
discipline than seamen’ was made in 2004, eighty-three years after the same 
comment was aired by the C-in-C Portsmouth in 1921. The accusation that 
stokers lacked discipline was a widely held belief in the wardrooms and mess-
decks of the twentieth century Navy. Yet, despite the longevity of the accusation, 
which now appears to have become part of naval folklore, it is a falsehood.  
 
Before he began his career as a journalist and lower-deck campaigner, 
Lionel Yexley was an experienced former petty officer seaman who had first- 
hand knowledge of the main causes of discontent on the lower-deck. Yexley 
campaigned vigorously against naval injustice even when it brought him into 
direct conflict with his former seaman colleagues. Yexley’s campaign against 
the Navy’s punitive and excessive regime of discipline had shown him that the 
uninformed in the Navy viewed stokers as ‘the undisciplined element of the 
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lower-deck'. In order to re-dress the balance, Yexley used punishment returns 
to challenge this common misconception. 760 
 
Yexley’s analysis of the punishment returns for the first seven years of 
the twentieth century showed that the total number of punishments awarded 
exceeded the number of men in service in every year. In 1905 for example, 
112,000 men accumulated 127,000 punishments, indicating to Yexley that far 
too many men were being punished for trivial misdemeanours. More importantly, 
the fact that stokers regularly received substantially fewer summary 
punishments than seamen, highlighted to Yexley that ‘stokers were far more 
disciplined than they were given credit for.’761 
 
 Following on from Yexley’s work, the following table (Table: 14) provides 
data for a twenty-five year period (1888-1912). This data, which covers an 
extended period prior to, and after that analysed by Yexley, also suggests that 
stokers were awarded substantially less summary punishments than seamen in 
every year shown. This evidence clearly contradicts the contemporary service 
and modern historical assumption that stokers were less-disciplined than 
seamen and also provides evidence that Yexley’s figures had not been chosen 
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Table 14:  Numbers of Summary Punishments Inflicted 1888-1912 
 
Year Seamen Non Seamen  Marines Afloat Marines Ashore 
1888 28,914 8,739 10,371 2,212 
1889 26,348 9,234 10,312 2,602 
1890 27,158 9,926 9,672 2,505 
1891 23,713 10,819 8,761 2,711 
1892 21,429 11,914 9,353 2,775 
1893 22,113 12,802 8,833 2,899 
1894 25,509 15,995 12,272 3,681 
1895 31,024 20,313 13,541 3,157 
1896 35,289 22,547 12,999 2,542 
1897 40,827 24,806 14,998 2,883 
1898 47,882 28,708 16,006 2,658 
1899 44,926 27,339 14,583 2,848 
1900 50,946 29,610 17,995 2,618 
1901 50,726 26,931 16,218 2,280 
1902 54,225 27,625 16,946 2,509 
1903 60,561 32,025 17,115 2,221 
1904 64,874 33,855 17,968 1,842 
1905 69,479 34,761 16,216 2,221 
1906 64,998 35,957 14,713 1,461 
1907 62,562 39,175 13,057 1,426 
1908 59,755 40,259 13,246 1,706 
1909 56,940 40,178 12,520 1,113 
1910 54,899 43,139 11,793 898 
1911 54,859 44,818 10,851 873 
1912 50,802 47,214 9,337 1,024763 
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While stokers shared the title of ‘non-seamen’ with other ratings, their 
overall numbers were small compared to the seamen branch prior to the late 
nineteenth century. This has been previously explained in chapter one whereby 
the relatively slow development of steam machinery and the reluctance to use it 
unless absolutely necessary kept the overall numbers of stokers required to a 
minimum. However, the rapid rise in the introduction of the water-tube boiler in 
the latter part of the nineteenth century accelerated the recruitment of stokers 
particularly after 1898. Despite this rise, Table 5: indicates that while the 
number of punishments awarded to non-seamen increased annually the 
increase was modest compared to that of seamen. Furthermore, while the data 
tables eventually converge, the gap did not begin to narrow until 1912 the last 
year that these returns were published. Unfortunately, it is impossible to 
separate the totals out to each respective branch.  
 
The reason why stokers were less likely to be disciplined than their 
seamen counterparts lay in the different working routines of the lower-deck. 
Yexley, observed that because men of the ‘non-seamen’ class were at work 
during the day in their respective departments, they were free from the 
‘harassing attentions’ of the ship’s police. Therefore, by the nature and place of 
their work, stokers were unable to commit the crimes (or be caught committing 
them) that seamen were regularly punished for. Yexley described these ‘crimes’ 
as being as trivial as leaning on paintwork or being improperly dressed; 
‘together with the hundred and one other petty restrictions that were introduced 
for no other reason than to irritate the men to the limit of their endurance.’764   
 
Although Yexley did not take it into consideration, one other important 
point to note with regard to stokers’ discipline was the fact that engineering 
officers did not have the power to punish. This power belonged exclusively to 
the executive branch; therefore stokers were even less likely to attract 
punishment while at work than seamen.  
  
During the Zealandia affair, the ship’s marine detachment was ordered to 
use violence if necessary in order to bring the stokers to order, despite the fact 
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that none of the stokers threatened violence themselves.765 The matter might 
have ended there but for the intervention of Yexley. Yexley forwarded a letter to 
the Admiralty written on behalf of the Zealandia’s stokers in which they outlined 
their grievances including the threat of force. The Admiralty was informed by 
Yexley that this information had passed around the fleet and that he had 
personally received assurances that no seaman, stoker or marine in any ship 
would assist their officers in similar situations.766  Having read this report, 
Winston Churchill then serving as First Lord observed, ‘this discloses a 
dangerous state of things.’767    
 
One striking difference between the discipline displayed between 
seamen and that shown by stokers was the way in which they conducted 
themselves during incidents of mutiny or acts of collective disobedience. In 
fourteen out of the sixteen mutinies which occurred prior to 1910, seamen 
committed acts of sabotage by throwing gun sights and gun parts overboard, 
thereby impairing the fighting efficiency of their ship. By contrast, the only 
recorded instance of stokers deliberately sabotaging their ship occurred 
onboard the Vindictive in 1919 when two stokers were charged with damaging 
the fan engines which supplied forced air to the stokehole furnaces, during the 
lower-deck Baltic service protest.768 
 
Stokers and Marines - an unlikely alliance? 
 
We will never know whether the marines would have actually used force 
against the Zealandia’s stokers. As it transpired they were not required to do so, 
which was just as well as it may have irreparably ruined the only real inter-
branch friendship that existed on the lower-deck. Seamen ruled the waves and 
despite the fact that stokers were the second largest branch of the lower-deck, 
they were unable to challenge the hierarchy that kept them at the bottom of the 
social ladder. Similarly, because the traditional shipboard role of marines was to 
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serve and protect officers, they were also looked down upon by seamen. The 
complex nature of the lower-deck social hierarchy contributed towards a most 
unlikely relationship which formed between stokers and marines.  These two 
very disparate bodies of men should have had little in common. On the one 
hand, stokers were commonly regarded as the ‘lowest of the low’ because of 
their dirty jobs and the perception that they lacked education and any sense of 
naval tradition or discipline. On the other, were Royal Marines, who, unlike men 
of the Royal Navy, were all sworn men who epitomised the military art through 
their smartness, military bearing and discipline.   
 
Baynham et al alluded to the fact that stokers and marines formed close 
relationships because, unlike seamen, they were both recruited as men rather 
than boys, while the lure of higher wages attracted many serving and ex-
marines and former Army personnel to join as stokers.769 Stoker William 
Stephenson was a typical cross-service volunteer. Stephenson was a former 
Royal Marine and officers servant, who later became the senior stoker on Sir 
Ernest Shackleton’s 1914 Trans-Antarctic Expedition.770  
 
However, there is another reason why these two very different types of 
men should form relationships which has not been examined in any depth. 
While on shore, marines followed a well-disciplined but relatively easy lifestyle, 
free from the petty restrictions that plagued the lives of the average sailor. 
Chapter four highlighted the better conditions of service enjoyed by marines 
who were accorded the maximum personal freedom, respect and privileges 
from their officers with regard to their rank, with even the lowest marine 
receiving privileges not accorded to a chief petty officer in the Royal Navy. 
 
However, when marines moved from their shore barracks to sea service 
they became subject to naval discipline. As a result, the well-disciplined shore 
marine suddenly found himself in direct conflict with naval authority. For 
example, in 1907 10,966 marines serving at sea accumulated 13,057 
                                            
769 H, Baynham, Men from the Dreadnoughts,164. 




punishments between them. By contrast, 7,062 marines serving ashore during 
the same period only attracted 1,046 punishments, thereby suggesting that sea-
going marines were disproportionately punished while at sea.771   
 
Yet despite the evidence presented above, the naval hierarchy used the 
example of the well disciplined marine to contrast the perceived poor discipline 
of stokers. In 1921 the C-in-C Portsmouth observed:  
 
Royal Marines and Stokers are recruited from about the same class and at 
about the same age, why is there such a marked difference in their 
discipline?772 
 
     In answer to his own question, the C-in-C suggested that marines 
were better disciplined than stokers because of the nature and extent of their 
initial military training on first entering service. However, the C-in-C argued that 
it was not the difference in time taken to train a marine or a stoker (thirty six 
weeks and sixteen weeks respectively) but the Admiralty’s insistence ‘in turning 
out a stoker first, and a disciplined man second.’773  In order to address this 
issue it was suggested that stokers should be sent to the marine barracks at 
Deal for sixteen weeks initial military training before they undertook their 
specialised engineering training; although this proposal was never implemented.      
   
Contrary to the claim made by the C-in-C Portsmouth that marines were 
better disciplined than stokers, it has been shown that well disciplined shore 
marines were more likely to incur naval punishments at sea, as they were 
largely unaccustomed to the particular petty discipline code of the Royal Navy. 
Moreover, from the sentiments expressed by the C-in-C Portsmouth it would 
appear that this fact had passed unnoticed because despite their obvious 
disciplinary problems marines were still held in high regard by officers. After all, 
marines were largely onboard to protect them from any uprising by the men. It is 
also important to note that many marines elected to act as officers’ stewards or 
servants, another reason perhaps why marines were resented by seamen. 
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Marine Richard Ley served as a marine in the Adventure during the 
Invergordon mutiny. While reminiscing about lower-deck relationships Ley 
recalled ‘marines weren’t liked you know aboard a lot of ships in those days.’774 
Ley stated that the only men marines seemed to get on with was the stokers, 
‘because stokers didn’t seem to have any antipathy towards us.’775 Therefore, it 
could be argued that because marines and stokers were regarded as lower-




During the First World War the grievances felt by the lower-deck with 
regards to their pay and general conditions of service became muted as war 
service took priority. Even Yexley’s publication, The Fleet Annual and Naval 
Year Book which pre-war had kept up a critical attack on Admiralty policy and 
indifference to the poor conditions of the lower-deck, adopted a supportive role 
towards the Admiralty’s progression of the war. At the end of the Great War 
membership of lower-deck societies began to increase and for the first time they 
became popular with the younger men of the service who were said to have 
‘flocked’ to join.776 The rise in membership of lower-deck societies and the 
general increase in militancy amongst men of the lower-deck can be explained 
by comparison with the growing interest in trade unionism ashore where 
membership of unions were also double pre-war levels.777 
 
Despite cost of living increases and a corresponding increase in civilian 
wages by 1912 pay in the Royal Navy had remained unchanged at 1s 8d per 
day for over fifty years, having remained unaltered since 1862.778  Moreover, 
there had been expensive increases in living conditions onboard, particularly 
with regard to the cost of messing, the purchase of mess-gear and clothing and 
the increased cost of canteen items. The low rate of pay in the service forced 
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married men to maintain a relatively low standard of living in their homes.779  In 
December 1912 the Admiralty approved an increase of 3d a day but only for 
men with over six years-service. The 1914 Magna Charta was the last to be 
submitted before the Great War commenced and continued the appeal for a 
‘reasonable wage for all.’780 However, by 1917 the general cost of living 
together with their low wages brought about great unrest in the service.781    
 
After the police strike of 1918, Yexley set out the lower-deck’s main 
grievances in a confidential memorandum to the Admiralty with a warning that 
grave political unrest existed on the lower-deck which if left ignored could ‘burst 
into flame.’782  Thirty-eight per cent of the men on the lower-deck were married 
and in the existing economic climate their wives could not cope, therefore, low 
pay once again became the main complaint and thrust of lower-deck 
societies.783 The captain of the Orion in supporting his ship’s welfare committee 
request to the Admiralty stated: 
 
          The governing factor appears to be increase of pay throughout and this is 
brought about by the large wages earned by people outside and the high cost of 
living. The men state their wives are in the same class and district in many 
cases as dockyard workmen and they have to compete with the wives of men 
earning £5 to £6 a week in buying provisions etc, and that despite the 
separation allowance, the family of an able seaman who is married, are living in 
real poverty from the above causes.784  
 
In October 1918 the Admiralty appointed Rear-Admiral Jerram as 
chairman of the Naval Personnel Committee. The committee was instigated 
firstly so that the Admiralty could monitor lower-deck societies and secondly in 
order to provide a forum where the Admiralty could be consulted on matters 
relating to pay and conditions. The first task of the committee was to look into 
the question of simplifying the existing structure of naval pay and allowances. 
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By 1918 there were 120 different allowances for ratings leading one senior 
officer to describe the basic rate of naval pay as ‘illogical.’785 These allowances 
had been granted to certain ratings in different branches because of perceived 
advantages by other branches. The personnel committee was unable to resolve 
the question of pay because it became bogged down with the complexities of 
these allowances, instead of tackling the root cause of dissatisfaction within the 
lower-deck which was the general ‘low level of pay.’ After the intervention of 
both Fisher and Yexley, who had publicly supported a rise in naval pay citing 
the threat of ‘trouble’ within the fleet unless pay levels were increased, the 
Admiralty reconstituted the Naval Personnel Committee in December 1918 with 
a new brief to inquire into lower-deck pay786.   
 
After only two days of hearings in the home ports, the committee 
recommended the payment of an immediate interim bonus of 1s 6d in 
recognition of the fact that naval pay had fallen far behind civilian wage 
levels.787  By 1918 the Treasury estimated the cost of living for an average 
semi-skilled family, such as a first class stoker with a wife and three children 
had increased by seventy-four per cent from 1914 levels.788 As part of this 
general increase the average food bill had nearly doubled from 23s 5d to 46s 3d, 
an average increase of ninety per cent, while the average cost of all semi-skilled 
household expenses had increased from 41s 8d to 73s a week.789   
 
In 1914 a first class stoker with six years-service earned 2s 6d a day or 
17s 6d a week, therefore his pre-war income would have been considerably 
less than the minimum required to feed a family, let alone pay for rent, clothing, 
heat and light. Even with the 1919 Jerram pay award stokers’ pay had only 
increased to 5s a day or 35s per week, less than half of the figure required to 
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maintain an average family’s household expenses.790  By contrast, a civilian gas 
work’s stoker, arguably a less-skilled man than a Navy stoker, earned around 
41s a week prior to 1914 and received regular cost of living increases.791  The 
low level of naval wages explains why so many married men were forced to live 
frugally onboard ship while earning extra money by operating lower-deck firms 
in order to support their families as previously described in chapter four.  
 
While the Navy took absolutely no responsibility for the families of its 
serving sailors, Royal Marines and soldiers’ families were exceedingly well 
provided for. Without the marriage allowances and married quarters provided 
for Army and Marines personnel, sailors and their families were reduced to 
living in damp, overcrowded and unsanitary rented rooms in the home ports. In 
Devonport for example, there was considerable overcrowding with the average 
rental for a single room typically costing from 11s to 15s a week which would 
have left a married stoker’s family living on bare subsistence levels.792   
 
The various Grand Fleet committees which offered evidence to the 
Jerram committee had asked for a flat-rate rise of 1s 6d a day across the board, 
however, this was rejected as the committee considered that a flat-rate rise 
would give the lower-deck a far greater proportionate increase ‘than was 
considered necessary or desirable.’793 Despite the previous acknowledgment 
that there were too many different scales of pay between different branches of 
men, the pay committee accepted requests from the seaman branch for a 
multitude of increases in non-substantive pay for various seaman 
specialisations which were all approved. In addition, extra allowances were 
granted to writers acting as senior officers clerks and victualling ratings 
employed in victualling office duties.794  However, the request made by stokers 
for non-substantive pay for auxiliary watch-keeping was refused on the grounds 
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that watch-keeping was considered to be ‘an ordinary part of their duty.’795 Had 
this principle been equally applied to the seaman and non-seaman branch 
requests as given above, stokers would had no choice other than to accept the 
rejection of their request on the basis that all men had been treated equally. As 
it transpired, it must have been plainly obvious to stokers that they were looked 
upon as a separate entity to all other men on the lower-deck, and as a result 
they were denied equal rights and opportunities.  
 
Jerram’s pay award was finally accepted by the Admiralty in its entirety 
and was implemented by the government in May 1919, the increases being 
backdated to the previous February. An able seamen with six years service saw 
his pay increase from 2s 1d to 4s 6d a day and a first class stoker from 2s 6d 
per day to 5s. However, with an additional one shilling a day non-substantive 
pay, a seaman qualified as gunner’s mate could equal a stoker’s pay, thereby 
removing the pay differential which had previously given stokers a higher daily 




The events which took place at Invergordon on 11 September 1931 have 
been variously described as a mutiny, disturbances, and a strike, although the 
Admiralty preferred the term ‘insubordination.’796 Despite having serious 
repercussions for the Navy and government no one was ever charged over the 
insubordination although scores of men were dismissed the service and many 
senior officers lost their commands in the aftermath. The insubordination was in 
effect a lower-deck strike over a proposed pay cut which had its beginnings in 
the pay rise of 1919. Despite the Admiralty promise that the 1919 pay rates 
would be permanent, men recruited after October 1925 were placed on a lower 
rate of pay after cuts of fifteen to sixteen per cent were demanded by the 
returning Conservative government. The idea of two different rates of pay for 
men doing the same job were bound to cause upset and resentment on the 
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closely packed lower-deck, particularly as the Navy lurched towards the end of 
the decade and into the slump of the 1930s. 
 
During the recession of 1931 the Labour government introduced cuts to 
unemployment benefits and in March of that year appointed Sir George May to 
chair a Committee on National Expenditure. The May Committee's report was 
presented to the government on 31 July and urged extensive cuts to State 
expenditure including wage cuts for civil servants, teachers, the police and the 
armed forces. The May report was published on 1st August 1931 and may have 
been read in the press by men serving in the Atlantic Fleet who had just begun 
their summer leave. The report advocated a general all round reduction in pay 
or the application of the 1925 pay rates to all men on the 1919 scale. At the time, 
seventy-five per cent of the lower-deck had joined up prior to 1925, therefore 
the proposed pay cut would have affected a majority of the lower-deck and 
would have had particular repercussions for married men. Carew, suggested 
that the lower-deck had plenty of time and opportunity to discuss the proposed 
pay cuts and their implications; therefore, when the announcement was made 
on the radio on budget day that the 1925 pay rates would be applied all round 
from 1st October 1931, it came as no real surprise.797   
 
However, the idea that the men were aware of the impending cuts prior 
to their arrival at Invergordon was rejected by former seaman Len Wincott, who 
is often referred to by authors as one of the ring-leaders and by the official 
Admiralty history as the ‘chief ring-leader’ of the mutiny. In his memoirs Wincott 
claimed the first the lower-deck heard anything about a pay cut was after the 
fleet arrived at Invergordon.798  Wincott also denied that there was any collusion 
amongst the men at Invergordon and dismissed subsequent claims of secret 
societies, pre-prepared signals and clandestine meetings as ‘fables invented by 
people anxious to save their own skins.’799 Moreover, while Wincott and the 
men of the Norfolk may have been ignorant of the proposed pay cuts, Stoker 
Robert Harbin serving in the Nelson recalled that notices reporting a flat rate 
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reduction of 1s a day for all petty officers and men, were posted on the ship’s 
notice boards which were read and discussed by the men during the passage 
north.800    
  
The pay cuts incensed the men because they affected the poorest paid 
the worst. A shilling a day deducted from an able-seaman’s pay amounted to a 
twenty five per cent reduction, whereas a lieutenant commander only lost 3.7  
per cent from his pay.801 Harbin joined the Navy at age eighteen in 1924 after 
becoming disillusioned working down the pits. He denied that there were any 
organised meetings onboard the Nelson on its passage to Invergordon, but 
admitted that the pay cuts were a source of heated debate in the lower-deck 
smoking room which was situated in the forward part of the ship.802  As a former 
miner Harbin had been a member of the miner’s union but had settled down to 
lower-deck life without any problems. He described the main spokesperson on 
the Nelson as being a three badge torpedoman (a man with twelve years 
service, each badge representing four years service). Harbin was single and, as 
he only spent his pay on ‘going ashore and beer’, he had resigned himself to 
losing a quarter of his pay and took little interest in the events occurring 
onboard his ship and in the wider fleet.   
 
On the second day of the mutiny Harbin remembered that most of the 
1919 pay scale stokers visited every mess-deck of the ship en-masse, 
encouraging the ship’s company to ‘stand firm.’ To qualify for the 1919 pay 
scale a man would have had to join the service prior to 1925 therefore by 1931 
these men would have been the older and more senior stokers. As such they 
would have been the men most likely to have been married through virtue of 
their age and their ability to afford to keep a wife and home as suggested in a 
breakdown of the Lancaster's married men in Table 8: p. 64. Married men would 
have had a particular interest in defending their right to keep the 1919 pay rate 
as they would have had the most to lose.  
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Through a series of Admiralty blunders, the news regarding the naval 
pay cuts reached the men via local and national newspapers rather than 
through official naval channels leaving Carew to consider that the men were 
better informed regarding the government’s proposals than their officers.803  A 
series of meetings were held in the canteen ashore and other meetings 
continued onboard individual ships over the following days. The men were 
furious that the largest cuts of twenty-five percent would hit the lowest paid men, 
while officers would receive relatively light cuts of eleven percent. In addition 
pensions had been cut which would have made little difference to the budget 
but would impact greatly on men nearing retirement. The main concern for 
married men was the suddenness of the cuts which were due to take effect in 
the following two weeks, leaving the men no time to discuss the implications on 
their household budgets with their wives or to make any arrangements to adjust 
their spending on items such as hire purchase agreements etc.804   
 
An agreement appears to have been reached amongst the men who 
attended the meetings in the shore side canteen and onboard individual ships 
that a protest was required against the pay cuts and a decision was made that, 
if the Valiant refused to sail for the fleet exercise as programmed on the 15th 
September, all ships would ‘down tools’ and refuse to sail. When the Valiant’s 
seamen refused to weigh anchor the Senior Naval Officer, (SNO), Rear-Admiral 
Tomkinson, contacted the Admiralty to inform it that four of his capital ships had 
refused to sail, at which point the exercise was cancelled and the Royal Navy’s 
largest mutiny since the Spithead and Nore mutinies of 1797 began.   
 
Stoker Walter Butcher joined the Navy in 1929 having been previously 
unemployed; as a result he was on the 1925 rate of pay, but thankful for it 
nonetheless. He served in the Atlantic Fleet flagship Nelson at Invergordon and 
recalled that most of the stokers on the Nelson were on ‘old rates’ of pay (1919 
rates) and being in the majority they were most likely to suffer from the cuts.805  
Despite claims of organised ‘soviet cells’ on every ship that had been planning 
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the mutiny for upwards of two years, the first Butcher heard about the mutiny 
was at 8 o’clock on the first morning after anchoring at Invergordon when 
groups of men went around the ship encouraging others to stop work.806   
 
On the first morning of the mutiny the morning watch had gone below at 
4 o’clock to light up Nelson’s boilers ready for sailing as normal, another 
indication that disobedience was unplanned. However, the forenoon watch 
failed to relieve them instead a party of stokers went below and shut the boilers 
down. One chief stoker tried to persuade the stokers to go back to work but was 
forcibly removed and locked in a drying room. Butcher recalled that the Nelson’s 
captain cleared lower deck to speak to the men but he was ‘booed’ by the ship’s 
company. 807  
 
At the time of the mutiny Stoker Walter Hargreaves had only been in the 
Navy for six months and was serving in the Hood. Prior to joining the Navy 
Hargreaves had been an unemployed weaver in Yorkshire and had joined the 
Navy because job prospects in his trade were poor. On the morning of the 
mutiny he tried to get down to the boiler room but was prevented by a large 
stoker. He remembered seeing the captain, ‘with tears running down his face,’ 
attempting to raise the anchor but the seamen linked hands and prevented 
him.808  Despite being a relative newcomer to the service Hargreaves was 
already aware that stokers and seamen didn’t get on, but was also aware of the 
strong friendship that existed between stokers and marines.809 Hargreaves, 
heard a seaman complaining that he couldn’t afford to buy any kit, and that his 
wife was struggling to make ends meet. However, when the men learned he 
was on the lower rate of pay he was shouted down, presumably because the 
higher rate of pay men would be worse off than the lower rate in the forthcoming 
cuts.     
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It must have come as something of a shock to most naval officers when 
marines participated in the insubordination. P. J. Dyke served as a Royal 
Marine non- commissioned officer in the Valiant at Invergordon. On the 
Tuesday morning of the mutiny, Dyke recalled that all of the junior marines 
refused to turn out of their hammocks when the hands were called. The Captain 
of Marines was so incensed he strapped on his revolver and went down to their 
mess deck, which marines called the ‘barracks,’ in order to speak to them. 
While he managed to talk his men into turning out of their hammocks, they 
steadfastly refused to do any work instead they went to the gun casemate which 
was their recreation area where they stayed for the rest of the day.810   
 
Dyke remembered that in the Valiant the stokers refused to go below to 
work while the only seamen on the foc’s’le were those congregating with other 
men in a show of mutual support. However, while no official work was 
conducted onboard Valiant during the protest the ship’s ‘firms’ operated as 
normal. With the planned exercise and gunnery firings cancelled, the Valiant’s 
gunnery officers helped by midshipmen, struggled to remove the sub-calibre 
mechanisms which had been fitted to the ship’s fifteen inch main guns in 
preparation for the gunnery firings. Dyke recalled that the men ignored their  
officer’s and instead queued in their casement to pay to use the dartboard 
operated by the ‘dartboard firm,’ while the cobbler and Jewing firm conducted 
their business as normal.811 Even before the insubordination at Invergordon 
Dyke considered the Valiant to be an ‘unhappy ship’, as each morning there 
would be a ‘full complement’ of men lined up on the quarter deck waiting to see 
the Commander or Captain having fallen foul of naval discipline regulations.812 
 
The manner in which the men conducted themselves during the 
insubordination differed from ship to ship. While the Valiant’s stokers were 
alleged to have refused to go below to work, Stoker Nicholas Carr recalled that 
                                            
810 P. J. Dyke, I.W.M. 5843 (London, Imperial War Museum Sound Archive, 1980). Audio Tape 
1 Reel. 
811 Sub-calibre mechanisms were fitted inside the fifteen inch main guns so that practice firing 
could be conducted using a smaller calibre shell, thereby reducing wear and tear on the main 
gun barrel which had a limited life when using full-calibre ammunition.  
812 P. J. Dyke, I.W.M. 5843. 
303 
 
all of the Hood’s stokers worked as normal; adding, ‘we just didn’t go to sea.’813 
Carr had an unusual service career as prior to joining the Hood he served for 
three years in the New Zealand Division of the Royal Navy.814  As a Stoker in 
the New Zealand Division Carr earned twice as much pay as he would have 
done in the Royal Navy, noting that when he joined the Hood after her ‘big refit’ 
in 1929, his pay reduced to five shillings and six pence a day which came as 
something of a shock.  
 
After two days of insubordination, the Admiralty took a gamble and 
ordered Tomkinson to sail his fleet back to their home ports in an attempt to end 
the status-quo not knowing whether the order would be obeyed or not. Despite 
reluctance on the part of Wincott and others to lose the upper-hand, the order 
was welcomed by a majority of the men and the fleet dispersed to their 
respective ports. On the passage back south investigations began in order to 
determine the effects the cuts would have on married men. Onboard the Nelson 
the chaplain undertook hardship interviews although Harbin could not 
remember any stoker presenting himself for interview.815 The naval committee 
formed at Portsmouth to hear evidence of hardship arising out of the pay cuts 
noted:  
 
           A large number of married men under the age of 25 (i.e. ineligible for marriage 
allowance) came forward and showed by their “budgets” the extreme difficulty 
they had experienced in the past making both ends meet. It appeared obvious 
from their statements that their wives and families are even now in difficult 
circumstances, in some cases being unable to provide sufficient nourishment. 
This is borne out by the appearance of some of the witnesses. From 
consideration of cases of married ratings over 25 below leading rates, there is 
no doubt that a large number of these ratings, who, in view of their high rents, 
instalments on furniture, etc, are finding it difficult to make ends meet on the 
1919 rates of pay, will find it much more difficult, if not impossible, to do so with 
a 10% cut.816 
 
                                            
813 Nicholas Smiles Carr, I.W.M. 5809 (London, Imperial War Museum Sound Archive, 1980). 
Audio Tape, 1 Reel. 
814 First World War-Royal New Zealand Navy, (History Group of the New Zealand Ministry for 
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815 R. H. Harbin, I.W.M. 5837.  
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The men most hard hit by the cuts were described as:  
a) single men under 25 who have dependents 
b) Men under 25 who married on the assumption that on the 1919 rates 
they could just manage until they qualified for marriage allowance. 
c) Men over 25 who have more than two children.817 
 
A typical example of the level to which the reduction in pay affected 
married men was described by a stoker serving in the Malaya who was aged 
twenty-four with one child who did not qualify for marriage allowance. Giving 
evidence to the Hardship Committee the stoker stated that prior to the pay cut 
his wage had been 37s 11d a week from which he allotted his wife 30s a week 
leaving him 7s 11d for his own expenses. As men were paid fortnightly this man 
saved a further 10s a fortnight and sent this directly to his wife, therefore he 
only allowed himself 2s 11d a week to pay his mess bill and other sundries. 
From her allowance, his wife paid 9s 6d rent, 15s on food, 3s on fuel and light, 
2s on clothes, and 1s on insurance. When the pay cuts came into force this 
man’s pay dropped to 32s 11d a week, therefore he was no longer able to send 
his wife the additional 10s. Moreover, as victualling allowance was also cut his 
mess bills would have increased. Without the additional 10s a fortnight his 
wife’s household expenses amounted to 6d a week more than she received.818    
 
The insubordination achieved its aim and the pay cuts were revised so 
that on paper no man lost more than ten per cent of his pay. However, the 
government had not abandoned its aim of applying the 1925 rates across the 
board. One way in which it achieved this was by limiting the ten per cent cut to a 
first term of engagement only. Therefore, any man who joined prior to 1925 and 
then re-engaged for a further term of service automatically reverted to the lower 
rate of pay and pension. Carew noted that this anomaly caused further 
confusion and distress with four different pay and pension scales in operation 
post 1931 depending on whether a man joined before, 1921, 1925, or 1930.819   
 
As previously stated, married men under the age of twenty-five who were 
not in receipt of marriage allowance were the hardest hit and those who would 
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accept it could apply for a small subsidy from the Royal Naval Benevolent Trust 
(R.N.B.T.). During the post Invergordon hardship enquiries, many men refused 
to discuss their financial affairs and declined to engage with investigating 
officers, while many others refused to apply to the R.N.B.T. for financial help. 
Despite the extreme financial hardship which fell mostly on the married men, 
many of them remained too proud to ask for help. Carew noted that the 
Admiralty instituted a fund of £5,000 administered by the R.N.B.T. to provide 
assistance to over 1,000 of the younger married men under the age of twenty 
five who were not entitled to marriage allowance. Only 716 men applied for 
financial support receiving just two shillings a week with children and one 
shilling without.820 With some irony, Carew noted that while the Admiralty 
offered the men ‘paltry handouts’ it pressed ahead with its plans for a new 
£800,000 Royal Yacht.821          
 
In his summing up of the Invergordon affair, Alan Eriera considered that 
the mutiny had broken the morale of many officers. The sudden realisation that 
the discipline of the men depended not on the authority invested in naval 
officers but on the consent of the men, had ‘shaken and cracked the very 
ground they stood on.’822  A naval officer present at Invergordon recorded the 
fact that given a bad enough situation, ‘force of numbers would always win,’ 
noting with hindsight that ‘twenty officers couldn’t make a thousand men do 
anything they didn’t want to do.’823   
 
With regards to apportioning blame for the insubordination, the 
Admiralty’s official history stated that most of the leaders at Invergordon were 
‘able seamen of standing’, with a few leading seamen and ‘some stokers and 
marines.’824  The Admiralty took the extraordinary step of not officially charging 
or punishing any of the men who took part, or those officers who may have 
been thought negligible in their handling of the incident. However, after a 
prolonged investigation 120 men identified as ‘trouble makers’ were quietly 
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removed from their ships in the Atlantic Fleet and sent to barracks. The majority 
of these men were later dispersed throughout the Navy or kept in barracks 
doing menial chores until they were time expired and could be discharged. 
Twenty-seven ring-leaders including Wincott, were discharged to shore services 
no longer required. In addition, the S.N.O. of the Atlantic Fleet and several of 
his commanding officers were later relieved of their commands.   
 
Just months after Invergordon a submarine executive officer felt 
compelled to publicly promote stokers by suggesting that ‘the stoker usually has 
a more developed sense of duty’ than the seaman. 825  It was pointed out that 
the mutiny on the Lucia only involved seamen, while after Invergordon a lower-
deck rumour surfaced in which it was alleged that stokers were very near to 
‘turning to’ (returning to work) after the seamen had refused duty.826  It was also 
claimed that stokers were quicker workers than seamen, who were judged to be 
very slow workers, ‘because they had so little work to do.’827   
 
In 1942 another submarine executive officer boldly stated that in his own 
ship he could ‘get on very well without any seamen at all’, with the proviso that 
he ‘had stokers instead.’828 The idea was put forward that a stoker’s training 
produced a ‘more adaptable and reliable man’ who ‘learnt how to steer just as 
quickly as the seaman.’  Moreover, stokers were said to have a better idea of 
what was happening when dealing with emergencies, while they were less 
clumsy than seamen in most tasks because they had been taught in training ‘to 
use their hands.’829  Coming from another executive officer this was praise 
indeed.   
 
One reason for this apparent volte-face from seaman officers could be 
attributed to what one termed the ‘intellectual snobbery’ practiced within the 
stokers’ branch which made them ‘extremely easy to handle.’ It was suggested 
that stokers ‘fancied their capabilities as E.R.As,’ therefore if they were treated 
                                            
825 ‘In Defence of Mechanical Training’ The Naval Review, 20, no. 4 (1932), 695. 
826 Ibid.  
827 Ibid. 
828 "Para Bellum," The Naval Review 30, no. 2 (1942). 119. 
829 Ibid, 119.   
307 
 
as ‘intelligent beings’ they would always ‘work splendidly.’830 These sentiments 
clearly contradict the usual negative stereotype of the typical stoker represented 
in fact and fiction and examined in earlier chapters, particularly the notion of 
intellectual snobbery.   
  
After decades of being dismissed as ill-disciplined and unworthy, stokers 
had finally found supporters from within the seaman branch who recognised the 
value of their high level skills and sense of duty. The expression of views from 
these executive officers remained unchallenged in their service journal thereby 
suggesting that stokers may have finally been rehabilitated and found renewed 
acceptance in the service. 
 
In conclusion, the statement made by the C-in-C Portsmouth that stokers’ 
were ‘the weak link in the naval chain of command’ was inaccurate and 
misleading. Had the C-in-C based his assumption on evidence, he would have 
had to modify his statement and accuse seamen of being the ‘weak link’, as 
statistically they were six times more likely to participate in mutiny than stokers.  
Moreover, in the twenty-four years between 1888-1912, seamen committed 
more offences against the Naval Discipline Act than stokers in every year. The 
reason for this anomaly is simplicity in itself. On the one hand seamen had little 
work to do onboard a ship at sea other than keeping it clean and painted and 
playing their part in daily evolutions and drills; therefore they were more prone 
to being caught committing disciplinary offences. On the other hand, stokers 
had too much work to do at sea and little time or opportunity to commit offences. 
When a ship was in harbour and seamen had even less work to do stokers 
would have been busily employed cleaning boilers and undertaking 
maintenance and repairs, again leaving them little time or opportunity to commit 
misdemeanours.   
 
The fact that seamen officers were deemed to have been responsible for 
two out of the three serious instances of mutiny involving stokers prior to 1921, 
further reinforces the notion that, despite general naval and historical opinion, 
stokers were on the whole very amenable to naval discipline provided they were 
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treated correctly. Stokers were often accused of being ill educated and uncouth, 
yet their behaviour during the Portsmouth barracks and Zealandia affairs 
suggests they had a highly developed sense of right and a determination to 
stand up for themselves, even when the penalties for doing so were severe. 
Moreover, despite extreme provocation, such as the treatment stokers received 
from their executive officers on the Zealandia, incidents of insubordination 
involving stokers were characterised by a lack of malice towards their officers 
together with an absence of sabotage. This contrasts strongly with the actions 
of seamen who were more likely to undertake sabotage during insubordination 
or mutiny by throwing gun-sights overboard, which was a prominent feature of 
most of the incidents of mutiny involving seamen prior to 1921. Because officers 
were to blame for the Portsmouth barracks mutiny, Stoker Moody had his 
sentence reduced after public protest and parliamentary support. Similarly, the 
Zealandia’s stokers had their sentences annulled.   
 
It is ironic that despite years of poor treatment from the seaman branch, 
by the 1930s seamen officers publicly acknowledged the value of a well trained 
stoker over a seaman rating. When the seamen mutinied on the Lucia, the 
captain turned to the ship’s stokers to guard them, while another executive 
officer downplayed the stoker’s role at Invergordon suggesting that they were 
more amenable to ending the incident than seamen and other ratings. This 
notion is reinforced by the Admiralty official history of Invergordon which 
observed that most of the leaders were able-seamen, with a few leading 
seamen and some stokers and marines. While this statement does not totally 
absolve stokers from participating in the largest single act of disobedience since 
1797, it clearly suggests that stokers took a more passive role than a majority of 
seamen further debunking the myth that stokers were ‘the weak link in the chain 
of naval discipline.’       
 
This chapter also addressed the unique relationship that existed between 
what were seen as undisciplined stokers and extremely well disciplined marines. 
On face value it was inconceivable that any relationship could have developed 
between these two very disparate bodies of men. However, it has been shown 
that once removed from the relative freedom of their shore barracks, marines at 
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sea brought a disproportionate amount of punishments upon themselves 
through falling foul of petty naval discipline. Moreover, while stokers committed 
far fewer offences than seamen, the actual perception was the reverse; 
therefore stokers were wrongly viewed by senior officers and a good body of the 
lower-deck as being undisciplined. Perversely, marines had the strongest 
reputation for discipline but their actual disciplinary record was poor. This 
anomaly was caused through the contrast between the mature manner in which 
marines were treated ashore, compared with the petty system of naval 
discipline at sea.  
 
It has already been noted that there was a longstanding tradition of using 
marines to support the stokehole crews when stokers were under pressure. In 
addition, many serving marines volunteered to change over to stoker, while 
marines who had left the service often re-joined as stokers in order to benefit 
from the extra pay. The fact that marines appeared to enjoy the work and were 
able to cope with the harsh conditions that existed in the stokehole goes some 
way to explaining the unusual friendship that grew between stokers and 
marines. To this we can add the common bond of their low social status and 
perceived ill discipline. In the stokers’ case, their ill discipline was more invented 
than real, while for the marines the perception of their excellent discipline failed 
to match the reality of their shipboard life. This contrast, together with the 
seaman dominated lower-deck which placed both stokers and marines at the 
bottom of the social hierarchy, only served to bring both bodies of men together 















Conclusion: A ‘very inferior class of men’- A reappraisal of the myth. 
 
In 1859 the Surveyor of the Navy described stokers as ‘a very inferior 
class of men.’831 This may well be the earliest recorded criticism of stokers but it 
would certainly not be the last. No other branch of the lower-deck has been 
subject to such prolonged and widespread criticism or censure than stokers. 
The purpose of this thesis has been to seek answers and evidence which might 
explain the reasons why stokers attracted such a poor reputation, and to test 
whether this reputation was deserved. 
The introduction to this thesis examined the historiography of stokers and 
their presentation in the social history of the Royal Navy. It argued that 
historians have either ignored the contribution of stokers entirely, or they have 
resorted to negative stereotypes portraying them in a poor light. Neither Edgar 
Smith in his Short History of Marine Engineering, or Admiral Kincome, in a 
lecture on the first one hundred years of naval engineering, saw fit to even 
mention the contribution of stokers to the growth of the steam Navy. Others, 
such as Rippon, and Beresford, deliberately misused the same historical source 
in an attempt to make history fit their story, thereby adding to the myth that 
stokers really were the ‘lowest of the low.’  
Christopher McKee, Sober Men and True, highlighted the fact that 
stokers suffered from a negative image and then set about describing them as 
‘big, strong, illiterate, dumb guys, all brawn and no brain recruited to do the 
ships heavy lifting in torrid, coal soiled engine spaces.’ While acknowledging 
that he had succumbed to the negative stereotype himself, McKee offered no 
apology for its use admitting that the negative stereotype stuck to stokers ‘with 
all the adhesive excellence of Tar Baby.’  
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In similar vein, stokers are often used as an example to illustrate 
disciplinary problems in the Navy. Mary Conley highlighted the Portsmouth 
barracks disturbances of 1906 in From Jack Tar to Union Jack and suggested 
that the stokers mutinied over pay, work and discipline. However, chapter seven 
clearly showed that the ‘disturbances’ at Portsmouth were actually caused by 
the improper use of an obscure order given by an over-zealous officer who was 
subsequently court-martialled for its use. Moreover, out of the fourteen recorded 
cases of mutiny prior to 1914, seamen staged eleven and stokers just three, 
while two of these were the direct result of their ill-treatment by officers. 
Therefore, by using stokers as an example and by highlighting one specific 
incident Conley has added to the enduring myth that stokers were ill-disciplined 
when the reverse is true. Had Conley mentioned the mutiny in the Barfleur at 
Hong Kong in 1900 or the Leviathan in 1909 both of which were staged by 
seamen, alongside the stokers' incident, she would have presented a more even 
handed and accurate picture of lower-deck ill-discipline. 
Brian Lavery’s Able Seaman: The Lower Deck of the Royal Navy 1850-
1939 stands alone as the only social history of the lower-deck written thus far 
that treats stokers as equals, while ignoring the use of the negative stereotype 
so often resorted to by others. Lavery made an important point when he 
declared that the ordinary sailor of the Royal Navy had not had his share of 
attention from historians over the years. As a result, Lavery describes the period 
1850 to the present as a ‘clean sheet’ as far as the naval historian was 
concerned. As the introduction to this thesis has demonstrated, stokers have 
been badly treated by history. They have been alternately ignored, marginalised 
and stereotyped; therefore, with regards to the writing of their social history this 
thesis can be considered the stokers’ ‘clean sheet.’  
Despite the naval surveyor’s personal opinion in 1859, criticism of stokers 
was relatively unusual in the nineteenth century Navy. The decade of the ‘great 
sailing era’ (1860-1870) saw little demand for stokers or steam. By 1864 there 
were barely 4,000 stokers at sea compared to 53,000 seamen; therefore the 
relatively small numbers of stokers in each ship posed little threat to the status 
quo. As a consequence, there is no evidence to suggest that stokers were 
treated any differently to seamen during this period. Indeed, it could be argued 
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that stokers received rather better treatment than seamen on account of their 
specialised skills for which they received a higher daily rate of pay and certain 
other privileges.  
Attitudes towards stokers began to change in the latter part of the 
nineteenth century when the water-tube boiler was introduced. The water-tube 
boiler was a major technological development being smaller and more efficient 
than the cylindrical fire-tube boiler it replaced, while it could also supply steam at 
much higher pressures. However, far more water-tube boilers were required to 
replace a smaller number of cylindrical boilers, therefore, a greater number of 
stokers was required to operate them. The sudden influx of large numbers of 
stokers into the Navy inevitably upset the balance between the various 
branches and posed a direct threat towards the traditional majority of the 
seaman branch. In addition, rivalries and animosities grew over the chore of 
coaling ship and the endless cleaning routines that became associated with the 
use of coal.   
The sudden demand for large numbers of stokers to operate the 
increased number of boilers placed a huge strain on naval recruitment. It is clear 
from the evidence presented that individual recruitment officers cut corners and 
entered men who fell short of the official physical entry requirements for stokers. 
Moreover, in its haste to introduce the water-tube boiler, the Admiralty also cut 
corners. The Admiralty acknowledged that it had failed to provide sufficient and 
timely training for stokers but stubbornly continued to send untrained stokers to 
sea, justifying its position by claiming that the boiler replacement programme 
was the main priority.  
When naval correspondents began to report news of mishaps, accidents 
and problems with the new boilers, the blame was unfairly placed on ‘unskilled’ 
stokers, when in fact the blame lay with the Admiralty and its policy of sending 
‘untrained’ stokers to man its most modern ships. With such a large 
technological investment at stake, the Admiralty clearly shifted the blame from 
its decision to introduce the new boiler and its related failure to provide sufficient 
training for the stokers from the technology, to the men themselves.  
313 
 
The coal-fired era placed stokers under abnormal conditions of mental 
and physical stress. They worked under intolerable conditions in suffocating 
coal bunkers and fiercely hot stokeholes with the knowledge that at any time 
they could suffer bunker or boiler explosions, suffocation, burns, scalds and 
other medical conditions associated with heat induced labour. Despite the 
knowledge that the maximum speed of a ship was limited by the endurance of 
its stokers, no official Admiralty investigations were ever made in order to 
determine the optimum conditions for labour in the stokeholes and engine 
rooms of its ships. It was only through the individual efforts and investigations of 
a handful of ships’ surgeons, notably those undertaken by Staff Surgeon Rees 
of the Fox in 1908, that the debilitating condition known as ‘stokers’ cramp’ was 
investigated. Even then, it took several more decades of suffering before the 
condition was finally diagnosed as a salt deficiency and remedies provided.  
During periods of intense heat or when steaming at high rates for 
extended periods of time, stokers working as trimmers in the coal-bunkers and 
those dragging coal to the stokehole in ‘skips’ had to be supplemented by 
seamen and marines. While they were paid the stoker’s rate of pay for this extra 
duty, seamen would have felt resentful having to endure stoker’s work, 
particularly as they were primarily responsible for according stokers the title of 
‘lowest of the low.’ By contrast, marines were always happy to work alongside 
stokers.  
Despite the cramped living conditions found onboard warships of the era, 
stokers and seamen hardly ever mixed. In some ships they were allocated 
different sections of the upper-deck for smoking and socialising. This 
segregation allowed many misconceptions to grow around stokers. Some 
seamen believed stokers did not have to pass the standard naval entry test 
leading to a belief that most stokers were illiterate. Whereas stokers, like 
seamen, came from a wide cross-section of working-class society. Many stokers 
were time-served tradesmen prior to joining the Navy while others successfully 
passed the academically challenging E.R.As entry examination to qualify as 
mechanicians. The former Chief Stoker, John Capes, was the son of a diplomat 
and enjoyed a public school education while Arthur Lilley, a Plymouth grammar 
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school boy qualified as a naval schoolmaster and taught literacy and numeracy 
to stokers and seamen.   
The grimy ‘underground’ nature of stokehole work has been a major 
contribution to the longevity of the stoker stereotype. McKee described stokers’ 
work as ‘heavy lifting in torrid, coal soiled engine spaces.’ However, the reality 
of their work was dramatically different. Those who actually experienced the 
conditions under which stokers laboured, such as Surgeon T. B. Dixon of the 
Kent did not need to make light of a stoker’s work. Dixon’s description of the 
choking atmosphere and impossible conditions in a coal bunker on the Kent 
while coaling ship defies the imagination. Dixon made one brief visit to a coal 
bunker and very nearly lost his life, thereafter he had nothing but the highest 
praise for the skill and fortitude of stokers who daily laboured under the most 
appalling conditions.832  
Part of the blame for the stokers’ negative stereotype undoubtedly rests 
on the stokers themselves for failing to unite and form a single society to fight 
their cause. One hundred percent of E.R.As and ships’ writers belonged to 
branch societies, but only thirty-three percent of stokers and mechanicians 
chose to join a representative society. Interestingly, only marines had a lower 
percentage of society membership than stokers, possibly suggesting that the 
two branches that occupied the lowest positions in naval society may well have 
lost the will to fight against the tide of discrimination.833 Then again, it could be 
argued that despite general consensus, stokers were never a militant body of 
men. While E.R.As and others had no hesitation in procuring the support of 
affiliated trade unions or sympathetic MPs to promote their individual branch 
petitions, stokers refused to acknowledge their place in the naval hierarchical 
system and simply got on with their job. 
Because stokers failed to unite under a single branch society they were 
unable to use their strength in numbers to put pressure on the Admiralty to grant 
their branch petitions. However, even if they had utilised their strength in 
numbers evidence shows that the Admiralty had a policy of treating stokers 
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differently to other men. Stokers were forced to continue to purchase their 
uniforms and bedding when all other men received their kit free of charge. In 
addition, the stokers’ branch was the only branch of the lower-deck that did not 
have direct promotion to warrant officer rank while stokers were denied any 
direct representation on the ratings advisory board of the 1918 Naval Personnel 
Committee. As a result, every item of the stokers’ respectful and relatively 
undemanding 1914 Loyal Appeal was rejected out of hand, whereas smaller, 
more unified branches, making similar appeals were rewarded. The one topic 
which actually brought stokers together and achieved limited success was their 
influence on victualling reform. Although even here, the reform proved beneficial 
to all men, not just to stokers.  
For over one hundred years the Admiralty systematically refused to 
accept any responsibility for the proper feeding of the lower-deck. The stokers 
representing the Devonport division made strong representation to the Login 
Victualling Committee requesting the abolishment of the canteen messing 
system and removal of the worst excesses of ship's canteens. Their argument 
was strong enough for them to receive the full support and backing of all the 
other Devonport branch societies at a time when branch societies remained 
insular and stokers remained on the periphery of the lower-deck movement. The 
fact that the Devonport division united behind the stokers attests to the strong 
feeling of the men for victualling reform.   
Yet, despite evidence which suggests that for many years prior to the 
Invergordon mutiny the poor system of naval victualling had been a real source 
of discontent on the lower-deck, the Admiralty and senior officers alike appeared 
to have taken little notice. Admiral Cowan, the former commanding officer of the 
Zealandia during the stokers’ mutiny of 1914, showed that he had learnt nothing 
from the past or from the Invergordon insubordination itself when he observed:   
           For the last 4 or 5 years in my judgement the Admiralty have failed to check a 
growing looseness of discipline. As regards the men there has been far too 
much talk of increased privileges, comfort, food etc and too little of achievement 
and efficiency.834 
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As the contemporary editor and leading naval advocate Stephen 
Reynolds noted, the Admiralty was notoriously clever at moving without 
progressing,...at altering things without changing them.835 Instead of changing 
its outdated and amateur victualling system to a professional system like the 
British Army, the Admiralty instigated a succession of victualling committees 
during the early twentieth century and offered minor reforms to victualling that in 
the end, changed very little towards the comfort and well-being of the men and 
only added to the discontent that was building towards the eventual outburst at 
Invergordon. 
On the lower-deck, relationships between most branches were strained 
to the point of open animosity. This situation also existed to some extent in the 
wardroom between different classes of warrant and commissioned officers; 
however, no such problems existed in the submarine service. Those who 
volunteered for submarines joined a service which treated everyone as an equal. 
It was also unusual in that it did not require the services of naval police to keep 
the men in order. If a submariner stepped over the line the worst punishment he 
could receive was to be ‘returned to general service.’ Submarine discipline to 
stoker Sydney Palmer ‘was doing your job efficiently.’ 836 Palmer remembered 
that once the klaxon sounded ‘everybody depended on everybody else to do 
their job……you were not allowed to make an error.’837 As a result, submariners 
enjoyed a unique camaraderie which was not found in any other part of the 
service. 
Submarine living was undoubtedly hard. Despite the obvious dangers, 
the relaxed style of discipline with more emphasis on personal rather than 
traditional naval discipline, together with the lure of extra pay, attracted a certain 
type of man. The oil fired, steam driven, K-class submarines have been 
portrayed by certain historians as inherently dangerous and intensely disliked by 
those unfortunate to have served in them. While they certainly suffered more 
than their fair share of accidents and mishaps, they were not as disliked as most 
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claim. Many men such as Leading Stoker Steel had great affection for their ‘K’ 
boats, even though being alternately baked by heat and then drenched with 
water cascading down the funnels and boiler room ventilators must have made 
keeping a watch in a K-Class boiler room a most trying experience. 
No submarines participated in the Invergordon insubordination. Their 
independence of command, smaller crews, better pay and vastly different way 
of life probably isolated them from the agitation that had built up for many years 
in the surface fleet prior to Invergordon. In the submarine service men also 
benefited from having more direct access to their officers, while the mutual 
respect which existed at every level contributed to a more open and less 
hidebound society.  
In late 1906, at the height of the popular culture of navalism, when the 
Navy and its sailors were very much in the public eye, a number of second class 
stokers caused a relatively minor disturbance at Portsmouth naval barracks 
which received widespread attention from the press. The Portsmouth barracks 
incident is notable not for what actually happened but for the way in which it 
brought stokers to the fore and into public and service disrepute. No doubt the 
press were initially attracted to the story because of the unusual nature of the 
incident which made lurid headlines. On the other hand, Jan Rüger noted in The 
Great Naval Game, that while the naval authorities attempted to utilise the naval 
stage for their own interests, the forces of mass culture had a strong grip on the 
way in which naval events were reported. As a result, what should have been a 
strictly private internal naval protest became a public spectacle in which civilian 
players became involved after the disturbances spilled out onto the public 
highway. Unfortunately, by bringing stokers to the fore, this incident became the 
catalyst which forever tarnished their reputation; thereafter they would be 
measured and judged by this one example of ill-discipline.  
There has been a longstanding belief within the service, which is shared 
by many historians, that stokers had the worse disciplinary record in the Navy. 
However, evidence produced in this thesis has demonstrated that stokers 
actually had a far better individual disciplinary record than seamen and were 
also far less inclined to participate in acts of mutiny or collective disobedience. 
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In addition, it is notable that stokers showed remarkable restraint while 
participating in mutiny or collective disobedience by refraining from acts of 
malice or sabotage which traditionally characterised acts of disobedience by 
seamen. Moreover, in each of the most serious cases of mutiny committed by 
stokers the Admiralty laid the blame for each incident entirely on senior officers. 
As a result, the officers were punished not the men. This thesis has also 
demonstrated that many stokers had prior military experience either as marines 
or as former Army volunteers. Therefore, it is inconceivable that as so many of 
them had prior military experience they should have displayed a poor attitude to 
discipline. Rather it appears to have suited their detractors to add ill-discipline to 
their list of undesirable qualities. 
With regards to the Invergordon insubordination the outcome is similar. 
The Admiralty official history observed that most of the leaders at Invergordon 
were ‘able seamen of standing, with a few leading seamen and some stokers 
and marines.’ This thesis set out to challenge the notion that stokers were an ill-
disciplined and inferior class of men. It has examined the evidence and 
concluded that much of what has been published about stokers is neither 
accurate nor true. Yet, from the 1906 Portsmouth barracks mutiny, the stoker 
has been portrayed in history in a stereotypical and negative manner.  
In concentrating on the negative stereotype historians have ignored much 
of what stokers stood for. No ship’s sports team was without its complement of 
stokers, while stokers liked nothing better than to take on and beat seamen 
whether in a gun loading, boat-pulling or shooting competition. Stokers were 
also capable of displaying the same levels of bravery, initiative and traditions for 
the Navy as any other man. They served with distinction in naval brigades 
ashore during the Boer War and elsewhere, while one of the very first recipients 
of the Victoria Cross (Naval) was Leading Stoker William Johnston who served 
in the Arrogant during the Crimean war. Stokers such as Chief Stoker Albert 
Stickley was one of many to be credited with courageous conduct in the 
stokehole. Stickley was awarded the Albert Medal in 1904 after an explosion 
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wrecked a stokehold in the Success. 838 Chief Stoker William Lashly was 
another exceptional man who epitomised the strong and patriotic sailor who was 
so popular in the public consciousness during the popular culture of navalism. 
Lashly accompanied Captain Scott on his 1901 and 1910 Antarctic expeditions 
and was awarded the Albert medal for helping to save the life of Lieutenant 
Evans on the hazardous 1500 mile trek back to base camp after Scott set out 
for the pole.839 Later in life, Admiral Evans wrote in the foreward to Lashly’s 
diary:   
This little volume Lashly’s diary, is a chapter from the life of one of those steel-
true Englishmen whose example sets us all a-thinking. I owe my life to Lashly’s 
devotion and his admirable duty sense. He is one of those Yeomen of England 
whose type gave us Drake’s men and Nelson’s men and Scott’s and 
Shackleton’s men, and will do so again.840 
These few examples represent the stokers who have been ignored in the 
general historiography of the lower-deck. Unfortunately, their deeds in the 
stokehole went unnoticed except by a handful of hardy commentators who 
witnessed at first hand the dangers they faced. It is a travesty of justice that men 
such as these should have suffered the label ‘lowest of the low,’ simply because 
their work was considered to be dirty, manual and un-seaman like. 
The naval lower-deck was a microcosm of British society. Like the society 
it served it was class conscious, riven by snobbery and organised on strict 
hierarchical terms. While seamen reigned supreme through tradition, weight of 
numbers and by virtue of their authority as the ‘military arm’ of the service, other 
branches vied to establish their own position within the hierarchy. Telegraphists, 
writers and sick berth attendants claimed a high position by virtue of their 
superior intellect. Similarly, artisans such as blacksmiths, shipwrights, and 
coopers, also demanded recognition for being time-served tradesmen.  
Ironically, the men who actually occupied the top position in the lower-
deck hierarchy were the E.R.As, men who had no wish to be associated with it. 
                                            
838 TNA. HO 45/10314/125047, "Albert Medal 2nd Class Alfred Stickley Chief Stoker," ed. Home 
Office (1905). 
839 TNA, HO 45/10314/125047, Albert Medal. 




E.R.As believed they were separate and distinct from the lower-deck, a notion 
they harboured as part of their longstanding ambitions to join the officer class. 
Because they were granted special privileges E.R.As looked down on all other 
tradesmen and seamen and consistently refused to participate in lower-deck 
petitions or Magna Charters preferring instead to pursue their own individual 
claims. 
The Navy made E.R.As a special case and by awarding them a high 
status in the Navy it elevated them far above their actual position of tradesmen. 
As a result, they became immune from the class snobbery that acted against 
stokers. Despite their elitist class position, E.R.As worked happily side by side 
with stokers, the ‘lowest of the low.’ This working relationship was highly 
beneficial to both parties and relied on shared dangers and mutual trust and 
respect. Seamen resented the superior status accorded to E.R.As particularly 
because they received special privileges and more importantly because seamen 
had no authority over them. Moreover, in similar vein to the way in which 
marines were despised by seamen because they acted as officers’ servants, 
stokers attracted the same level of criticism because they acted as mess-men to 
E.R.As.  
The influence of Royal Marines on stokers became an unexpected 
feature of this thesis. Others have alluded to the mutual friendship that existed 
between these two groups of men but, apart from noting that a number of 
stokers had previously served in the marines or Army prior to joining the Navy, 
no real evidence or rationale for this friendship has been produced. It is now 
clear that both groups of men had more in common than previously thought. 
 Marines and stokers were both recruited as men as opposed to seamen 
who were mainly recruited as boys and youths. They also shared similar 
physical characteristics which set them apart from seamen and others. The 
numbers of former marines and soldiers in the stokers’ ranks has been 
mentioned. However, while stokers have been accused of being the weak link in 
the chain of naval discipline, no one has considered the effect of the military 
experience and discipline that these former military men would have brought to 
the stokers’ ranks. It is probable that they would have made stokers more, not 
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less, disciplined. Apart from stokers, marines were the only other men attracted 
to stokehole work. No doubt the attraction was the opportunity to earn extra pay 
at a time when pay was minimal, but possibly also because many of their former 
comrades were stokers and they identified with their ethos. As a result, these 
two disparate groups of men bonded together and formed lasting friendships on 
a lower-deck that was awash with inter-branch rivalries.    
After the trouble at Portsmouth in 1906 a S.P.O. summed up the feelings 
of the stokers’ branch by observing that stokers were viewed as 'social lepers 
whose presence in the Navy was only tolerated as a kind of necessary evil.’ 
This thesis argues that history has helped portray stokers as the ‘social lepers’ 
of the Navy by repeating myths without providing the evidence necessary to 
substantiate their claims. The Navy has also played its part by regarding stokers 
as something akin to a ‘necessary evil’ and allowing the myths to become 
established when it had the evidence to dispel them at source. 
This thesis argues that stokers were neither the ‘lowest of the low,’ the 
‘weakest link,’ or ‘a most inferior class of men.’ Stokers themselves never 
acknowledged any of the myths attributed to them. Despite suffering many 
grievances through being treated differently to other men stokers simply got on 
with their job refusing to make a fuss. When challenged or to make a point they 
would demonstrate to one and all their expertise and stamina by ‘overdriving’ in 
the stokehole and blowing the safety valves. Stokers were never afraid to speak 
out when they suffered injustice. The stokers who created the disturbances at 
Portsmouth barracks and those who mutinied in the Zealandia spoke out 
against injustice. Unfortunately, anyone speaking out in a hidebound service 
such as the Royal Navy was bound to suffer the consequences and be noted for 
doing so. While largely avoiding punishment for these indiscretions, stokers 
undoubtedly brought attention to themselves. It is ironic that while stokers were 
much better disciplined than seamen, the few examples of ill-discipline that they 
became involved in were disproportionately advertised such that they attracted 
a reputation as ‘trouble makers.’  
 The possibility exists that the myths that surround the stokers’ story have 
survived for so long because stokers refused to acknowledge them. Had they 
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fought against them they may have made matters worse. Equally, by ignoring 
the labels pinned on them stokers gave others free reign to enlarge and 
elaborate the myths until they eventually permeated every level of the Navy and 
became an accepted part of naval historical belief. This thesis has challenged 
the many myths and inaccuracies that have blighted the stokers' story and 
ruined their historical reputation. It is hoped that the evidence provided here will 
prove useful to historians in the future and prevent others from making false 
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Belfast Antrim  Ireland 
 
Single 
















































































Carshalton Surrey SE 
 
Single 
Average Age of Chief Petty Officer Seaman 35.0 
Average Age of Petty Officer Seaman Ratings                                29     
Average Age of Leading Seamen Ratings                                        25.5 
Average Age of Able-Seamen Ratings    24 
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Shankhill   Belfast Ireland 
 
Single 
Average Age of Chief Stokers                       38.2 
Average Age Of Stoker Petty Officers           31.1 
Average of Leading Stokers                          26.9 
Average Age of v1st & 2nd Class Stokers     23.2 
 















Outside Air (in-degrees) 
After end of S.H. (stokehole) not in use. Used by experimenter, fluid 
was kept here, the men coming to drink as requiring of it. 
Fore part of fore S.H. fans running  about 400 lineal feet 
Engine Room starboard evaporator -      -       -      -      - 
-      -      -      -      -         condenser -       -       -      -     - 
 -      -      -      -      -        dynamo     -       -       -      -     -  
-       -      -      -      -        port evaporator -       -      -     -  






















No Age Years Service 
Years   Months 
Duty Remarks 
1 20 1            9 Firing 80 fluid ounces in 3 hours 
2 20 1            8 Firing 105 oz 
3 25 7            0         Firing 120 oz 
4 20 1            5    Coal Trimming 82 oz 
5 34 14          0 Petty Officer in charge 63 oz 
6 27 7            8    Firing 120 oz 
7 38 18          0 Petty Officer in charge 52 oz 
8 26 5            5 Firing 76 oz 
9 31 10          7 Evaporator 40 oz 
10 27 3            4   Engine Room 60 oz 
11 22 1            8 Firing 80 oz. Was exhausted after half an 
hour’s work, but carried on to end of 
watch, when urine temperature = 100.6 
degrees F. Placed on sick list following 
day.   
12 26 4            6 Engine Room 19 oz 
13 20 1            5 Trimming 77 oz urine temperature, 96.6 F 
14 25 5            4 Engine Room 40 oz 
15 26 4            9 Dynamo 12 oz 
16 20 1            8 Cleaning No. 6 boiler 73 oz in 1.5 hours 
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Note: The fluid is given in ounces per three hours. We attempted to 
obtain the urine temperatures on return from the stokehold but were only 
able to get any urine passed in two cases. 
  
Two or three points emerge from this table. In the first place, provided the work 
is of the same character, there is very little difference in the amount of fluid 
taken. Of the six men who were employed in “firing” the amounts drunk were 
76.80 (2), 105 and 120 (2), respectively, and both of the 120 ounce men had 
over seven years experience as stokers (No. 3 & 6.)  When we hear that it is the 
young stoker who suffers most from drinking too much fluid in the stokehold, we 
must remember that it is the young stoker who is employed in the hottest 
positions; the older man has obtained a rate, or is engaged in day work on 
some special job. The fluid was taken at very regular intervals, and there was 



























                                            
841 Oswald, Rees, Staff-Surgeon, H.M.S Fox, Stoker’s Cramp, in Statistical Report of the Health 























 842 L. Yexley, The Inner Life of the Navy, (London: 1908), 386 












The United States Navy supplied a wide variety of fresh, frozen and chilled foods 

















                                            
843 Yexley, L., ed. ‘American Navy Victualling,’ The Fleet Annual and Naval Year Book 1908, 






                                            
844 Report of the Committee Appointed to Inquire into the Question of Navy Rations, Meal Hours, 







Stokers’ Loyal Appeal March 1914 
 
 
To the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty and all Members of 
Parliament. Following up the Loyal Appeal from the Lower-deck, we the above 
mentioned ratings present in a full spirit of loyalty the following disabilities under 
which we still labour. We have noticed with interest that the Naval estimates for 
1913-14 show that the total engine room personnel for the first time in the 
history of the British Navy outnumber the Executive or seamen class. 
 
We would beg to state that modern machinery and the various appliances on 
board ships of war call for a higher class of work and therefore better men than 
formerly, we therefore ask that this appeal may have your favourable 
consideration, our rates of pay being not such as we consider our due. 
 
The qualification money asked for remuneration in specialising in different kinds 
of work performed is not an innovation as it would only level us up with other 
classes of service ratings. We are of the opinion that the position of the Leading 
Stoker should be improved onboard HM Ships and more consideration given to 
him as a ‘Leading Hand’ thus enabling him to assume that sense of 
responsibility so necessary to the discipline and efficiency of HM Navy. 
 
We would point out that the mechanician was the only rating in our department 
who did not benefit under the recent increases in pay, we therefore ask that he 
be considered and that the rating of chief mechanician be acceded to him. This 
rating of ‘Chief’ is enjoyed by the E.R.A. and Electrical Artificer and we think it 
would be an act of simple justice to open it up to the mechanician also. 
 
At present promotion to Warrant rank for the Stoker Class is only made possible 
through the mechanician, we feel that the time and the opportunity has arrived 
to extend this rank to the chief stokers. At present a committee under the 
presidency of Rear Admiral E. E. Bradford, CVO is inquiring into the advisability 
of a single Store Officer onboard HM Ships and we suggest that chief stokers 
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are eminently suitable to fill these positions (with Warrant rank) owing to their 
previous experience of stores and practical knowledge of the various store 
articles in HM Ships. 
 
We hope that something may be done to extend promotion from stoker to 
Commissioned Rank, at present the limit being to Commission Warrant Rank 
only.  
 
A tabulated statement relative to revision of pay is shown with remarks as to 




Pay Revision of  Present rate  New rates required 
Stoker 2nd Class  1s-8d   No change 
Stoker 1st Class  2s-1d   2s-2d 
After 6 years service 2s-4d   After 3 years’ service 2s-6d 
Acting Leading Stoker 2s-8d   2s-8d 
Leading Stoker  2s-8d   2s-9d 
After 3 years service  2s-10d  After 3 years service 3s-0d 
Stoker Petty Officer  3s-2d   3s-5d 
After 3 years service  3s-4d   After 3 years service 3s-7d 
After 6 years service  3s-6d   After 6 years service 3s-9d 
      After 9 years service 3s-11d 
Chief Stoker   3s-10d  4s-2d 
After 3 years service  4s-4d   After 3 years service 4s-10d 
After 6 years service 4s-10d  After 6 years service 5s-5d 
After 9 years service 5s-4d   After 9 years service 6s-0d 
After 12 years service  5s-10d 
 
Note at the present rating of Chief Stoker it is impossible to attain 12 years 





Mechanician   4s-6d   5s-0d 
After 3 years service  5s-0d  increased 6d every three years 
After 6 years service  5s-6d 
After nine years service  6s-0d 
After 12 years service  6s-6s 
 
Note only a very small percentage can attain to over 12 years service as a 
Mechanician. 
 
Remuneration for duties performed outside the ordinary Engine Room and 
Stokehold duties. 
 
We are of the opinion that a small remuneration should be given for men 
qualified in Internal Combustion Engines, Oil Fuel, Distilling Plant, Dynamos, Air 
Compressors, Refrigerating and Hydraulic Machinery on similar lines to that 
given to the Seaman Class for gunnery and torpedoes.  
 
We also ask that Mechanicians, Chief Stokers and Stoker Petty Officers may 
qualify for Instructors and be paid as such. 
 
J.H. Southam Secretary 











                                            









The course of training in the use of mechanical tools and in stokehold work for 
Ordinary Seamen qualifying for the rating of Able Seamen is to be as follows :- 
 
(a) Training in the use of simple tools, under a Chief or Leading Stoker 
Mechanic, and working at water tight doors, sluices, fire-mains, ventilator 
systems, etc., as convenient . 
Time 15 days, 
 
The following is a list of the tools :- 
Levers,       Ratchet brace, 
Screw-driver, Jacks,    Purchases,  
Spanners,     Spanish windlass, 
Tommies,      Hammers, hand and sledge, 
Wedges,      Drifts and punches, 
Files,      Brace and bits, 
Hatchet,      Chisel 
 
(b)  Training in stokehold work, ordinary stokehold day work, sweeping tubes 
and backs, cleaning etc. 
Time 5 Days 
Bunker work and firing – alternate watches at the two duties, working in three 
watches, in harbor or easy steaming at sea. 
 
Time 5 Days 
 
Firing, cleaning fires, and general stokehold watch-keeping in three watches, in 
harbor or easy steaming at sea. In ships with cylindrical boilers, part of this 
instruction is, if possible, to be in picket boat or other boat fitted with water tube 
boiler. 




Total time under instruction 30 days. While under instruction in the use of tools  
and in stokehold work, Ordinary Seamen are in every respect to be considered 
as attached to the engine room complement. 
 
3, - No change has been made in these courses since 1903 and they are now 
laid down in the present (1913) Article 378A of the King’s Regulations.  
 
4, - The syllabus of Mechanical Training was laid down as follows :- 
 
1 day To learn the names and uses of tools, etc- calipers, rule, set-
square, spanner, taps, dies, drills etc.   
2 days Chipping,  With flat and cross cut chisels and hammer, to form a 
flat surface on a piece of rough material, afterwards to form into a 
square, rectangle or hexagon, a mm piece of iron bolt-stave to a 
standard size. 
5 days Filing,  Learning to use files and to file a flat surface. Afterwards to 
shape a piece of Bolt-stave into a square, rectangle or hexagonal 
form, to a given size and to file a square hole in a piece of scrap 
boiler plate. 
2 days Drilling,  Drilling holes with ratchet brace and drill to standard sizes 
for tapping or clearing holes, in scrap material for nuts, ship’s 
fittings etc. 
3 days Tapping  Forming a thread in a hole that has been drilled, for a nut 
or other purpose, to a standard size; and screwing a piece of bolt-
stave forming a stud or bolt, the bolt or nut to be a good working fit 
on completion.  
2 days, Blacksmiths Work,  To work at a small forge –repairing and 
tempering chisels, drills, etc and repairs to ship’s work of a minor 
character. 
2 days,  Ships Work,  Working in the Engine Room. 
1 day,  the names and uses of W.T. doors, sluice and drain valves, 
pumps, and simple rules for opening and closing valves, cocks etc. 




5 :- The syllabus was reduced in 1913 to a fortnight as follows ;- 
 
Lecture on tools, names uses etc    1 day 
Chipping        1 day 
Filing        1 day 
Drilling         1 day 
Tapping        1 day 
Blacksmiths work      2 days 
Names of water tight doors, valves etc   1 day 
Resume (any subject they may be backward in)  1 day 
       Total 9 days  
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Numbers of Permanent Active Service Ratings 
in each Branch on 15 June 1919. 
 
 
Seamen    46,802 
Telegraphists   4,065  55,343 
Signals    4,476 
Sailmakers    101 
E.R.As & Mechanicians  5,042   
Stokers    30,477           35,519 
Shipwrights    1,332 
Carpenters Crew   163 
Joiners    311 
Blacksmiths    391 
Plumbers    238 
Painters    266 
Coopers    212 
Armourers    938 
Electrical Artificers   932 
Sick Berth Staff   1,492 
Writers    952 
Victualling    697 
Cooks    1,994 
Miscellaneous   1,262 
Officers Stewards & Cooks  4,598 
Service Boys    5,296 
Boy Telegraphists   802 
Boy Signals    711 

















                                            





“Naval Magna Charta” for 1912 
 
A Loyal Appeal from the Lower-deck 
 
 
Sir, YOUR attention is respectfully drawn to the following disadvantages under 
which Petty Officers and Men of the Royal Navy still labour. These items 
are set forth in a loyal spirit, by selected representatives of all classes of 
the Lower-Deck, with the earnest hope that you will continue to use your 
influence to have them placed before, and carefully considered by, My 
Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty and Treasury, with a view to their 
being, if possible, remedied. This opportunity is taken, also, to express 
grateful appreciation of the several concessions already made, resulting 
in greatly improved and happier conditions of service to the men of His 
Majesty’s Fleet. 
 
Direct Representation to the Admiralty  
 
1. That the Lower-deck be granted the privilege of forwarding 
petitions , through Commanding Officers and thence through 
Commanders-in-Chief, to the Admiralty, at stated periods, in a 
similar manner to the concessions enjoyed by men of His 
Majesty’s Dockyards. This privilege would allow Naval matters 
of general interest –such as the following-to be correctly 
explained by them in a disciplined and loyal manner, with 
mutual good results to the Royal Navy. 
 
Increased Pay, Promotion. and Pay for Good Conduct 
 
2. That a 20 per cent increase of wages be granted to all Lower-
deck Ratings having in view the increased cost of living and the 
increasing difficulties that Lower-deck Ratings find to meet their 
liabilities. 
2 (a)   That a system of continuous progressive pay be introduced for 
all ratings, as an incentive to zeal and good conduct, and to 
insure a possibility of maximum rates of pay being reached 
before completing time for pension. 
2 (b)   That where practicable, Chief Petty Officers Rating and 
 Warrant and Commissioned rank be extended to all ratings on 
 Lower-deck in proportionate numbers. 
2(c)     That all Lower-deck ratings be granted Good Conduct Badges  




3. That the foundation of a man’s standard pension, at present 
limited to 10d. per day, be based on a scale of 1/2d. a day for 
each year of a man’s service, observing that although the 
period of service to obtain a pension has been increased from 
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20 to 22 years, no corresponding increase of pension has been 
granted for the additional time required to be served. Also that 
Non-continuous Service Men may receive, in addition to the 
standard rate, the pension of the substantive rating held by 
them. 
 
3 (a)  That Leading Seamen shall be allowed the addition of one 
farthing a-day towards their pension for each year’s service in  
that rating from date of being rated instead of “after three 
years service as such”. 
 
Good conduct Gratuity to C.P.O’s  
 
3 (b)  That all Chief Petty Officer’s be again granted a Good conduct 
Gratuity of 20s as was formerly the case, instead of 15s as now 
authorised, and that Non-continuous service men receive the 
gratuity of their relative ratings. 
 
Pensions to Widows, Children &c  
 
3 (c)   That pensions be granted to Widows, Children, or dependent 
     relatives of deceased Petty Officer’s, Seamen and Marines in 
proportion, according to their length of service. Such pensions 
to be granted whether they are serving or pensioned at the 
time of death. 
 
Profits on Provisions  
 
3 (d)  That all articles sold by Civilian Contractors in ships and Naval 
Establishments be supplied direct through official naval 
 sources, similar to those under Vote 2, and that the profits  
 accruing from both sources be controlled by the Admiralty, and 
 applied as a fund for Widows , Orphans or other dependent 
 relatives of Naval men.  
 
Long and Meritorious Medal  
 
3 (e)  That a Long and Meritorious Service Medal be authorised for 
         the Royal Navy, carrying with it annuities in a similar manner to  
         that awarded to the Royal Marines, vide  Article 1191 of the 
         King’s Regulations. 
 
     Disrating only after trial by Court-Martial 
 
4. Whilst fully appreciating the concessions contained in Circular 
Letter No. of 5th April 1910, the men ask that, prior to disrating, 
they shall be tried by a Service Court-Martial, and they submit 
that, for offences of a technical nature, one or more Officer’s 
with a knowledge of the duties of the Petty Officer or Non-
Commissioned Officer being tried, shall be a member of the 
court. The great injustice of summarily disrating Petty Officers, 
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Leading Rates and Non-Commissioned Officers with its 
attendant grave consequences, such as reduction of Pension, 
ineligibility for promotion to Warrant Rank, loss of Good 
Conduct  Medal, Badges, Gratuities &c., is well known and 
universally admitted, and in view of the fact that the cost would 
be very little –other than the small official fee now paid –a just 
reason is seen for withholding this simple reform. 
4 (a)    That in the event of a Petty Officer being disrated, all his Petty 
           Officer’s time shall be secured to him for Pension should he 
           not regain his former rating, prior to being Pensioned. 
 
   Tuberculosis Sanatoria 
 
5. That Sanatoria for the treatment of Tuberculosis contracted by 




6. That all Lower-deck ratings sent to hospital, except when sent 
there through their own misconduct, be given free treatment 
without loss of pay (after being sick in a Home Hospital for 30 
days, men are stopped a portion of their pay, except when 
injured on duty , varying according to their status. After a 
further period of 61 days their pay ceases altogether). 
 
Assessment of Abilities 
 
7. That the new method of assessing men’s abilities in 
accordance with Admiralty Circular Letter No. 14, N12331/10, 
of 12th May 1911, be discontinued, and the old method be 
reverted to, as it is viewed with disfavour by all Lower-deck 
Ratings. The just application of the instructions contained in the 
above quoted letter is believed to be impracticable, and would, 
in any case, act prejudicially against men seeking employment 
in civil life on leaving the service, owing to the apparent, but 
unreal fluctuations in a man’s recorded ability as he progressed 




8. That a gratuitous issue of Uniform Clothing be supplied and 
maintained for all Naval Ratings, in order that the Senior 
Service may be placed on an equality in this respect with the 
public services of the State.  
 
Distinctive Uniform for Petty Officers 
 
8 (a)    That a distinctive and general pattern Uniform be supplied to 
           all Petty Officers and Artisan Ratings similar to that worn by 




Items which will not involve a great increase in Naval Estimates 
 
Civil Power Convictions 
 
9. At present a man convicted on shore for a Civil Offence, on his 
returning to his ship is often again punished by the Service for 




10. That the wearing of plain clothes by naval men while on leave 




11. That Mess Attendants be provided for Chief and Petty Officers 
by scale, under the definite authority of the King’s Regulations, 




11 (a) That the attention of the Authorities responsible for designing  
His Majesty’s Ships be earnestly directed to the inadequate 
Messing and Sleeping accommodation provided for Lower  
Deck Ratings. 
 
Petty Officers in Hospital 
 
11 (b) That where possible, separate Wards and Messing  
accommodation be provided for Chief and Petty Officers in 
Naval Hospitals, and that they be relieved of menial work. 
 
Freedom of Purchase  
 
12. That while the present system of Victualling continues, messes 
placed on the 9 1/2d scale be allowed freedom of action as to 
where they purchase their provisions, other than those 
obtained through official sources; observing that compulsory 
purchase through the Canteen is viewed with intense disfavour, 
as the latter is not always the cheapest and best market. 
 
 
Improved Issue and Store Rooms, and Cooking Facilities 
 
12 (a)  That the present Issuing Rooms are too small and 
  inadequately fitted. Better storage accommodation is required 
  in the latest design of ships, to comply with, and make  
  successful, the present condition of victualling. It is also 
  submitted that the issuing and cooking staffs at present 
allowed are totally insufficient to meet requirements, in view of 
the fact that they are constantly called away from their work for 
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  evolutions, &c. 
 
13. That all Chief and Petty Officers Messes throughout the service 
be allowed the option of receiving the 9 1/2d victualling scale. 
 
Short or Special Service 
 
14. After an adverse experience of 8 years, it is respectfully 
impressed on the Authorities that the entry of men for “Special” 
Service is a distinct weakness to the ships in which they serve 
and the Public Service in general. 
 
Employment of ex-Naval Men 
 
15. To facilitate and enable ex-Naval men to procure employment, 
the Admiralty are asked to exert their influence to induce other 
Government Departments, and Contractors with Naval 
Establishments, to give favourable consideration to the 
employment of these men. 
 
16. That the Royal Fleet Reserve be open to all ratings. 
 
17. That a Petty Officer or man be not deprived of his Non-
substantive rating for alleged incompetency, until after 
examination by a qualified board of Officers, similar to that 
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Interview 5822:  
Walter Prior Butcher, Stoker onboard HMS Nelson at Invergordon, 1931. 
Source Allan Ereira, Recorded 1980, 1 Reel, 13 minutes. © I.W.M. 
 
Q1: Stokers played a very big part in the mutiny why? 
 
A: Most stokers were on old rates of pay on a ship like that so were more  
or less in the majority. Pay was the cause of the mutiny.  
 
Q2: Without the stokers the mutiny would have been impossible? 
 
A: Well yes, they all played their part in that way but the seamen made  
sure the anchors couldn’t be raised, so she couldn’t have gone to sea  
with the anchors still down. 
 
Q3: What did they do with the anchors? 
 
A; They lashed the cables and put, sat across, put seats across the  
cables.  
 
Q4: Was any attempt made to shift them? 
 
A: No, no  
 
Q5: I gather that what happened on the Nelson unlike some other ships 
was that there was a recognised group of men who as it were running the 
ship for those two days and that the Commander was communicating 
with them about what would happen and what wouldn’t?  
    
A: That is correct. That is correct. Lew Lake? He kept everyone in touch 
 more or less with what ever came from the Admiralty.  
 
 
Q6: And you were at some meeting on the Wednesday I think when Lew 
 Lake called that group together? 
 
 
A: Oh that was on the upper deck. He called the group together. It wasn’t 
 a clear lower deck or anything like that. He got what people he could 
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 together on the upper deck and said the Admiralty had ordered the ships 
 back to ,port ‘would they go.’ And everyone, well I won’t say everyone, 
 but most of the people agreed and it was carried by a majority.  
 
Q7: Was there was much discussion of it, you were at that meeting were 
 you? 
 
A: Yes I was at that meeting, there was not a great lot of discussion it  
was just when he said about going back to Home Ports everyone wanted  
to go home and that was it. 
     
Q8: Was morale good or bad onboard the Nelson before this happened? 
 
A: I always found the morale very good. 
  
Q9: And what about after it happened, did it have any effect? 
 
A: Not really, not to my knowledge, no I didn’t really find that. 
 
Q10: Of course from your personal point of view it didn’t really affect you  
very much? 
 
A: No, no. 
 
Q11: You mentioned a couple of Nelson stokers who were discharged,  
what happened to them? 
 
A: Well they were taken into barracks and I only know that Bazzleget  
wrote back to the ships company and asked for help because he’d been 
discharged. He wrote a letter back and said he’d stuck up for all those  
people onboard now he’d got his ticket. 
 
Q12: And what response was there onboard? 
 
A: Well I think some did give money but there was no great lot of 
 response, not really speaking. 
 
Q13: Did the men who got discharged, were they actually the ring  
leaders?  I suppose they were, they would have been well known on that 
ship? 
 
A: Oh yea, yeh, yeh. 
 
Q14: Was there any surprise that this had happened to him I mean one 
of the reasons why people had agreed to sail home was because they 
had been promised there would be no reprisals? 
 
A: Well, I think he did other things as well, I think there was other things  
compared with him you see he acted as a, apparently one thing he did  
he was supposed to double across the parade everyone doubled across  
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the parade in barracks and he walked across and there was a whistle  
blown and he said I’m deaf like you know he made out he was deaf. 
 
Q15: So far as the Navy was concerned it was an opportunity to get rid of 
 general trouble makers? 
 
A: That’s right yeh, that’s what I think. 
 
Q16: Now obviously the Commander onboard the Nelson Lew Lake 
played a very important part in…..  
 
A: That’s right, he was a very tall man everyone said he wore corsets, 
but er he was really smart, a smart fellow. When we went through the  
Panama canal he had the ship enamelled it was supposed to be out  
of his own pocket whether it was or not it, I think it was true. He also had 
all the upper deck done with, over the bollards he had them all covered 
with a trellis wooden work and everything was really done up to impress  
the Yanks when we got to the other end. Going through one of the locks 
the ship went in crab fashion and scrapped the sides and hit the ‘regal’  
on top of the port just as I was looking through. 
 
Q17: Was there a great feeling of shame over the mutiny, I’m very struck  
by…………. 
 
A: Well he went throughout the fleet with the same story, he said they 
 looked for all the people they could send they looked to Nelson but he’s 
 dead they can’t have him; Jellicoe we can’t get him either he said they 
 sent me.  
 
Q18: Is that the story you heard? That’s another one, but obviously it was 
very much a two fingers at the Admiralty speech  
 
A: If anyone knew John Kelly he was a very straight talking man, he 
 didn’t talk educated at all he always talked very gruff he was a gruff  














                                            
849 W. P. Butcher, I.W.M. 5822, (Imperial War Museum Sound Archive, 1980), Audio Tape 1 












'Diagram Showing the Number of Ships in Commission and Engine Room 
 Ratings, Seamen and Marines Voted for Each Year from 1793-1903,' (London,  
1904). 
 
His Majesty's Steam Vessel Comet: Pay Book. ed. (Admiralty, 1822). 
 
'Return of Numbers Borne in H.M. Fleet,' ed. (Admiralty, 1918), p. 15. 
 
 





TNA ADM 156/71, 'Atlantic Fleet: Insubordination at Invergordon,' ed. Admiralty,  
(London, 1931). 
 
TNA ADM 156/94, 'Disaffection in 1st Destroyer Flotilla,' ed. Admiralty, (London, 
1919). 
 
TNA ADM 173-6134, Log of Submarine K-5. ed. Admiralty (London, 1918). 
 
TNA ADM 1/7895, 'Court Martial Lieutenant B St G Collard,' ed. Admiralty,  
(London, 1906). 
 
TNA ADM 1/7895, 'Rules and Regulations: Royal Naval Barracks Portsmouth,'  
ed. Admiralty, (London, 1905). 
 
TNA ADM 1/8627/118, 'Training of New Entries: Report on the Training and  
Discipline of Stokers,' ed. Admiralty, (London, 1922). 
 
 
TNA ADM 1/8756/174, 'Committee of Messing in H.M. Ships Victualled on the  
Standard Ration and Messing Allowance System,' ed. Admiralty, (London, 
1931). 
 
TNA ADM 7/941, 'New Scheme of Training Officers and Men,' ed. Admiralty,  
(London, 1903). 
 
TNA ADM 35/4426, 'His Majesty's Steam Vessel Lightning: Pay Book,' ed.  





TNA ADM 116/626, 'Clothing Gratuity Granted to Stoker Ratings on First Entry,'  
ed. Admiralty, (London, 1902). 
 
TNA ADM 116/1661, 'Revised Rates of Pay, Allowances and Pensions for  
Naval Ratings and Royal Marines,' ed. Admiralty, (London, 1912). 
 
TNA ADM 116/1680, 'Training of Young Seamen and Boys in Seagoing Ships:  
Report of Admiral Hood's Committee,' ed. Admiralty, (London, 1913). 
 
TNA ADM 116/1728, 'Pay, Allowances, Pensions Etc: Recommendations of the  
Jerram Committee,' ed. Admiralty, (London, 1919). 
 
TNA ADM 116/1867, 'Pay and Allowances, Equalisation of Army and NavyNavy  
Separation Allowances Etc.,' ed. Admiralty, (London, 1918). 
 
TNA ADM 116/1893, 'Welfare Organization-Minute by Admiral of the Fleet Earl  
Beatty,' ed. Admiralty, (London, 1920), p. 5. 
 
TNA ADM, 'Welfare Committee: Representation of Lower Deck,' ed. Admiralty,  
(London, 1919). 
 
TNA ADM 116/2867, 'Representation of Grievances by Men of the Royal 
NavyNavy,'  
ed. Admiralty, (London, 1931). 
 
TNA ADM 116/2891, 'Cuts in Lower Deck Pay,' ed. Admiralty, (London, 1931). 
 
TNA ADM 116/3136, 'Naval Canteens: Excise Laws and Licensing,' ed.  
Admiralty, (London, 1930). 
 
TNA ADM 116/ 975, 'Commander-in-Chief Devonport to Secretary Admiralty,'  
ed. Admiralty (London, 1907), p. 1. 
 
TNA ADM 156/89, 'H.M.S. Leviathan: Outbreak Amongst Men at Birkenhead  ', 
ed. Admiralty, (London, 1918). 
 
TNA ADM 156/157, 'Court of Enquiry into Mutinous Conduct Amongst H.M.S. 
 Zealandia's Stokers ', ed. Admiralty, (London, 1914). 
 
TNA ADM, 156/157, 'Mutiny in the Royal NavyNavy: H.M.S. Amphitrite,' ed.  
Admiralty, (London, 1917). 
 
TNA ADM, 156/157, 'Disaffection in Number 2 Portsmouth Battalion,' ed. 
 Admiralty, (London, 1921). 
 
Jellicoe Sir, J., 'Board Minutes on Court of Inquiry,' in TNA, ADM, 156/157 Court  






TNA ADM 174/404, 'Report of the Committee Appointed to Enquire into the  
Question of the Canteen and Victualling Arrangements in H.M Fleet,' ed.  
Admiralty, (London, 1907), p. 119. 
 
TNA ADM 188/286, 'Continuous Service Certificate John Walker Reynolds ', ed.  
Admiralty (London, 1893). 
 
TNA ADM 188/888, 'Continuous Service Certificate, Bullock E.W.,' ed.  
Admiralty, (London, 1911). 
 
TNA ADM 188/900, 'Continuous Service Certificate, Richard Frank Rose,' ed.  





TNA FS 15/218, 'Royal Naval Chief Stokers, Leading Stokers and Stokers Sick  
Benefit and Burial Society,' ed. Friendly Societies, 1885). 
 
 
His Majesty’s Stationery Office 
 
'Friendly Societies, Workmen’s Compensation Schemes, Industrial and  
Provident Societies, and Trade Unions: Reports of the Chief Registrar of  





TNA. HO 45/10314/125047, 'Albert Medal 2nd Class Alfred Stickley Chief  
Stoker,' ed. Office, H., 1905). 
 
 
Office for National Statistics 
 
TNA 14/349731, 'Census of England and Wales: Enumeration Book for the  
Royal Navy: His Majesty's Ship Lancaster ' (London, 1911), p. 25. 
 
 
Imperial War Museum Sound Archive  
 
 Primary Source Oral Testimony - Audio Tape and Transcripts 
 
Boin, H. W., I.W.M. 666 (London, Imperial War Museum Sound Archive), 1975,  
Audio Tape 3 Reels. 
 
Bruty, W. G., I.W.M. 759 (London, Imperial War Museum Sound Archive), 1976,  
p. 85. 
 
Butcher, W. P., I.W.M. 5822: (London, Imperial War Museum Sound Archive), 




Carr, N. S., I.W.M. 5809 (London, Imperial War Museum Sound Archive), 1980. 
 
Claude, A. R., I.W.M. 661 (London, Imperial War Museum Sound Archive), 
1975. 
 
Consett, M. C., I.W.M. 17308, (London, Imperial War Museum Sound Archive),  
1997. 
 
Dunn, J., I.W.M. 769 (London, Imperial War Museum Sound Archive), 1975,  
Audio Tape 9 Reels. 
 
Dyke, P. J., I.W.M. 5843 (London, Imperial War Museum Sound Archive), 1980, 
 
Harbin, R. H., I.W.M. 5837(London, Imperial War Museum Sound Archive), 
1980, Audio Tape1 Reel. 
 
Hargreaves, W. R., I.W.M. 750 (London, Imperial War Museum Sound Archive), 
1980, Audio Tape 1 Reel. 
 
Leary, J., I.W.M. 553/18 (London, Imperial War Museum Sound Archive), 1975, 
p.127. 
 
Ley, R. P., I.W.M. 5810 (London, Imperial War Museum Sound Archive), 1980, 
 
Lilley, A. E., I.W.M. 750 (London, Imperial War Museum Sound Archive), 1976,  
Audio Tape 8 Reels. 
 
Maloney, J. A., I.W.M. 663 (London, Imperial War Museum Sound Archive), 
1975, Audio Tape 6 Reels. 
 
Masters, H., I.W.M. 26543, (London, Imperial War Museum Sound Archive), 
2003, Audio Tape 7 Reels. 
 
Palmer, S., I.W.M. 28696, (London, Imperial War Museum Sound Archive), 
2005. 
 
Piggott, W., I.W.M. 12235 (London, Imperial War Museum Sound Archive), 
1991. Audio Tape 15 Reels. 
 
Pullen, E., I.W.M. 692 (London, Imperial War Museum Sound Archive), 1975.  
Audio Tape 27 Reels. 
 
Rose, R. F., I.W.M. 754 (London, Imperial War Museum Sound Archive), 1976. 
p. 104. 
 
Willis, R., I.W.M. 758 (London, Imperial War Museum Sound Archive), 1976. 
 





University of Leeds Brotherton Archive - Liddle Collection 
 
Primary Source Oral Testimony - Audio Tape and Transcripts 
 
 
Bedford, L. V., 'Personal Recollections of Naval Service,' in Liddle Collection, ed. 
Liddle, P. H. (Leeds, 1976), p. 4. 
 
 
Bullock, E. W., 'R.N.M.N./ Bullock, Transcript of Memoirs of Service as a Stoker  
in the Royal Navy,' in Liddle Collection, ed. Liddle, P. H. (Leeds, 1971), p. 
66. 
 
Cooper, T., R.N.M.N. (Rec) 018, Transcript of Memoirs of Service as a Stoker in  
the Royal Navy, in Liddle Collection, ed. Liddle, P. H. (Leeds, 1975). 
 
Hutchinson, T. G., 'R.N.M.N/Hutchinson (Rec), Transcript of Memoirs of Service  
as an Engineer Lieutenant Commander R.N.,' in Liddle Collection, ed. 
Liddle, P. H. (Leeds. 
 
Millett, W. T., Stoker, 'R.N.M.N. (Rec) 121, Transcript of Interview,' in Liddle  
Collection, ed. Liddle, P. H. (Leeds, 1978), p. 8. 
 
Nancarrow, H., Leading Stoker, 'Personal Recollections of Naval Service,' 
R.N.M.N. (REC) 121, in Liddle Collection,  ed. Liddle, P. H. (Leeds, 
1988). 
 
Reid, C., Stoker, 'R.N.M.N. (Rec) 090a, Transcript of Interview,' in Liddle  




Royal Navy Submarine Museum 
 
Primary Source Diaries and Letters 
 
N. 575/25, Commander-in-Chief Plymouth Station to Secretary of the Navy,  
1925, 'Unwillingness of Plymouth Men to Volunteer for Submarines'. 
 
Godden, E. F. M., to Gus Britton Archivist, November 16th 1984, 'Some 
Reminiscences of the 'Old Days'. 
 
Nicholas, J. P., 'Some Sort of Description of Submarine K26,' in A1985/041,  
Royal Navy Submarine Museum (Gosport, p. 24). 
 
Ridley, R., 'Life in a 'H' Boat Fifty Years Ago,' (Gosport, 1983). 
 






Printed Primary Sources 
 
 
National Museum of the Royal Navy 
 
Admiralty, Mutiny in the Royal Navy: 1691-1919, ed. Tactical 
and Staff Duties Division. 2 vols. Vol. 1 (London: 1933). 
 
Admiralty, Mutiny in the Royal Navy 1921-1937. ed. Tactical and Staff Duties  
Division. 2 vols. Vol. 2 (London: 1955). 
 
Eardley-Wilmot, A. P., Manning the Navy (London: 1849). 
 
'Orders in Council for the Regulation of the Naval Service 18: School of Cookery  
and Trained Cooks,' ed. Admiralty, 1872). 
 
'Orders in Council for the Regulation of the Naval Service 107: 'Training Stokers  
to Arms and Management of Machinery and Boilers of Torpedo Boats,' 
ed. Admiralty (London, 1886). 
 
'Orders in Council for the Regulation of the Naval Service 119: Allowance for  
Instruction of Stokers in Use of Small Arms, Boat Pulling Etc,' ed. 
Admiralty (London, 1891). 
 
'Orders in Council for the Regulation of the Naval Service 129: Alterations in  
Training Pay Etc of Engine Room Ratings,' ed. Admiralty (London, 1906). 
 
'Orders in Council for the Regulation of the Naval Service 232: Clothing Gratuity  
to Newly-Entered Stokers,' ed. Admiralty (London, 1902). 
 
'Orders in Council for the Regulation of the Naval Service: Ships Complements ',  
ed. Admiralty (London, 1853), pp. 740-869. 
 
Reynolds, J. W., 'Diary of the Mediterranean Commission of H.M.S. Lancaster '  
in Manuscript Collections, (Portsmouth, 1910). 
 
 
Scotland's People: Registrar of Births and Deaths 
 
837/020011, 'Births in the Southern District of Kirkpatrick Flemming in the 




House of Commons Parliamentary Papers Online  
 
 
Bowles, G., 'Navy Estimates for 1900-1; with Explanation of Differences (Navy:  





Elliot, G., and Ryder, A. P., ' Report by Admiral G. Elliot and Rear-Admiral A. P.  
Ryder, Members of Committee on Designs for Ships-of-War, Dissenting 
from Report of Committee,' ed. (Admiralty, 1872), p. XIV.583. 
 
Hamilton, J. A. B. S., 'Working Classes Cost of Living Committee, 1918. Report  
of the Committee Appointed to Enquire into and Report Upon (I) the 
Actual Increase since June, 1914, in the Cost of Living to the Working 
Classes and (II) Any Counterbalancing Factors (Apart from Increases of 
Wages) Which May Have Arisen under War Conditions,'  (London: 1918). 
 
Hansard, 'Navy Estimates for the Year 1910-11, with Explanation of 
Differences,' ed. (Admiralty, 1910), p. LXI.1. 
 
Hansard, 'Insubordination among Crews,' in (House of Commons Debate, 1914). 
 
House of Commons, 'Stoker Mechanics,' ed. (Admiralty, 1912). 
 
 Jerram, M., 'Report of Naval Pay Committee: Recommendations in Regard to  
Pay Allowances and Pensions of Royal Navy and Royal Marines,' ed. 
(Admiralty, 1919), p. 22. 
 
Login, S. H. M., 'Report of the Committee Appointed to Inquire into the Question  
of the Canteen and Victualling Arrangements in H.M. Fleet (Navy: 
Canteen and Victualling Arrangements),' ed. (Admiralty, 1907), p. L.841. 
 
'Memorandum Dealing with the Entry, Training, and Employment of Officers and  
Men of the Royal Navy and of the Royal Marines (Navy: Personnel: Navy 
and Marines,' ed. (Admiralty, 1902), p. LXI.673. 
 
'Memorandum Respecting Water-Tube Boilers in H.M. Ships,' ed. (Admiralty,  
1900), p. LI.305. 
 
Navy (Victualling Savings). Copy of the Report of the Admiralty Committee  
Appointed in 1870 to Inquire into the System of Savings of Provisions 
and Victualling in Royal Navy,' in House of Commons Papers, Reports of 
 Commissioners (London, 1876), pp. 1-46. 
 
'Navy Estimates with Explanation of Differences ', ed. Admiralty, 1914), p. LIII.1. 
 
Noel, C. N. n. B. B., 'The Third Report of the Commissioners for Revising and  
Digesting the Civil Affairs of His Majesty's Navy,' in House of Commons 
Papers; Reports of Commissioners (London, 1806). 
 
'Particulars of the More Serious Accidents Which Have Occurred During the  
Coaling of His Majesty's Ships in the Years 1910, 1911, and 1912 ', ed.  
(Admiralty, 1912), p. LIII.433. 
 
 
Rees, O., 'Body Temperature and the Causation of Heat Stroke,' in Statistical  




Rees, O., 'Papers on Stokers' Cramp,' in Statistical Report of the Health of the  
Navy 1909, ed. Porter, J. (London, 1909), pp. 184-7. 
 
'Report of the Committee Appointed to Inquire into the Question of Navy  
Rations, Meal Hours, the Prices Paid for Savings and the Management 
of Canteens,' ed. Admiralty (London: 1901), p. 70. 
 
'Report on Standard Time Rates of Wages and Hours of Labour in the United  
Kingdom on October, 1913 ', ed. (Board of Trade, 1914), p. LXXX.919. 
 
'Report to Admiralty by Committee on Marine Engines,' ed. Admiralty, 1859), p.  
XV.517.'Return of Number of Steam-Ships Afloat, Building and 
Converting, with Number of Effective Sailing Ships: February 1865,' ed. 
(Admiralty, 1865), p. XXXV Pt.II.567. 
 
Return showing, approximately for five years (a) Percentage of Seamen and 
Stokers who Re-engage to Complete Time for Pension; and (b) 
Percentage of Seamen and Stokers who Leave on Termination of First 
Engagement, but who Return to the Service within Twelve Months, 
(Admiralty, 1894), in Navy (Seamen and Stokers Re-Engagement),  
House of Commons Parliamentary Papers Online, 1894, (189).   
 
'Return of Torpedo Boats of Navy Tested in Trials in Channel, May 1887,' ed.  
(Admiralty, 1887), p. LII.673. 
 
'Returns of the Number of Courts-Martial Held and Summary Punishments  
Inflicted on Seamen of the Royal Navy, &C., During the Years 1888-
1912,'  (London), HOC Parliamentary Papers Online. 
 
'Seamen and Royal Marines (Seniority),' ed. Commons, H. O., 1919). 
 
'Seamen, Marines and Stokers in the Royal Naval Barracks on 4th and 5th  
November,' ed. House of Commons, 1906). 
 
'Statement of Admiralty Policy ', ed. Admiralty (London: 1906), p. LXX.445. 
 
'Statistical Report of the Health of the Navy for the Years 1901-1912,' in House 
of Commons Papers, ed. Ellis, H.M. (London, 1902),  
 
Statement Showing the Present and New Rates of Pay for the Royal Navy and 
Royal Marines, (Admiralty, 1912), Cd. 6118. 
 
Yorke, C. P. t. E. H., 'Report of the Commissioners Appointed to Inquire into the 




Printed Primary Sources 
 
 




'Advantages of Service in the Royal Navy and Royal Marines and How to Join '  
(London: 1902), p. 30. 
 
'Advantages of Service in the Royal Navy and Royal Marines and How to Join,' 
(London, 1904), p. 47. 
  
'Advantages of Service in the Royal Navy and Royal Marines and How to Join,'  
(London: 1907), p. 47. 
 
Fox, C. H., Lt RN, Manual of Seamanship for Boys and Seamen of the Royal  
Navy, 1904. Vol. 1 (London: 1905). 
 
The King's Regulations and Admiralty Instructions for the Government of His  
Majesty's Naval Service 1913. ed. Admiralty. 2 vols. Vol. 1 (London: 
1913). 
 
Ross, J., A Treatise on Navigation by Steam: Comprising a History of the Steam  
Engine, and an Essay Towards a System of the Naval Tactics Peculiar to  
Steam Navigation, as Applicable Both to Commerce and Maritime 
Warfare; Including a Comparison of Its Advantages as Related to Other 
Systems in the Circumstances of Speed, Safety and Economy, but More 
Particularly in That of the National Defence (London, 1828). 
 
 
Printed Secondary Sources 
 
 
Anon, The History of H.M.S. Drake (Plymouth, 1973). 
 
Arthur, M., Lost Voices of the Royal Navy: Vivid Eyewitness Accounts of Life in  
the Royal Navy from 1914 to 1945 (London: 2005), p. 563. 
 
Bailey, C., Howard, (ed) Social Change in the Royal Navy 1924-1970: The Life  
and Times of Admiral Sir Frank Twiss (Gloucestershire: 1996), p. 235. 
 
Baynham, H., Men from the Dreadnoughts (London, 1976), p. 272. 
 
 
Broten, N., 'From Sickness to Death: The Financial Viability of the English  
Friendly Societies and Coming of the Old Age Pensions Act, 1875-1908,'   
(London, 2010), p. 67. 
 
Brown, D. K., Warrior to Dreadnought; Warship Development 1860-1905  
(London, 1997), p. 224. 
 
 
Burgess, R., and Blackburn, R., We Joined the Navy: Traditions, Customs and  





Capper, H. D., Aft-from the Hawsehole: Sixty-Two Years of Sailors' Evolution   
(London, 1927), p. 267. 
 
 
Carew, A., The Lower Deck of the Royal Navy 1900-39: Invergordon in  
Perspective (Manchester, 1981), p. 269. 
 
Clayton, T., Sea Wolves: The Extraordinary Story of Britain's W.W.2  
Submarines (London, 2011), p. 436. 
 
Clinker Knocker, Aye Aye Sir (London, 1938). 
 
Compton-Hall, R., Submarines at War, 1914-18 (Penzance, 2004), p. xiv, 345 p.,  
[16] p. of plates. 
 
Conley, Mary, A, From Jack Tar to Union-Jack: Representing Naval Manhood in 
the British Empire, 1870-1918 (Manchester, 2009), p. 215) 
 
Corbett, J. S., History of the Great War: Naval Operations. 3 vols. Vol. 1  
(London, 1921). 
 
Craven, J. P., The Silent War: The Cold War Battle beneath the Sea (New York:  
2001), p. 304. 
 
Deck, L., The British Navy from Within (London: 1914), p. 200. 
 
Divine, D., Mutiny at Invergordon (London, 1970), p. 259. 
 
Dixon, T. B., The Enemy Fought Splendidly (Poole, 1983), p. 96. 
 
Dorling, T., [Taffrail], Endless Story (London, 1931). 
 
Dwyer, D. J., A History of the Royal Naval Barracks Portsmouth (Portsmouth:  
1961), p. 90. 
 
Edwards, K., The Mutiny at Invergordon (London, 1937), p. 425. 
 
Ellis, A. R., Under Scott's Command: Lashly's Antarctic Diaries (New York:  
1969), p. 160. 
 
Ereira, A., The Invergordon Mutiny: A Narrative History of the Last Great Mutiny  
in the Royal Navy and How It Forced Britain Off the Gold Standard in 
1931 (London, 1981), p. x,182p. 
 
Everitt, D., K Boats: Steam-Powered Submarines in World War I (Shrewsbury:  
1999), p. 144p.,[8]p. of plates. 
 
Gardiner, L., The Royal Oak Courts Martial (London, 1965), p. 258. 
Glenton, R., The Royal Oak Affair: The Saga of Admiral Collard and  




Goslan, R., History and Counter History in Post War France: Vichy's after Life  
(Nebraska USA, 2000). 
 
Greenhill, B., and Giffard, A., Steam, Politics and Patronage: The  
Transformation of the Royal Navy 1815-54 (London: 1994), p. 256. 
 
Greenwood, S., Stoker Greenwoods Navy (Tunbridge Wells Kent, 1983), p. 186. 
 
Griffiths, D., Steam at Sea: Two Centuries of Steam-Powered Ships (London,  
1997), p. 241. 
 
Hallam, R., and Beynon, M., Scrimeour's Small Scribbling Diary 1914-1916: The  
Truly Astonishing War Time Diary and Letters of an Edwardian 
Gentleman, Naval Officer, Boy and Son (London, 2008), p. 304. 
 
Hampshire, A. C., Just an Old Navy Custom (London, 1979). 
 
Kedward, H. R., In Search of the Maquis: Rural Resistance in Southern France  
1942-44 (Oxford, 1993). 
 
Kemp, P., The British Sailor: A Social History of the Lower Deck (London, 1970), 
p. 241. 
 
Knock, S., Clear Lower Deck. 2nd ed (London, 1932). 
 
 
Lambert, N. A., The Submarine Service, 1900-1918, Publications of the Navy 
Records Society Vol. 142 (Aldershot, 2001), p. xliv, 397 p. 
 
Lavery, B., Able Seamen: The Lower Deck of the Royal Navy 1850-1939  
(London: 2011), p. 352. 
 
Le Bailly, L., The Man around the Engine (Emsworth, Hampshire, 1990), p. 186. 
 
Lewis, M., The Navy in Transition: A Social History 1814-1864 (London, 1965),  
p. 287. 
 
Lipscomb, F. W., The British Submarine. 2nd, ed (Greenwich, 1975), p. 284. 
 
 
Mackay, R., A Precarious Existence: British Submariners in World War One  
(Penzance, 2003), p. 138. 
 
 
Masie, R. K., Dreadnought: Britain, Germany and the Coming of the Great War 
(London, 1992), p. 1007.  
 






McKibbin, R., Classes and Cultures: England 1918-1951, (Oxford, 1998), p. 562.  
 
Nash, N. S., K Boat Catastrophe: Eight Ships and Five Collisions, the Full Story  
of the 'Battle' of the Isle of May (Barnsley, 2009), p. 148. 
 
 
Neave, D., The Friendly Societies in Great Britain, in Social Security Mutualism: 
 The Comparative History of Mutual Benefit Societies. ed. van der Linden, 
M. (New York, 1996). 
 
Parker, J., The Silent Service:The inside Story of the Royal Navy's Submarine  
Heroes (London, 2001), p. viii, 294 p., [16] p. of plates. 
 
Penn, G., Up Funnel, Down Screw: The Story of the Naval Engineer (London, 
1955), p. 184. 
Price, R., An Imperial War and the British Working Class: Working Class 
Attitudes and Reactions to the Boer War 1899-1902, (London, 1972), p. 
279. 
 
Ricoeur, P., Memory, History, Forgetting, trans. Blamey, K. and Pellauer, D.  
(Chicago, 2006), p. 642. 
 
 
Rippon, P. M., The Evolution of Engineering in the Royal Navy. 2 vols. Vol. 1  
(Tunbridge Wells, 1988), p. 304. 
 
 
Rüger, J., The Great Naval Game: Britain and Germany in the Age of Empire, 
(Cambridge, 2007), p. 337. 
 
 
Searle, G.R., The Quest for National Efficiency : A Study in British Politics and 
Political Thought, 1899-1914, (London, 1990).  
 
 
Sinclair, U., The Jungle (Chicago, 1906). 
 
 
Smith, E. C., A Short History of Naval and Marine Engineering (Cambridge,  
1937), p. 376. 
 
 
Stone, W., Hero of the Fleet:Two World Wars, One Extraordinary Life-the  
Memoirs of Centenarian William Stone (Edinburgh, 2009), p. 256. 
 
 
Taylor, B., The Battlecruiser H.M.S. Hood: An Illustrated Biography 1916-1941  
(London, 2004), p. 256. 
 










The History of H.M.S. Drake,  (Plymouth, 1973). 
 
Thompson, E. P., The Making of the English Working Class. 4th ed (London,  
1991), p. 958. 
 
 
Thompson, J., The Imperial War Museum Book of the War at Sea 1914-1918:  
The Face of Battle Revealed in the Words of the Men Who Fought 
(London, 2005), p. 466. 
 
Thompson, P., The Voice of the Past: Oral History 3rd ed (Oxford, 2000), p. 368. 
 
Tosh, J., The Pursuit of History: Aims, Methods and New Directions in the Study  
of History (London, 2002). 
 
Tosh, J., and Lang, S., The Pursuit of History. 4th ed (Harlow, U.K., 2006). 
 
Trevelyan, G. M., English Social History (London, 1944). 
 
Wigby, F., Stoker Royal Navy (London: 1967), p. 202. 
 
Wincott, L., Invergordon Mutineer (London: 1974), p. 183. 
 
Winton, J., The Submariners: Life in British Submarines 1901-1999: An  
Anthology of Personal Experience (London: 1999), p. xiv,316p., [16] p. of 
plates. 
 
Vincent, H., A Stoker's Log (London: 1929). 
 
Yexley, L., The Inner Life of the Navy (London, 1908). 
 
Yexley, L., ed. 'American Navy Victualling,' The Fleet Annual and Naval Year 
Book 1908, (London, 1908). 
 
 
Young, F., With the Battle Cruisers. Facsimile Reprint 2002 ed (Edinburgh,  
1921). 
 
Articles in Books 
 
Pursey, H., From Petitions to Reviews:The Presentation of Lower-Deck  
Grievance. ed. Thursfield, H. G., Brassey's Naval Annual 1937 (London, 







Appleyard, R., 'The Trouble at Portsmouth,' The Times, 12 November 1906. 
 
'Behaving Like Madmen, Scenes Outside Portsmouth Naval Barracks During 
the Second Disturbance Caused By Discontented Stokers' Daily Graphic, 
8 November 1906. 
 
'British Navy Seeks Stokers with Brains,' The New York Times, August 24 1929. 
 
'Canteens and Victualling,' The Fleet, March 1908, 74-5. 
 
'Correspondence: Stokers,' The Fleet 3, no. 21 (1907). 
 
C.P.O., 'Deck Cloths,' The Naval and Military Record and Royal Dockyard  
Gazette, 27 September 1911. 
 
Cross, R., 'Tommy Atkins Married,' The Navy and Army Illustrated (1896), 131-4. 
 
Fisher, J. A., 'Lord Fisher on the Navy: Oilers or Coaling Stations,' The Times  
1919. 
 
'Foreign Naval Notes,' The New York Times, 18 January 1891. 
 
 
'Friendly Societies Act 1896: Devonport Royal Naval United Stokers' Sick  
Benefit and Burial Society, Advertisement of Dissolution by Instrument,' 
The London Gazette, 10 October 1916.  
 
'Heroism in the Stoke Hold,' The Naval and Military Record and Royal Dockyard 
Gazette, 26 July 1911, 472. 
 
'Mechanician Chief & Stoker Petty Officer's Benefit Association Minutes  
of Monthly Meeting,' The Fleet, January 1914, 29. 
 
'Model Barracks,' The Naval and Military Record and Royal Dockyard Gazette,  
25 January 1911, 59. 
 
'Regulations for Examination and Pay of Stokers,' The Fleet (1912), 699-700. 
 
'Rioting at Portsmouth,' The Times, 6 November 1906, 1. 
 
'Rioting at Portsmouth Naval Barracks,' The Times, 7 November 1906, 11. 
 
'R.N. Mechanicians, Chief Stokers, Stoker Petty Officers, Leading Stokers and  
Stokers Class Appeal.,' The Fleet, March 1914. 
 
'Soldiers Messing,' The Naval and Military Record and Royal Dockyard Gazette,  





'Stoker's Work in Battle: Toiling in Heat, He Learned Fight Progress by  
Bulletins,' The New York Times, June 12 1916. 
 
'Sunday in the Navy,' The Fleet, October 1911, 252-3. 
 
 
 'Sunday in the Navy: The Fetish of Inspections and Its Results,' The  
Naval and Military Record and Royal Dockyard Gazette, September 
1911. 
 
Sympathiser, A., 'Stoker Ratings V. Engine Room Artificers: Their Claims and  
Counter Claims,' The Fleet (1912), 654-5. 
 
'The Disturbances at Portsmouth-Admiralty Minute,' The Times,  (London, 1906). 
 
'The Engine Room Artificers Latest: Another Attack on the Stokers,' The Fleet,  
February 1913, 40-1. 
 
'The Naval Manoeuvres: The Cruiser Work,' The Times, 21 August 1903. 
 
'The Trouble at Portsmouth,' The Army and Navy Gazette (1906), 1068-9. 
 




'The Navy and Its Personnel,' The Bluejacket and Coastguard Gazette,  
March 1903, 103. 
 






Akiyama, Y., 'Trained Cooks and Healthy Boys: Reforming the Mess in the  
Royal Navy before the First World War,' The Mariner's Mirror 94, no. 4 (2008),  
420-31. 
 
Alderson, P. F. S. C., 'The Incidence of Tuberculosis in the Royal Navy,' Journal  
of the Royal Naval Medical Service XIII (1927), 9. 
 
Beresford, B. W., 'Stoker Royal Navy, the Lowest of the Low,' Sea Breezes 67,  
no. 575 (1993), 889-95. 
 
Brown, D., 'The Introduction of Oil Fuel,' Journal of Naval Engineering 37, no. 2  
(1997), 4. 
 
Conley, M. A., 'You Don't Make a Torpedo Gunner out of a Drunkard: Agnes  





Correspondent, P., 'Working Conditions of Ship's Stokers,' The British Medical  
Journal (1936), 672-75. 
 
 
Dahl, E. J., 'Naval Innovation: From Coal to Oil,' Joint Force Quarterly 22, no.  
Winter (2000), 6. 
 
De Mericourt, H., 'Modern Naval Hygiene,' The British Medical Journal 2, no.  
777 (1875), 2. 
 
Dupper, A., 'Phillipp Frick a Stoker in the Imperial Russian Navy,' American  
Historical Society of Germans from Russia 5, no. 4 (1982), 58. 
 
Fardell, H. M., 'The "K" Submarines,' The Naval Review VII, No 2 (1919), 234- 
36. 
 
'A Few Lectures on Naval Discipline,' The Naval Review 7, no. 4 (1919), 467-70. 
 
Forbes Guild, W. J., 'Submarine Living,' Journal Naval Engineering 14, no. 3  
(1961), 6. 
 
Fouracre, S. F., 'A Medical Man in Mesopotamia : Some Clinical Experiences in  
the Tropics and Their Application to Temperate Climates,' Supplement to 
the British Medical Journal 1, no. 3972 (1937). 
 
H.B.C., 'Naval Mutiny in 1914,' The Naval Review LX, no. 3 (1972), 5. 
 
Hill, J. R., 'Accelerator and Brake: The Impact of Technology on Naval 
 Operations 1855-1905,' Journal for Maritime Research (1999), 1-21. 
 
'In Defence of Mechanical Training,' The Naval Review 20, no. 4 (1932), 693-6. 
 
J.H.H., 'Clear Lower Deck,' The Naval Review 20, no. 2 (1932). 
 
Jack, I., 'Cocoa, Sir?,' London Review of Books 25, no. 1.2 (2003), 18-22. 
 
Kingcome, J., 'A Century of Naval Engineering,' Journal of Naval Engineering  
43, no. 2 (2007), 329-50. 
 
Langmaid, J., 'A Proposed Method of Training Naval Stokers, and Otherwise  
Increasing the Efficiency of the Steam Branch Personnel,' Royal United 
Service Institution 35, no. 156 (1891), 21. 
 
Looks, O. E. C., 'The Engine Room Staff of S.M.S. Seydlitz in the Battle of  
Skagerrack ' The Naval Review 10, no. 2 (1922), 307-17. 
 
'Para Bellum,' The Naval Review 30, no. 2 (1942), 117-9. 
 




Poseidon, 'In Bondage to Oil,' The Naval Review 16, no. 4 (1928), 769-75. 
 
'Re-Inventing the Wheel? Precis of Reports from Commissioners, Inspectors &  
Others 1877: Navy Engineers,' Journal of Naval Engineering 36, no. 1 
(1995), 125-39. 
 
Reynolds, S., 'Navy Discontents,' English Review 9 (1911), 11. 
 
Romans, E., 'The Internal Economy of the Royal Navy in the Twentieth 
Century,' Mariner's Mirror 94, no. 1 (2008), 79-88. 
 
'Russian Navy: The Armament and Equipment of the Fleet,' in The Russo- 
Japanese War Research Society, 2002). 
 
S.D.S., 'The Fuel of the Future?,' The Naval Review 23, no. 2 (1935), 333-40. 
 
Skelton, R. W., 'Coal Versus Oil for the Navy,' The Royal United Services  
Institution 79, no. 514 (1934), 18. 
 
Somerville, J. F., 'The Lower Deck, Past and Present,' The Royal United 
Services  Institute, 81, no. 522 (1936), 303-14.  
 
'Sunday in the Navy,' The Naval Review 9, no. 4 (1921), 619-21. 
 
'Sunday in the Navy,' The Naval Review 10, no. 1 (1922), 153-5. 
 
Suzuki, S. S.-G., Imperial Japanese Navy, 'Notes on Experiences During the 




Vale, B., 'The Conquest of Scurvy in the Royal Navy 1793-1800: A Challenge to  




Walton, O. C., 'Officers or Engineers? The Integration and Status of Engineers  
in the Royal Navy, 1847-60,' Historical Research 77, no. 196 (2004), 
178-201. 
 







Historic Dockyard Chatham 
 
Excerpt from Stoker First Class, Crowhurst, H.M.S. Leviathan, Chatham: (The 






Kennerley, A., 'Stoking the Boilers: Firemen and Trimmers in British Merchant  
Ships, 1850-1950,'  (University of Plymouth, 1996). 
 
Jones, M, 'The Making of the Royal Navy Officer Corps', (University of Exeter, 







Cunha, J. P., Heat Exhaustion and Heat Stroke WebMD, 2012 [cited 2 May  
2012]. Cited in http://www.emedicinehealth.com/heat exhaustion and 
heat stroke/article em.htm 
 




First World War-Royal New Zealand Navy, History Group of the New Zealand  
Ministry for Culture and Heritage, 2011 [cited 20 April 2012]. Cited in 
http://www.nzhistory.net.nz/war/royal-new-zealand-Navy/first-world-war. 
 




H. O. Prisons over Two Centuries Home Office, 1982 [cited 20 May 2012].  




Houterman, H., and Koppes, J., World War Two Unit Histories and Officers: 
British Army Officers 1939-1945, 2012 [cited 15 April 2012]. Cited in 
http://www.unithistories.com/officers/Army officers CO2.htm. 
 
 
Lamb, D., 1918-1930 Mutiny and Resistance in the Royal Navy [web site].  
libcom.org, 2005 [cited 8 January 2012]. Cited in  
http://libcom.org/library/mutinies-dave-lamb-solidarity  
 
Lord Charles Beresford Tribute to the Black Squad Lloyds Weekly News, 1912  
[cited 28 May 2012]. Cited in http://www.encyclopedia-titanica.org/black-
gang-tribute.html. 
 
Nova-online, Shackelton's Voyage of Endurance, 2002 [cited 15 August 2012]. 




Royal Commission on the Ancient and Historical Monuments of Scotland,  
Inchindown; Invergordon Oil Fuel Storage Tanks, 2011 [cited 27 
February 2012]. Cited in http://canmore.rcahms.gov.uk/en/event/ 
588220/. 
 












What Is C.O.P.D. US Department of Health and Human Services, 2011 [cited  









Groves, F. J., Audio-Cd of Memoirs, Sussex, 2005. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
